Again, I'm saying that I'm extremely skeptical that any sense data theorists say both (a) that sense data provide anything like a foundation for epistemic certainty, and (b) that sense data can get things wrong and we can only achieve some degree of reliability for veridical claims.

I'd have to be shown a sense data theorist saying both of those things to believe that any actually say both of them.

In other words, the idea that anyone actually says both of those things seems like bullshit.

Yeah, I understand that you're skeptical, but I'm trying to understand why you're skeptical. I provided my interepretation of why, based on what you'd written, you'd think that claim is bullshit. But you said that's not what you meant. So I'm trying to understand what you meant.

Simply because the two ideas are contradictory.

How does that differ from what I posted, which you said is not what you meant?

The difference is that I wasn't critiquing a putative sense data theorist view. I was critiquing the idea that that is any sense data theorists' view in the first place.

If you'd simply asked "Why do you believe that's not any sense data theorists' view?" to start, I would have said what I said above.

But what I meant by the sentence you quoted was that I'm not buying that that's any sense data theorists' view. So when you said, "Did you mean ____," I took it that you were asking about the entire sentence you quoted.

Ok, got you.

This is why I think it's not a contradiction (while bracketing the legitimate questions of whether there are other problems with the account or whether there even really are theorists who hold these views)

So the view of Sellars' purported sense theorist is not both that there are no experiences which we can be certain are veridical and also that there are some which necessarily are. I agree that this would be absurd, and it's very difficult to imagine someone holding this position. What he's saying instead is that the sense data theorist begins with the idea that no experiences ('ostensible seeings") can be determined to be veridical or non-veridical, but then, upon discovering the idea of a class of necessarily veridical experiences (sensations, sense-data) realizes he was wrong. There are some experiences which are necessarily veridical.

What he's saying instead is that, the sense data theorists begins with the idea that no experiences ('ostensible seeings") can be determined to be veridical or non-veridical, but then, upon discovering the idea of necessarily veridical sense data, he realizes he was wrong. There are some experiences which are necessarily veridical. — csalisbury

I'm not sure where he says this, but to start, why would a sense data theorist begin with the idea that no experiences can be determined to be veridical or non-veridical?

He says it at the end of the first section (An Ambiguity in Sense Data Theories.) It's the 'unfortunate, but familiar, line of thought' + the paragraph after it.

why would a sense data theorist begin with the idea that no experiences can be determined to be veridical or non-veridical? — Terrapin

Answer:

The seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular is a veridical member of a class of experiences -- let us call them 'ostensible seeings' -- some of the members of which are non-veridical; and there is no inspectible hallmark which guarantees that any such experience is veridical. — Sellars, speaking as the sense data theorist

But that doesn't have anything to do with what you just said.

Where in that is something about a sense data theorist starting with the idea that they can't determine whether an experience is veridical or not?

And you're not equating "determine" with "guaranteeing" are you? Those are two different terms, two different ideas.

Not equation but seeing guarantee as a necessary condition of determining - but I'm glad to drop determine and replace it with guarantee.

Well, thats a huge difference though. Re guarantees we're talking about certainty. That's not the case with "determine."

If we're talking about guarantees instead, leaving aside for a moment the idea of where any sense data theorist begins with the idea that they can't guarantee veridicality (since it would be unusual for anyone to start with the opposite idea), how are we getting to the idea that some sense data theorists "realize that they were wrong" and say that they can guarantee veridicality? What the quote that you pasted says is that "there is no inspectible hallmark which guarantees that any such experience is veridical."

Well, thats a huge difference though. Re guarantees we're talking about certainty. That's not the case with "determine."

I disagree. Determine is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary thus: "Ascertain or establish exactly by research or calculation" & Ascertain is defined by the OED thus: "Find (something) out for certain; make sure of:"

how are we getting to the idea that some sense data theorists "realize that they were wrong" and say that they can guarantee veridicality? What the quote that you pasted says is that "there is no inspectible hallmark which guarantees that any such experience is veridical." — Terrapin

This is just a matter of reading the first section.

So: After the section I'd already quoted, Sellars continues, describing how the sense-data theorists come to the conclusion "Therefore, given that the foundation of empirical knowledge cannot consist of the veridical members of a class not all the members of which are veridical, and from which the non-veridical members cannot be weeded out by 'inspection,' this foundation cannot consist of such items as seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular."

In other words, this is the sense data theorist following his conclusion about 'there being no inspectible [sic] hallmark' to the bitter end (one which Sellars claims he cannot but be dissatisfied with.) But Then!

The idea springs to mind that sensations of red triangles have exactly the virtues which ostensible seeings of red triangular physical surfaces lack. To begin with, the grammatical similarity of 'sensation of a red triangle' to "thought of a celestial city" is interpreted to mean, or, better, gives rise to the presupposition, that sensations belong to the same general pigeonhole as thoughts -- in short, are cognitive facts. Then, it is noticed that sensations are ex hypothesi far more intimately related to mental processes than external physical objects. It would seem easier to "get at" a red triangle of which we are having a sensation, than to "get at" a red and triangular physical surface. But, above all, it is the fact that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations which strikes these philosophers, though for it to strike them as it does, they must overlook the fact that if it makes sense to speak of an experience as veridical it must correspondingly make sense to speak of it as unveridical. — Sellars

The phrase "The idea springs to mind" with which this passage opens signals that a new thought, has occurred, one which appears to offer a way out of the deadlock: Sensations cannot be unveridical.

I have come to have a very high regard for Sellars as a philosopher, and for Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind in particular. It's great to see people digging into his work on the forum. I've read most of the thread and have to say that you seem to have Sellars pegged, which is pretty impressive considering that you just started reading him a couple of weeks ago. So kudos for that. The only thing more impressive than your grasp of Sellars is your patience with Terrapin. 8-)

I did not expect to like him this much at all. tbh, when I started this thread, before I started reading (beyond the first section) I saw him more as an irksome figure I wanted to know from inside, so I could dismiss him free from any charge of ignorance. But nah, he's great. And I think talking him out with others aids comprehension a lot - Very few philosophers have so much packed into so little space. And you don't necessarily realize how much is packed in until you talk it out. (And then you realize his precise phrasing indexes his own thoroughly dialectical thought. He's speaking so precisely, because he's done the back-and-forth himself. Or it seems like that.) Any one of these sections could be a stand-alone essay.

I disagree. Determine is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary thus: "Ascertain or establish exactly by research or calculation" & Ascertain is defined by the OED thus: "Find (something) out for certain; make sure of:" — csalisbury

And that's it? Or are you cherry-picking a definition? It doesn't have definitions such as "firmly decide" or simply "decide," "make up one's mind," "choose" etc.? That would make the OED kind of suck if it doesn't have those other definitions. Use a dictionary that better captures all of the common nuances of a term.

No part of what you quoted from Sellars after this amounts to "realizing that they were wrong and saying that they can guarantee veridicality," does it?

And that's it? Or are you cherry-picking a definition? It doesn't have definitions such as "firmly decide" or simply "decide," "make up one's mind," "choose" etc.? That would make the OED kind of suck if it doesn't have those other definitions. Use a dictionary that better captures all of the common nuances of a term.

OED is kind of the gold standard, isn't it? I didn't cherry-pick, that was literally the first definition I looked up. I appreciate that you don't like the definition, but then, I guess the burden is on you to show that your non-standard definition is the right one.

No part of what you quoted from Sellars after this amounts to "realizing that they were wrong and saying that they can guarantee veridicality," does it?

No? It seems clear to me.

I have come to have a very high regard for Sellars as a philosopher — Aaron R

Whereas I hadn't read him in a long time and had a relatively favorable opinion of him from my student days, but rereading this essay now, I've decided that he can't write for shit. For one, I can't imagine that he possibly revised anything in this paper, it had to be a stream-of-consciousness first draft. And he seems to be a completely disorganized, chaotic thinker.

Whereas I hadn't read him in a long time and had a relatively favorable opinion of him from my student days, but rereading this essay now, I've decided that he can't write for shit. For one, I can't imagine that he possibly revised anything in this paper, it had to be a stream-of-consciousness first draft. And he seems to be a completely disorganized, chaotic thinker. — terrapin

Yeah, no shit, as if there was some doubt about you being unjustifiably arrogant and patronizing. You'd probably find conversations furthered better without that attitude. — terrapin

OED is kind of the gold standard, isn't it? — csalisbury

Not if it doesn't include definitions such as "firmly decide" or simply "decide," "make up one's mind," "choose" etc.

I guess the burden is on you to show that your non-standard definition is the right one. — csalisbury

There are no such things as right definitions. Using "determine" in those other ways is common, and those definitions are found in other dictionaries. If the OED doesn't include those definitions, they're not doing their job very well in my opinion.

You're not unfamiliar with normal English usage, by the way, are you, so that you need to look up terms like "determine" and "guarantee" to have some idea of their conventional connotations?

No? It seems clear to me. — csalisbury

What part clearly says anything about guaranteeing veridicality?

I'm not going to argue about the definition anymore.

What part clearly says anything about guaranteeing veridicality? — Terrapin

But, above all, it is the fact that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations which strikes these philosophers, though for it to strike them as it does, they must overlook the fact that if it makes sense to speak of an experience as veridical it must correspondingly make sense to speak of it as unveridical. — Sellars

Obviously he doesn't say the word "guarantee" for example, so you must be translating something as that. What phrase there amounts to "guarantee"?

No 'phrase', but that quote taken in full. How do you understand that quote?

Well, the first part isn't at all clear to me:

it is the fact that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations which strikes these philosophers, — Sellars

--I have no idea why Sellars thinks that that doesn't make sense. Also his "It is the fact" is grammatically ambiguous to me contextually, especially re what the pronoun "it" is standing for, if anything but that's maybe not a big deal.

The last part is just the old "If it makes sense to talk about x, it must make sense to talk about not-x" thing that we went over a bit earlier in this thread.

The linking part doesn't make sense, though, either. You have the phrase "speaking of (or about) unveridical sensations", and with respect to that, he makes the claim that for it to strike someone as if it makes sense to speak of unveridical sensations, they must overlook the fact that if it makes sense to talk about veridicality, then it makes sense to talk about non-veridicality. That seems ridiculously contradictory though.

And none of that has anything to do with claiming that one is guaranteeing veridicality for anything.

Also his "It is the fact" is grammatically ambiguous to me contextually, especially re what the pronoun "it" is standing for, if anything but that's maybe not a big deal. — Terrapin Station

That's a pleonastic 'it,' it doesn't refer. It's like saying 'It was the rain that worried me,' which is the same as 'the rain worried me.' 'It' isn't referring to anything.

he makes the claim that for it to strike someone as if it makes sense to speak — Terrapin Station

...for it to strike someone (i.e., impress them) that it does not make sense...

Since this is an English lesson now, I guess the philosophical discussion is over.

Ah, then he's not saying "Unveridical sensations which strike these philosophers (I took "strikes" rather than "strike" to be a typo/oversight) do not make sense to speak of" but "These philosophers believe that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations." I read it the first way, hence I took "to strike them as it does" to refer to the unveridical sensations which strike these philosophers.

However, if he's saying "These philosophers believe that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations," then what was he doing in the passage right before that, when supposedly giving the view of the philosophers in question, when he said, "The seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular is a veridical member of a class of experiences -- let us call them 'ostensible seeings' -- some of the members of which are non-veridical" and "Rather they would . . . reason that . . . it does consist of members of a class which contains non-veridical members"?

If the philosophers in question believe that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations, then we can't say that their view includes that "some of the members of 'seeing that x if F' are non-veridical." They don't believe that it makes sense to speak of unverdical sensations. (And this is why I read "unveridical sensations which strike these philosophers" as I did.)

Is it that he's using the odd distinction he later seems to use between "seeing" and "sense data"? If so, though, "ostensible seeings, hearings, etc" in that passage doesn't seem to fit the quirky distinction he makes later. "Seeings, hearing, etc." in that context should be referring to sense data, no?

Since this is an English lesson now, — The Great Whatever

It's going to be difficult to avoid these sorts of issues given the sloppy manner in which Sellars writes.

It's going to be difficult to avoid these sorts of issues given the sloppy manner in which Sellars writes. — Terrapin Station

Given that you're now literally reinterpreting what Sellars writes on the assumption he is making typos...

If the philosophers in question believe that it doesn't make sense to speak of unveridical sensations, then when we can't say that their view includes that "some of the members of 'seeing that x if F' are non-veridical." — Terrapin Station

Because as he says, there he's talking about ostensible seeings, not sensations.

(I took "strikes" rather than "strike" to be a typo/oversight) — Terrapin Station

The word "strikes" in there refers back to the word "fact" earlier in the sentence, which means that "strikes" is correct because "fact" is singular.

It's going to be difficult to avoid these sorts of issues given the sloppy manner in which Sellars writes — Terrapin Station

I think it's difficult to avoid these issues because you're attempting to process a text that is, apparently, above your reading level.

Because as he says, there he's talking about ostensible seeings, not sensations. — The Great Whatever

"seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular" isn't a sensation?

"seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular" isn't a sensation?

The former necessarily involves an object external to me. (An "ostensible seeing" involves a belief in an object external to me, whether that belief is correct or not.) Thus 'seeing that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular', while it may require a sensation, is not simply a sensation.

Seeing is sensation unless Sellars is using the quirky apparent distinction he tried to make that I detailed above (quite a few posts ago, in comments about section three) but that he seems to be using inconsistently.

And also if we're talking about veridicality versus non-veridicality, we're talking about how sensations link up with something that's not the sensation, which is the same, functionally, at least, as objects external to you. (Technically it wouldn't have to be something literally external to your body, but it would have to be something external to your present phenomenal awareness.)