Just giving it back! — Noah Te Stroete

I am pretty sure that you were first to call someone's sex into question because they disagree with you.

Interesting. I will just let that stand as an insight into your sensibilities. — Noah Te Stroete

Take a trip to any political philosophy department at any Ivory League institution and describe what you see. Or just even compile a list of the most influential egalitarian thinkers. I'll spare you the suspense: You're gonna find copious amounts of white affluent males. Those who live in glass houses...

I’ve read arguments for laissez faire capitalism and for socialism. BOTH come from the ivory tower. I do not. BOTH are wrong-headed, except laissez faire capitalism philosophy is driven by selfishness of the capitalists, while socialist philosophy is driven by altruistic impulses. Like I said, both are wrong. — Noah Te Stroete

I think that you might be confusing "reading someone" and "psychoanalyzing someone".

Do you have an argument?

That fact isn't relevant to your original claim. You claimed that Capitalism is an "obviously desirable thing", and that those who oppose or "vehemently oppose" it are exclusively out-of-touch academics perched within their ivory towers. As I've shown, that's simply not true. There is sustained criticism and skepticism of Capitalism that exists across incomes and demographics. — Maw

This is of course not what I said. The fact that I said "misled by arguments" and not "progenitors of such arguments" makes it clear that I am not talking solely about ivory tower academics.

The inability to even grasp that we're talking about rival views calls into question the validity of an answer given by someone who harbors said inability.

I am pretty sure that you were first to call someone sex into question because they disagree with you. — Constrained Maximizer

It was a joke between friends. I apologize.

I think that you might be confusing "reading someone" and "psychoanalyzing someone". — Constrained Maximizer

One cannot critically read political philosophy without also taking into account motivations. Political philosophy deals with “ought” conclusions.

This is of course not what I said. The fact that I said "misled by arguments" and not "progenitors of such arguments" makes it clear that I am not talking solely about ivory tower academics. — Constrained Maximizer

Do you sincerely believe that adults making less than $30K annually are reading arguments laid out in the works of academics? Or do you think they are able to understand their own material conditions and see how Capitalism doesn't work in their favor? And what of Sanders' wide network of donors who live across America. Not going to let you circumvent that one.

The inability to even grasp that we're talking about rival views calls into question the validity of an answer given by someone who harbors said inability. — Constrained Maximizer

I've heard drunks ramble more cogently than this sentence.

Don’t pick on someone who is constrained by regulation to maximize his personal profits.

I've heard drunks ramble more cogently than this sentence. — Maw

Your reading comprehension deficiencies are most unfortunate, but no major concern (or fault) of mine.

Do you sincerely believe that adults making less than $30K annually are reading arguments laid out in the works of academics? Or do you think they are able to understand their own material conditions and see how Capitalism doesn't work in their favor? And what of Sanders' wide network of donors who live across America. Not going to let you circumvent that one. — Maw

Why are these people convinced that they're living under capitalism to begin with? Why not any other "ism" that one might throw around? Such views don't pop into existence out of thin air. You don't have to read the works of academics to be influenced by views that originate in the works of academics, so much should be fairly obvious.

You mean the completely unverifiable claim about Sanders' network of donors? You will excuse me if I don't find "Bernie said so" terribly convincing.

By the way, I wonder who was funding the Sanders Institute. And that, by contrast, is a question to which there is a definitive answer. Hint: Not exactly the meek and the poor.

https://nypost.com/2019/03/14/sanders-institute-suspends-operations-amid-criticism-over-donations/

I’m not a Sanders fan myself. He might have good motives, but his idealistic policies are never going to work. People don’t work that way. Libertarians are just as idealistic but with worse motives. People don’t work the way they think, either.

I wonder if Virgo isn’t actually an older white male billionaire? She’s certainly a cheerleader for their cause. — Noah Te Stroete

Virgo claims to be a cheerleader for the wealthy, but really acts toward removing the rights to ownership with anarchism. That's why I call it deception. No State, means no universal convention on property ownership, means the NAP is inapplicable. It's deception to circulate the NAP as if a billionaire's right to ownership would be respected without the State to support it. I think Virgo is seeking financing for the anarchist cause. Give to anarchism, we guarantee your property rights with the NAP, at a cost much less than taxes.

Why are these people convinced that they're living under capitalism to begin with? Why not any other "ism" that one might throw around? Such views don't pop into existence out of thin air. You don't have to read the works of academics to be influenced by views that originate in the works of academics, so much should be fairly obvious. — Constrained Maximizer

This is tortured reasoning. You just refuse to accept the fact that low income adults are capable of understanding how the socio-economic system they live in doesn't work in their favor.

You mean the completely unverifiable claim about Sanders' network of donors? You will excuse me if I don't find "Bernie said so" terribly convincing. — Constrained Maximizer

Individual donations made to presidential campaigns are required to be reported to the FEC, idiot.

Marx skewered the arguments typified in the original post over 150 years ago. "Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham" sound wonderful in abstract theory, but go underneath mere appearance - particularly within, in Marx's time, "Dark Satanic Mills", and in our time "communist governments", these libertarian arguments quickly fall apart.

Individual donations made to presidential campaigns are required to be reported to the FEC, idiot. — Maw

Donations under $200 don't have to be reported, so it's an unverifiable claim unless Sanders would be kind enough go willingly disclose the information. Check your facts before insulting anyone else, you utter nincompoop.

Your whole point was questioning whether or not the "meek and poor" were contributing to Sanders' campaign, or if shadowy big money was, and now you're getting fussy over contributions that are less than $200, you dumbass.

For the purposes of my argument, I have defined market failure as a situation wherein each individual acts correctly in his/her own interests, and the net result is to make (almost or absolutely) everybody worse off. One element of my argument is that such a phenomenon is a relative rarity in a system of private property and non-aggression. Both of the conditions are important: the NAP is senseless without a system of property (because, in the absence of ownership rights, ‘aggression’ cannot be recognised definitively as such), and private property is also important for avoiding the problems of market failure which plague a collective system of ownership. I understand ‘right-libertarianism’ to be the conjunction of these two principles (in distinction from, say, ‘left-libertarianism’, which upholds the latter but rejects the former).

If market failure is as I have defined it, then a system will successfully avoid market failure if, generally, individuals acting correctly in their own interests serves to improve their own situations as well as other peoples’, and does not make people substantially worse off than they would have been under some alternative system. I have provided a number of reasons for thinking that right-libertarianism satisfies these criteria.

I have argued that, since individuals tend to be best acquainted with their own situations, it is reasonable to expect people to do what is best for themselves if left to their own devices, rather than being forcibly coerced into living in a particular way, or being co-owned by everybody else. I know what is best for myself better than I do for any other person in this world, and I also know what is best for myself better than anybody else does, whether individually or collectively. I think that this principle is reasonable, and it stands in support of both private property and the NAP: private property, because ownership rights begin with the right to own one’s self, and the NAP, because I am more likely to know what is best for myself than someone who wishes to coerce me into living in a certain way. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is fair enough, and I have no problem accepting, at least in the context of this thread, your argument to this point.

I have also drawn attention to the nature of voluntary trade. Voluntary trade is win-win; the only way in which a trade can occur is if we each value what the other person has more than what we each presently have. Notice that this applies, not only in commercial ‘market-place’ situations, but for non-aggressive interactions in general. If you and I become friends, it is because you and I would each rather be friends than non-friends. This principle can be pushed very far, I think. Again, this serves as a vindication of both of our right-libertarian principles. ‘Trade’ cannot occur in a system of collective ownership, and therefore requires private ownership, and the NAP is that which secures the mutually beneficial result of the interaction (contrast this with an aggressive act, such as theft or murder). — Virgo Avalytikh

I think this is where my main problem lies. You are claiming that, in the grand scheme of things (ignoring fringe cases) any interaction that is not aggression - initiatory use of force, as you put it - is beneficial for everyone involved. The only way I can see this claim working is if you bend aggression to encompass a whole lot more than just the initiatory use of force. Even concerning the main example of trade, things aren't as clear cut as "everyone will only agree to things that are beneficial to them". Sure, if you engage in trade that means you value what is offered, but only insofar as it has value to you in your present circumstances. If your present circumstance are that you are starving, you might sell your house for a loaf of bread. This is an extreme example, but people are definetly in differing bartering positions, and that will how beneficial the trades are. There are also all kinds of other factors from outright fraud to misinformation, from addiction to brand loyalty. There is plenty of room to enrich yourself to the detriment of others without resorting to force.

Then we get into things like labor or housing and the whole "win-win" claim breaks down further. There are lots of examples, both past and present, of people being locked in an exploitative situation without any clear way out. You may not always be able to look for "better conditions" elsewhere if you have mouths to feed, an illness or are simply too poor to move.

And if we want to push the NAP even farther, we get into things like pollution, usage of scarce resources, long-term environmental damages and there is simply no ground to stand on. Who is going to decide, and on what basis, what level of environmental degradation constitutes an "aggression" towards your neighbors, for example?

Third, I drew attention to the way in which private property rights tend to eliminate the market failure problems inherent in a collective system of ownership. Collective ownership tends towards market failure for numerous reasons, but one reason is that no individual is personally responsible for that which is owned. In a system of collective ownership, an individual who puts that which is owned collectively to profitable use may not receive the profits him/herself, instead losing most of it to the central pot. An individual who does not put that which is owned collectively to profitable use is negligibly worse off than he would have been otherwise, and enjoys far more leisure. This becomes more and more the case as the scale of collective ownership increases.

Not so under private ownership. A private owner who puts his property to profitable use receives that profit, and bears the cost (e.g. forgone profit) if he does not. Moreover, unlike collectivist situations, markets have an astonishing capacity to function on a scale that is simply dizzying (I strongly recommend Leonard Read’s short essay, ‘I, Pencil’, which illustrates this point marvellously). Not only is private property important, but of course the NAP is a vital ingredient here, too. That I bear the profits and costs of doing what I want with what I own presupposes that I am not subject to predatory aggression.

Contrast all of this with Friedman’s observation in my opening argument, that virtually everybody in the political realm take decisions whose costs and benefits go to others. The differences are striking and, to me at least, impressive (which is why I am an anarcho-capitalist). — Virgo Avalytikh

But Anarcho-Capitalism and collective ownership are not the sum-total of economic systems. There are plenty of different ideas for free-market socialism, for example, that do non advocate fully collective ownership or a more powerful state than the current one.

If a right is something of ‘higher order’ than individual persons, and if collective entities (like States) are, ontologically speaking, nothing above and beyond the individuals which comprise them, then States are no more capable of creating or bestowing rights than anyone else. — Virgo Avalytikh

Ontologically speaking, a state is nothing other than an idea, something inside someone's head. However, the parliament, the agencies and all their employees are real enough. It used to be that people had a higher authority by divine providence, now the idea is that we hand it to them by voting. The point is that everyone agrees that there is a higher order above the individuals, and that that higher order is actually effective in practice.

I am not sure what this means. I can enforce my own rights (by defending myself against an aggressor), a friend can help me to do so, and a private service-provider can help me do so as well. Why can't I pay someone to enforce my rights, or help me to do so? — Virgo Avalytikh

If you pay someone explicitly to enforce your rights, sure. But who would do that if they could pay someone to enforce their interests instead?

You'e rude, your reading comprehension skills are atrocious, and you're a fucking moron to boot. Good grief.

If my grandpa steals all your land then leaves it to me in his will, would you and the courts be the aggressors when you try to get your land back? I didn't do anything wrong? — ZhouBoTong

Well, this is a different case from the original one, so the result may well be different. There is no reason, from a libertarian perspective, why I should be culpable for an act of murder that somebody else committed, and the fact that the murderer just happens to be the parent of the person who just happens to be the parent of me doesn’t change this fact. Murder is the act of a personal agent, and I am not the personal agent who committed it. So any retributive force that is implemented against me is initiatory, and is in violation of the NAP.

If my grandfather steals property from somebody, he is not the rightful owner. He therefore has no rightful basis to bestow it upon anyone else. I, perhaps an innocent beneficiary, do not own it rightfully so long as the rightful owner (let’s say, the person from whom it was stolen) is alive, or some clearly identifiable heir (like, for instance, someone to whom the theft-victim left all his worldly possessions upon his death). If there is no clearly identifiable heir, then it is essentially unowned, and therefore free to be appropriated by a new person. No doubt this will appear rather ad hoc, but it is in fact the natural outworking of a system of Lockean private property theory and can be found explored at some length in Rothbard’s ‘The Ethics of Liberty’, which I posted above.

I disagree (how is the trespassing MORE aggressive than the ownership?). — ZhouBoTong

Because ‘ownership’ is not per se aggressive. Indeed, since the question of whether a given instance of force is initiatory or defensive is determined by who owns what, there must be a system of property in place before ‘aggression’ is possible. I made this point in more detail above:

“‘Aggression’ is not a property which inheres in an action; it is a relation of an action to a specific (property) right. Consider something ostensibly aggressive, such as my punching you in the face. Does this constitute an act of ‘aggression’? That depends. Perhaps we have both signed up for a boxing match. Perhaps we are acting and this is part of the scene. Or consider something ostensibly innocuous, like simply standing. Is this aggression? Again, it depends. If I am standing in my own living room, then probably not. If I am trespassing in your living room, and have been asked to leave, then yes. To say of any particular action that it is ‘aggressive’ presupposes a background schema of rights. Therefore, rights are a precondition of aggression. Therefore, declaring a right of ownership in the first instance cannot be aggression. That is to put the cart before the horse.”

OK, we can probably all agree that there ought to be a system of property rights, but this doesn't make such a convention magically appear. But the NAP, as described by you, presupposes the existence of such a system. So it is the NAP which ought to be thrown away, because its principal prerequisite does not exist. Once convention on property rights is established, then we might decide whether something like the NAP is called-for. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a leap being made here, and I do not make it with you. You seem to be saying, ‘We need to establish a universal convention of property rights first, and only then can we start talking about the NAP.’ The relative priority of a system of property rights, and the relative posteriority of the NAP, is a relation that is logical, not temporal. The NAP does not ‘come along later’; it is implementable (and should be implemented) synchronically with the system of property upon which it (logically) depends. There’s no reason to hold off on talk of the NAP until later. No reason – that is – unless the NAP poses a threat one’s own position.

Alright, so let us say that ‘being good’ is a logical precondition of ‘not acting aggressively’. Does this mean that we cannot even have a discussion about the worthiness of non-aggression, until we have got a suitable number of people in the world to be good? I don’t see why. We can develop a system of thought with numerous logical steps, before we seek practically to implement the first, or before we have successfully done so. Of course we may.

But you have been proposing a completely different angle, one in which the State has been abolished. At this point, there are no rights, that's the important point which you do not seem to be grasping. At this point we cannot say "rights determine the acceptable use of force" because there are no rights, the revolt is against the State which is the support of the existing rights. — Metaphysician Undercover

Again, a complete non sequitur. That the State is the only possible ‘source’ of rights has not yet been justified. Indeed, that the State even can be a ‘source’ of rights has not been justified. It is simply assumed. There is nothing special or mystical about States. They are associations of human individuals, who hold a successful monopoly on the use of force over a historically arbitrary territory. And this leads into another point which ought to be clarified: I do not begin with an opposition to Statism. That is an incidental consequence of libertarianism. It is because the State exists in violation of the NAP that it is objectionable.

You begin in the opposite direction. You begin with the State, taking for granted both its legitimacy and its necessity, as well as affording it the unique privilege of rights-bestower, and from these assumptions you take it that the libertarian alternative is impossible. But this is not convincing. Rights are principles, abstractions, and to leave the question of which rights are worth recognising, and which are not, to the State is simply un-philosophical. It is nothing short of ‘might makes right’.

I think this is where my main problem lies. You are claiming that, in the grand scheme of things (ignoring fringe cases) any interaction that is not aggression - initiatory use of force, as you put it - is beneficial for everyone involved. The only way I can see this claim working is if you bend aggression to encompass a whole lot more than just the initiatory use of force. Even concerning the main example of trade, things aren't as clear cut as "everyone will only agree to things that are beneficial to them". Sure, if you engage in trade that means you value what is offered, but only insofar as it has value to you in your present circumstances. If your present circumstance are that you are starving, you might sell your house for a loaf of bread. This is an extreme example, but people are definetly in differing bartering positions, and that will how beneficial the trades are. There are also all kinds of other factors from outright fraud to misinformation, from addiction to brand loyalty. There is plenty of room to enrich yourself to the detriment of others without resorting to force. — Echarmion

If you take issue with my thesis that voluntary trade works for mutual benefit, then what I would expect you to do is to provide a counter-instance. But the example you have given actually isn’t. If you trade away a house for a loaf of bread, it is because you value the loaf of bread more than you value the house. You are better off for having made the trade rather than not having made it. This is perfectly compatible with what I have argued. I have not made the claim that both parties are going to be in position of equal negotiating strengths (not least because I haven’t the faintest idea how ‘negotiating strength’ could be quantified in units). I have only argued that, if our interaction be peaceful rather than coercive, we are both better off for it.

This analysis is true, but makes no claim to comprehensiveness. Being in the position of having to sell one’s house for bread is regrettable, but I would simply say this of it: if you want to help the poor, what you certainly should not do is look at the option that they have actually chosen, and deprive them of that option (advice from which a good many legislators would benefit).

Fraud (and misinformation, if it be relevantly fraudulent) is prohibited under the NAP (it is really just a form of theft). As for addiction and brand loyalty, these are not counter-instances to my thesis, either. The addict who pays for heroin values the heroin more than the money. Just so with the brand-loyalist, and the particular brand of something (heroin?) to which he is eccentrically attached. Value is a subjective relation; different people value different things differently (trade could not occur except on this basis). You might think that my commercial decisions are poor, but you aren’t the one making them.

It is perhaps worth clarifying: when I speak of mutual benefit, I am speaking from an ex ante rather than ex post perspective (this is an important distinction when trying to understand the rationality axiom in Austrian economics). Voluntary trade is mutually beneficial because we both enter into a transaction with the anticipation of personal benefit. It is possible that our preferences may change after the transaction and we regret our decisions.

And if we want to push the NAP even farther, we get into things like pollution, usage of scarce resources, long-term environmental damages and there is simply no ground to stand on. Who is going to decide, and on what basis, what level of environmental degradation constitutes an "aggression" towards your neighbors, for example? — Echarmion

Why ‘no ground to stand on’? There would be rights-enforcement and dispute-resolution services in a voluntary society; they would simply be private competing firms rather than an agency of monopolistic coercion. The question ‘Where does negligible pollution end and meaningful damage to property begin?’ is a difficult question, but not for distinctively libertarian reasons. Whatever answer one gives is no more or less arbitrary in a Stateless or Statist society. Practically, it would be determined by whichever arbitrator settles a dispute if it came to it. Any court – Statist or private – must draw the line, and that line will no doubt disappoint some people. So this isn’t a ‘libertarian’ problem.

However, a virtue of the private justice system is that it is polylegal. It may be that A and B take their dispute to one arbitrator, and A and C take their dispute to a different arbitrator. ‘Law’ is simply a function of dispute-resolution administered by the arbitrator. So there is no need for a ‘one size fits all’ solution. Multiple crossing lines of legal rules may apply over a single territory, which is of course far more conducive to the satisfaction of justice-consumers than a single set of legal rules being imposed uniformly over an arbitrary territory.

But Anarcho-Capitalism and collective ownership are not the sum-total of economic systems. There are plenty of different ideas for free-market socialism, for example, that do non advocate fully collective ownership or a more powerful state than the current one. — Echarmion

This is true enough. But the observations I made about private property, communal property and the State, and their relative tendencies towards market failures, are true regardless of scale (though, the problems associated with communal property and the State become more and more prevalent as the scale increases).

Ontologically speaking, a state is nothing other than an idea, something inside someone's head. However, the parliament, the agencies and all their employees are real enough. It used to be that people had a higher authority by divine providence, now the idea is that we hand it to them by voting. The point is that everyone agrees that there is a higher order above the individuals, and that that higher order is actually effective in practice. — Echarmion

An ‘idea’ does not have agency. If the State is nothing more than an ‘idea’ then it cannot engage in concrete instances of purposeful action. ‘Ideas’ cannot tax, or implement justice, let alone bestow rights. The things we refer to as States are human associations, (the members of) which act in ways that are impermissible for non-States. I still do not see what is supposed to be so special about a State that it has unique right-bestowing capabilities. This has not been made clear at all.

If you pay someone explicitly to enforce your rights, sure. But who would do that if they could pay someone to enforce their interests instead? — Echarmion

I’m sorry, I’m not being difficult. I just really don’t understand what you’re getting at here.

Again I'm responding very late to the discussion, this time starting from page 4 and then commenting the later debate.

Hatred really has nothing to do with anything. I don’t ‘hate’ the State. I am opposed principally to aggression for philosophical reasons, and the State is an agency of monopolised aggression.

But you do see the difference between property (that can be owned by many) and your body.
— ssu

Yes, I do. — Virgo Avalytikh

Then your body, your liberty isn't property in the similar way and cannot be explained in the same way as something that's value is defined by the market and can be sold and bought (and I don't mean here people selling services). And when you look just what Murray Rothbard said about the 'libertarian creed', this difference is quite evident even from your quote from Rothbard:

This is Murray Rothbard, prolific libertarian theorist and the first anarcho-capitalist:

The libertarian creed rests upon one central axiom: that no man or group of men may aggress against the person or property of anyone else. This may be called the “nonaggression axiom.” “Aggression” is defined as the initiation of the use or threat of physical violence against the person or property of anyone else. Aggression is therefore synonymous with invasion. — Virgo Avalytikh

This 'central axiom' is quite clearly a social insititution, a very collective axiom, a general law accepted collectively. And any individual thinking that he or she doesn't have to abide with this 'central axiom', or that this creed limits his or her freedoms (like enslaving other people) obviously will not be tolerated. And this DOES make it blurred, even if you deny it. Because typically a state is there to uphold exactly these kinds of freedoms.

Hence Metaphyisician Undercover makes this argument:

You disavow the State, which gives a system of property rights, but at the same time you presuppose a system of property rights. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because what else other is the state as an collective effort of it's citizens? People that adhere to the "libertarian creed" do form in a way a proto-state themselves. If they enforce collectively this creed, what is so different of them acting as a state? Or is the thinking here so naive that states just 'exist' and are formed from people who get their salaries from the 'state', hence occupy a governmental position?

I would say that a major task of political philosophy is to determine in a reasoned way what kinds of conventions in relations to property are worth recognising and which are not. — Virgo Avalytikh

And this is basically what a state does...

The fact that there are differences of opinion on this question is not to say that there are not or could not be such conventions; it simply requires us to do the hard work that political philosophers do. Moreover, to say that, because one is a Statist, one simply doesn't have any basis on which to conduct such a discussion, is completely unwarranted and not convincing. — Virgo Avalytikh

Again this hatred of 'statism', which you deny to have, which I don't know where it comes. So 'philosophers' can thinking about 'political philosophy', but if they reach some universal agreement (or close to it), they wouldn't be... politicians?

That the State is the only possible ‘source’ of rights has not yet been justified. — Virgo Avalytikh

And just who is saying that?

Then your body, your liberty isn't property in the similar way and cannot be explained in the same way as something that's value is defined by the market and can be sold and bought (and I don't mean here people selling services). — ssu

Self-ownership is a sub-species of ownership in general. My right of ownership over my self is more basic than other forms of ownership, as it is a precondition of them, and it is also not the result of any productive or commercial activity. So there is a difference. But they are both ownership rights of some kind.

Because what else is the state as an collective effort of it's citizens? People that adhere to the "libertarian creed" do form in a way a proto-state themselves. If they enforce collectively this creed, what is so different of them acting as a state? — ssu

A State is an association of persons who hold a successful monopoly on the use of force over a geographical territory. Whether there is more to it (and there may well be), it is not helpful to simply use ‘State’ as a stand-in for any obtaining social organisational principle. States are agencies of force, force that is wielded at the behest of some (historically, a monarch or ruling class) against others. It can never be ‘representative’ of the people as a whole, for precisely this reason. Even if it is notionally ‘democratic’, the logic of predation (as Michael Huemer aptly calls its) is such that, in a Statist society, there will always be winners and losers, exploiters and exploited. This is what the initiation of force results in.

To address your argument head-on, one important feature which distinguishes States from non-States is that the States of our acquaintance engage in activities which would be clearly impermissible if a non-State agent were to act similarly. If I were to ‘tax’ people this would be theft/extortion, if I were to raise my own army and engage in acts of war this would be terrorism, and so on. States violate the NAP. They initiate force and invade property. Supposing that ‘Ancapistan’ is ushered in and a voluntary society is realised – one in which private property and the right not to be aggressed against are observed – there would be nothing like what we now know as a ‘State’. If you use ‘State’ simply to stand in for ‘any situation in which individuals organise themselves in some way’, then I suppose you could describe anything other than a Hobbesian state of nature a ‘Statist’ society. But I do not use the term in this way, and I do not think that it is at all a conventional or helpful usage.

So 'philosophers' can thinking about 'political philosophy', but if they reach some universal agreement (or close to it), they wouldn't be... politicians? — ssu

Again, not in anything like the ordinary sense in which we use this term. I am (humbly) a political philosopher. I am not a politician. I really hope we don't go down an interminable semantic road where these terms are given non-standard meanings and the goal-posts are shifted ad hoc. Please, let's not do that.

And just who is saying that? — ssu

Virtually everybody? I don’t begrudge your not reading the entire thread (I haven’t). But if you do, you will see what I mean. It is an unwarranted assumption being made tacitly left, right and centre. It is the number-one philosophical prejudice that I am gradually trying to gnaw away at.

A State is an association of persons who hold a successful monopoly on the use of force over a geographical territory. — Virgo Avalytikh

By that definition Syria isn't a state.

Whether there is more to it (and there may well be), it is not helpful to simply use ‘State’ as a stand-in for any obtaining social organisational principle. — Virgo Avalytikh

Why not? Especially when looking at history this divide becomes very problematic. How do you define a tribal community? These communities surely did have laws of their own and could be very advanced.

States are agencies of force, force that is wielded at the behest of some (historically, a monarch or ruling class) against others. It can never be ‘representative’ of the people as a whole, for precisely this reason. Even if it is notionally ‘democratic’, — Virgo Avalytikh

And what does the libertarian society with the 'libertarian creed' do to enforce this creed? Or it isn't needed to be enforced?

If I were to ‘tax’ people this would be theft/extortion, — Virgo Avalytikh

And what's the difference between a tax and a payment for services, especially if you provide me a service I need?

Virtually everybody? I don’t begrudge your not reading the entire thread (I haven’t). But if you do, you will see what I mean. It is an unwarranted assumption being made tacitly left, right and centre. It is the number-one philosophical prejudice that I am gradually trying to gnaw away at. — Virgo Avalytikh

I have to remind you of the definition of statism:

a political system in which the state has substantial centralized control over social and economic affairs.

Now what I don't understand is that you are talking about just this 'Statist' nations and seem not to show any interest or accept even the possibility that the state wouldn't have 'substantial centralized control' over social affairs and the economy. That those classically liberal/libertarian elements are there in many countries curtailing the power of the state. A lot of people simply don't think that all countries are so centralized. In my view a Statist nation was the old Soviet Union, which I had the opportunity to visit just when it was falling apart. Western countries simply aren't similar to Soviet Union.

Why not? Especially when looking at history this divide becomes very problematic. How do you define a tribal community? These communities surely did have laws of their own. — ssu

A tribal society may or may not have a State; it would depend on how it is structured. I don’t know if you are using ‘tribe’ in a vague way, or if you have a specific kind of social/political structure in mind. It may well be difficult to determine just where non-States end and States begin, but there is certainly a meaningful distinction between States and non-States. I am not a State, and my scrabble club is not a State. There must be certain distinguishing characteristics which distinguish States from non-States, and I have attempted to draw attention to some of them (most notably force, monopoly and territorial sovereignty). The fact that a society has law does not make it a Statist society: law can exist under anarcho-capitalism as a function of dispute-resolution provided by private competing firms. But such a society would still be Stateless (hence: ‘anarcho’).

And what does the libertarian society with the 'libertarian creed' do to enforce this creed. Or it isn't needed to be enforced? — ssu

Yes, it may, must and would be enforced. The important point to note here is that the NAP applies equally to everyone, everyone should be subject to it, and anyone should be able to enforce it. But the State is an aggressor, which reserves for itself (coercively) monopolistic privileges. This is where the difference lies. It violates the NAP, and uses force to reserve for itself the monopolistic privilege to do so.

And what's the difference between a tax and a payment for services, especially if you provide me a service I need? — ssu

Taxation is a confiscationary levy, meaning that it is implemented under the threat of force. It is implemented whether or not I consent to it, whether or not I receive a service (e.g. redistributive taxation) and whether or not I even approve of that which tax revenue goes on to fund (war). It is not the same thing as payment made for services rendered, on the basis of a peacefully negotiated contract. One is an act of aggression, and one is an act of peaceful voluntarism.

Now what I don't understand is that you are talking about just this 'Statist' nations and seem not to show any interest or accept even the possibility that the state wouldn't have 'substantial centralized control' over social affairs and the economy. That those classically liberal/libertarian elements are there in many countries curtailing the power of the state. A lot of people simply don't think that all countries are so centralized. I think that af Statist nation was the old Soviet Union, which I had the opportunity to visit just when it was falling apart. Western countries simply aren't similar to Soviet Union. — ssu

‘Substantial’ isn’t nearly refined enough to get any philosophical purchase on it. All major States of my acquaintance have ‘substantial’ control by the standards of the classical liberals. The United States government, that bastion of capitalism (apparently), has its money supply and interest rate determined centrally, and has (without exaggeration) recognised a good half of the stipulations of the communist manifesto, from government-controlled education to the inheritance tax. States which reserve for themselves monopolistic privileges and maintain this monopoly by force (which is what they all do; otherwise, we couldn’t tell them apart from non-States) already have ‘substantial’ control.

What is more, 'limited government' is utopian. Once a government exists, its growth is inevitable. There are good reasons for this, and Michael Huemer's 'The Problem of Political Authority' explores them quite well (ch. 9).

I think we need a real world example of how anarcho-libertarianism would work. How would it deal with hate speech, radicalization on the Internet, leading to terrorism?

Because ‘ownership’ is not per se aggressive. — Virgo Avalytikh

Haha. Because 'trespassing' is not per se aggressive? (I am just standing there). I get that that libertarians would respond:

“‘Aggression’ is not a property which inheres in an action; it is a relation of an action to a specific (property) right. Consider something ostensibly aggressive, such as my punching you in the face. Does this constitute an act of ‘aggression’? That depends. Perhaps we have both signed up for a boxing match. Perhaps we are acting and this is part of the scene. Or consider something ostensibly innocuous, like simply standing. Is this aggression? Again, it depends. If I am standing in my own living room, then probably not. If I am trespassing in your living room, and have been asked to leave, then yes. To say of any particular action that it is ‘aggressive’ presupposes a background schema of rights. Therefore, rights are a precondition of aggression. Therefore, declaring a right of ownership in the first instance cannot be aggression. That is to put the cart before the horse.” — Virgo Avalytikh

one of my best friends is libertarian. I have had these arguments for dozens (hundreds) of hours. This paragraph above is just rhetoric (as is most of what I am saying of course).

I am not trying to say libertarians are wrong (I think they are, but so what), just questioning the certainty of their convictions.

I think this is where my main problem lies. You are claiming that, in the grand scheme of things (ignoring fringe cases) any interaction that is not aggression - initiatory use of force, as you put it - is beneficial for everyone involved. The only way I can see this claim working is if you bend aggression to encompass a whole lot more than just the initiatory use of force. — Echarmion

That's right, that's why I mentioned to Virgo other forms of aggression, aggressive sales and aggressive trading on the market. When we are confronted with such "aggressions" we often make mistakes in our decisions. And these mistakes result in trades which are not mutually beneficial.

There is a leap being made here, and I do not make it with you. You seem to be saying, ‘We need to establish a universal convention of property rights first, and only then can we start talking about the NAP.’ — Virgo Avalytikh

This is your claim not mine, the NAP "presupposes" a system of property rights. Therefore there needs to be a universally accepted system of property rights before the NAP can have any merit. Otherwise the NAP is useless because it would be applied differently according to different conventions of property rights. This is obvious. I am just following the logic of your claims. The NAP refers directly to the right to ownership. You have stated this clearly. But if what I believe is my right to ownership is different from what you believe is your right to ownership, we would each apply the NAP differently. So the NAP would be meaningless in this case, useless. And when the land is full of people claiming that you have no right to ownership of what you claim to own, the NAP does nothing for you.

Alright, so let us say that ‘being good’ is a logical precondition of ‘not acting aggressively’. Does this mean that we cannot even have a discussion about the worthiness of non-aggression, until we have got a suitable number of people in the world to be good? I don’t see why. We can develop a system of thought with numerous logical steps, before we seek practically to implement the first, or before we have successfully done so. Of course we may. — Virgo Avalytikh

Sure we can discuss such things, but what force does a discussion impose upon our actions if we fail to agree with one another? When we discuss things and fail to agree, we will each retreat and resort to our own means. Since we haven't agreed on property rights, the NAP could not be relevant.

Again, a complete non sequitur. That the State is the only possible ‘source’ of rights has not yet been justified. Indeed, that the State even can be a ‘source’ of rights has not been justified. It is simply assumed. There is nothing special or mystical about States. They are associations of human individuals, who hold a successful monopoly on the use of force over a historically arbitrary territory. And this leads into another point which ought to be clarified: I do not begin with an opposition to Statism. That is an incidental consequence of libertarianism. It is because the State exists in violation of the NAP that it is objectionable. — Virgo Avalytikh

We've been through this already. I don't claim "the State" as the source of rights. I thought we agreed on "convention". But the State upholds the conventions with the means of force when necessary. Notice I say "when necessary". The majority of conventions are upheld by the State without the use of force, through institutions, because we readily agree to them. But without the State we do not have the institutions, nor the means to uphold the conventions, and the conventions fall apart. "State" and "conventions" co-exist.

That the State violates the NAP is simply an indication that the NAP places the right of ownership higher up in the hierarchy of rights, than the conventions which the State is bound to uphold places that right. The State upholds a multitude of rights, and there is a hierarchy of rights which itself is conventional. That the right to private ownership is limited, restricted, even forfeited in some cases, because other rights are of greater importance, according to the conventions which the State is bound to uphold, is evidence that the NAP is not a good principle. Why ought the right to private ownership be given such priority when the conventions which are presently accepted, and upheld by the state, assign a lesser priority to this right? The State can force one to give up ownership (fines) when that individual has committed offences not covered by the NAP. Clearly there is reason to believe that some rights ought to take priority over property rights. In this case the State is right in forcing one to give up one's property. Valuing private property higher than what is provided for in the conventional hierarchy of rights, validates the use of force against oneself, in contravention of the NAP.

You begin in the opposite direction. You begin with the State, taking for granted both its legitimacy and its necessity, as well as affording it the unique privilege of rights-bestower, and from these assumptions you take it that the libertarian alternative is impossible. But this is not convincing. Rights are principles, abstractions, and to leave the question of which rights are worth recognising, and which are not, to the State is simply un-philosophical. It is nothing short of ‘might makes right’ — Virgo Avalytikh

No. this is not all what I've been arguing.

If you take issue with my thesis that voluntary trade works for mutual benefit, then what I would expect you to do is to provide a counter-instance. — Virgo Avalytikh

I've already given you examples of such, aggressive sales, and aggressive trading. They refer to the means by which one takes advantage of another in business transactions. If one takes advantage of the other, yet it is not fraud, you cannot call this "mutual advantage". Are you not familiar with these terms?

These are fair questions, though I would hasten to point out that libertarianism does not present itself as a structural model by which to organise a society. It is a set of principles which are considered to be just and, if recognised, can reasonably be expected to make the world a better place relative to its alternatives (as per my opening argument). To ask a question like ‘What would libertarianism do about x’ is therefore slightly wrong-headed, since libertarianism is not a recipe for how to organise ourselves; it is a fairly modest set of principles, on the basis of which we may then choose to organise ourselves. The limits of what a libertarian world could look like are the limits of human imagination and ingenuity, operating within the framework of private property and non-aggression.

With this in mind, I really do not know enough about the internet to offer a quick-fix ‘solution’ to the problem of online radicalisation. As regards the principle of it, I would point out that online radicalisation of a kind that results in terrorism is essentially conspiracy to murder, and is prohibited under the NAP. How these particular aggressors would be dealt with is beyond the expertise of a recluse like me (analogously, I know the world is a better place where people are free to manufacture computers, but I haven’t any idea how to build one myself).

Speech is easier. ‘Hate speech’ is not a helpful category, at least when it comes to the question of rights. The right to ‘free speech’, just like all rights, is really just an ownership right: the right to do as one likes with one’s own property. There is no such thing as an unqualified ‘right to free speech’; your right to say what you want to say is always qualified by the property in relation to which you are standing. If you are sitting in your own house, your right to ‘free speech’ is nothing other than the right to use your property as you see fit. If you are sitting in my house, and you engage in speech which I dislike, and I tell you that you must leave if you continue, your right to ‘free speech’ is limited by the limitations that I have placed upon the use of my property. If you continue with this speech against my wishes, you have made yourself a trespasser and are now in violation of the NAP. It may surprise some people, then, to discover that libertarianism does not imply free-speech absolutism.

Haha. Because 'trespassing' is not per se aggressive? (I am just standing there). — ZhouBoTong

No, trespassing is aggressive, and prohibited under the NAP. Notice that ‘trespass’ presupposes property rights. I am trespassing on someone’s land because it is their land. If the land were unowned, or owned by me, it would not be trespass. This is actually rather a tidy illustration of what I have just argued.

This is your claim not mine, the NAP "presupposes" a system of property rights. Therefore there needs to be a universally accepted system of property rights before the NAP can have any merit. Otherwise the NAP is useless because it would be applied differently according to different conventions of property rights. This is obvious. I am just following the logic of your claims. — Metaphysician Undercover

I thought we had come to the agreement together that the NAP presupposes property. After I drew attention to the fact that this is universally acknowledged among libertarian theorists (the NAP being a libertarian principle, after all), I thought this was an agreement we had reached. Is this not so? My claim, in any case, is that the dependence relationship between the NAP and a system of property rights is one that is logical and not temporal, so I am not committed to holding off on ‘NAP-talk’ until after I have successfully realised a particular system of property rights in the world.

The NAP refers directly to the right to ownership. You have stated this clearly. But if what I believe is my right to ownership is different from what you believe is your right to ownership, we would each apply the NAP differently. So the NAP would be meaningless in this case, useless. And when the land is full of people claiming that you have no right to ownership of what you claim to own, the NAP does nothing for you. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is true, different people may have different conventions regarding rights. I responded to this point here:

Moreover, the fact that there may be diverse conventions with regards to rights does imply that all conventions are created equal. Some systems of rights are good and worthy, and some are not. This is where political philosophy has a role to play. By the same token, the fact that one system of rights might be recognised as ‘conventional’ does not imply that there is not a better system of rights that we might choose to employ.

I might believe that I have a rightful property claim to x because I traded for it peacefully with somebody else. You might believe that you have a rightful property claim to x because it is a full moon tonight, and on a full moon all x’s automatically pass to you. We may disagree, and it may come to blows. But this does not mean that our respective claims are equally reasonable, implementable, liberty-conducive or prosperity-conducive.

Moreover, I am not sure to what extent Statism is supposed to solve such a problem. You and I may both exist in the same Statist society and have differing views regarding what constitutes a rightful property claim. The only sense in which a State may be said to ‘solve’ such a disagreement, as far as I can see, is simply by picking a winner, and enforcing a single system of rights upon everyone. But there is nothing to say that this system of rights is just, or reasonable, or generally agreeable. Indeed, it seldom is. It may choose in favour of my claim, or yours, and the ‘winner’ is simply the one which the State chooses to enforce. But there is nothing philosophical about it, nothing reasoned. Everything is settled by the arbitrary use of force. It is the view of Thrasymachus in The Republic: ‘justice’ is just the advantage of the stronger.

It is just not altogether clear what you mean by ‘State’, nor what kind of philosophical work the State is doing in your argument. The arguments you are attempting to level against libertarianism can only be successful if the State solves the problems you raise. But I am still in the dark as to how it is supposed to do so. Can you explain? As things stand, the work the State seems to be doing is to enforce one particular system of property rights upon everyone (within its territory, that is). But whether that system is the right one remains to be seen.

We've been through this already. I don't claim "the State" as the source of rights. I thought we agreed on "convention". But the State upholds the conventions with the means of force when necessary. Notice I say "when necessary". The majority of conventions are upheld by the State without the use of force, through institutions, because we readily agree to them. But without the State we do not have the institutions, nor the means to uphold the conventions, and the conventions fall apart. "State" and "conventions" co-exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

But if the State is not the source of conventions, and conventions can and do exist independently of the State, and if conventions can be enforced by non-States, I fail to see how you arrive at a State. Again, the State just seems smuggled in, and no justification for it has been offered. You earlier denied the charge that you are attempting to ‘justify Statism’. But you must, otherwise you really don’t have anything with which the threaten anti-Statism.

That the State violates the NAP is simply an indication that the NAP places the right of ownership higher up in the hierarchy of rights, than the conventions which the State is bound to uphold places that right. The State upholds a multitude of rights, and there is a hierarchy of rights which itself is conventional. That the right to private ownership is limited, restricted, even forfeited in some cases, because other rights are of greater importance, according to the conventions which the State is bound to uphold, is evidence that the NAP is not a good principle. Why ought the right to private ownership be given such priority when the conventions which are presently accepted, and upheld by the state, assign a lesser priority to this right? The State can force one to give up ownership (fines) when that individual has committed offences not covered by the NAP. Clearly there is reason to believe that some rights ought to take priority over property rights. In this case the State is right in forcing one to give up one's property. Valuing private property higher than what is provided for in the conventional hierarchy of rights, validates the use of force against oneself, in contravention of the NAP. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not possible to prioritise a non-property-right over a property right, because all rights are fundamentally property rights. I made this point here:

As I observed above, fundamentally all rights are really just rights of use or ownership over scarce resources which have alternative uses. The right to do anything in particular is really a right to do what one wants with a resource which might have instead gone to serve someone else’s ends. So the whole question of ‘rights’ in general is really just a question of resource allocation to someone or other, to serve someone or other’s separate ends.

And it certainly appeared as though you concede this point:

OK, I'll go with this, it sounds reasonable. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only outstanding question is which specific property-claims are worth recognising, and which are not. We may decide this reasonably, as many in the libertarian intellectual tradition attempt to do, or it may be decided by the arbitrary use of force, which is the solution of the thieves, murderers, States, etc.

I've already given you examples of such, aggressive sales, and aggressive trading. They refer to the means by which one takes advantage of another in business transactions. If one takes advantage of the other, yet it is not fraud, you cannot call this "mutual advantage". Are you not familiar with these terms? — Metaphysician Undercover

You did indeed make this point, and I responded with:

You are wrong. As you discover if you read libertarian defences, fraud is considered a form of theft and is assuredly prohibited under the NAP, as an invasion of one’s property. Lying and cheating too, if they be relevantly fraudulent. I don’t know what you mean by ‘aggressive sales’, but if you are talking about bringing a gun to the negotiating table and forcing a sale under duress, then of course this is in violation of the NAP; it is a ‘hold-up’!

Maybe you need to refine what you intend by ‘take advantage of’. In a voluntary trade, we both ‘take advantage of’ each other, in the sense that we both benefit from one another’s existence. This is not an embarrassment or a counter-instance. I know I seem to have quoted myself a lot here, but we have now reached that point at which most of what you are presenting has been addressed in my previous responses.

I thought we had come to the agreement together that the NAP presupposes property. After I drew attention to the fact that this is universally acknowledged among libertarian theorists (the NAP being a libertarian principle, after all), I thought this was an agreement we had reached. Is this not so? My claim, in any case, is that the dependence relationship between the NAP and a system of property rights is one that is logical and not temporal, so I am not committed to holding off on ‘NAP-talk’ until after I have successfully realised a particular system of property rights in the world. — Virgo Avalytikh

Right, the relationship between property rights, and the NAP as libertarians propose, is logical. I've shown that the premise is false therefore the logic is unsound. The NAP is based in unsound logic, so it ought not be considered as a principle which could be applied in practise. Of course you can talk about it all you want, but I don't see the point in talking about it as if it is a principle which could be practised, unless your intent is to deceive.

The only sense in which a State may be said to ‘solve’ such a disagreement, as far as I can see, is simply by picking a winner, and enforcing a single system of rights upon everyone. — Virgo Avalytikh

I agree with you here, remember, I am not supporting Statism, so I am not going to say that the system of rights enforced by the State is necessarily reasonable or just. But the state has the institutions, courts, judges, police, by which "a single system of rights" might be enforced. The NAP presupposes such a system of rights, requires it, without the means to produce or maintain it. Furthermore, the system of the State is one agreed upon by the convention of those in the position of forming such conventions, and this is intended to create a representation of what is agreeable to the general population at that time. With all of the institutions in place, intended to ensure that the use of force by the State is restricted to those conventions which are agreeable to the general population, it is completely irrational for you, an individual person, to refer to this as "arbitrary use of force".

It is just not altogether clear what you mean by ‘State’, nor what kind of philosophical work the State is doing in your argument. The arguments you are attempting to level against libertarianism can only be successful if the State solves the problems you raise. But I am still in the dark as to how it is supposed to do so. Can you explain? As things stand, the work the State seems to be doing is to enforce one particular system of property rights upon everyone (within its territory, that is). But whether that system is the right one remains to be seen. — Virgo Avalytikh

Having a particular system of rights, which is intended to represent what is agreeable to the population in general, enforced by the institutions of the State, I believe is far better than having a multitude of systems of rights, enforced by the NAP, which would be absolutely impotent because the NAP requires a particular system of rights to have any practical application.

But if the State is not the source of conventions, and conventions can and do exist independently of the State, and if conventions can be enforced by non-States, I fail to see how you arrive at a State. — Virgo Avalytikh

This is where your faulty definition of "aggression" is at play in your little game. You assume, conventions can be enforced by non-States, which is fine. But your NAP, with your definition of "aggression" places the right to ownership as the highest right. This is a convention which I, as well as others, cannot agree to. Therefore it is very clear that as much as you might create a non-State entity which respects the NAP, others will create a non-State entity with no respect for the NAP. You assume to have the "right" to defend your property with force according to your principles, and the others assume a right to seize your property with force, according to their principles, and there is no peace. What good is the NAP if the vast majority of people refer to some other principle of rights?

But whether that system is the right one remains to be seen. — Virgo Avalytikh

It's irrelevant whether the system is "the right" one. This is because organization and cooperation amongst people is better than disorganization and lack of cooperation, as it is conducive to a happy, peaceful life for the human population. Furthermore, if the persons charged with creating the conventions have a true respect for the general population, the State will have a good system, and be on track toward finding "the right" system.

If it is your claim, that the system of the State has as its end, something bad, and the organization and cooperation within the state is all going toward a bad goal, then you ought to be able to make a demonstration of this. Placing ownership of property as the highest goal of human existence, as your NAP does, and implying that the State's goal is to misappropriate the properties of individuals, therefore the goal of the State is something bad is just foolish, irrational talk.

If you want to demonstrate that the State is bad, get to some real principles, rather than playing with material objects like a child.

It is not possible to prioritise a non-property-right over a property right, because all rights are fundamentally property rights. I made this point here:

As I observed above, fundamentally all rights are really just rights of use or ownership over scarce resources which have alternative uses. The right to do anything in particular is really a right to do what one wants with a resource which might have instead gone to serve someone else’s ends. So the whole question of ‘rights’ in general is really just a question of resource allocation to someone or other, to serve someone or other’s separate ends.

And it certainly appeared as though you concede this point: — Virgo Avalytikh

Sure, I conceded that point concerning "rights", but didn't you also notice that I appealed to something higher than rights? It is through the appeal to a higher principle that we have the means to prioritize rights. Notice above, I am talking about goals, and good and bad. This is the basis of morality, and rights are grounded in morality, not property ownership. Don't you think that the latter (rights are grounded in property ownership) is a rather foolish opinion? Rights concern property ownership, but you cannot ground a principle in itself, that would be circular, and not a grounding at all. So we ground rights in morality, and produce a hierarchy of rights accordingly.

Maybe you need to refine what you intend by ‘take advantage of’. In a voluntary trade, we both ‘take advantage of’ each other, in the sense that we both benefit from one another’s existence. — Virgo Avalytikh

If you do not recognize that there are transactions where one person takes advantage of another, or a group takes advantage of another group, and it is not by means of fraud or lying, and that these instances ought to be discouraged rather than encouraged, then I do not see any point in discussing this.

If I understand the essence of your argument, it seems to hinge on the issue of standardisation, or universality: in the absence of the State, there may be as many rights-conventions as there are individuals, and so uniformity is impossible. Given the existence of a State, however, it is reasonable to think that there would be a unified system of rights, which the State has the institutions to enforce.

There are few problems with this. First, I would ask how much standardisation you believe to be necessary. Must it be absolute? If it does, then not even Statism is enough, for a world with multiple existing States would be one in which there might be multiple competing systems of rights. If two nation-States both believe themselves (or their citizens) to have some sort of rightful claim over a territory, by what higher standard do they resolve their dispute? There is none, and so, just as two individuals with competing conventions would break out into violence and the winner would be determined by arbitrary force, so too would the two nations break out into war and, once again, justice would be the advantage of the stronger. Even a multinational political union could only ever be a partial solution. In order for a State to do the work you need it do philosophically, there really can be only one of them, and its scale must be global. Anything short of that, and the standardisation problem which you seem to be levelling at the an-cap position is equally applicable to a Statist situation.

If, on the other hand, the standardisation does not strictly have to be absolute, then there is no reason why a State is necessary at all to preserve and enforce it. Once we establish the precedent that a convention can exist and be enforced at something less than a global scale, there is no longer any in-principle reason why its enforcement can only be done by the kind of thing that a State is. This is especially the case since, as I have pointed out on a number of occasions, the services of rights-enforcement and dispute-resolution can be (and, to a significant extent, are) provided by private agencies.

Moreover, we ought not to underestimate the tendency of individuals to arrive at a spontaneous order in the absence of coercive institutions. While it is conceivably possible that there be as many rights-systems as there are individuals (as in my silly ‘all x’s pass to me on a full moon’ example), this kind of situation is praxeologically unlikely to obtain (and, even if it does, the formation of a meaningful State is going to be impossible). It is precisely because not all systems of rights are created equal, that some are conducive towards mutual advantage where others are not, that creates a tendency towards spontaneous (if imperfect) standardisation. Fairly rigorous game-theoretic explorations concerning how this standardisation comes about in a state of nature can be found in Friedman:

http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/Property/Property.html

(a more reader-friendly version may be found in the Social Philosophy and Policy Journal in which it was first published)

And more general treatments may be found in Hayek:

https://mises-media.s3.amazonaws.com/Individualism%20and%20Economic%20Order_4.pdf

Or for something more fun:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BOvAbjfJ0x0

And, as always, Rothbard is excellent here too.

Going back to my opening post, from which we seem to have become somewhat uncoupled, a system of private property and non-aggression is not arbitrarily chosen. It has distinct and significant advantages relative to its competitors. Spontaneous order occurs because it is in individuals’ interests to enter into peaceful constant dealings with others, and it is private property and non-aggression which allows this to take place. And, while the integrity of such a system requires the means of enforcing one’s rights against aggressors, the very system of private property and non-aggression is capable of producing such services without violating anyone’s rights, by the standards of the system. The fundamental difference between this and a Statist situation is that the State reserves for itself the prerogative to engage in acts of aggression which it prohibits others from engaging in. This remains the fundamental philosophical problem of the State, and as yet I have not encountered any non-arbitrary justification for it (and if providing such a justification is something which you are not interested in doing, then I am not hopeful of hearing such a thing anytime soon).