Could you expand upon this (or anyone else who happens to agree)? I'm genuinely curious. I have no philisophical knowledge of Witty at all. — emancipate
http://paulgraham.com/philosophy.htmlThe real lesson here is that the concepts we use in everyday life are fuzzy, and break down if pushed too hard. Even a concept as dear to us as 'I.' It took me a while to grasp this, but when I did it was fairly sudden, like someone in the nineteenth century grasping evolution and realizing the story of creation they'd been told as a child was all wrong. [2] Outside of math there's a limit to how far you can push words; in fact, it would not be a bad definition of math to call it the study of terms that have precise meanings. Everyday words are inherently imprecise. They work well enough in everyday life that you don't notice. Words seem to work, just as Newtonian physics seems to. But you can always make them break if you push them far enough.
I would say that this has been, unfortunately for philosophy, the central fact of philosophy. Most philosophical debates are not merely afflicted by but driven by confusions over words. Do we have free will? Depends what you mean by "free." Do abstract ideas exist? Depends what you mean by "exist."
Wittgenstein is popularly credited with the idea that most philosophical controversies are due to confusions over language. I'm not sure how much credit to give him. I suspect a lot of people realized this, but reacted simply by not studying philosophy, rather than becoming philosophy professors.. — Graham
Perhaps it's because I read mostly continental stuff, yet this doesn't seem like a unique vision. — emancipate
If you believe that we use language for the purpose of understanding each other, i.e. language is used to help us to understand one another, then you ought to reject the principle stated at 98 as false, and unsupportive of this premise. — Metaphysician Undercover
But if we accept the principle at 98, then we ought to accept what is implied by it, and that is that language may be used for any goals whatsoever, including cheating and deceit. — Metaphysician Undercover
The issue is whether or not language use is an activity which may be governed by principles of good and bad, morality. If it is, then there is a moral basis for the judgement of better (more perfect) or worse (less perfect) language use. If it is not, then any way of using language is just as good (perfect) as any other way. — Metaphysician Undercover
What do you think about (81 & 98), old? Is a fuzzy, imprecise, vague concept, which readily gives misunderstanding, just as "perfect" as a precisely defined mathematical concept? if so, how would you understand "perfect" in this context? — Metaphysician Undercover
Which "principle"? — Luke
To paraphrase §98, he says "it is clear that every sentence in our language ‘is in order as it is’." — Luke
Wittgenstein makes no mention of morality in the text. Why are you? — Luke
I read those passages as us being cautioned against projecting some kind of exact, quasi-mathematical meaning 'behind' language. The fact that we can ask Joe to elaborate on his 'feeling shitty' doesn't imply that his feeling-shittiness has some exact nature that we can approximate with arbitrary precision by talking about it long enough. Joe doesn't even know exactly (ideally, perfectly) what he means. He doesn't need to. Maybe he's explaining why he wants or does not want to walk in the park. — old
But when he says, at 98, that even the vaguest sentence has "perfect" order, isn't he saying exactly what you are saying that he is cautioning against? But instead of saying that the perfect order is something we seek with ideal languages such as mathematics and logic, he is saying that perfect order is already right there, in even the vaguest sentence. — Metaphysician Undercover
Thought is surrounded by a halo.—Its essence, logic, presents
an order, in fact the a priori order of the world: that is, the order of
possibilities, which must be common to both world and thought.
But this order, it seems, must be utterly simple. It is prior to all
experience, must run through all experience; no empirical cloudiness
or uncertainty can be allowed to affect it——It must rather be of the
purest crystal. But this crystal does not appear as an abstraction;
but as something concrete, indeed, as the most concrete, as it were the
hardest thing there is (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus No. 5.5563).
We are under the illusion that what is peculiar, profound, essential,
in our investigation, resides in its trying to grasp the incomparable
essence of language. That is, the order existing between the concepts
of proposition, word, proof, truth, experience, and so on. This order
is a super-order between—so to speak—super-concepts. Whereas, of
course, if the words "language", "experience", "world", have a use, it
must be as humble a one as that of the words "table", "lamp", "door".
98. On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language
'is in order as it is'. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal,
as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us.—On the
other hand it seems clear that where there is sense there must be perfect
order.——So there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence.
99. The sense of a sentence—one would like to say—may, of
course, leave this or that open, but the sentence must nevertheless
have a definite sense. An indefinite sense—that would really not be a
sense at all.—This is like: An indefinite boundary is not really a
boundary at all. Here one thinks perhaps: if I say "I have locked the
man up fast in the room—there is only one door left open"—then I
simply haven't locked him in at all; his being locked in is a sham.
One would be inclined to say here: "You haven't done anything at all".
An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as none.—But is that true?
100. "But still, it isn't a game, if there is some vagueness in the
rules".—But does this prevent its being a game?—"Perhaps you'll call
it a game, but at any rate it certainly isn't a perfect game." This means:
it has impurities, and what I am interested in at present is the pure
article.—But I want to say: we misunderstand the role of the ideal
in our language. That is to say: we too should call it a game, only we
are dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail to see the actual use of the
word "game" clearly. — Wittgenstein
Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither
explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view
there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no
interest to us.
One might also give the name "philosophy" to what is possible
before all new discoveries and inventions.
127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders
for a particular purpose.
128. If one tried to advance theses in philosophy, it would never
be possible to debate them, because everyone would agree to them.
129. The aspects of things that are most important for us are
hidden because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to
notice something—because it is always before one's eyes.) The real
foundations of his enquiry do not strike a man at all. Unless that fact
has at some time struck him.—And this means: we fail to be struck
by what, once seen, is most striking and most powerful. — W
You left out the word "perfect", he says that it has "perfect order". — Metaphysician Undercover
So "perfect" plays a very important role here. It is only by saying that language is already "perfect", as it is, even in the vaguest sentences, that he gets away from the notion that we are striving after some ideal perfection in language. — Metaphysician Undercover
"Perfect" implies without deficiency, faultless, — Metaphysician Undercover
I wouldn't make too much of 'perfect order.' Making too much of that little choice is perhaps to be 'dazzled by the ideal.' — old
Not necessarily. The "perfect" order Wittgenstein speaks of here has the sense of 'suitable', 'apt' or 'appropriate', rather than 'faultless', 'flawless' or 'ideal'. The same distinction that you made above — Luke
The terms you have proposed allow for the possibility of something better, or more complete, which "perfect" does not allow for. — Metaphysician Undercover
If Wittgenstein was using "perfect" in the way you suggest, it would not serve his purpose. His purpose is to demonstrate that we are not striving after an ideal language, perfection is already there, within our common, ordinary language. — Metaphysician Undercover
So if "perfect" here is anything less than the ideal, it does not serve the purpose because then we could still be striving after the ideal. It is crucial that "perfect" is equivalent (in value) to "ideal", in order to dismiss as unjustified, 'striving after the ideal'. — Metaphysician Undercover
Why should I accept your assertion that there is only one possible meaning of the word "perfect"? — Luke
That's right: the kind of perfection under discussion is already there within our ordinary language, but it is "perfect" in the sense of 'suitable', 'apt', or 'appropriate', rather than the ideal sense that you are attempting to stipulate. — Luke
This is true only if you stipulate that "perfect" must have the one (ideal) meaning. Whereas Wittgenstein is counselling the reader to abandon such a philosophical pursuit of sublime chimeras (§94). — Luke
As I explained, it doesn't matter how many possible meanings of "perfect" there are — Metaphysician Undercover
it is the only one that serves Wittgenstein's purpose, of dismissing 'striving for the ideal'. — Metaphysician Undercover
It does matter, because your whole argument hangs on the fallacious assumption that the word "perfect" must always mean "ideal". — Luke
Then I'll leave it to you to explain why you apparently believe that our ordinary vague sentences have not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language still has to be constructed by us. — Luke
You might think that we can either play the language-game for fun or play for keeps, and it would be better if we would all just play for fun and forget about playing for keeps. It doesn't matter who wins or loses, we're playing for fun. The problem though, is that in reality we all play for keeps, and that's why we continually strive to better ourselves (strive for the ideal). — Metaphysician Undercover
Ever see a chess player who says it doesn't matter which move I make, because any move is going to create a perfect order? The chess player strives for the ideal move. — Metaphysician Undercover
The point is that he uses "perfect". — Metaphysician Undercover
One might say that G.E. Moore is the one and only known example of Wittgensteinian man: unpuzzled by the world or science, puzzled only by the oddity of the sayings of philosophers, and sensibly reacting to that alleged oddity by very carefully, painstakingly and interminably examining their use of words. . . The philosophical job is to persuade us of the adequacy of ordinary conceptualisations. It is the story of Plato over again–only this time it is the philosopher’s job to lead us back into the cave. — Gellner
If I understand your analogy, are you saying that everyone is somehow trying to win the language game? — Luke
It seems like you want to knock Wittgenstein down, which is fine. But isn't it also valuable to understand his appeal? — old
What he criticized was the leap from often possible improvement to the postulation of some non-fuzzy kernel of meaning, an idea that tempts philosophers away from better uses of their time. — old
Those wrapped up in a game that depends on the non-fuzzy kernel (who think that some kind of superscience of meaning is possible) are naturally going to resist his project. — old
That the kernel is a fuzzy kernel is a cop-out, a refusal to acknowledge the reality of the situation, that there is no such thing as the kernel, and seeking the kernel is a lost enterprise. — Metaphysician Undercover
That's why you need to push Wittgenstein aside, look behind that door yourself, contemplate the kernel of meaning for yourself, and truly realize that there is no such thing. — Metaphysician Undercover
Not necessarily everyone is trying to win, but there are varying goals which people have behind their use of language. This is why it's a moral issue, because language serves as a means to achieving various goals. If it were an organized game, we'd all have the same goal, trying to win. — Metaphysician Undercover
So for instance, if we say that the purpose of language is for us to understand each other, then we can judge the vague or ambiguous sentence as a bad sentence because it is not conducive to understanding, and therefore not consistent with the designated purpose of language. — Metaphysician Undercover
But if we allow that language is sometimes for this purpose, sometimes for that purpose, and sometimes for another purpose, then we have no ideal by which to judge language use, and the goodness or badness of each instance of language use must be judged in relation to that particular purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover
The problem is that the particular purpose may itself be morally wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover
I might be trying to knock him down a few notches, but that's my approach to every philosopher, look for weaknesses as well as strengths, to me that's what philosophy is. And when it's a philosopher with high esteem, much appeal, the challenge is just as much to find the weaknesses as it is to understand the strengths. — Metaphysician Undercover
I agree (with reservations below), yet you write as if I'm purveying some theory of the non-fuzzy kernel. My position is roughly that it's not worth the trouble to try to create or appeal to a superscience of meaning. This is not to say that such a thing is impossible, for that would be to fall right back into linguistic metaphysics. Instead one can just market a different approach which is not justified in terms of the old approach. Just as a certain kind of atheist doesn't take the God issue seriously enough to debate about it, so an anti-profound 'Wittgensteinian' might no longer bother engaging in certain stripe of theorizing. — old
tend to agree, especially with pushing Wittgenstein aside. I quoted Graham to emphasize the possibility that the later Wittgenstein is something like a representative of ordinary wisdom who happened to make explicit within philosophy what others implied by not taking a certain kind of philosophy seriously in the first place. To sell Wittgenstein as a must-read guru looks like more linguistic metaphysics. If Wittgenstein is profound and difficult, then I increase my own status by translating him for the mystified. — old
As for realizing that there is no such thing, I mostly agree there too, but I'd be careful not to frame it as the result of a method (like a 'theologically' justified atheism.) — old
It is still entirely unclear what counts as 'winning' in this analogy, and you also didn't explain what you meant by "playing for keeps" in the context of a language game. Just a reminder, too, that not all games have the goal of winning (§66). — Luke
What purposes other than understanding do you mean? A lie is still understandable, isn't it? Likewise, jokes, stories, orders, reports, and all of the other language-games (or purposes of language-use) that Wittgenstein lists at §23 may be understood. To include understanding as a similar "purpose" of language appears to be a category error. — Luke
This is irrelevant. We are here to discuss Wittgenstein's philosophy, not yours. — Luke
Your examples here are called "kinds of use". They are not purposes of use. So for example, an order is a kind of use, but an order is done for a purpose, it is not the purpose itself. — Metaphysician Undercover
The purpose of the lie is to make the other person misunderstand what you are doing. — Metaphysician Undercover
The pushing aside is meant to have a look for yourself. If someone is guarding a door, and claiming there is nothing behind that door, so don't even bother trying to look, doesn't it make you want to have a look for yourself? — Metaphysician Undercover
You did not answer the question: What purposes other than understanding do you mean?
When is the purpose of language use "for us to understand each other"? If it is not always the purpose of language use, then what other purposes are you talking about? Provide an example.
According to you, a lie is a kind of use, it is not the purpose itself. — Luke
But not to make them misunderstand what I am saying. Otherwise, the lie would not fulfil its purpose. All that is relevant here (to §98) is understanding what is said. — Luke
Yeah, I'd want to look. The guard says it all. I just wanted present the anti-profound reading as a current favorite that I didn't already see on the thread. I'm always looking for better words, a slight further clarification. I'm glad I joined the conversation. — old
I gave you the example, misunderstanding. In deception the purpose, or goal is misunderstanding. — Metaphysician Undercover
If meaning is use, there is no such thing as "what I am saying", there is only "what I am doing". — Metaphysician Undercover
Now we need to create consistency between what is "good" morally, and what is "good" linguistically. — Metaphysician Undercover
If someone is guarding a door, and claiming there is nothing behind that door, so don't even bother trying to look, doesn't it make you want to have a look for yourself? — Metaphysician Undercover
A man will be imprisoned in a room with a door that's unlocked and opens inwards; as long as it does not occur to him to pull rather than push.
The danger in a long foreword is that the spirit of a book has to be evident in the book itself and cannot be described. For if a book has been written for just a few readers that will be clear just from the fact that only a few people understand it. The book must automatically separate those who understand it from those who do not. Even the foreword is written just for those who understand the book.
Telling someone something he does not understand is pointless, even if you add
that he will not be able to understand it. (That so often happens with someone you love.)
If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!
The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.
You're saying that there are only two "purposes" of language use: for understanding and for misunderstanding; for good and for evil? Yeah, okay. — Luke
First you say that there is no saying and only doing, but then you say that we need to create consistency between saying and doing. How do we create consistency between saying and doing if they are the same thing? — Luke
If I lie and tell you that "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" (when I am not ill) do you not understand what "I cannot attend your party today because I am ill" means? — Luke
Again, you need to understand what I am saying in order for a lie to fulfil its purpose (i.e. to lead you to "misunderstand what I am doing" - or however you describe it). — Luke
If you have a room which you do not want certain people to get into, put a lock on
it for which they do not have the key. But there is no point in talking to them about it,
unless of course you want them to admire the room from outside!
The honorable thing to do is to put a lock on the door which will be noticed only
by those who can open it, not by the rest.
I said we need to create consistency in what is determined as "good", so that the same thing would not be both good and bad.. — Metaphysician Undercover
No you do not understand. Because you do not understand what the speaker is doing with the words, you do not understand the use of the words in that instance. — Metaphysician Undercover
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