I completely disagree with that. I'm looking for whether he provides any sort of argument to support that characterization of ontological realism. — Terrapin Station
And I'd not disagree with that in the slightest. But I already explained this. It's a correlative belief. It's not part of what realism refers to.
It's no different than it being a fact that very few atheists will say that evolutionary theory is hogwash. But atheism doesn't refer to a stance on evolutionary theory. The beliefs simply have a strong positive correlation with respect to atheism. — Terrapin Station
And how do we determine what realism refers to? — Michael
I'd say that for the most part they'd say "it means that I believe that the existence of the moon is independent of human belief and linguistic practices and that the truth of this belief is independent of human belief and linguistic practices". — Michael
By the way, what would you say the ontological stance is of someone who believes that the moon, etc. exist external-to-minds, independently of any persons, etc., but who doesn't believe that truth is mind-independent? You wouldn't say that they're anti-realists, would you? And you wouldn't say that they're realists. So what would you say they are? — Terrapin Station
Okay, but in my case, using Chalmers' terminology, my claim that the moon is independent is an ontological existence claim, not an "ordinary existence claim." So what stance is that in your view? — Terrapin Station
Also, I'm just curious if you recall why I do not believe that truth can not be mind-independent. As a hint: in my view, it's an objective fact that the moon is mind-independent. It is not an objective truth however, since no truths are objective.
That it's to be understood as saying that the truth of "the moon is independent" is verification-transcendent. — Michael
That's what distinguishes an ordinary from an ontological existence claim; — Michael
I don't think that this makes any sense. To say that the mind-independence of the moon is an objective fact just is to say that the truth of "the moon is mind-independent" is verification-transcendent. — Michael
Not per that Chalmers paper. Here are his definitions:
"An ordinary existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort
typically made in ordinary first-order discussion of the relevant subject matter. For example, a
typical mathematician’s assertion of ‘There are four prime numbers less than ten’ is an ordinary
existence assertion, as is a typical drinker’s assertion of ‘There are three glasses on the table’.
"An ontological existence assertion, to a first approximation, is an existence assertion of the sort
typically made in broadly philosophical discussion where ontological considerations are paramount.
For example, a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘Abstract objects exist’ is an ontological existence
assertion, as is a typical philosophers’ assertion of ‘For every set of objects, there exists an object
that is their mereological sum’."
Per those definitions, I'm making an ontological existence assertion about the moon being mind-independent/external to minds, yet I'm not saying anything about truth (being mind-independent/external to minds) in that. (By the way, for people reading this discussion but who haven't read the Chalmers paper, his discussion prior to that of Carnap's "internal"/"external" distinction with respect to existence questions in linguistic frameworks is helpful in understanding the distinction Chalmers is making.) — Terrapin Station
Truths and facts are not the same thing. Truth-value is a property of propositions, and on my account, it's a judgment about whether propositions have the property in question, as that's the only means by which the property can obtain (also on my account, propositions only obtain when people are thinking about them, as meaning is a mental phenomenon only). Facts, on the other hand, are states of affairs in the world.
As a hint: in my view, it's an objective fact that the moon is mind-independent. It is not an objective truth however, since no truths are objective. — Terrapin Station
Truths and facts are not the same thing. Truth-value is a property of propositions ... Facts, on the other hand, are states of affairs in the world. — Terrapin Station
And he continues by saying that "ordinary and ontological existence assertions differ with respect to an important sort of utterance evaluation, which I will call correctness", — Michael
If you reject verification-transcendent truth conditions then, as an ontological existence assertion, a claim like "the moon is mind-independent" can't be true. — Michael
Then you're just shifting the verification-transcendence from truth to facts, which hardly makes any difference. — Michael
Out of interest, what word do you use (if any) to describe a sentence that describes a fact if not "true"? — Michael
Is it an objective truth that no truths are objective? — aletheist
This distinction does not make any sense to me. — aletheist
All facts are propositions--ones that correspond to states of affairs in the world; — aletheist
If it is an objective fact (state of affairs in the world) that the moon is mind-independent, then "the moon is mind-independent" is a true proposition. What am I missing? — aletheist
No, of course not, since there is no such thing as objective truth. It is a fact, however. — Terrapin Station
So, you're saying that in your ontology, facts are the meanings of (declarative) statements? — Terrapin Station
On my account, what you're missing is that (a) the proposition has no meaning aside from people thinking about it and assigning meaning to it (to the sentence), that (b) it has no relation to the states of affairs in question aside from people thinking about it and assigning meaning to the sentence, and (c) the property of corresponding (or whatever property we go with re truth theories) only obtains by judgment of an individual with respect to assigning meaning and thinking, in the context of that meaning, about the relation of the proposition with the facts in question. — Terrapin Station
I'm saying that "The moon exists independently of us/it exists extramentally" is an objective fact that in no way hinges on our thinking about it, our verification, etc. — Terrapin Station
Whereas you use the word "true" to describe a sentence that's judged a certain way, I'm using the word "true" to describe a sentence that describes a fact. — Michael
Is "there is no such thing as objective truth" a true proposition? — aletheist
And how can it nevertheless be a fact that there is no such thing as objective truth? — aletheist
Every proposition purports to declare a fact . . . — aletheist
All this is really saying is that every proposition is a symbol--a sign that represents its object by convention, — aletheist
I'm using the word "true" to describe a sentence that describes a fact. — Michael
By what other criterion, besides describing a fact, would someone judge a sentence--or rather, the proposition that a sentence expresses--to be true? — aletheist
When we do an inventory of the world, we do not find truth outside of minds making judgments about propositions. — Terrapin Station
I asked a simple yes or no question, however, and you didn't respond with a direct yes or no or an explanation why a direct yes or no didn't work for you. — Terrapin Station
That's not something I agree with, so it's probably not "all that I'm really saying." — Terrapin Station
I personally use correspondence theory ... — Terrapin Station
Are you saying that truth is a property of judgments about propositions, and thus subjective, rather than a property of propositions themselves, and thus objective? — aletheist
Declarative statements express propositions, and propositions purport to represent facts. — aletheist
With what, exactly, do you disagree--that a proposition is a sign, or that it represents its object by convention? — aletheist
In that case--by what other criterion, besides describing a fact, would someone who subscribes to the correspondence theory judge a sentence--or rather, the proposition that a sentence expresses--to be true? — aletheist
Well, first I don't agree that propositions are objective. — Terrapin Station
So truth is ... a property that obtains via making a judgment about the relation of a proposition to something else (like facts when we're talking about correspondence theory). — Terrapin Station
So then you do not believe that facts and propositions are the same thing. Or, "No" is your answer to the question I asked. — Terrapin Station
I disagree that "it represents its object by convention." I might also disagree that it's a sign, but it depends on just how you're defining sign. — Terrapin Station
I'm pretty sure I explained this above, but at any rate, you judge it by assigning meaning to the terms in the declarative sentence (that's what a proposition is--the meaning of a statement) and then assessing (on correspondence theory, for example) whether that meaning matches the fact(s) you take the statement to pick out. — Terrapin Station
Would you mind clarifying what you mean by "subjective" vs. "objective"? — aletheist
Are you saying that my judgment makes a proposition true or false, rather than its correspondence to the facts? — aletheist
If so, then it seems to me that I can never be wrong when I judge a particular proposition to be true, because that very judgment is what makes it true. — aletheist
If a proposition does not represent its object--a purported fact--by convention, then how does it do so? — aletheist
How does this differ significantly from my criterion that a proposition is true if, and only if, it represents a fact? — aletheist
A proposition corresponding to facts is a judgment about the proposition's relationship to facts. — Terrapin Station
By individuals thinking about the proposition in a representational way. That doesn't require any sort of convention or consensus. — Terrapin Station
A proposition is not itself a judgment; — aletheist
words, which only represent anything by convention. — aletheist
Another way of saying it is that a symbol represents its object only because it will be interpreted as doing so. — aletheist
In other words, the action or status of corresponding to facts is a judgment. — Terrapin Station
There certainly are conventions, but representation works via individuals thinking about things in a particular way, even when we're talking about conventions. — Terrapin Station
Whether a proposition corresponds to facts is itself an objective fact. The judgment does not determine such correspondence, it evaluates it, and can be mistaken in doing so. — aletheist
If you are thinking about something concrete using words or other symbols, then you are representing it by conventions. — aletheist
Objective correspondence is an incoherent idea on my view. — Terrapin Station
What makes it a convention or not is simply whether it's the common/standard representation and/or way of representing. — Terrapin Station
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