I completely disagree with that. I'm looking for whether he provides any sort of argument to support that characterization of ontological realism. — Terrapin Station

It'll be what came before, given that the passage starts with "We are now in a position...". ;)

It'll be what came before, — Michael

Yeah, no duh.

And I'd not disagree with that in the slightest. But I already explained this. It's a correlative belief. It's not part of what realism refers to.

It's no different than it being a fact that very few atheists will say that evolutionary theory is hogwash. But atheism doesn't refer to a stance on evolutionary theory. The beliefs simply have a strong positive correlation with respect to atheism. — Terrapin Station

And how do we determine what realism refers to? Ask self-proclaimed realists what they mean by "I'm a realist". I'd say that for the most part they'd say "it means that I believe that the existence of the moon is independent of human belief and linguistic practices and that the truth of this belief is independent of human belief and linguistic practices".

I think that if someone were to say "it means that I believe that the existence of the moon is independent of human belief and linguistic practices but that the truth of this belief is dependent on human belief and linguistic practices" then it would be appropriate to consider their use of the label "realist" a misuse. Although they're making a realist-like existence claim, what they mean by this claim shows them to be a metaphysical anti-realist.

Again, it's analogous to the nominalist and Platonist who both make the same existence claim "numbers exist" but mean very different things by it.

Some comments on the stuff leading up to the passage I quoted before (these will make more sense if you're familiar with the paper; I'm just quoting the sentences I want to comment on):

"There is a strong intuition that we are thereby in a position to know everything relevant
there is to know about the objects." --which is a mistake in my view. We only know it from a particular reference point.

"Ontological anti-realism, at least in its strong form, is committed to denying that these theses have
objective and determinate truth-values."--there's absolutely no argument prior to this establishing that realism/antirealism should have something to do with a belief in objective truth values.

Alright, reading through the rest of the early part of the paper, prior to "We are now in a position to state ontological realism . . . " I wouldn't say that he provides an argument for realism necessarily having something to do with belief in objective truth value. He's also leaving truth unanalyzed (which isn't surprising, as the paper isn't about an analysis of what truth is ontologically), but the problem with this is that he seems to simply be using "truth" so that it could be a synonym for "fact."

And how do we determine what realism refers to? — Michael

Via familiarity with a wide span of philosophcial literature, as well as definitions such as those in the dictionaries and encyclopedias I quoted earlier (where putatively the authors of those definitions are doing their work based on familiarity with a wide span of philosophical literature).

I'd say that for the most part they'd say "it means that I believe that the existence of the moon is independent of human belief and linguistic practices and that the truth of this belief is independent of human belief and linguistic practices". — Michael

Yeah, but it just has nothing to do with your intuitive beliefs re what you'd guess that people would say.

You'd need empirical evidence of what people with a philosophical education actually do say. And once again, you'd need to sort out correlative beliefs from definitions (since there's no disagreement that the vast majority of realists are going to also be truth realists).

By the way, what would you say the ontological stance is of someone who believes that the moon, etc. exist external-to-minds, independently of any persons, etc., but who doesn't believe that truth is mind-independent? You wouldn't say that they're anti-realists, would you? And you wouldn't say that they're realists. So what would you say they are?

By the way, what would you say the ontological stance is of someone who believes that the moon, etc. exist external-to-minds, independently of any persons, etc., but who doesn't believe that truth is mind-independent? You wouldn't say that they're anti-realists, would you? And you wouldn't say that they're realists. So what would you say they are? — Terrapin Station

I'd say that they're anti-realists. Their claim that the moon is independent is, to use Chalmer's terminology, an ordinary existence claim, not an ontological existence claim, and so says nothing about their view on metaphysics. They're just playing along with our language game, not doing philosophy. Their views on metaphysics are instead given in their account of truth.

Okay, but in my case, using Chalmers' terminology, my claim that the moon is independent is an ontological existence claim, not an "ordinary existence claim." So what stance is that in your view?

Also, I'm just curious if you recall why I do not believe that truth can not be mind-independent. As a hint: in my view, it's an objective fact that the moon is mind-independent. It is not an objective truth however, since no truths are objective.

Okay, but in my case, using Chalmers' terminology, my claim that the moon is independent is an ontological existence claim, not an "ordinary existence claim." So what stance is that in your view? — Terrapin Station

That it's to be understood as saying that the truth of "the moon is independent" is verification-transcendent. That's what distinguishes an ordinary from an ontological existence claim; the latter says something about what makes an existence-claim true (making it an account of metaphysics) whereas the former just asserts the claim's truth (making it just a (non-philosophical) move in a language game).

Also, I'm just curious if you recall why I do not believe that truth can not be mind-independent. As a hint: in my view, it's an objective fact that the moon is mind-independent. It is not an objective truth however, since no truths are objective.

I don't think that this makes any sense. To say that the mind-independence of the moon is an objective fact just is to say that the truth of "the moon is mind-independent" is verification-transcendent.

As an aside, would you mind if I move these comments out of the Shoutbox and into their own discussion?

That it's to be understood as saying that the truth of "the moon is independent" is verification-transcendent. — Michael

Aside from that not being the name of a stance (although you could make it one I suppose), you'd have a problem there because that's not at all my stance. My stance is that the moon is mind-independent/extra mental, where I'm making an ontological claim, not an "ordinary claim," but I am NOT saying anything about truth. I'm saying something about the moon and its relationship to us.

That's what distinguishes an ordinary from an ontological existence claim; — Michael

Not per that Chalmers paper. Here are his definitions:

"An ordinary existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort
typically made in ordinary first-order discussion of the relevant subject matter. For example, a
typical mathematician’s assertion of ‘There are four prime numbers less than ten’ is an ordinary
existence assertion, as is a typical drinker’s assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’.

"An ontological existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort
typically made in broadly philosophical discussion where ontological considerations are paramount.
For example, a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘Abstract objects exist’ is an ontological existence
assertion, as is a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘For every set of objects, there exists an object
that is their mereological sum’."

Per those definitions, I'm making an ontological existence assertion about the moon being mind-independent/external to minds, yet I'm not saying anything about truth (being mind-independent/external to minds) in that. (By the way, for people reading this discussion but who haven't read the Chalmers paper, his discussion prior to that of Carnap's "internal"/"external" distinction with respect to existence questions in linguistic frameworks is helpful in understanding the distinction Chalmers is making. That starts on page 4.)

I don't think that this makes any sense. To say that the mind-independence of the moon is an objective fact just is to say that the truth of "the moon is mind-independent" is verification-transcendent. — Michael

Truths and facts are not the same thing. Truth-value is a property of propositions, and on my account, it's a judgment about whether propositions have the property in question, as that's the only means by which the property can obtain (also on my account, propositions only obtain when people are thinking about them, as meaning is a mental phenomenon only). Facts, on the other hand, are states of affairs in the world.

Re moving the discussion--sure, that would be a good idea.

Not per that Chalmers paper. Here are his definitions:

"An ordinary existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort
typically made in ordinary first-order discussion of the relevant subject matter. For example, a
typical mathematician’s assertion of ‘There are four prime numbers less than ten’ is an ordinary
existence assertion, as is a typical drinker’s assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’.

"An ontological existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort
typically made in broadly philosophical discussion where ontological considerations are paramount.
For example, a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘Abstract objects exist’ is an ontological existence
assertion, as is a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘For every set of objects, there exists an object
that is their mereological sum’."

Per those definitions, I'm making an ontological existence assertion about the moon being mind-independent/external to minds, yet I'm not saying anything about truth (being mind-independent/external to minds) in that. (By the way, for people reading this discussion but who haven't read the Chalmers paper, his discussion prior to that of Carnap's "internal"/"external" distinction with respect to existence questions in linguistic frameworks is helpful in understanding the distinction Chalmers is making.) — Terrapin Station

And he continues by saying that "ordinary and ontological existence assertions differ with respect to an important sort of utterance evaluation, which I will call correctness", and draws a distinction between heavyweight and lightweight quantification. Following it through, for a claim like "the moon is mind-independent" to be a true ontological existence assertion it is required that there is some relevant verification-transcendent truth condition.

If you reject verification-transcendent truth conditions then, as an ontological existence assertion, a claim like "the moon is mind-independent" can't be true. It might be true as an ordinary existence assertion, but then that's insufficient to count as metaphysical realism.

Truths and facts are not the same thing. Truth-value is a property of propositions, and on my account, it's a judgment about whether propositions have the property in question, as that's the only means by which the property can obtain (also on my account, propositions only obtain when people are thinking about them, as meaning is a mental phenomenon only). Facts, on the other hand, are states of affairs in the world.

Then you're just shifting the verification-transcendence from truth to facts, which hardly makes any difference. There's some verification-transcendent state-of-affairs which is (somehow) described by the sentence "the moon is mind-independent".

Unless you're also saying that these facts -- these states-of-affairs in the world -- aren't independent of our beliefs, experiences, and linguistic facts, in which case you're back to being an anti-realist.

Out of interest, what word do you use (if any) to describe a sentence that describes a fact if not "true"?

As a hint: in my view, it's an objective fact that the moon is mind-independent. It is not an objective truth however, since no truths are objective. — Terrapin Station

Is it an objective truth that no truths are objective?

Truths and facts are not the same thing. Truth-value is a property of propositions ... Facts, on the other hand, are states of affairs in the world. — Terrapin Station

This distinction does not make any sense to me. All facts are propositions--ones that correspond to states of affairs in the world; i.e., true propositions. If it is an objective fact (state of affairs in the world) that the moon is mind-independent, then "the moon is mind-independent" is a true proposition. What am I missing?

And he continues by saying that "ordinary and ontological existence assertions differ with respect to an important sort of utterance evaluation, which I will call correctness", — Michael

Which he explains is not the same as, or at least need not be the same as a truth claim.

If you reject verification-transcendent truth conditions then, as an ontological existence assertion, a claim like "the moon is mind-independent" can't be true. — Michael

This is incorrect. It can be true, it's just not verification-transcendentally or objectively true, as nothing is.

Then you're just shifting the verification-transcendence from truth to facts, which hardly makes any difference. — Michael

It makes a difference in that truth and facts are not the same thing. If someone says that Toyotas and Rolls Royces aren't the same thing, they're not going to say "Sure, I'll take a Toyota" when they want a Rolls Royce. For someone who just wants a car, any car, it wouldn't make a difference. So if you take truth and facts to be the same thing, it won't make any difference to you. They're very different things on my view, however, so it makes a big difference to me. In any event, yes, I'm saying that "The moon exists independently of us/it exists extramentally" is an objective fact that in no way hinges on our thinking about it, our verification, etc. It's just that no proposition is true objectively, because truth of what truth is ontologically--it's a judgment about the meanings of statements.

Out of interest, what word do you use (if any) to describe a sentence that describes a fact if not "true"? — Michael

A "descriptive sentence" would do, or a claim (where the persons asserting it and agreeing with it are taking it to describe the fact at hand), etc. Note that these things only obtain when someone thinks about them in that way. Aside from thinking about them, sentences are just marks on paper, or sounds, or whatever, with no meaning, no reference, etc.

Is it an objective truth that no truths are objective? — aletheist

No, of course not, since there is no such thing as objective truth. It is a fact, however.

This distinction does not make any sense to me. — aletheist

Okay, but it's been an explicitly-expressed (maybe first in Russell's Philosophy of Logical Atomism), standard, received-view distinction in analytic philosophy for more or less 100 years now.

All facts are propositions--ones that correspond to states of affairs in the world; — aletheist

On the standard, received view, propositions are the meanings of (declarative) statements. So, you're saying that in your ontology, facts are the meanings of (declarative) statements? Or you disagree with the received view in this regard?

Also, if on your view all facts are propositions, and then you're specifying propositions that correspond to states of affairs, you're saying propositions that correspond to propositions and/or facts that correspond to facts? That seems like a mess, doesn't it? It seems, rather, that you are making a distinction between the two, otherwise the notion of correspondence between facts and propositions wouldn't even make any sense (unless you're just saying that anything "corresponds" to itself a la that being an alternate way of describing logical identity).

If it is an objective fact (state of affairs in the world) that the moon is mind-independent, then "the moon is mind-independent" is a true proposition. What am I missing? — aletheist

What you're missing on the standard, received view, where I'll use correspondence since that's what you prefer, is that the reason that "The moon is mind-independent" is a true proposition is because the proposition, that is, the meaning of that declarative statement, corresponds to a fact, that the moon is mind-independent. It's not that they're identical, that they're the same thing. (If we weren't using correspondence and we were using something else, like consensus, say, what you'd be missing is that the proposition is held to be true by consensus (at least of the relevant parties).)

On my account, what you're missing is that (a) the proposition has no meaning aside from people thinking about it and assigning meaning to it (to the sentence), that (b) it has no relation to the states of affairs in question aside from people thinking about it and assigning meaning to the sentence, and (c) the property of corresponding (or whatever property we go with re truth theories) only obtains by judgment of an individual with respect to assigning meaning and thinking, in the context of that meaning, about the relation of the proposition with the facts in question.

No, of course not, since there is no such thing as objective truth. It is a fact, however. — Terrapin Station

Is "there is no such thing as objective truth" a true proposition? If not, then why should anyone believe it? And how can it nevertheless be a fact that there is no such thing as objective truth?

So, you're saying that in your ontology, facts are the meanings of (declarative) statements? — Terrapin Station

Every proposition purports to declare a fact. Every true proposition does declare a fact. If it is a fact that the moon is mind-independent, then "the moon is mind-independent" is a true proposition--i.e., an objective truth.

On my account, what you're missing is that (a) the proposition has no meaning aside from people thinking about it and assigning meaning to it (to the sentence), that (b) it has no relation to the states of affairs in question aside from people thinking about it and assigning meaning to the sentence, and (c) the property of corresponding (or whatever property we go with re truth theories) only obtains by judgment of an individual with respect to assigning meaning and thinking, in the context of that meaning, about the relation of the proposition with the facts in question. — Terrapin Station

All this is really saying is that every proposition is a symbol--a sign that represents its object by convention, rather than direct causal connection (index) or resemblance (icon). Words like "moon" and "mind-independent," as well as combinations thereof, only represent their objects because people interpret them as doing so; but the object of a true proposition, that which it represents, is still a fact--a state of affairs in the world.

I'm saying that "The moon exists independently of us/it exists extramentally" is an objective fact that in no way hinges on our thinking about it, our verification, etc. — Terrapin Station

So you're saying that the sentence describes a verification-transcendent fact. That's what I mean when I say that realism requires verification-transcendent truths. I'm just using the word "true" where you'd use the sentence "describes a fact".

So this is just a trivial terminological dispute. Whereas you use the word "true" to describe a sentence that's judged a certain way, I'm using the word "true" to describe a sentence that describes a fact.

Whereas you use the word "true" to describe a sentence that's judged a certain way, I'm using the word "true" to describe a sentence that describes a fact. — Michael

We seem to be on the same page here. By what other criterion, besides describing a fact, would someone judge a sentence--or rather, the proposition that a sentence expresses--to be true?

Is "there is no such thing as objective truth" a true proposition? — aletheist

It certainly is in my view, yes. Re why you should believe it, why you should believe anything is up to you--it depends on what you take to be good reasons to buy one thing versus another.

And how can it nevertheless be a fact that there is no such thing as objective truth? — aletheist

By that being what the world is like. When we do an inventory of the world, we do not find truth outside of minds making judgments about propositions.

Every proposition purports to declare a fact . . . — aletheist

If only you'd answered the question I asked you. Note that I'm not suggesting that you didn't answer it in your opinion. I asked a simple yes or no question, however, and you didn't respond with a direct yes or no or an explanation why a direct yes or no didn't work for you.

All this is really saying is that every proposition is a symbol--a sign that represents its object by convention, — aletheist

That's not something I agree with, so it's probably not "all that I'm really saying."

I'm using the word "true" to describe a sentence that describes a fact. — Michael

A sentence doesn't do anything except sit there as ink marks on a page or whatever outside of people thinking about it.

By what other criterion, besides describing a fact, would someone judge a sentence--or rather, the proposition that a sentence expresses--to be true? — aletheist

I personally use correspondence theory, but you seem to be educated enough about philosophy that you should be aware of several other popular truth theories, such as coherence, pragmatism, etc., no?

Is a corporation verification-transcendent? Ordinary existence claim: yes. Metaphysically? no.

I think I've got it.

When we do an inventory of the world, we do not find truth outside of minds making judgments about propositions. — Terrapin Station

Are you saying that truth is a property of judgments about propositions, and thus subjective, rather than a property of propositions themselves, and thus objective? I think of truth in the latter sense; our (subjective) judgments about propositions are then fallible assessments of whether they are (objectively) true.

I asked a simple yes or no question, however, and you didn't respond with a direct yes or no or an explanation why a direct yes or no didn't work for you. — Terrapin Station

I hoped that my answer would make it apparent why a direct yes or no did not work for me. Declarative statements express propositions, and propositions purport to represent facts. True propositions really do represent facts, but false propositions do not.

That's not something I agree with, so it's probably not "all that I'm really saying." — Terrapin Station

With what, exactly, do you disagree--that a proposition is a sign, or that it represents its object by convention?

I personally use correspondence theory ... — Terrapin Station

In that case--by what other criterion, besides describing a fact, would someone who subscribes to the correspondence theory judge a sentence--or rather, the proposition that a sentence expresses--to be true?

Are you saying that truth is a property of judgments about propositions, and thus subjective, rather than a property of propositions themselves, and thus objective? — aletheist

Well, first I don't agree that propositions are objective. I believe that meaning, as well as truth, is subjective. So truth is a (subjective) property of propositions, which are also subjective, and more specifically, it's a property that obtains via making a judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else (like facts when we're talking about correspondence theory).

Declarative statements express propositions, and propositions purport to represent facts. — aletheist

So then you do not believe that facts and propositions are the same thing. Or, "No" is your answer to the question I asked.

With what, exactly, do you disagree--that a proposition is a sign, or that it represents its object by convention? — aletheist

I disagree that "it represents its object by convention." I might also disagree that it's a sign, but it depends on just how you're defining sign.

In that case--by what other criterion, besides describing a fact, would someone who subscribes to the correspondence theory judge a sentence--or rather, the proposition that a sentence expresses--to be true? — aletheist

I'm pretty sure I explained this above, but at any rate, you judge it by assigning meaning to the terms in the declarative sentence (that's what a proposition is--the meaning of a statement) and then assessing (on correspondence theory, for example) whether that meaning matches the fact(s) you take the statement to pick out.

Well, first I don't agree that propositions are objective. — Terrapin Station

Would you mind clarifying what you mean by "subjective" vs. "objective"?

So truth is ... a property that obtains via making a judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else (like facts when we're talking about correspondence theory). — Terrapin Station

Are you saying that my judgment makes a proposition true or false, rather than its correspondence to the facts? If so, then it seems to me that I can never be wrong when I judge a particular proposition to be true, because that very judgment is what makes it true. Again, what am I missing?

So then you do not believe that facts and propositions are the same thing. Or, "No" is your answer to the question I asked. — Terrapin Station

Yes, no. :D

I disagree that "it represents its object by convention." I might also disagree that it's a sign, but it depends on just how you're defining sign. — Terrapin Station

A sign is anything that stands for something (its object) to something else (its interpretant). If a proposition does not represent its object--a purported fact--by convention, then how does it do so?

I'm pretty sure I explained this above, but at any rate, you judge it by assigning meaning to the terms in the declarative sentence (that's what a proposition is--the meaning of a statement) and then assessing (on correspondence theory, for example) whether that meaning matches the fact(s) you take the statement to pick out. — Terrapin Station

How does this differ significantly from my criterion that a proposition is true if, and only if, it represents a fact?

Realism is a rejection of the claim that we are confined exclusively to self reference.

Exclusive self reference leads to an ill defined infinite regress.

http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Self-Recursion.html
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-reference/

If we can reach any logical conclusion then this means that in reality we are not restricted exclusively to self reference.

If we can reach any logical conclusions than necessarily there is something which exists independently of our own minds which allows us to avoid the infinite regress of exclusive self reference..

If it were a reality that we were limited exclusively to self reference then there would be no way to prove that was true in reality and in fact there would be no way to prove anything because we would be trapped in an infinite loop of self regress inherent of exclusive self reference.

Would you mind clarifying what you mean by "subjective" vs. "objective"? — aletheist

Subjective = mental phenomena
Objective = external to mental phenomena

Are you saying that my judgment makes a proposition true or false, rather than its correspondence to the facts? — aletheist

A proposition corresponding to facts is a judgment about the proposition's relationship to facts.

If so, then it seems to me that I can never be wrong when I judge a particular proposition to be true, because that very judgment is what makes it true. — aletheist

What makes you wrong with respect to judging a proposition to be true or false is that a different judgment is reached, either by someone else, or by yourself at a different time. You're right or wrong in your truth-value assignments always to someone, by virtue of their own judgments, or by your own judgment (at a different time).

If a proposition does not represent its object--a purported fact--by convention, then how does it do so? — aletheist

By individuals thinking about the proposition in a representational way. That doesn't require any sort of convention or consensus.

How does this differ significantly from my criterion that a proposition is true if, and only if, it represents a fact? — aletheist

That would depend on whether what you're referring to is an individual thinking about things. If that's what you're referring to, then it might not differ.

A proposition corresponding to facts is a judgment about the proposition's relationship to facts. — Terrapin Station

A proposition is not itself a judgment; rather, a judgment is an evaluation of a proposition as either true or false. If I judge a proposition to be true, then that judgment is correct if and only if the proposition really does represent the fact that it purports to represent.

By individuals thinking about the proposition in a representational way. That doesn't require any sort of convention or consensus. — Terrapin Station

We typically represent propositions in words, which only represent anything by convention. Another way of saying it is that a symbol represents its object only because it will be interpreted as doing so.

A proposition is not itself a judgment; — aletheist

I didn't say that it was. I said a proposition corresponding to facts. In other words, the action or status of corresponding to facts is a judgment.

On my view there is no "really does represent a fact." That is, there is no objective representation.

words, which only represent anything by convention. — aletheist

Obviously I disagree on that. There certainly are conventions, but representation works via individuals thinking about things in a particular way, even when we're talking about conventions.

Another way of saying it is that a symbol represents its object only because it will be interpreted as doing so. — aletheist

I don't disagree with that but I see it as being about an individual interpreting something however they do.

In other words, the action or status of corresponding to facts is a judgment. — Terrapin Station

Whether a proposition corresponds to facts is itself an objective fact. The judgment does not determine such correspondence, it evaluates it, and can be mistaken in doing so.

There certainly are conventions, but representation works via individuals thinking about things in a particular way, even when we're talking about conventions. — Terrapin Station

If you are thinking about something concrete using words or other symbols, then you are representing it by conventions. The word "moon" represents the moon only by convention--that is what English-speakers typically call the very large spherical mass of rock that orbits the earth. Even if you are primarily using icons or indices, conventions are almost always also involved. You can draw a picture of the moon, but you will have to use certain artistic conventions in order to do so. You can simply point at the moon, but it is only by convention that this typically directs someone else's attention to it.

Whether a proposition corresponds to facts is itself an objective fact. The judgment does not determine such correspondence, it evaluates it, and can be mistaken in doing so. — aletheist

I certainly understand that view, I understand that it's the popular view, and I understand that it's your view.

However, it's not my view. Objective correspondence is an incoherent idea on my view. Whether a proposition corresponds to facts is a subjective judgment. Being mistaken is equally a subjective matter of evaluation, either by others or by oneself at another time.

In any event, there's not really any need to keep explaining the standard view in contradistinction to my own. It's not as if I'm not familiar with or do not understand the standard view. I just believe that the standard view has the facts wrong/is incoherent/etc. Other people think that I have the facts wrong obviously. I'm not going to switch over to the standard view unless you have some whopper of an argument for it/against my own view that I've not encountered before, and you're extremely unlikely to come up with an argument I've not encountered before because I've been around the block a couple times. I don't expect you to switch over to my view, either, for a number of reasons, including that I simply don't spend the time/energy on attempting that any longer online (because I believe it's generally futile to do that in these online contexts for a variety of reasons relating to how people interact online, especially when they're anonymous/when they don't also know each other offline).

If you are thinking about something concrete using words or other symbols, then you are representing it by conventions. — aletheist

What makes it a convention or not is simply whether it's the common/standard representation and/or way of representing. It doesn't have to be, though. You can do something (relatively) idiosyncratic. (It doesn't have to be completely unique to you to not be a convention, though.)

Objective correspondence is an incoherent idea on my view. — Terrapin Station

Interesting ... any other notion of correspondence is an incoherent idea on my view.

What makes it a convention or not is simply whether it's the common/standard representation and/or way of representing. — Terrapin Station

No, what makes it a convention is that it is arbitrary--there is nothing about the moon itself that makes "moon" the proper term for it in English. The only difference with a private, idiosyncratic convention is that it is not very useful for communicating with others.