Even thoughts take up space some where... — BrendanCount
All this talk about human lives being meaningless because of the vastness and indiference of the universe is just wrong footed in my opinion. I don't see how the meaning of our lives depends in any way on whether this universe is large or small, its stars hot or cold or whatever.The stars are hotter than I am, so what? — Kenosha Kid
. As Richard Feynman said, understanding something on another level only increases its beauty. — Kenosha Kid
What I am trying to say is: a scientific theory cannot contradict itself and still be worthy of the name "scientific". — Olivier5
All this talk about human lives being meaningless because of the vastness and indiference of the universe is just wrong footed in my opinion. I don't see how the meaning of our lives depends in any way on whether this universe is large or small, its stars hot or cold or whatever.
Astronomers study the universe for very human reasons: it's an interesting job if you can get it. — Olivier5
And that is exactly what I am saying: one cannot logically use reason to dismiss reason, but one can use it to explain how useful and beautiful it is. — Olivier5
Why can't I justify my claim to understand what a triangle is by drawing one? Why do I need to bring up a mental image, rather than a physical one on paper?As soon as you say, “I understand what a triangle is”, you’ve already brought up a mental image of one, otherwise you would have no means to justify such a claim.
A scientific answer is an answer the requires, in principle, only understanding consistent with current or future established empirically-verified scientific models of reality. I'm anticipating the question "What is a scientific model in this context?" whose answer will yield another "What is a scientific X in this context?".
we're a fleeting fizz at a tiny dot in a mundane part of a giant cosmos. It's an artefact of our biology that our word revolves around us. But it is great being a fizz, so make the most it — Kenosha Kid
Personally I wouldn't trade my present condition with that of, say, a galaxy. I'm just finishing some appricot jam, not the best I've ever done, but better than hydrogen and helium still... — Olivier5
Why can't I justify my claim to understand what a triangle is by drawing one? — jkg20
how do you see this:
"images are the schemata of our representations."
tallying with this, emphasis added:
"In truth, it is not images of objects, but schemata, which lie at the foundation of our pure sensuous conceptions"? — jkg20
“Redundancy,” “tautology,” ultimately end up meaning the same thing (this is a mere quibble with words), which is insignificance due to repetition. ‘Tautology’ literally means “repeating what has been said,” while ‘redundancy’ means, in the context of discourse, what’s useless, superfluous, or doesn’t add any meaning, because it’s been said before. Either way, you admit that your term (“rational reasoning”) is redundant, right, &, so, useless? This was basically my point; modifying the term “reasoning” with the adjective of “rational” is insignificant, for the former term is already qualified as such &, therefore, cannot be otherwise without invalidating the usage of the word altogether.It's not a tautology, it's a redundancy. To say ‘rational reasoning’ is a redundancy
Yet my original point was that one can’t make an argument against reason, in general, without already presupposing its validity; such that their argument would be inherently self-defeating.... because every argument we want to make for or against something will use reason in one way or another.
Yet in my view, it is a method, or rather the principle of a method, for justification, namely that which is analyzed apriori; although when experience is concerned, such as the particular aposteriori cause of a pandemic, reason is insufficient, & we must have recourse to observation or perception for obtaining what’s true.Reason is not a method of justifying anything. It is not the method of proving that the current pandemic is caused by a virus.
Sure, their contemporary rendering may be alien to his terminology, but the etymological root of both of them, i.e., “logos,” definitely isn’t; which denotes (what in English means) “reason, idea, word.” So this proves my point that a distinction between them is ultimately flawed, because the root of “reason,” which is the Latin “ratio,” derives from the Greek “logos”; & therefore these terms originally have one and the same thing, so that a distinction between them is inadmissible.Aristotle does not distinguish between logic and reason because these two terms are alien to his terminology.
Only in colloquial terms can the method of ‘science’ be called “rational,” as its mode of investigation isn’t apriori but aposteriori. Here “rational” can only simply or casually mean something like “prudent” or “judicious.” To call the method of science “rational,” in the formal sense, is a misnomer.As scientific methods have proved very effective in similar cases. And we call those methods and other similar ways of thinking rational or ‘reason’ for short.
“Reason,” in the original or truest sense of the word, is in no way equivalent with the sciences (as was stated, in my previous paragraph, about the term “rational” [i.e., that which pertains to ‘reason’]), if we understand that etymologically it means “to reckon, think.” Thus science, either currently or in the past, can’t be equated with “reason” or what’s “rational,” since it’s not based purely on reckoning or thought (this would be an awful mischaracterization of it).... he does distinguish between the study of the forms of argumentation and categorization (which would be roughly equivalent to today's logic) and the sciences (which would be equivalent to today's reason).
This misses that statements themselves are made up of components, which aren’t themselves statements; hence, in the “Categories,” Aristotle asserts, “None of these terms (‘substance’ or ‘quantity’ or ‘quality’ or ‘relationship’ or ‘the doing of something’ or ‘the undergoing of something’) is used on its own in any statement, but it is through their combination with one another that statement COMES INTO BEING.” Now these components are what any statement, let alone the passage of one statement to another, depend on to come about (as was just noted); & the being of these components themselves are subject to a certain principle, without which they couldn’t be formed. This principle is the primary principle of logic or reason, in general, & not only a rule on how to pass from one statement to another; for, again, it’s what allows for the possibility of an initial statement, as to the components of a statement, in the first place.Logic is therefore a method of deduction that allows us to move from premises to conclusions, from some statements to others. You can call that a method of ‘formation’ of statements, but not hide that this formation is a deductive procedure of passing from some statements to others.
Try to distinguish between different types of logic without having recourse to their different objects of consideration; the inability to do so will show that logic itself isn’t distinguishable, but only the objects to which it’s applied are. Aristotle even states this about science; that is, science doesn’t differ in general, the various types of science only being distinguished by their particular objects of consideration: “But all these sciences have marked out for themselves some particular thing that is, some particular class of objects, and concern themselves with that.” (“Metaphysics, Book IV)“Therefore, to say that there is ‘one’ logic (please, note this ‘one’) is an abstraction that we use in ordinary language to talk about or group the different logics. A logician will always specify the branch of logic in which he works.”
Yet if “today’s reason” isn’t equivalent with the sciences, or experience, as by their etymological definition “reason” & “experience” can’t be synonymous, I fail to see how you’ve distinguished between logic & reason, except by having “reason” to mean “experience,” i.e., except by a word-game? & if we don’t allow reason to mean experience (the latter being what the sciences are derived from), how then are logic & reason different? Well, if we don’t allow this linguistic exception, then it’s evident that they aren’t.I follow the current philosophy that makes a clear distinction between logic and reason, considering logic a part or instrument of rational procedures of thinking. Simply put, the concept of reason is broader than that of logic.
Again, since reason has an intrinsic form, it doesn’t need to go on to justify the bounds of its employment, for the bounds of its possible employment are self-evident in its form already; such that the only thing which needs to be justified is what’s maintained to be bounded in its actual employment, that is, whether such things are in accord or discord with it.Reason needs to justify the bounds of its proper employment
No, I didn’t suggest that reason can create contradictory domains. My point was that your claim that reason “... in and of itself doesn’t have a principle, but rather, constructs them” suggests that, since reason doesn’t have a principle of itself, i.e., a fundamental principle, it should then be able to create ones which contradict each other; for as it has no foundation in itself, there shouldn’t be a SINGLE principle which holds true in all of its constructs. Yet, since it can’t do such a thing, this proves that reason does of itself have a foundation, i.e., a fundamental principle, which pervades or holds true in all of its constructs — contrary to your claim about reason in & of itself.‘It’ being reason? So you suggest reason could create two mutually contradictory domains? Yeah...no. Not in its pursuit of knowledge as we understand it, and certainly not in the speculative epistemology I favor.
Contingent constructions of reason is possibility. It is irrational to suppose domains using principles for its rules, should operate on possibility, at the exclusion of necessity.
My point with the square circle goes back to showing that abstracts/concepts can only alter what they’ve created (like being able to alter the features of a pegasus or a unicorn); & if they can’t alter something, it’s precisely because they didn’t create it (such reasoning was to be applied to the principle or law of reason itself). Without sensations, abstracts/concepts couldn’t come to posses any shape, i.e., abstracts/concepts can’t of themselves purely intuit shapes (this admission is enough to satisfy my point). Now, the formation of a square circle can’t take place in any empirical intuition, such that the impossibility of which holds true in abstraction/conception as well & can’t be altered by it; this latter fact shows that abstraction/conception doesn’t determine or create what’s possible or impossible in empirical intuition, but it simply reflect them. So that the same is the case for the principle of reason; in other words, since what’s possible or impossible with reason can’t be determined or altered by abstraction/conception, i.e., abstraction/conception can’t form what’s contradictory, this goes to show that they’re not a creation of abstraction/conception, but it simply reflects them.A square meets these principles, a circle meets those principles, all constructed by reason a priori, which is sufficient for squared circle to be impossible, within the domain reason created: synthetic a priori cognitions.
My point was just that scientists are not "dismissing" reason by understanding it as emergent behaviour any more than non-materialist philosophers who describe it as immaterial. In fact, I'd say scientists would be taking it far more seriously. The immaterial world is a vague dumping ground for things not yet understood, which is ]back to what I said before: if someone had a meaningful non-materialist explanation for consciousness, that would be something to consider. But it seems to me the root if the conflict is not incompatible descriptions of consciousness but rather a matter of taste: "Out of bounds, science!" — Kenosha Kid
A “principle” is to be understood as one understands the word “law.” — aRealidealist
law of reason — in other words, that by which it governs or determines either the identity or formation of objects or percepts. — aRealidealist
it should then be able to create ones which contradict each other; for as it has no foundation in itself, there shouldn’t be a SINGLE principle which holds true in all of its constructs. Yet, since it can’t do such a thing — aRealidealist
reason itself must have a form by which it can possibly give principles — aRealidealist
abstracts/concepts can’t of themselves purely intuit shapes (this admission is enough to satisfy my point) — aRealidealist
abstracts/concepts can only alter what they’ve created (like being able to alter the features of a pegasus or a unicorn); & if they can’t alter something, it’s precisely because they didn’t create it — aRealidealist
From an etymological standpoint, in one way or another, “principle,” “law,” & “rule,” aren’t as different as you’re trying to make them seem, & they can be understood to coincide if one looks past nominal trifles.Not from where I sit. A law, to distinguish itself from a rule or a directive, adheres to the principle of necessity and universality. In that case, law presupposes the principle, whereas rules presuppose only the contingencies which justify them. It is absurd to think mathematics, and logic in general, is governed by mere rules.
Not in any way are we at a loss as to how we can experience mistaken identity, granted that the principle of reason is a reality; this is explainable in terms of the subject’s confused or erroneous knowledge, which is rationally distinguishable from clear or veritable knowledge. For example, an impersonator; one may think that they’re looking at the real Barack Obama, although they’re actually looking at an impersonator; which if only they knew all of the qualities constituting the real Obama, would reveal to them that they’re looking at an impersonator instead of the real Obama.If that is the case, we are at a loss as to how we can be mistaken in identifying an object, or, which is the same thing, not being able to identify some object at all. We are also at a loss to explain how it is we can be irrational, if reason adheres to the universality and absolute necessity of law.
Reason is lawful, that is, recognizable by its law or rule, in the same way the apriori forms of sensibility are; objects being subject to their invariant form. Thus reason is lawful because, like space or time, it determines things under a fixed law, rule or condition (which doesn’t change, like the objects that it subjects may).Object and precepts are determined by reason in accordance with a law, but reason is not itself lawful.
Reason itself IS THE LAW by which objects or percepts act lawfully.But I understand what you’re trying to say, in that reason, to be any real use to us, must act lawfully
Apriori, beauty is in the eye of the beholder. So I fail to see (no pun intended) how your example here is proof that rational or logical thought can form constructs which are in disagreement with itself? Since the disagreement of your example here pertains to AESTHETICS, rather than to logic or reason per se.Oh, but it can, and it does. It is the ground of all the differences in human thought: I think the Mona Lisa is an ugly broad because of the principles by which I judge beauty, you think the Mona Lisa is angelic because of....obviously....a different set of principles by which you judge beauty.
Reason no more attains or is assigned a form than space or time, as its character or form is what it is apriori & isn’t determined aposteriori, i.e., it’s not attained or assigned aposteriori or in time.Ok, fine. What form does reason have, that isn’t assigned to it by reason? How would reason attain its form?
Right, as I’ve said in my past replies, it’s the form or condition by which human thought is possible; it being something actual apriori (like the forms of sensibility are), through which the latter (thought) is possible.If reason has a form just because it inheres in human subjects, then it is no different than being a condition by which the reality of the human qua human rationality, is possible.
It should be noted that the way which I say that one “creates” in conception/abstraction is somewhat similar to how one would “create,” say, a clubhouse. In this way, the materials that are used to create aren’t themselves what are created, but they’re merely assembled, arranged, & joined in a way which they weren’t originally given. So, to be sure, I’m not saying that one’s concepts/abstracts create the materials that they utilize, but that one can create or form artificial objects of thought, such as a pegasus or unicorn, with materials which are already given.Fine. How? How does a concept alter, regardless of the actual reality of that to which they are applied? Bearing in mind a concept represents a thing or a possible thing. An impossible thing is, of course, inconceivable, that is, has no concepts belonging to it at all. The concept of “dog” (“unicorn”) presupposes the object (possible object) dog (unicorn), otherwise, to what does the concept relate? If the thing is presupposed, how in the hell can a concept create it?
Now, a thing can be altered, certainly. A dog with a bushy tail is one thing, a dog with a non-bushy tail in not that thing, merely from the different constituent concepts of “tail”. Obviously, if this is true, but if it is true because concepts themselves are the causality for the altering, then we must admit concepts think. Say wha?!?!?!?
Concepts don’t create, they facilitate and that which is facilitated, is understanding. So if you want to say concepts create understanding, I’ll let that slide, to wit: I can cognize what a unicorn would be, whether or not there is one, merely from the concepts my understanding says it must have in order to even be a unicorn. Understanding being nothing but a part of my reason, in the case of unicorns a priori; in the case of dogs, a posteriori.
Thanks, friend, I do appreciate the compliment.As for the rest.....you think idealistically, so kudos for that.
That is not why they are considered eccentric, but because of their interpretation of the problem of observation in quantum theory. Winger didn't get a Nobel Prize for sticking the consciousness of the observer in the middle. As far as I know.Winger won a Nobel, and Von Neumann — Wayfarer
it is nothing substantially speaking, I insist. — David Mo
Modern realism, generally, has the conceit that it can see the world ‘as it really is’, — Wayfarer
The problem is the role of observation, not the human soul. This "soul" thing is a sensationalist headline.That’s why there are still so many books about the topic subtitled the ‘battle for the soul of science’ or the ‘battle for reality’. — Wayfarer
I don't know if you've noticed that you're describing consciousness all the time in terms of ideas (of a pig), perceptions (of things), and sensations (of pain). If we don't talk about them we can't talk about any consciousness.Let's say you are watching something extraordinary like a pig flying, then you accidentally put your finger in boiling water. I doubt you would have any thoughts about it, all your thinking would be occupied with trying to believe that you were really looking at a flying pig. — Punshhh
I don't know what the problem of materialists is, but the problem of idealists is not to have problems. When they can't explain something, they put a ghost in the machine. Or an invisible dragon, if they're Chinese. And it always works!The brain mind issue is a problem for materialists. For idealists not so — Pop
You don't need a purpose to sing a song, but I find it helps going through life... :-)I'm screaming out some tunes at the recording studio to no obvious purpose :) — Kenosha Kid
I asked you for a thought proven to be true and you mentioned a finger in boiling water, it is you who are confused. My next point was that your body will act independent of your mind and consciousness (something else you use interchangeably).I don't know if you've noticed that you're describing consciousness all the time in terms of ideas (of a pig), perceptions (of things), and sensations (of pain). If we don't talk about them we can't talk about any consciousness.
I note that the one attribute you are not prepared to remove in your description of the void of consciousness is the body. So you are secretly relying on it.I think you confuse the concept of consciousness as nothing with the concept of non-existence.
You can, it has the property of being alive, it is living. Now prove that things live without being conscious?Consciousness exists, but you cannot define it or describe it with consistent properties.
This intrigues me, I also have experienced it thus, but I somehow I don't think you mean it the same way.That's why I say it's nothing. Perhaps it would be more appropriate to say that it is a void.
Living.Choose the word you like best.
his was basically my point; modifying the term “reasoning” with the adjective of “rational” is insignificant, — aRealidealist
It's not just colloquially. When Kant speaks of metaphysics he adds the term "pure" reason because it claims to be the science of the a priori. But it does not occur to anyone to say that empirical science is not rational. It's just not pure. In any case, empirical reasoning is the opposite of the irrational, which is what we are talking about, I think.Only in colloquial terms can the method of ‘science’ be called “rational,” as its mode of investigation isn’t apriori but aposteriori. — aRealidealist
“Reason,” in the original or truest sense of the word, — aRealidealist
They're two different problems.I asked you for a thought proven to be true and you mentioned a finger in boiling water, it is you who are confused. My next point was that your body will act independent of your mind and consciousness (something else you use interchangeably). — Punshhh
If consciousness is not strictly materialist in origin- being nothing more than a complex product of chemical reactions and electrical impulses of cells, then why can we completely alter the state of consciousness/our experience with chemicals, drugs or neurotransmitters.
I understand that this is a reductive way of thinking regarding one of the most complicated phenomena in existence but it just strikes me that if I add Chemical A to experience B I get an altered experience - C. Such effects made by mood enhancers, antidepressants, mood stabilizers or anesthetics, tranquilizers and painkillers.
How do you reconcile these observed medical qualities with ideas such as pan-psychism consciousness is a fundamental force of nature, or inherent to all matter, or that it is something beyond and larger than the brain or part of gods mind or an illusion? — Benj96
the possibilities & impossibilities of the sensible world aren’t determined by abstracts/concepts; for if they were, then they could be altered by them, like the features of the artificial creations of one’s abstracts/concepts — aRealidealist
materials that are used to create aren’t themselves what are created — aRealidealist
Reason itself IS THE LAW by which objects or percepts act lawfully. — aRealidealist
reason isn’t determined by abstracts/concepts. — aRealidealist
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