I addressed different senses you might have had in mind, because I wasn't sure. Again, it's being charitable. If I were to just ask you what sense you have in mind, I'm guessing you'd not just straightforwardly answer, because that keeps happening. So I addressed multiple senses to avoid having to ask you. — Terrapin Station

Please stop doing that. Again, it's not helping. It's just an annoying distraction. I've made my meaning clear enough to you. Go with that, not something plucked from your imagination.

I'm not sure how you think they can. The only things I can imagine are that you're either (1) egotistically asserting your view as correct and anything too different from it as incorrect, (2) appealing to common or consensus opinion and equating that with "correct," which is the argumentum ad populum fallacy, or (3) saying that it either matches or fails to match what the world is like, but factually, the extramental world (extramental because otherwise then we either have (1) or (2) above) doesn't contain moral stances--hence why objectivism is wrong (it fails to match what the extramental world is like). — Terrapin Station

To get to the right conclusion, you need to work backwards. That's something that you should do more often. That's something that a lot of members of this forum should do more often.

We know that, ordinarily, we call things like this right and wrong. Then you just think of a way to fit that in with your metaethics. If your metaethics can't do that, then your metaethics is inferior.

I don't need a single, rigid way of counting something as right or wrong with regard to the kind of statements we've been talking about. With the example I gave earlier, that it's wrong could be explained in light of the consequences. If all you have in response to that is, "But someone might have a different opinion about that!", then that's no argument, or if it is, it's got to be one of the weakest arguments imaginable, so my point stands.

Seriously? You think that I'm going to go, "Proper conduct? Alrighty then" ? — Terrapin Station

I know that, to your discredit, you sometimes express a disregard for proper conduct in debates. That isn't entirely contrary to my expectations. But it's something that I consider pretty awful and shocking, hence why I return to it. So I just want to be clear:

Do you accept that you have a burden of attempted justification?

Do you value intellectual honesty?

And do you value logic?

Then support it better. — Terrapin Station

Do I really need to elaborate on why a test fit for purpose would need to rule out stuff like my example?

Answer the question.

So yeah, you are just kowtowing to the crowd again. ಠ_ಠ — Terrapin Station

So yeah, you're still clueless enough to keep confusing any explanation referencing what a large number of people think with "kowtowing to the crowd". For the millionth time, it doesn't matter that my views are in accordance with "the crowd" in the sense that that in no way detracts from my views. The "crowd" has got this one right (again), so I would rather my views match theirs then someone who is wrong, such as yourself. In this case, it's worse to be a crackpot who clashes with the good sense of the "crowd".

There's nothing else to talk about, though. Again, there are no factual normatives.

This means that it is not correct/incorrect to not have (seemingly) inconsistent dispositions, feelings, etc. — Terrapin Station

No it doesn't, it means only that you're choosing to go by an interpretation which leads to that conclusion. You're the cause of your own problem, namely the problem that you reach the wrong conclusion, because it flies in the face of what we see and hear and feel and the behaviour all around us. If you were an extraterrestrial and you observed a society of humans, you would conclude that there are rights and wrongs. You would observe that people who say outlandish things are told that they're wrong, mistaken. Your metaethical theory fails in terms of explanatory power. Your theories often do, generally speaking. You really need to work on that.

Problematic in semblance and inherently problematic aren't mutually exclusive

I think part of the problem is the terms being used, some baggage on a few that seems to be causing confusion.
You are essentially talking about referencing a standard, right? You accept the initial subjectivity of whether or not someone values morality or reason, but once they do there are certain standards they are agreeing to operate from that do not change based on l subjective whims?
Is that right?

Well, for example you're bringing up "objective standards." I don't agree that there are such things first off. Standards are not objective, and if we're referring to standards in the sense of those that obtain via consensus in some population, if we're suggesting that it's correct to follow them, we're asserting an argumentum ad populum.

I'm not disagreeing that there are standard that are agreed upon. But there is nothing normative about them, factually.

"Sensible" is simply "something not too far removed from my own or from the consensus view" --that is, something not too different. Where the only thing motivating that is whether it matches oneself or the norm (which are more or less the same thing if one tempers one's views to the norm). — Terrapin Station

No, that's not what it is by definition. But yes, if something not too far removed from my own view happens to be sensible, then it's sensible. And if something not too far removed from the consensus view happens to be sensible, then it's sensible.

The view that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "m" isn't sensible, whether it's not too far removed from my view, or your view, or the consensus. If you were to say, "But it's not too far removed from my view, so it's sensible!", you'd just be wrong. And pretty stupid, to be honest.

That view, and all others like it, shouldn't be put to a test which would pass them. That itself is actually a test for a bad test: whether or not your test passes all kinds of nonsense.

Well, call it a standard then. Do you believe in those?

I think part of the problem is the terms being used, some baggage on a few that seems to be causing confusion.
You are essentially talking about referencing a standard, right? You accept the initial subjectivity of whether or not someone values morality or reason, but once they do there are certain standards they are agreeing to operate from that do not change based on l subjective whims?
Is that right? — DingoJones

Yes. An example of this would be earlier on when Terrapin revealed that he has got the nature of reason completely wrong, in that he thinks that it's subjective, when it isn't, it's objective. His view on the matter is subjective, but reason isn't. I refuted that position earlier. He can of course stick with his subjective view on the matter, but whether affirming the consequent is unreasonable isn't a moot topic. The right answer is that it's unreasonable. That he might have a different opinion won't change that.

Please stop doing that. Again, it's not helping. — S

I'd not do it if you'd give what I consider to be straightforward answers to questions, with some detail to them, when I ask something like "anything goes in what regard?"

What you typically do is respond with something in the vein of, "You (should) know what regard."

To get to the right conclusion, you need to work backwards. That's something that you should do more often. That's something that a lot of members of this forum should do more often.

We know that, ordinarily, we call things like this right and wrong. Then you just think of a way to fit that in with your metaethics. If your metaethics can't do that, then your metaethics is inferior.

I don't need a single, rigid way of counting something as right or wrong with regard to the kind of statements we've been talking about. With the example I gave earlier, that it's wrong could be explained in light of the consequences. If all you have in response to that is, "But someone might have a different opinion about that!", then that's no argument, or if it is, it's got to be one of the weakest arguments imaginable, so my point stands. — S

The whole point is this:

Say that Joe claims, "There should be no crimes about actions normally named by words beginning with the letter 'm.'"

Someone chimes in, "But that would make murder legal!" (we can, as we often do, Ignore the conventional definition of murder being illegal killing for this.)

Joe says, "Yes, obviously. That shouldn't be a crime in my view."

So Joe knows something about the consequences. Joe is expressing his view that that situation--where murder is legal--should be the case.

So for Joe, it does no good for anyone else to simply say, "You're wrong! You're incorrect!" Joe is aware of the consequences and it's something he doesn't have a problem with. Presumably he has a problem with the alternate situation instead.

The "crowd" has got this one right (again), — S

So are you using my (1) or my (3) for how something can be "correct"/"incorrect" in this realm, or are you appealing to something I wasn't able to imagine?

No it doesn't, it means only that you're choosing to go by an interpretation which leads to that conclusion. You're the cause of your own problem, namely the problem that you reach the wrong conclusion, because it flies in the face of what we see and hear and feel and behave all around us. If you were an extraterrestrial and you observed a society of humans, you would conclude that there are rights and wrongs. You would observe that people who say outlandish things are told that they're wrong, mistaken. Your metaethical theory fails in terms of explanatory power. Your theories often do, generally speaking. You really need to work on that. — S

So you're arguing that argumentum ad populums are not fallacious because? (Maybe because they're commonly accepted? But that itself is an argumentum ad populum.)

Re explaining things, by the way, what I'm concerned with is ultimately explaining what's really going on, which is often different than what people believe (is going on). For example, I'm not about to explain religious activities in terms of a God really existing, even though that's what religious folks believe/how they behave in that context. I'm going to explain their behavior in the context of the fact that there are no gods.

Problematic in semblance and inherently problematic aren't mutually exclusive — Shamshir

I have no idea what that's even saying. What's the distinction you're making there?

Well, call it a standard then. Do you believe in those? — DingoJones

There are personal and agreed-upon standards, sure. They just don't have any normative weight aside from an individual personally wanting to follow something because it's the norm or because they decided on some credo or whatever.

the nature of reason . . . it's objective. — S

So would you posit some sort of real (extramental) abstract for it?

Maybe I'm remembering this wrong, but I thought you didn't buy the idea of nonphysical existents.

Ok, so as an example, the unit of measurement of an “inch”.
Lets agree to use that standard of measurement.
So we have a tape measure, and its marked in inches. We can take that and measure the size, in inches, of all manner of objects, right? And those things will have a certain length, in inches? Right?

Sure. Objects have whatever lengths they do in particular circumstances. This does nothing to make the standard correct/incorrect, or to make it correct to use it or anything like that.

I didn't say it did. Im just saying that here is a standard (inches), and if we both agree to use that standard then we can use it to measure things in inches and you agree, right?

I didn't say it did. Im just saying that here is a standard (inches), and if we both agree to use that standard then we can use it to measure things in inches and you agree, right? — DingoJones

I was just nipping the "correct" stuff in the bud.

But again, sure re all of that.

(I'm just about to start a session, by the way, so I'll be back in a few hours.)

Ok, so if I measure a stick and it comes to 7”, what do I say to you when you look at it by eye and say “no, its 5” long”. Are you using the standard we agreed upon? What is the length of the stick in inches?

I'd not do it if you'd give what I consider to be straightforward answers to questions, with some detail to them, when I ask something like "anything goes in what regard?"

What you typically do is respond with something in the vein of, "You (should) know what regard." — Terrapin Station

But you should, because a) it was obvious from the context (I'm pretty sure others aren't having the problem that you're having here), and because b) I've clarified multiple times now. It's not that you really don't get it enough to respond properly. That's just a ruse, a tactic. You're just basically trying to shift the burden like you always do, and red herrings which insistently press me for unnecessary detail regarding the point I'm raising to you is one way of doing that.

I don't like repeating myself, so just refer back to my previous posts regarding what I've said about that. The clarifications I've given are sufficient for someone of average intelligence to figure out what I'm getting at, so the way you're responding is effectively just playing dumb, unless you really do have below average intelligence, which I don't believe.

The whole point is this:

Say that Joe claims, "There should be no crimes about actions normally named by words beginning with the letter 'm.'"

Someone chimes in, "But that would make murder legal!" (Ignoring the conventional definition of murder being illegal killing.)

Joe says, "Yes, obviously. That shouldn't be a crime in my view."

So Joe knows something about the consequences. Joe is expressing his view that that situation--where murder is legal--should be the case.

So for Joe, it does no good to simply say, "You're wrong! You're incorrect!" Joe is aware of the consequences and it's something he doesn't have a problem with. Presumably he has a problem with the alternate situation instead. — Terrapin Station

Wow. How many times? That is not the whole point at all! How on earth can it be the whole point? So the whole point is an irrelevance I've already accepted multiple times? No, I don't think so. You seriously need to rethink what your whole point is. You would need to take the above and lead it somewhere logically relevant.

So are you using my (1) or my (3) for how something can be "correct"/"incorrect" in this realm, or are you appealing to something I wasn't able to imagine? — Terrapin Station

Neither (1) nor (3). That would-be false dichotomy made me chuckle. The "crowd" has got it right (again) because the "crowd" doesn't accept that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "m". That's a stupid view which should not be accepted. You don't accept it yourself, yet you totally undermine that by saying that you'd indirectly allow it to pass your test through knowingly putting it through a useless test that lets anything through so long as the persons feelings match.

So you're arguing that argumentum ad populums are not fallacious because? (Maybe because they're commonly accepted? But that itself is an argumentum ad populum.) — Terrapin Station

No, you don't understand the fallacy of appealing to the masses enough, so you misidentify it in cases like this, as everyone hereabouts knows. And you're proving immune to correction.

So would you posit some sort of real (extramental) abstract for it?

Maybe I'm remembering this wrong, but I thought you didn't buy the idea of nonphysical existents. — Terrapin Station

I'm not engaging your nonsense about the extramental. I don't have to. I've refuted the stance that reason is subjective based solely on my earlier argument. You would need to deal with that instead of trying to distract me.

Ok, so if I measure a stick and it comes to 7”, what do I say to you when you look at it by eye and say “no, its 5” long”. Are you using the standard we agreed upon? What is the length of the stick in inches? — DingoJones

I know that this was for him, because he's the one with the problem. But I just want to jump in to say what most of us already know, which is that, in this context, the correct answer would be 7”. It's arbitrary nonsense to say that "correct" doesn't apply. That's going against the grain of ordinary language use for no sensible reason.

I think Terrapin's problem here is a more general problem he has with having a die-hard commitment to something first, and then trying to work around the problems with it. It's putting the cart before the horse.

No, it makes sense from a certain perspective. Its just that you two are talking about two different things. I dont think this is some sort of pathology on his part, he is just being informed by his view of things. I actually think its largely semantic.

Hate speech laws are only sensible if a sensible argument in favor of the censorship of hate speech can be given. There has yet to be such an argument.

No, it makes sense from a certain perspective. Its just that you two are talking about two different things. I dont think this is some sort of pathology on his part, he is just being informed by his view of things. I actually think its largely semantic. — DingoJones

But it's his perspective which is the problem. Ordinary language wins out because it causes less problems. He's having to go out of his way to make his point about "correct" and "incorrect" not applying. That's the cause of the problem here. He should just speak normally, and adapt his position accordingly.

Well ill let you two settle that point. Im making a different point.

Ok, so if I measure a stick and it comes to 7”, what do I say to you when you look at it by eye and say “no, its 5” long”. Are you using the standard we agreed upon? — DingoJones

Especially if we've agreed on using the same definition of "inch," you're simply going to think that my estimate is off.

The length of the stick in inches (your other question) is whatever the measurement turns out to be per the definition of inch (or whatever unit) used. So in the example, it's going to be 7"

So I was interested in what your reasoning would be for believing that moral stances can be correct/incorrect, that reason somehow transcends individuals, and that argumentum ad populums can be non-fallacious . . . but you're not providing much info. You're just claiming that all of that is so.

Ordinary language wins out because it causes less problems. — S

Not the case, because you wind up telling people that their moral stances are incorrect, where you're not simply saying that they're very unusual (relative to commonly-expressed moral stances).

And pointing out that they're very unusual should be met with a response of, "And?"--in other words, what would the relevance to anything be? It would be as pointless as saying that the stance was expressed in English, or consisted of 10 words or whatever.

Especially if we've agreed on using the same definition of "inch," you're simply going to think that my estimate is off. — Terrapin Station

Right, because we are referencing a standard of what an inch is, that we’ve agreed upon.
So 7” inches is what the length is in inches, and 5” is not what the length in inches. Right?
So if a person agrees to the standard of measurement of an “inch”, their feeling about 5” can be shown not to be the case as it doesnt match the standard being used. (The measuring tape will show that 7” is the length in inches).
The subjective feeling, in other words, of 5” inches is not correct according to the standard being used.

So in the example, it's going to be 7". — Terrapin Station

Correct.

So I was interested in what your reasoning would be for believing that moral stances can be correct/incorrect, that reason somehow transcends individuals, and that argumentum ad populums can be non-fallacious . . . but you're not providing much info. You're just claiming that all of that is so. — Terrapin Station

That's a gross mischaracterisation. You aren't showing enough interest in what I've actually said about that, because you aren't going by that, you're going by your mischaracterisation and pressing for unnecessary details as a distraction technique. I've given you the answer, and I've repeated that answer to you multiple times in response to your questions, but you'll keep going with the line that you don't understand or that it's not enough, because you see that as advantageous. But you can't really win that way. At the end of the day, I have truth on my side.

Not the case, because you wind up telling people that their moral stances are incorrect, where you're not simply saying that they're very unusual (relative to commonly-expressed moral stances). — Terrapin Station

It is the case, because they are incorrect, not just unusual. That's why there are two different words with two different meanings, and I'm using them differently according to which one is appropriate for what I mean. They can't mean the same thing because if it was usual to think that there shouldn't be any crimes beginning with "m", it would still be wrong.

How was that a different point? You were explaining how "correct" and "incorrect" apply, and how a standard can be such that particular subjective judgements are irrelevant, like with reason, which is also such that particular subjective judgements are irrelevant, as justified by my example of affirming the consequent.