What he's saying instead is that, the sense data theorists begins with the idea that no experiences ('ostensible seeings") can be determined to be veridical or non-veridical, but then, upon discovering the idea of necessarily veridical sense data, he realizes he was wrong. There are some experiences which are necessarily veridical. — csalisbury
why would a sense data theorist begin with the idea that no experiences can be determined to be veridical or non-veridical? — Terrapin
The seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular is a veridical member of a class of experiences -- let us call them 'ostensible seeings' -- some of the members of which are non-veridical; and there is no inspectible hallmark which guarantees that any such experience is veridical. — Sellars, speaking as the sense data theorist
Well, thats a huge difference though. Re guarantees we're talking about certainty. That's not the case with "determine."
This is just a matter of reading the first section.how are we getting to the idea that some sense data theorists "realize that they were wrong" and say that they can guarantee veridicality? What the quote that you pasted says is that "there is no inspectible hallmark which guarantees that any such experience is veridical." — Terrapin
The idea springs to mind that sensations of red triangles have exactly the virtues which ostensible seeings of red triangular physical surfaces lack. To begin with, the grammatical similarity of 'sensation of a red triangle' to "thought of a celestial city" is interpreted to mean, or, better, gives rise to the presupposition, that sensations belong to the same general pigeonhole as thoughts -- in short, are cognitive facts. Then, it is noticed that sensations are ex hypothesi far more intimately related to mental processes than external physical objects. It would seem easier to "get at" a red triangle of which we are having a sensation, than to "get at" a red and triangular physical surface. But, above all, it is the fact that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations which strikes these philosophers, though for it to strike them as it does, they must overlook the fact that if it makes sense to speak of an experience as veridical it must correspondingly make sense to speak of it as unveridical. — Sellars
I disagree. Determine is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary thus: "Ascertain or establish exactly by research or calculation" & Ascertain is defined by the OED thus: "Find (something) out for certain; make sure of:" — csalisbury
OED is kind of the gold standard, isn't it? I didn't cherry-pick, that was literally the first definition I looked up. I appreciate that you don't like the definition, but then, I guess the burden is on you to show that your non-standard definition is the right one.And that's it? Or are you cherry-picking a definition? It doesn't have definitions such as "firmly decide" or simply "decide," "make up one's mind," "choose" etc.? That would make the OED kind of suck if it doesn't have those other definitions. Use a dictionary that better captures all of the common nuances of a term.
No? It seems clear to me.No part of what you quoted from Sellars after this amounts to "realizing that they were wrong and saying that they can guarantee veridicality," does it?
I have come to have a very high regard for Sellars as a philosopher — Aaron R
Whereas I hadn't read him in a long time and had a relatively favorable opinion of him from my student days, but rereading this essay now, I've decided that he can't write for shit. For one, I can't imagine that he possibly revised anything in this paper, it had to be a stream-of-consciousness first draft. And he seems to be a completely disorganized, chaotic thinker. — terrapin
Yeah, no shit, as if there was some doubt about you being unjustifiably arrogant and patronizing. You'd probably find conversations furthered better without that attitude. — terrapin
OED is kind of the gold standard, isn't it? — csalisbury
I guess the burden is on you to show that your non-standard definition is the right one. — csalisbury
No? It seems clear to me. — csalisbury
What part clearly says anything about guaranteeing veridicality? — Terrapin
But, above all, it is the fact that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations which strikes these philosophers, though for it to strike them as it does, they must overlook the fact that if it makes sense to speak of an experience as veridical it must correspondingly make sense to speak of it as unveridical. — Sellars
--I have no idea why Sellars thinks that that doesn't make sense. Also his "It is the fact" is grammatically ambiguous to me contextually, especially re what the pronoun "it" is standing for, if anything but that's maybe not a big deal.it is the fact that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations which strikes these philosophers, — Sellars
Also his "It is the fact" is grammatically ambiguous to me contextually, especially re what the pronoun "it" is standing for, if anything but that's maybe not a big deal. — Terrapin Station
he makes the claim that for it to strike someone as if it makes sense to speak — Terrapin Station
Since this is an English lesson now, — The Great Whatever
It's going to be difficult to avoid these sorts of issues given the sloppy manner in which Sellars writes. — Terrapin Station
If the philosophers in question believe that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations, then when we can't say that their view includes that "some of the members of 'seeing that x if F' are non-veridical." — Terrapin Station
(I took "strikes" rather than "strike" to be a typo/oversight) — Terrapin Station
It's going to be difficult to avoid these sorts of issues given the sloppy manner in which Sellars writes — Terrapin Station
Because as he says, there he's talking about ostensible seeings, not sensations. — The Great Whatever
The former necessarily involves an object external to me. (An "ostensible seeing" involves a belief in an object external to me, whether that belief is correct or not.) Thus 'seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular', while it may require a sensation, is not simply a sensation."seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular" isn't a sensation?
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