Because the fact that I am bert1 allows me two different perspectives to examine bert1's mental processes: introspection and extropsection. Whereas other people only have extrospection as a way of observing bert1's mental processes (to the extent that the can do so at all).

Is that question equivalent to "Why am I some particular person, rather than no one in particular?"? — bert1

No. The question is just a different way of framing the hard problem of why there are two very different perspectives of mental processes, but only one type of perspective for everything else, like chairs, mountains and trees.

Where is bert1 relative bert1's mental processes? Where is bert1 relative to bert1's digestive processes? Are you saying that bert1 IS bert1's mental processes?

This is where we have to be careful to differentiate the two distinct ways that "form" is used, one referring to our description of the thing, which is posterior to the thing, and the other referring to the creation of the thing, which is prior to the thing. So we have a "formula" or blueprint, by which we create a thing, and a "form" which is a description of a thing, and each is a distinct sense of "form". — Metaphysician Undercover

What are ‘things’? This is where the assumption of a self-conscious system, in recognising concepts or things, distorts the way we understand the structure of reality. If it were not for our temporal relation to the ‘thing’, then there is no other distinction between its description and creation. This ‘thing’ we create is conceptual, in relation to what is real, and so the blueprint is a rendering of relational structure, the limited perception of which consolidates that particular form within the mind. Existentially prior to the ‘thing’ is only a relation to what is real: pure possibility structured by the limited perception of the observer (who consolidates) and the limited expression of the observed.

Now, our subject of inquiry is the rules or laws which apply to forms being responsible for invariability. In describing a form, the rules are descriptive, in creating a form, the rules are prescriptive. Notice that both refer to what "ought" to be done, therefore the two types are reducible to a single type rule, as prescriptive rules. So the rules and laws, which are responsible for the creation of forms, of both types, are of the prescriptive type, rules of how things ought to be done. "Ought" implies the activity of intention, final cause. — Metaphysician Undercover

And again, this assumption of intentionality in time turns creativity into specific rules of how events ought to be done, rather than a variability in how events can be done, limited by awareness, connection and collaboration. ‘Ought’ implies a priori knowledge, an illusion created by the temporal shift of conscious perception, constrained to a logical structure of time. But the structure of time in reality is relative - so the notion of ‘final cause’ or ‘activity of intention’, and the temporal distinction between descriptive and prescriptive ‘form’, don’t even make sense in relation to reality.

We can apply this back against the dilemma of variable (indefinite) relations, and consolidated (definite) forms. We see that a "relation" implies members, elements, particles, or some form of a multitude, distinct differences which are related in that condition of variability. And, there is some form of "ought" which is applied to these relations which converts the existence from variable to invariable, creating a form. The existence of human beings provides our example of individual members, with intention, acting with final cause. We see that the final cause and intention inheres within the particulars, who produce principles from within their own minds, as rules to act by, each person attempting to constrain one's own acts with personal principles which they adhere to. Therefore from this example, we can see that the invariance required to produce a form comes from within the individual members, as final cause, so that all forms are bottom-up. — Metaphysician Undercover

‘Relation’ does imply difference, but not necessarily existence, so any difference need not be so distinct. This ‘ought’ which converts an assumed existence from variable to invariable is a function of consciousness. The invariance required to describe a ‘thing’ is an internal relation of perceived potentiality, but no such invariance is required to create the ‘thing’ prior to describing its form, and no such existence need be assumed. Creativity derives from a relation to non-existent possibility, limited by awareness, connection and collaboration. It is the perceived variability in this relation that enables creativity, intentionality and the determination of ‘personal principles’.

You don't seem to understand, logic is necessity. What is logically so is necessarily so. What is logically impossible is necessarily impossible. How can you introduce a form of necessity which is outside of logic? You could appeal to a "need" in the sense of pragmatism, and final cause, as the means to an end, what you call "usefulness", but then your proposed end needs to be justified. This justification is a process of logic. So you say, mathematics is "useful" for understanding, but to use mathematics which produces conclusions which are unintelligible is misunderstanding. That is the position we're in with quantum mechanics. Imaginary numbers, infinities, and such, are used for the sake of prediction, so they are useful, but the result can in no way be described as understanding. If we apply good principles of logic, and rid ourselves pragmatic necessity in favour of logical necessity, we have a true course toward understanding. When your pragmatic end must be justified, on what would you pretend to base any other form of true necessity on, other than logic? — Metaphysician Undercover

You’re assuming that necessity must be logical because it needs to be justified, but I’m not under any illusion that I can justify the necessity of illogical possibility - because I recognise that it is as unnecessary as it is necessary. I’m not saying that mathematics produces conclusions that are unintelligible, but that they make use of imaginary numbers and infinities - allowing for their illogical possibility - to produce intelligible conclusions from what would otherwise remain unintelligible. This is not misunderstanding - rather, it enables understanding unbound by logic. When we apply good principles of logic, we are not ridding ourselves of pragmatic necessity, but exploring beyond its bounds, to enable a more accurate understanding of the ‘rules and laws’ of pragmatism. When we act, we are still bound by pragmatic necessity. And when we communicate (ie. when we attempt to justify), we are still bound by logical necessity. But when we relate, we are bound by neither.

I am limited with time this week, but I hope to get to the rest of your post soon.

What are ‘things’? This is where the assumption of a self-conscious system, in recognising concepts or things, distorts the way we understand the structure of reality. If it were not for our temporal relation to the ‘thing’, then there is no other distinction between its description and creation. — Possibility

The temporality of a thing is its reality. Having temporal extension makes a thing real because there is no such thing as existence which is just an instant (no extension in time). Therefore "our temporal relation to the 'thing'" is our access to the thing's reality.

This ‘thing’ we create is conceptual, in relation to what is real, and so the blueprint is a rendering of relational structure, the limited perception of which consolidates that particular form within the mind. Existentially prior to the ‘thing’ is only a relation to what is real: pure possibility structured by the limited perception of the observer (who consolidates) and the limited expression of the observed. — Possibility

The blueprint of the thing, which precedes the thing's material existence, is just as much a part of the thing's reality as is the thing's material existence, because it is a necessary part of the thing's existence.
So to remove this part of the thing's existence, as not real, is to make a false representation of the thing's reality.

And again, this assumption of intentionality in time turns creativity into specific rules of how events ought to be done, rather than a variability in how events can be done, limited by awareness, connection and collaboration. ‘Ought’ implies a priori knowledge, an illusion created by the temporal shift of conscious perception, constrained to a logical structure of time. — Possibility

You are reversing what I said. You had mentioned rules, and I said rules imply "ought". Ought implies intention. But intention does not necessarily imply ought, that's why the will is free. So the person with intent makes a plan to bring about the desired material situation, and this is reality. But whether or not the person ought to do this is another issue altogether. However, if we start with the assumption of rules which one ought to follow, then intention is already implied. So intentionality does not necessarily turn creativity into rules and "ought", that's a misrepresentation which is a reversal of reality.

The invariance required to describe a ‘thing’ is an internal relation of perceived potentiality, but no such invariance is required to create the ‘thing’ prior to describing its form, and no such existence need be assumed. — Possibility

But this is the difficult point. In order for a thing to be a thing, it must have a form, and this implies invariance. Because we believe that there were things in existence before human intention, we want to remove the intention, which we know to cause invariance by the examples above, so that we can have a real thing which is not dependent on intention. We cannot say that "no such invariance is required to create the 'thing'", because to be a thing implies such invariance. And, we have no principles which will tell us where that invariance could come from other than intention. So where can we go?

I’m not saying that mathematics produces conclusions that are unintelligible, but that they make use of imaginary numbers and infinities - allowing for their illogical possibility - to produce intelligible conclusions from what would otherwise remain unintelligible. This is not misunderstanding - rather, it enables understanding unbound by logic. — Possibility

When the conclusions contain contradiction, such as the idea that the same energy is transmitted both as a wave and as a particle, this must be classed as misunderstanding. Despite your claim that this might be somehow be "intelligible" it is not. There is no such thing as understanding which is unbound by logic. You should easily see that this is illogical and clearly a misunderstanding. Logic is the means for understanding, so anything outside the bounds of logic cannot be understood.

I found a quote by the biologist J B S Haldane which makes the point I was trying to get across — Wayfarer

Good things come to those who wait.

For if my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of atoms in my brain I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true.

...

This is because, as I said, logical necessity can’t be equated to physical necessity. And this has nothing intrinsically to do with whether it’s a ‘human being figuring it out’ or not - although, as it happens, humans are the only beings we know of who can figure it out. But were some other sentient rational beings to exist somewhere else in the universe, they too would be obligated to recognise logical necessity, and for the same reasons - even if their brains were configured completely differently to our own. — Wayfarer

He's right insofar as the processes themselves don't speak to the truth of a belief they culminate in, as evidenced by the prosperity of untrue beliefs. He's wrong insofar as even a dumb machine can infer accurately. If you believe that your beliefs are true because you believe in them, you have a circularity problem. The precise causes of my beliefs are important, not solely because of the physical mechanisms in the brain that yield them, or the physical configuration that stores them, but because the _external_ causes are not equal. "Because my parents taught me" is not the equal of empiricism, for instance.

If it were the case that we only believe true things, he might be presenting something of a mystery. As it happens, he's not stating anything but his own additional belief about his beliefs, which is, to me, obviously bogus.

The physical processes by which we arrive at and recall beliefs are not separable from the beliefs themselves. Knowing more about how these work sheds light on how we can avoid false beliefs, e.g. due to propaganda, which is the art of exploiting the errors and limitations of brains in forging beliefs and making decisions based on them. The fact that a human and a sentient Martian can both figure out the law of the excluded middle demonstrates the efficacy of a highly evolved brain: it would be of no benefit to have a brain that inferred wrongly most of the time, which is why we build good beliefs on evidence and logic. But having the belief is not what makes it true: rather, we need a brain that handles data accurately in order to form good beliefs. Computers handle data accurately, and its trivial to train one to yield good inferences. It's also trivial to train one to yield bad ones.

even a dumb machine can infer accurately. — Kenosha Kid

Machines infer nothing. They perform calculations, on the basis of which their operators may make inferences.

the prosperity of untrue beliefs. — Kenosha Kid

:roll:

The physical processes by which we arrive at and recall beliefs are not separable from the beliefs themselves. — Kenosha Kid

How can you say we arrive at beliefs by 'a physical process'? How is the process 'physical' as distinct from cultural, emotional, and so on?

And furthermore how are you to judge whether a physical state of the brain or a computer or a switch or anything else, is reliable, without appealing to reason? And where in the material world is 'reason'? Materialists never tire of telling us that the Universe is devoid of it.

The fact that a human and a sentient Martian can both figure out the law of the excluded middle demonstrates the efficacy of a highly evolved brain: — Kenosha Kid

But you would not know that, unless you knew what the law of the excluded middle meant in the first place. So when you say,

If you believe that your beliefs are true because you believe in them, you have a circularity problem. — Kenosha Kid

Does that include the primitive laws of logic, such as the law of the excluded middle? Because if you say that those kinds of propositions are simply a matter of belief, then radical scepticism follows.

But having the belief is not what makes it true: rather, we need a brain that handles data accurately in order to form good beliefs — Kenosha Kid

Brains don't 'handle data'. Humans think, reason and infer, 'handling data' is a bad analogy from computer science. Humans have the capacity to reason, to make inferences - that is what makes us the 'rational animal', and what you're doing when you make these arguments.

What Haldane's quote illustrates, is that rational necessity, or logical necessity, is of a different order to physical necessity. If you were compelled to make the arguments you're making purely because your brain was configured in a particular way, then I'm afraid you'd be something you're clearly not, namely, an idiot.

Relevant quotation from Rene Descartes:

if there were machines that resembled our bodies and if they imitated our actions as much as is morally possible, we would always have two very certain means for recognizing that, none the less, they are not genuinely human. The first is that they would never be able to use speech, or other signs composed by themselves, as we do to express our thoughts to others. For one could easily conceive of a machine that is made in such a way that it utters words, and even that it would utter some words in response to physical actions that cause a change in its organs—for example, if someone touched it in a particular place, it would ask what one wishes to say to it, or if it were touched somewhere else, it would cry out that it was being hurt, and so on. But it could not arrange words in different ways to reply to the meaning of everything that is said in its presence, as even the most unintelligent human beings can do. The second means is that, even if they did many things as well as or, possibly, better than anyone of us, they would infallibly fail in others. Thus one would discover that they did not act on the basis of knowledge, but merely as a result of the disposition of their organs. For whereas reason is a universal instrument that can be used in all kinds of situations, these organs need a specific disposition for every particular action. — Rene Descartes

From Discourse on Method, 1637

Of course, Descartes could not have foreseen neural networks, but it's still surprisingly prescient, and also to the point, which is impressive, considering when it was written. But then, he was a genius.

Machines infer nothing. They perform calculations, on the basis of which their operators may make inferences. — Wayfarer

You can train a neural network to infer, say, the interests of a shopper looking for t-shirts based on similar shoppers who bought t-shirts. The operator infers nothing: they accept the inference, until evidence suggests the neural net is systematically wrong. The error is in assuming that humans do the same thing in a significantly different way.

How can you say we arrive at beliefs by 'a physical process'? How is the process 'physical' as distinct from cultural, emotional, and so on? — Wayfarer

I'm amazed you assume that I think emotion doesn't have a physical basis. Doesn't seem a rational inference.

Brains don't 'handle data'. — Wayfarer

I'm also amazed you think that stating your beliefs would move me in any way. I already know you believe this. Untrue beliefs do prosper, see? Handling data is precisely what brains do, with or without the capacity for reason. Or do you believe that all mammals rationally invert images, whiteshift colours, detect outlines, etc?

What Haldane's quote illustrates, is that rational necessity, or logical necessity, is of a different order to physical necessity. — Wayfarer

No, what Haldane's quote illustrates is that Haldane believed in something that is almost certainly untrue. Viz your Descartes quote also, argument as hominem is only as good as the authority, and authority has progressed somewhat.

The precise causes of my beliefs are important, not solely because of the physical mechanisms in the brain that yield them, or the physical configuration that stores them, but because the _external_ causes are not equal. — Kenosha Kid

Are you overlooking the internal causes? Surely things like instinct and genetics ought to be classed as internal causes. And these are evident in the subconscious or unconscious levels, being very influential in our emotions. Since the internal, and external causes are completely different classifications, how could you propose any sort of equality, or a single system of measurement which could account for both?

You can train a neural network to infer, say, the interests of a shopper looking for t-shirts based on similar shoppers who bought t-shirts. The operator infers nothing: they accept the inference, until evidence suggests the neural net is systematically wrong. The error is in assuming that humans do the same thing in a significantly different way. — Kenosha Kid

In the case of internal causes, the so-called training is what has already occurred, and the results of that training lie deep within the genetic codes and things like that. I suggest that the error is in your assumption that training an already existent "neural network", which is already constrained by a specific physical manifestation, is somehow "the same thing" as the process of self-constructing such a network. Notice that in the self-constructed model, the training is already built in to the physical manifestation. That is why the internal causes cannot be balanced or scaled with the external, being far more important, because of all the training (a huge amount of external influence) which has already gone into the construction of the system which produces them. And, this internal system, which is the product of self-training, determines how the external will affect us. But be careful where you go with this, because we still need to avoid that circularity you referred to.

This is why we posit a "soul" in dualist philosophy. The physical body of a living being is always a manifestation of some prior learning. We need to have something to account for that original learning which resulted in the first physical manifestation of a living being. We cannot allow infinite regress, nor can we allow the circle which panpsychism leads toward. So we posit a soul as prior to the physical body, to account for the fact that the living physical body is the manifestation of prior learning.

Handling data is precisely what brains do, with or without the capacity for reason. — Kenosha Kid

Minds don't process binary units. It's a false analogy. I've worked in an AI company, and the system I was documenting didn't 'infer' anything whatever, it responded to queries posed by the designers and users of the system.

I can see that you're so convinced of your physicalism that there is no prospect of me changing your belief, but if I did do that, nothing physical would have passed between us.

Minds don't process binary units. — Wayfarer

It does not follow that they don't process data, which they absolutely do. Analogue data is still data.

Data - facts, and the assimilation of facts - is only one facet of what minds do. They are also constantly engaged in judgement and reasoning. I do get that in our techno-centric culture it is natural to think of minds as computers, but it’s misleading. 1 , 2.

The problem with process philosophy and assuming "events" as fundamental, is that traditionally relations would be inherent within the classical description of an event. An event in the classical sense is a changing of relations between things. Now, as the fundamental element, the "event" is the thing. So we have two new problems. How do we describe what is internal to the fundamental "event", so as to make it consistent with the traditional "event"? What is changing inside that fundamental event to justify calling it an event? And the second problem is on what principles do we relate one event to another, to represent the passing of time. At this point, since we do not have any real understanding of the passing of time, and science turns it into something subjective, the trend is to appeal to panpsychism to justify the apparent continuity of the passing of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

Process philosophy is a starting point - I don’t see ‘events’ as fundamental, rather I see the capacity to describe reality in terms of a variability of relations between 4D ‘events’ rather than a changing of relations between 3D ‘objects’ as simply a step towards a more accurate perspective. This term ‘thing’ refers to an indeterminate concept - neither particularly three, four or five-dimensional, rather whatever is being related to.

The unfolding universe is commonly viewed as one all-encompassing event: a temporal duration of changing relations between physical matter, from the ‘Big Bang’ to heat death (or some other predicted future end). But if physics is understood as a set of interrelated events with no universally linear progression of time, then what is fundamental cannot be an ‘event’ in itself, but is more like the concept of a ‘block universe’, in which all energy/entropy is structured according to value/potentiality, as determined from the perspective of a particular event/observer - a moveable 4D relation point within a conceptual block universe.

Don’t get me wrong, though - I’m not subscribing to Eternalism. We also have the capacity to understand reality in terms of a variability of relations between conceptual ‘block universes’ or minds, shifting the fundamental ‘thing’ once again from concepts in a 5D structure of mind to meaningful relations in a 6D structure of possibility.

The issue of subjectivity is nothing new - science just struggles to apply it to itself, is all. Panpsychism is one way to describe this variability of relations between conceptual structures, by consolidating all five-dimensional relations into ‘things with minds’. So the idea is that anything that WE can consolidate into a ‘thing’ (like a rock) must have a ‘mind’. I don’t agree with this - the consolidation of a ‘rock’ is based on our own conceptual structures. A rock has no internal structural consolidation beyond the molecular level - if it breaks in half, the extent to which it may be ‘aware’ of this is confined to individual molecules suddenly relating to oxygen molecules instead, for instance.

Process philosophy is a starting point - I don’t see ‘events’ as fundamental, rather I see the capacity to describe reality in terms of a variability of relations between 4D ‘events’ rather than a changing of relations between 3D ‘objects’ as simply a step towards a more accurate perspective. This term ‘thing’ refers to an indeterminate concept - neither particularly three, four or five-dimensional, rather whatever is being related to. — Possibility

I don't see how there could be variability in such relations. An event is something which has occurred in the past, therefore its relations are fixed, invariable, as the facts about the past. There might be variability in our descriptions of these relations, but there is no variability in the actual relations. As for the future, there is no such thing as events in the future, because the future has not occurred yet, so there is only possibilities for events in our understanding of the future.

The unfolding universe is commonly viewed as one all-encompassing event: a temporal duration of changing relations between physical matter, from the ‘Big Bang’ to heat death (or some other predicted future end). — Possibility

An event only occurs, or unfolds, at the present, as time passes. It doesn't make sense to speak of past events as occurring or unfolding, because they've already occurred, nor does it make sense to speak of future events as occurring. If we say that the present necessarily has temporal extension, then we can extend the present as far as we want into the past, and say that all time until now is the present, but we can't extend it this way into the future. The future has not materialized yet, so there really is no time on that side of the present. So as much as we can extend the present into the past, by understanding the real fixed relations of real past events, we cannot extend the present into the future this way because there are no real fixed events, only what is imagined, predicted, or inferred.

I don't see how there could be variability in such relations. An event is something which has occurred in the past, therefore its relations are fixed, invariable, as the facts about the past. There might be variability in our descriptions of these relations, but there is no variability in the actual relations. As for the future, there is no such thing as events in the future, because the future has not occurred yet, so there is only possibilities for events in our understanding of the future. — Metaphysician Undercover

When you describe an event in the past, this is relative to a fixed point of observation: a relating event in itself. So the ‘actual relations’ you’re referring to as invariable are a relation between these two events, not the relations of the event itself - the variability of which transcends this description.

An event in the classical sense is a changing of relations between things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Right - so describing an ‘event in the future’ is not just a mere possibility, but can more specifically be a calculated probability or potentiality wave that maps changing relations between observables.

An event only occurs, or unfolds, at the present, as time passes. It doesn't make sense to speak of past events as occurring or unfolding, because they've already occurred, nor does it make sense to speak of future events as occurring. If we say that the present necessarily has temporal extension, then we can extend the present as far as we want into the past, and say that all time until now is the present, but we can't extend it this way into the future. The future has not materialized yet, so there really is no time on that side of the present. So as much as we can extend the present into the past, by understanding the real fixed relations of real past events, we cannot extend the present into the future this way because there are no real fixed events, only what is imagined, predicted, or inferred. — Metaphysician Undercover

Time is bound by materialisation - and events ‘fixed’ - only in relation to a point of observation. So an event can only be observed in matter as time passes, but it exists regardless of the observer’s position as a four-dimensional structure. Time may not be observable on that side of the present, but it is predictable - and our predictions have become increasingly more accurate. This is just as well, because it is not our observations that determine and initiate action, but our predictions.

When you describe an event in the past, this is relative to a fixed point of observation: a relating event in itself. So the ‘actual relations’ you’re referring to as invariable are a relation between these two events, not the relations of the event itself - the variability of which transcends this description. — Possibility

It is not a fixed point of observation, the present is not fixed. And the present is not an event itself. It is contradictory to call a fixed point an event, as you do here, "event" is incompatible with "fixed point". Clearly, what we are discussing is whether or not it is true that relations are variable, as in your definition.

In my understanding of "event" as something in the past, the relations of any event are necessarily fixed, invariable, so it makes no sense to say that there is a variability which transcends the description. The opposite is the case. There is variability in description, but no variability in what has actually occurred, therefore no variability in the relations between the events which actually occurred.

Right - so describing an ‘event in the future’ is not just a mere possibility, but can more specifically be a calculated probability or potentiality wave that maps changing relations between observables. — Possibility

Talking about an event in the future cannot properly be called a "description" because that refers to observation, there is nothing observed in the future. Talking about a supposed future event is a projection, not a description.

Time is bound by materialisation - and events ‘fixed’ - only in relation to a point of observation. — Possibility

I disagree with this too. Materialization is bound by time. And the point of observation is also bound by time.

So an event can only be observed in matter as time passes, but it exists regardless of the observer’s position as a four-dimensional structure. — Possibility

An event can only occur as time passes, regardless of observation. The occurrence of an event requires the passing of time, whether or not there is an observer.

It is not a fixed point of observation, the present is not fixed. And the present is not an event itself. It is contradictory to call a fixed point an event, as you do here, "event" is incompatible with "fixed point". Clearly, what we are discussing is whether or not it is true that relations are variable, as in your definition.

In my understanding of "event" as something in the past, the relations of any event are necessarily fixed, invariable, so it makes no sense to say that there is a variability which transcends the description. The opposite is the case. There is variability in description, but no variability in what has actually occurred, therefore no variability in the relations between the events which actually occurred. — Metaphysician Undercover

You’re missing my point here, which is about describing an event, as opposed to observing it. ‘The present’ is not a universal perspective, but a subjective one. When you describe an event from the past, you are describing it from your position as observer - a ‘present’ that is ‘fixed’ only in that statement. In reality, your position of observation is an ongoing event that changes in relation to the event you describe. So each time you describe that event, it is from a different ‘fixed’ perspective.

But the ‘event’ is not an isolated set of relations - this consolidation is conceptual. There is no line of separation in reality between the relations that constitute an ‘event’ and the variability in relations that enable us to describe it as such. Each description is inclusive of a fixed point of observation, to which we relate as ongoing events. But each ‘event’ consists of four-dimensional relations, not all of which we are aware of from our perspective at any moment of observation, let alone render in our description. So this variability that I’m talking about is in a relation not between two events that have actually occurred in relation to an observation, but between the event and an ongoing observation.

Talking about an event in the future cannot properly be called a "description" because that refers to observation, there is nothing observed in the future. Talking about a supposed future event is a projection, not a description. — Metaphysician Undercover

And yet we describe objects of our imagination - a ‘description’ is just using words to render information, and doesn’t necessitate observation, only perception. But I understand the need to distinguish between imagined possibility, perceived potentiality and observed actuality. I’m not talking about a ‘projection’ as a specifically described event from some future observation point. A description of perceived potentiality is more wave-like: it describes the relational structure between the event and an ongoing observation. In this way it is less definitive, but more accurate.

Time is bound by materialisation - and events ‘fixed’ - only in relation to a point of observation.
— Possibility

I disagree with this too. Materialization is bound by time. And the point of observation is also bound by time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with you here. What I was trying to say was that it is only when we describe ‘events’ from a point of observation that they appear ‘fixed’; and only when we try to describe ‘time’ from a point of observation that it appears bound by materialisation. But where an ‘event’ or ‘time’ appears infinite, it is really bound by the perceived potentiality of the conscious observer. And where potential appears infinite, it is bound by imagined possibility.

So an event can only be observed in matter as time passes, but it exists regardless of the observer’s position as a four-dimensional structure.
— Possibility

An event can only occur as time passes, regardless of observation. The occurrence of an event requires the passing of time, whether or not there is an observer. — Metaphysician Undercover

Time exists as a four-dimensional structure, but passes only in relation to a conscious observer - a point of experience within a five-dimensional conceptualisation. Any event, too, exists as a four-dimensional structure of relations, regardless of the passing of time, but ‘occurs’ only in relation to a conscious observer, and can be ‘described’ only in relation to a point of observation.

You’re missing my point here, which is about describing an event, as opposed to observing it. — Possibility

The problem is that we seem to disagree on so many fundamental points, that I cannot even get to the place where your "point" might even start to make any sense to me. See, here's another example. I believe a description is just an extension of observation, it is to recount what has been observed. The two are not "opposed".

‘The present’ is not a universal perspective, but a subjective one. — Possibility

As you may have noticed, I strongly disagree with this.

In reality, your position of observation is an ongoing event that changes in relation to the event you describe. So each time you describe that event, it is from a different ‘fixed’ perspective. — Possibility

How can this make sense to you? If "your position of observation is an ongoing event that changes in relation to the event you describe", then it is contradictory to say that you have a "fixed perspective". What could possibly indicate that your perspective is "fixed" if it is an ongoing change?

Each description is inclusive of a fixed point of observation, to which we relate as ongoing events. — Possibility

So this makes no sense because your description denies that a point of observation is "fixed".

So this variability that I’m talking about is in a relation not between two events that have actually occurred in relation to an observation, but between the event and an ongoing observation. — Possibility

Perhaps I can make sense of this statement. You have posited an ongoing observation which you say is itself an event. Now you say that the variability is not between two events, but between an event and the ongoing observation. The ongoing observation is an event though. See why I can't get anywhere in trying to understand what you are saying?

And yet we describe objects of our imagination - a ‘description’ is just using words to render information, and doesn’t necessitate observation, only perception. — Possibility

Actually, we describe the dream, or the imaginary experience, we do not describe the "objects" of our imagination, because we do not think of them as actual objects. So I might describe something which came to me in a dream, or in my imagination, but I describe them as things of my imagination, and that is an observation of something past, as I said. We cannot describe future things because they have not happened and cannot be observed. If I imagine a future scenario, I can describe what came to my imagination, but that is a description of something past, the imagination which came to my mind.

But where an ‘event’ or ‘time’ appears infinite, it is really bound by the perceived potentiality of the conscious observer. And where potential appears infinite, it is bound by imagined possibility. — Possibility

Here again, I have a hard time understanding your use of words. How could something appear to be infinite? I don't think "infinite has any sort of appearance at all, because no one has ever sensed it. I think what we do is designate something as infinite, like the natural numbers. We say something like, let's make the natural number infinite, so that we have the capacity to count any magnitude we come across. But mathematics uses "infinite" in strange ways, so that sometimes when they apply mathematics to a problem, infinity will pop up, and people will say that it appears like the thing referred to is infinite. But that's just faulty mathematics, making the thing which the math is being applied to appear as infinite, when in reality the thing just cannot be understood by those mathematics.

Time exists as a four-dimensional structure, but passes only in relation to a conscious observer — Possibility

This I completely disagree with. I think that geology demonstrates to us that time was passing before there were conscious observers on earth.

I believe a description is just an extension of observation, it is to recount what has been observed. The two are not "opposed". — Metaphysician Undercover

An observation is a process of relating one 4D structure to another; what has been observed is a 4D structure of difference between them.

A description is a linguistic rendering of information, not necessarily confined to what has been observed. It includes linguistic structures, probabilistic patterns of prediction and concepts that enable what has been observed to make sense in a conceptual system.

I realise this seems unnecessarily complicated. If you assume a ‘fixed’ point of conscious observation, then of course what has been observed is all an observation is, and the description simply renders what has been observed. But you’ve already agreed that a point of observation cannot be ‘fixed’ in reality, so an observation is not just what has been observed, but by whom, at what point(s) and under what conditions.

A description that recounts only what has been observed assumes both a ‘fixed’ observer and conceptual system. Someone reading this description needs to be aware of the assumed position of the observer and structure of the conceptual system, in relation to their own perspective of the ‘event’, in order to make sense of the description in relation to reality. In most situations, we can deduce this, or we don’t need to be so precise, so this is being pedantic - but hopefully it illustrates the extent to which we can take for granted the difference between an observation and a description of an event.

How can this make sense to you? If "your position of observation is an ongoing event that changes in relation to the event you describe", then it is contradictory to say that you have a "fixed perspective". What could possibly indicate that your perspective is "fixed" if it is an ongoing change? — Metaphysician Undercover

Complicated, but not contradictory. Having described an event, your perspective of it may have changed. ‘Half an hour ago, I ate crab sticks over there’ describes an event from a perspective which is ‘fixed’ within the description. You would need to describe that same event differently a week later, because the description has a fixed perspective, but NOT the observer.

So this variability that I’m talking about is in a relation not between two events that have actually occurred in relation to an observation, but between the event and an ongoing observation.
— Possibility

Perhaps I can make sense of this statement. You have posited an ongoing observation which you say is itself an event. Now you say that the variability is not between two events, but between an event and the ongoing observation. The ongoing observation is an event though. See why I can't get anywhere in trying to understand what you are saying? — Metaphysician Undercover

Well of course not, if you’re only going to read half the sentence. This is difficult enough to explain without you skim-reading. Yes, the ongoing observation is an event, but not an observed “event that has actually occurred”, as you were arguing.

But where an ‘event’ or ‘time’ appears infinite, it is really bound by the perceived potentiality of the conscious observer. And where potential appears infinite, it is bound by imagined possibility.
— Possibility

Here again, I have a hard time understanding your use of words. How could something appear to be infinite? I don't think "infinite has any sort of appearance at all, because no one has ever sensed it. I think what we do is designate something as infinite, like the natural numbers. We say something like, let's make the natural number infinite, so that we have the capacity to count any magnitude we come across. But mathematics uses "infinite" in strange ways, so that sometimes when they apply mathematics to a problem, infinity will pop up, and people will say that it appears like the thing referred to is infinite. But that's just faulty mathematics, making the thing which the math is being applied to appear as infinite, when in reality the thing just cannot be understood by those mathematics. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have a definitive approach to language that I find restrictive, but bear with me. Considering that we don’t really sense ‘time’, I don’t think ‘time’ has any sort of appearance, either. What I’m referring to is thinking of ‘time’ as boundless. I used the term ‘infinite’ in reference to Kant’s categories of Quality: as a limitation, or horizon, impossible to measure or quantify. I agree that it’s faulty mathematics, though - in reality it denotes a dimensional shift.

Time exists as a four-dimensional structure, but passes only in relation to a conscious observer
— Possibility

This I completely disagree with. I think that geology demonstrates to us that time was passing before there were conscious observers on earth. — Metaphysician Undercover

Geology demonstrates to conscious observers that a certain amount of time has passed, but I think it’s a bit like Schrödinger’s cat. I guess it depends on what you understand ‘time’ to be.

An observation is a process of relating one 4D structure to another; what has been observed is a 4D structure of difference between them.

A description is a linguistic rendering of information, not necessarily confined to what has been observed. It includes linguistic structures, probabilistic patterns of prediction and concepts that enable what has been observed to make sense in a conceptual system. — Possibility

We disagree fundamentally here, and I see no route to compromise. I think a description is necessarily confined to something observed, and I see no need for a description to relate one 4d structure to another. You hold the opposite to this.

Complicated, but not contradictory. Having described an event, your perspective of it may have changed. ‘Half an hour ago, I ate crab sticks over there’ describes an event from a perspective which is ‘fixed’ within the description. You would need to describe that same event differently a week later, because the description has a fixed perspective, but NOT the observer. — Possibility

This doesn't resolve the contradiction. To simply describe the perspective as fixed, when you have already premised that the perspective is changing, means that either your premise that the perspective is changing, or your description which includes a fixed perspective, is false.

Well of course not, if you’re only going to read half the sentence. This is difficult enough to explain without you skim-reading. Yes, the ongoing observation is an event, but not an observed “event that has actually occurred”, as you were arguing. — Possibility

But the ongoing observation really is an observed event, because it is this act of observation which is being described. So the relation between the ongoing observation, and the observed event, is a relation between two events and this is being described as observation.

What I’m referring to is thinking of ‘time’ as boundless. — Possibility

I cannot think of time as "boundless" because I find the essence of time is found in boundaries. The present is the boundary between past and future. It is the beginning of the past, and the end of the future. Further, any period of time has a beginning and an end, which are boundaries, and to name a particular point in time is to mark a boundary between prior and posterior time. I find that there is no way to talk about time except in terms of explicit or implicit boundaries. So the idea of time as boundless seems incoherent to me.

We disagree fundamentally here, and I see no route to compromise. I think a description is necessarily confined to something observed, and I see no need for a description to relate one 4d structure to another. You hold the opposite to this. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you recognise a distinction between observation, perception and apperception? Observation is unconscious sensory interaction, perception is a process of consciousness that integrates sensory information, and apperception is an awareness of this process of consciousness. Surely you’re not suggesting that all of these refer to an act of ‘observation’? When we describe a subjective perception (‘Half an hour ago, I ate crab sticks over there’), we are relating one 4D structure (the act of perceiving) to another (the act of eating crab sticks). There are two temporal structures here.

This doesn't resolve the contradiction. To simply describe the perspective as fixed, when you have already premised that the perspective is changing, means that either your premise that the perspective is changing, or your description which includes a fixed perspective, is false. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes! The description is false - or at least ambiguous and prone to inaccuracy in relation to reality. Our description of reality is never accurate in itself once described, because it is always relative to a changing perspective. For the most part we understand this, and make adjustments when we interpret descriptions, attempting to reconstruct the conceptual structure in which that description would make sense - like DNA reconstruction.

Observation is unconscious sensory interaction, perception is a process of consciousness that integrates sensory information, — Possibility

In my mind you have these two reversed. Perceiving is the simple receiving of the sensory information. It may or may not require consciousness as a necessity, this is debatable. If it does require consciousness it's to a very minimal extend, as we can perceive things in a very limited way, when we are asleep, and these sensations might enter our dreams, or wake us up . Observation is a noticing of what is happening, so this is necessarily consciousness at work. So observation requires apperception as a sort of medium between perceiving and observing. To make our perceptions into observations requires apperception which is the conscious acknowledgement of the act of perceiving. This is why I say that observation is very close to describing. Describing is just one step up from observing, in the conscious mind, as the act of putting what is observed into words.

The description is false — Possibility

But don't we have as a goal, to make true descriptions. Why would you say that descriptions are necessarily false, if we have as a goal to make true descriptions?

In my mind you have these two reversed. Perceiving is the simple receiving of the sensory information. It may or may not require consciousness as a necessity, this is debatable. If it does require consciousness it's to a very minimal extend, as we can perceive things in a very limited way, when we are asleep, and these sensations might enter our dreams, or wake us up. Observation is a noticing of what is happening, so this is necessarily consciousness at work. So observation requires apperception as a sort of medium between perceiving and observing. To make our perceptions into observations requires apperception which is the conscious acknowledgement of the act of perceiving. This is why I say that observation is very close to describing. Describing is just one step up from observing, in the conscious mind, as the act of putting what is observed into words. — Metaphysician Undercover

Language doesn’t lend itself to clarity here. My understanding of ‘observation’ as not requiring consciousness comes from the definition used in physics. Noticing something happening is different to noticing what is happening. So observation often refers to the content as well as the act of observing. The former depends on consciousness, the latter does not.

Perceiving - as in receiving sensory information - is noticing what is happening rather than simply noticing something happening. For me, this requires consciousness - although it doesn’t require one to BE conscious.

To make our perceptions (the received sensory information) into what can be described as ‘observations’ requires self-consciously noticing the process of perceiving: ie. apperception.

The description is false
— Possibility

But don't we have as a goal, to make true descriptions. Why would you say that descriptions are necessarily false, if we have as a goal to make true descriptions? — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn’t say necessarily false. The truth of a description is only in its relation to reality.

Language doesn’t lend itself to clarity here. My understanding of ‘observation’ as not requiring consciousness comes from the definition used in physics. Noticing something happening is different to noticing what is happening. So observation often refers to the content as well as the act of observing. The former depends on consciousness, the latter does not. — Possibility

Sorry Possibility, but I've read this over numerous times and I just can't apprehend the distinction you're trying to make. To me, "noticing" implies necessarily a discernment of "what is happening", even if that discernment might be judged by another as completely wrong.

Now I do not see how you proceed to your conclusion "observation often refers to the content as well as the act of observing". Are you saying that there is a verb "observation" which refers to the act, and there is a noun "observation" which refers to a stated description, "an observation"? If so, how does this relate to the distinction described above? Both, the active "observation", and the noun, "an observation", involve a discernment of "what is happening". If the act of observation requires no such discernment, then you might say that a rock is observing.

Sorry Possibility, but I've read this over numerous times and I just can't apprehend the distinction you're trying to make. To me, "noticing" implies necessarily a discernment of "what is happening", even if that discernment might be judged by another as completely wrong.

Now I do not see how you proceed to your conclusion "observation often refers to the content as well as the act of observing". Are you saying that there is a verb "observation" which refers to the act, and there is a noun "observation" which refers to a stated description, "an observation"? If so, how does this relate to the distinction described above? Both, the active "observation", and the noun, "an observation", involve a discernment of "what is happening". If the act of observation requires no such discernment, then you might say that a rock is observing. — Metaphysician Undercover

And here we reach the real problem in discussions about panpsychism and the quantum nature of consciousness: an understanding of what information is, regardless of consciousness. When consciousness observes, it also perceives: it discerns this difference as temporally differentiated information. With non-conscious observation, however, that difference is integrated by the system - we observe that it notices (or changes in response to) something - but there is no discernment within the observer itself of what the change is, because it cannot temporally differentiate the information. As conscious observers of this non-conscious observer, we can discern what has changed, and this is information for us that the non-conscious observer embodies without discerning themselves. So a rock ‘observes’ surrounding temperature changes at a molecular level without discerning this change as anything different. What differs is how those molecules relate to each other over time.

Separating our conscious observation (what I refer to as perception) from these non-conscious observations of the measuring devices we interpret is tricky, because we don’t often apperceive the process of integrating this information, let alone its temporal aspect. For you, information is always attributed to the conscious observer - but if we can discern that time was ‘passing’ before there were conscious observers, then differences such as molecules relating to each other over time must have been observed non-consciously (ie. integrated into molecular structures) for this temporally differentiated information to be perceived now.

I never expect this to be easy to understand - it’s a paradigm shift in how we talk about information and consciousness - and I certainly don’t think I’m explaining it very well. Our language doesn’t really lend itself to explaining this aspect of reality, because it is structured to account for the shift - and we don’t have a quantifiable structure to help us, like we do with global time. But I keep trying to work through the confusion, because I think it’s vital to how we understand reality.

Obviously, I do not agree with the idea of a non-conscious observer. Nor do I agree with the idea of information which is not dependent on consciousness to exist as information.

but if we can discern that time was ‘passing’ before there were conscious observers, then differences such as molecules relating to each other over time must have been observed non-consciously (ie. integrated into molecular structures) for this temporally differentiated information to be perceived now. — Possibility

I think you only derive this conclusion from a false premise concerning the nature of time, so it doesn;t persuade me at all in changing my mind. The false premise seems to be that if time is passing, observation is necessarily occurring.

“Think of one of the grandest and most obvious phenomena: the diurnal rotation of the skies. It is the most immediate and magnificent characteristic of the universe around us: it turns. But is this turning really a characteristic of the universe? It is not. It took us thousands of years, but in the end we managed to understand the revolving of the heavens: we understood that it is we who turn, not the universe. The rotation of the heavens is a perspective effect due to our particular way of moving on Earth, rather than a mysterious property of the dynamics of the universe.

“Something similar might be true for time’s arrow. The low initial entropy of the universe might be due to the particular way in which we - the physical system that we are part of - interact with it. We are attuned to a very particular subset of aspects of the universe, and it is this that is orientated in time.”

“Kant discusses the nature of space and time in his Critique of Pure Reason, and interprets both space and time as a priori forms of knowledge, that is to say, things that relate not just to the objective world but also to the way in which a subject apprehends it. But he also observes that, whereas space is shaped by our external sense, that is to say, by our way of ordering things that we see in the world outside of us, time is shaped by our internal sense, that is to say, by our way of ordering internal states within ourselves. Once again: the basis of the temporal structure of the world is to be sought in something that closely relates to our way of thinking and perceiving, to our consciousness. This remains true without having to get tangled up in Kantian transcendentalism.”

Time may not be what you think it is. It’s worth reading Rovelli’s book, if only for a clearer explanation of this nature of time as I see it.