I addressed different senses you might have had in mind, because I wasn't sure. Again, it's being charitable. If I were to just ask you what sense you have in mind, I'm guessing you'd not just straightforwardly answer, because that keeps happening. So I addressed multiple senses to avoid having to ask you. — Terrapin Station
I'm not sure how you think they can. The only things I can imagine are that you're either (1) egotistically asserting your view as correct and anything too different from it as incorrect, (2) appealing to common or consensus opinion and equating that with "correct," which is the argumentum ad populum fallacy, or (3) saying that it either matches or fails to match what the world is like, but factually, the extramental world (extramental because otherwise then we either have (1) or (2) above) doesn't contain moral stances--hence why objectivism is wrong (it fails to match what the extramental world is like). — Terrapin Station
Seriously? You think that I'm going to go, "Proper conduct? Alrighty then" ? — Terrapin Station
Then support it better. — Terrapin Station
So yeah, you are just kowtowing to the crowd again. ಠ_ಠ — Terrapin Station
There's nothing else to talk about, though. Again, there are no factual normatives.
This means that it is not correct/incorrect to not have (seemingly) inconsistent dispositions, feelings, etc. — Terrapin Station
"Sensible" is simply "something not too far removed from my own or from the consensus view" --that is, something not too different. Where the only thing motivating that is whether it matches oneself or the norm (which are more or less the same thing if one tempers one's views to the norm). — Terrapin Station
I think part of the problem is the terms being used, some baggage on a few that seems to be causing confusion.
You are essentially talking about referencing a standard, right? You accept the initial subjectivity of whether or not someone values morality or reason, but once they do there are certain standards they are agreeing to operate from that do not change based on l subjective whims?
Is that right? — DingoJones
Please stop doing that. Again, it's not helping. — S
To get to the right conclusion, you need to work backwards. That's something that you should do more often. That's something that a lot of members of this forum should do more often.
We know that, ordinarily, we call things like this right and wrong. Then you just think of a way to fit that in with your metaethics. If your metaethics can't do that, then your metaethics is inferior.
I don't need a single, rigid way of counting something as right or wrong with regard to the kind of statements we've been talking about. With the example I gave earlier, that it's wrong could be explained in light of the consequences. If all you have in response to that is, "But someone might have a different opinion about that!", then that's no argument, or if it is, it's got to be one of the weakest arguments imaginable, so my point stands. — S
The "crowd" has got this one right (again), — S
No it doesn't, it means only that you're choosing to go by an interpretation which leads to that conclusion. You're the cause of your own problem, namely the problem that you reach the wrong conclusion, because it flies in the face of what we see and hear and feel and behave all around us. If you were an extraterrestrial and you observed a society of humans, you would conclude that there are rights and wrongs. You would observe that people who say outlandish things are told that they're wrong, mistaken. Your metaethical theory fails in terms of explanatory power. Your theories often do, generally speaking. You really need to work on that. — S
Problematic in semblance and inherently problematic aren't mutually exclusive — Shamshir
Well, call it a standard then. Do you believe in those? — DingoJones
the nature of reason . . . it's objective. — S
I didn't say it did. Im just saying that here is a standard (inches), and if we both agree to use that standard then we can use it to measure things in inches and you agree, right? — DingoJones
I'd not do it if you'd give what I consider to be straightforward answers to questions, with some detail to them, when I ask something like "anything goes in what regard?"
What you typically do is respond with something in the vein of, "You (should) know what regard." — Terrapin Station
The whole point is this:
Say that Joe claims, "There should be no crimes about actions normally named by words beginning with the letter 'm.'"
Someone chimes in, "But that would make murder legal!" (Ignoring the conventional definition of murder being illegal killing.)
Joe says, "Yes, obviously. That shouldn't be a crime in my view."
So Joe knows something about the consequences. Joe is expressing his view that that situation--where murder is legal--should be the case.
So for Joe, it does no good to simply say, "You're wrong! You're incorrect!" Joe is aware of the consequences and it's something he doesn't have a problem with. Presumably he has a problem with the alternate situation instead. — Terrapin Station
So are you using my (1) or my (3) for how something can be "correct"/"incorrect" in this realm, or are you appealing to something I wasn't able to imagine? — Terrapin Station
So you're arguing that argumentum ad populums are not fallacious because? (Maybe because they're commonly accepted? But that itself is an argumentum ad populum.) — Terrapin Station
So would you posit some sort of real (extramental) abstract for it?
Maybe I'm remembering this wrong, but I thought you didn't buy the idea of nonphysical existents. — Terrapin Station
Ok, so if I measure a stick and it comes to 7”, what do I say to you when you look at it by eye and say “no, its 5” long”. Are you using the standard we agreed upon? What is the length of the stick in inches? — DingoJones
No, it makes sense from a certain perspective. Its just that you two are talking about two different things. I dont think this is some sort of pathology on his part, he is just being informed by his view of things. I actually think its largely semantic. — DingoJones
Ok, so if I measure a stick and it comes to 7”, what do I say to you when you look at it by eye and say “no, its 5” long”. Are you using the standard we agreed upon? — DingoJones
Ordinary language wins out because it causes less problems. — S
Especially if we've agreed on using the same definition of "inch," you're simply going to think that my estimate is off. — Terrapin Station
So in the example, it's going to be 7". — Terrapin Station
So I was interested in what your reasoning would be for believing that moral stances can be correct/incorrect, that reason somehow transcends individuals, and that argumentum ad populums can be non-fallacious . . . but you're not providing much info. You're just claiming that all of that is so. — Terrapin Station
Not the case, because you wind up telling people that their moral stances are incorrect, where you're not simply saying that they're very unusual (relative to commonly-expressed moral stances). — Terrapin Station
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.