No. The question is just a different way of framing the hard problem of why there are two very different perspectives of mental processes, but only one type of perspective for everything else, like chairs, mountains and trees.Because the fact that I am bert1 allows me two different perspectives to examine bert1's mental processes: introspection and extropsection. Whereas other people only have extrospection as a way of observing bert1's mental processes (to the extent that the can do so at all).
Is that question equivalent to "Why am I some particular person, rather than no one in particular?"? — bert1
This is where we have to be careful to differentiate the two distinct ways that "form" is used, one referring to our description of the thing, which is posterior to the thing, and the other referring to the creation of the thing, which is prior to the thing. So we have a "formula" or blueprint, by which we create a thing, and a "form" which is a description of a thing, and each is a distinct sense of "form". — Metaphysician Undercover
Now, our subject of inquiry is the rules or laws which apply to forms being responsible for invariability. In describing a form, the rules are descriptive, in creating a form, the rules are prescriptive. Notice that both refer to what "ought" to be done, therefore the two types are reducible to a single type rule, as prescriptive rules. So the rules and laws, which are responsible for the creation of forms, of both types, are of the prescriptive type, rules of how things ought to be done. "Ought" implies the activity of intention, final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover
We can apply this back against the dilemma of variable (indefinite) relations, and consolidated (definite) forms. We see that a "relation" implies members, elements, particles, or some form of a multitude, distinct differences which are related in that condition of variability. And, there is some form of "ought" which is applied to these relations which converts the existence from variable to invariable, creating a form. The existence of human beings provides our example of individual members, with intention, acting with final cause. We see that the final cause and intention inheres within the particulars, who produce principles from within their own minds, as rules to act by, each person attempting to constrain one's own acts with personal principles which they adhere to. Therefore from this example, we can see that the invariance required to produce a form comes from within the individual members, as final cause, so that all forms are bottom-up. — Metaphysician Undercover
You don't seem to understand, logic is necessity. What is logically so is necessarily so. What is logically impossible is necessarily impossible. How can you introduce a form of necessity which is outside of logic? You could appeal to a "need" in the sense of pragmatism, and final cause, as the means to an end, what you call "usefulness", but then your proposed end needs to be justified. This justification is a process of logic. So you say, mathematics is "useful" for understanding, but to use mathematics which produces conclusions which are unintelligible is misunderstanding. That is the position we're in with quantum mechanics. Imaginary numbers, infinities, and such, are used for the sake of prediction, so they are useful, but the result can in no way be described as understanding. If we apply good principles of logic, and rid ourselves pragmatic necessity in favour of logical necessity, we have a true course toward understanding. When your pragmatic end must be justified, on what would you pretend to base any other form of true necessity on, other than logic? — Metaphysician Undercover
What are ‘things’? This is where the assumption of a self-conscious system, in recognising concepts or things, distorts the way we understand the structure of reality. If it were not for our temporal relation to the ‘thing’, then there is no other distinction between its description and creation. — Possibility
This ‘thing’ we create is conceptual, in relation to what is real, and so the blueprint is a rendering of relational structure, the limited perception of which consolidates that particular form within the mind. Existentially prior to the ‘thing’ is only a relation to what is real: pure possibility structured by the limited perception of the observer (who consolidates) and the limited expression of the observed. — Possibility
And again, this assumption of intentionality in time turns creativity into specific rules of how events ought to be done, rather than a variability in how events can be done, limited by awareness, connection and collaboration. ‘Ought’ implies a priori knowledge, an illusion created by the temporal shift of conscious perception, constrained to a logical structure of time. — Possibility
The invariance required to describe a ‘thing’ is an internal relation of perceived potentiality, but no such invariance is required to create the ‘thing’ prior to describing its form, and no such existence need be assumed. — Possibility
I’m not saying that mathematics produces conclusions that are unintelligible, but that they make use of imaginary numbers and infinities - allowing for their illogical possibility - to produce intelligible conclusions from what would otherwise remain unintelligible. This is not misunderstanding - rather, it enables understanding unbound by logic. — Possibility
I found a quote by the biologist J B S Haldane which makes the point I was trying to get across — Wayfarer
...For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true.
This is because, as I said, logical necessity can’t be equated to physical necessity. And this has nothing intrinsically to do with whether it’s a ‘human being figuring it out’ or not - although, as it happens, humans are the only beings we know of who can figure it out. But were some other sentient rational beings to exist somewhere else in the universe, they too would be obligated to recognise logical necessity, and for the same reasons - even if their brains were configured completely differently to our own. — Wayfarer
even a dumb machine can infer accurately. — Kenosha Kid
the prosperity of untrue beliefs. — Kenosha Kid
The physical processes by which we arrive at and recall beliefs are not separable from the beliefs themselves. — Kenosha Kid
The fact that a human and a sentient Martian can both figure out the law of the excluded middle demonstrates the efficacy of a highly evolved brain: — Kenosha Kid
If you believe that your beliefs are true because you believe in them, you have a circularity problem. — Kenosha Kid
But having the belief is not what makes it true: rather, we need a brain that handles data accurately in order to form good beliefs — Kenosha Kid
if there were machines that resembled our bodies and if they imitated our actions as much as is morally possible, we would always have two very certain means for recognizing that, none the less, they are not genuinely human. The first is that they would never be able to use speech, or other signs composed by themselves, as we do to express our thoughts to others. For one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs—for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do. The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action. — Rene Descartes
Machines infer nothing. They perform calculations, on the basis of which their operators may make inferences. — Wayfarer
How can you say we arrive at beliefs by 'a physical process'? How is the process 'physical' as distinct from cultural, emotional, and so on? — Wayfarer
Brains don't 'handle data'. — Wayfarer
What Haldane's quote illustrates, is that rational necessity, or logical necessity, is of a different order to physical necessity. — Wayfarer
The precise causes of my beliefs are important, not solely because of the physical mechanisms in the brain that yield them, or the physical configuration that stores them, but because the _external_ causes are not equal. — Kenosha Kid
You can train a neural network to infer, say, the interests of a shopper looking for t-shirts based on similar shoppers who bought t-shirts. The operator infers nothing: they accept the inference, until evidence suggests the neural net is systematically wrong. The error is in assuming that humans do the same thing in a significantly different way. — Kenosha Kid
Handling data is precisely what brains do, with or without the capacity for reason. — Kenosha Kid
Minds don't process binary units. — Wayfarer
The problem with process philosophy and assuming "events" as fundamental, is that traditionally relations would be inherent within the classical description of an event. An event in the classical sense is a changing of relations between things. Now, as the fundamental element, the "event" is the thing. So we have two new problems. How do we describe what is internal to the fundamental "event", so as to make it consistent with the traditional "event"? What is changing inside that fundamental event to justify calling it an event? And the second problem is on what principles do we relate one event to another, to represent the passing of time. At this point, since we do not have any real understanding of the passing of time, and science turns it into something subjective, the trend is to appeal to panpsychism to justify the apparent continuity of the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover
Process philosophy is a starting point - I don’t see ‘events’ as fundamental, rather I see the capacity to describe reality in terms of a variability of relations between 4D ‘events’ rather than a changing of relations between 3D ‘objects’ as simply a step towards a more accurate perspective. This term ‘thing’ refers to an indeterminate concept - neither particularly three, four or five-dimensional, rather whatever is being related to. — Possibility
The unfolding universe is commonly viewed as one all-encompassing event: a temporal duration of changing relations between physical matter, from the ‘Big Bang’ to heat death (or some other predicted future end). — Possibility
I don't see how there could be variability in such relations. An event is something which has occurred in the past, therefore its relations are fixed, invariable, as the facts about the past. There might be variability in our descriptions of these relations, but there is no variability in the actual relations. As for the future, there is no such thing as events in the future, because the future has not occurred yet, so there is only possibilities for events in our understanding of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover
An event in the classical sense is a changing of relations between things. — Metaphysician Undercover
An event only occurs, or unfolds, at the present, as time passes. It doesn't make sense to speak of past events as occurring or unfolding, because they've already occurred, nor does it make sense to speak of future events as occurring. If we say that the present necessarily has temporal extension, then we can extend the present as far as we want into the past, and say that all time until now is the present, but we can't extend it this way into the future. The future has not materialized yet, so there really is no time on that side of the present. So as much as we can extend the present into the past, by understanding the real fixed relations of real past events, we cannot extend the present into the future this way because there are no real fixed events, only what is imagined, predicted, or inferred. — Metaphysician Undercover
When you describe an event in the past, this is relative to a fixed point of observation: a relating event in itself. So the ‘actual relations’ you’re referring to as invariable are a relation between these two events, not the relations of the event itself - the variability of which transcends this description. — Possibility
Right - so describing an ‘event in the future’ is not just a mere possibility, but can more specifically be a calculated probability or potentiality wave that maps changing relations between observables. — Possibility
Time is bound by materialisation - and events ‘fixed’ - only in relation to a point of observation. — Possibility
So an event can only be observed in matter as time passes, but it exists regardless of the observer’s position as a four-dimensional structure. — Possibility
It is not a fixed point of observation, the present is not fixed. And the present is not an event itself. It is contradictory to call a fixed point an event, as you do here, "event" is incompatible with "fixed point". Clearly, what we are discussing is whether or not it is true that relations are variable, as in your definition.
In my understanding of "event" as something in the past, the relations of any event are necessarily fixed, invariable, so it makes no sense to say that there is a variability which transcends the description. The opposite is the case. There is variability in description, but no variability in what has actually occurred, therefore no variability in the relations between the events which actually occurred. — Metaphysician Undercover
Talking about an event in the future cannot properly be called a "description" because that refers to observation, there is nothing observed in the future. Talking about a supposed future event is a projection, not a description. — Metaphysician Undercover
Time is bound by materialisation - and events ‘fixed’ - only in relation to a point of observation.
— Possibility
I disagree with this too. Materialization is bound by time. And the point of observation is also bound by time. — Metaphysician Undercover
So an event can only be observed in matter as time passes, but it exists regardless of the observer’s position as a four-dimensional structure.
— Possibility
An event can only occur as time passes, regardless of observation. The occurrence of an event requires the passing of time, whether or not there is an observer. — Metaphysician Undercover
You’re missing my point here, which is about describing an event, as opposed to observing it. — Possibility
‘The present’ is not a universal perspective, but a subjective one. — Possibility
In reality, your position of observation is an ongoing event that changes in relation to the event you describe. So each time you describe that event, it is from a different ‘fixed’ perspective. — Possibility
Each description is inclusive of a fixed point of observation, to which we relate as ongoing events. — Possibility
So this variability that I’m talking about is in a relation not between two events that have actually occurred in relation to an observation, but between the event and an ongoing observation. — Possibility
And yet we describe objects of our imagination - a ‘description’ is just using words to render information, and doesn’t necessitate observation, only perception. — Possibility
But where an ‘event’ or ‘time’ appears infinite, it is really bound by the perceived potentiality of the conscious observer. And where potential appears infinite, it is bound by imagined possibility. — Possibility
Time exists as a four-dimensional structure, but passes only in relation to a conscious observer — Possibility
I believe a description is just an extension of observation, it is to recount what has been observed. The two are not "opposed". — Metaphysician Undercover
How can this make sense to you? If "your position of observation is an ongoing event that changes in relation to the event you describe", then it is contradictory to say that you have a "fixed perspective". What could possibly indicate that your perspective is "fixed" if it is an ongoing change? — Metaphysician Undercover
So this variability that I’m talking about is in a relation not between two events that have actually occurred in relation to an observation, but between the event and an ongoing observation.
— Possibility
Perhaps I can make sense of this statement. You have posited an ongoing observation which you say is itself an event. Now you say that the variability is not between two events, but between an event and the ongoing observation. The ongoing observation is an event though. See why I can't get anywhere in trying to understand what you are saying? — Metaphysician Undercover
But where an ‘event’ or ‘time’ appears infinite, it is really bound by the perceived potentiality of the conscious observer. And where potential appears infinite, it is bound by imagined possibility.
— Possibility
Here again, I have a hard time understanding your use of words. How could something appear to be infinite? I don't think "infinite has any sort of appearance at all, because no one has ever sensed it. I think what we do is designate something as infinite, like the natural numbers. We say something like, let's make the natural number infinite, so that we have the capacity to count any magnitude we come across. But mathematics uses "infinite" in strange ways, so that sometimes when they apply mathematics to a problem, infinity will pop up, and people will say that it appears like the thing referred to is infinite. But that's just faulty mathematics, making the thing which the math is being applied to appear as infinite, when in reality the thing just cannot be understood by those mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover
Time exists as a four-dimensional structure, but passes only in relation to a conscious observer
— Possibility
This I completely disagree with. I think that geology demonstrates to us that time was passing before there were conscious observers on earth. — Metaphysician Undercover
An observation is a process of relating one 4D structure to another; what has been observed is a 4D structure of difference between them.
A description is a linguistic rendering of information, not necessarily confined to what has been observed. It includes linguistic structures, probabilistic patterns of prediction and concepts that enable what has been observed to make sense in a conceptual system. — Possibility
Complicated, but not contradictory. Having described an event, your perspective of it may have changed. ‘Half an hour ago, I ate crab sticks over there’ describes an event from a perspective which is ‘fixed’ within the description. You would need to describe that same event differently a week later, because the description has a fixed perspective, but NOT the observer. — Possibility
Well of course not, if you’re only going to read half the sentence. This is difficult enough to explain without you skim-reading. Yes, the ongoing observation is an event, but not an observed “event that has actually occurred”, as you were arguing. — Possibility
What I’m referring to is thinking of ‘time’ as boundless. — Possibility
We disagree fundamentally here, and I see no route to compromise. I think a description is necessarily confined to something observed, and I see no need for a description to relate one 4d structure to another. You hold the opposite to this. — Metaphysician Undercover
This doesn't resolve the contradiction. To simply describe the perspective as fixed, when you have already premised that the perspective is changing, means that either your premise that the perspective is changing, or your description which includes a fixed perspective, is false. — Metaphysician Undercover
Observation is unconscious sensory interaction, perception is a process of consciousness that integrates sensory information, — Possibility
The description is false — Possibility
In my mind you have these two reversed. Perceiving is the simple receiving of the sensory information. It may or may not require consciousness as a necessity, this is debatable. If it does require consciousness it's to a very minimal extend, as we can perceive things in a very limited way, when we are asleep, and these sensations might enter our dreams, or wake us up. Observation is a noticing of what is happening, so this is necessarily consciousness at work. So observation requires apperception as a sort of medium between perceiving and observing. To make our perceptions into observations requires apperception which is the conscious acknowledgement of the act of perceiving. This is why I say that observation is very close to describing. Describing is just one step up from observing, in the conscious mind, as the act of putting what is observed into words. — Metaphysician Undercover
The description is false
— Possibility
But don't we have as a goal, to make true descriptions. Why would you say that descriptions are necessarily false, if we have as a goal to make true descriptions? — Metaphysician Undercover
Language doesn’t lend itself to clarity here. My understanding of ‘observation’ as not requiring consciousness comes from the definition used in physics. Noticing something happening is different to noticing what is happening. So observation often refers to the content as well as the act of observing. The former depends on consciousness, the latter does not. — Possibility
Sorry Possibility, but I've read this over numerous times and I just can't apprehend the distinction you're trying to make. To me, "noticing" implies necessarily a discernment of "what is happening", even if that discernment might be judged by another as completely wrong.
Now I do not see how you proceed to your conclusion "observation often refers to the content as well as the act of observing". Are you saying that there is a verb "observation" which refers to the act, and there is a noun "observation" which refers to a stated description, "an observation"? If so, how does this relate to the distinction described above? Both, the active "observation", and the noun, "an observation", involve a discernment of "what is happening". If the act of observation requires no such discernment, then you might say that a rock is observing. — Metaphysician Undercover
but if we can discern that time was ‘passing’ before there were conscious observers, then differences such as molecules relating to each other over time must have been observed non-consciously (ie. integrated into molecular structures) for this temporally differentiated information to be perceived now. — Possibility
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