I would think no. Because the intention to do X didn’t affect whether or not you tried or succeeded at doing X, physically. — khaled

Well, I think you're going to be on your own there. So, just to be clear, your view is that if I attempt to kill Sarah, I am not morally responsible for forming that intention if it does not result in Sarah's death? That's too bonkers for words.

I would think to be morally responsible in that scenario you’d need some social definition of moral responsibility. — khaled

I don't have a clue what you're on about. You can't define someone into being morally responsible. Writers of dictionaries are not Gods.

If so, then I think that bizarre and unmotivated thesis
— Bartricks

Why bizarre? It comes from splitting up the world into mental and physical stuff. Then noticing that the physical stuff seems to be self determining with no need of mental stuff. — khaled

Well, that too is extraordinarily confused. It's bizarre and unmotivated because it is asymmetrical - it is being claimed that material events cause mental events, but mental events can't cause material events. That's perverse. If there are material events, then we have good evidence that they cause mental events and vice versa. I just intended to raise my arm and it raised. There.

Oh, and physical stuff does not appear to be self-determining. When a physical thing does something we look for a cause of its doing it.

we do make our own choices, I think I may of poorly worded this question! But nevertheless, I am grateful for your perspective, I need to do further research on the Big Bang theory as I only have basic knowledge

So, just to be clear, your view is that if I attempt to kill Sarah, I am not morally responsible for forming that intention if it does not result in Sarah's death? — Bartricks

No that’s not my view. That you interpreted it that way is too bonkers for words.

If you decide to kill Sarah, your attempt to kill Sarah following that decision was not actually caused by that decision. So you did not even cause the physical attempt of killing Sarah. So how can you be blamed for something you didn’t cause?

it is being claimed that material events cause mental events, but mental events can't cause material events. That's perverse. If there are material events, then we have good evidence that they cause mental events and vice versa. I just intended to raise my arm and it raised. There. — Bartricks

Even in an epiphenomenalist view, your decision to raise the arm will always be preceded by an intention to raise the arm. The claim is that the physical raising of the arm causes both the intention and the raising. In a pair.

Your intention to raise the arm and it rising isn’t evidence that the intention was causal. In the same way that a color change preceding a pH change in titration is not evidence that the color has anything to do with pH (it doesn’t). And the fact that the intention always precedes the action is consistent with epiphenomenalism.

Oh, and physical stuff does not appear to be self-determining. When a physical thing does something we look for a cause of its doing it. — Bartricks

Correct. And at no point have we looked at the cause of a physical thing and did NOT find that it was purely and completely caused by other physical things. That’s very strong evidence that physical stuff is self determining.

No that’s not my view. That you interpreted it that way is too bonkers for words.

If you decide to kill Sarah, your attempt to kill Sarah following that decision was not actually caused by that decision. So you did not even cause the physical attempt of killing Sarah. So how can you be blamed for something you didn’t cause? — khaled

In that case you simply didn't understand the original point and you used entirely the wrong words to express yourself. I am morally responsible for my decisions regardless of whether they are effective in the world.

And because of that epiphenomenalism, if true - and it isn't - would not preclude my being morally responsible for my mental activities.

Your intention to raise the arm and it rising isn’t evidence that the intention was causal. In the same way that a color change preceding a pH change in titration is not evidence that the color has anything to do with pH (it doesn’t). And the fact that the intention always precedes the action is consistent with epiphenomenalism. — khaled

What in blue blazes are you on about?

The question you asked me - and that I am patiently answering - is whether we would still be morally responsible if epiphenomenalism is true, yes?

Focus.

The answer to that question is 'yes'. Why?

Because whether I am morally responsible or not for my intentions and decisions and other mental activities has nothing to do with whether they are causally effective in the world.

Simples.

What matters where my moral responsibility for such activities is concerned, is their causal history. If I myself am simply a product of external events that I had no hand in, then I am not morally responsible for being the mind that I am and so consequently I would not be morally responsible for any of my mental activity. Holding me so would be as unfair as holding me morally responsible for my eye colour or height or some other feature of my material body that I had no hand in it having.

If my mind is a material thing, then it would be the product of external events that I had no hand in, as this is the case with all material things.

So, in order for me to be morally responsible for the activities my mind engages in, I need 'not' to be a material thing. And as my reason and the reason of virtually all other careful reasoners (an important qualification - we're not including total spanners), represents us to be morally responsible for our mental activities, we can and should conclude that we - we minds, that is - are not material objects. Of course, few are willing to follow reason where she leads, but decide in advance how far they are willing to go.

Again, whether epiphenomenalism is true or not has no bearing on this whatsoever.

I am morally responsible for my decisions regardless of whether they are effective in the world. — Bartricks

Sure. I would assume that being morally responsible would require you and your decisions to be able to.... you know.... do something. Guess not though.

What in blue blazes are you on about? — Bartricks

Whether or not the thesis is bizarre and motivated. You would have known that had you simply read what I quoted.

Because whether I am morally responsible or not for my intentions and decisions and other mental activities has nothing to do with whether they are causally effective in the world. — Bartricks

I think you're on your own there.

If a bedridden paralyzed patient who can't move any muscle in his body intends to donate to charity, but since he can't move he doesn't, has he done something moral? Similarly if he decides to kill someone, but since he can't move he doesn't, has he done something immoral?

Morality applies to actions. Not mental activities.

then I am not morally responsible for being the mind that I am and so consequently I would not be morally responsible for any of my mental activity. — Bartricks

Disagree. But that's not something I want to get into again.

And I'm curious how you think your mind originated. Not due to your birth or anything physical like that of course. So what? It was just sort of always there? An immortal soul of some sort?

Sure. I would assume that being morally responsible would require you and your decisions to be able to.... you know.... do something. Guess not though. — khaled

No, that's the bonkers view you expressed earlier and then disavowed when its bonkerishness became apparent. To be morally responsible for intending to kill Sarah your intention does not need to have resulted in Sarah's death, it is sufficient that you formed it. Obviously.

Whether or not the thesis is bizarre and motivated. You would have known that had you simply read what I quoted. — khaled

This is a derailing move as whether epiphenomenalism is plausible or not is demonstrably irrelevant to the free will question. But it 'is' a bizarre and unmotivated view. For the same evidence that implies material events cause mental ones exists for the reverse. What's the evidence that material events cause mental ones? Well, I just bashed my toe - material event - and it caused me to be in pain - mental event. What's the evidence that mental events cause material ones? The pain - mental event - caused me to shout out "ouch", which was a material event. But anyway, whether or not epiphenomenalism is a really stupid view or a sensible interpretation of the data is neither here nor there, as it doesn't bear on the issue under debate.

Because whether I am morally responsible or not for my intentions and decisions and other mental activities has nothing to do with whether they are causally effective in the world.
— Bartricks

I think you're on your own there. — khaled

Oh, so now you 'do' think that whether you're morally responsible for intending to do X depends on whether X actually occurs? Not a great friend of Consistency are you? Until you and consistency start getting on a bit better I'm not sure this is going to be at all productive.

Morality applies to actions. Not mental activities. — khaled

It applies to more than actions, and some mental activities are actions and some mental activity is essential to all actions. So, you know, well done for being so wrong about so much.

And I'm curious how you think your mind originated. Not due to your birth or anything physical like that of course. So what? It was just sort of always there? An immortal soul of some sort? — khaled

It didn't originate, for if it did then it would be the product of external causes. And yes, a soul. That's the point. Free will requires a soul.

Here's the argument again, clearly laid out:

1. If my mind is the product of external events that I had no hand in, then I am not morally responsible for anything about my mind or anything it is caused to do. (If A, then B)
2. I am morally responsible for being the mind that I am and am morally responsible for what it is caused to do. (Not B)
3. Therefore, my mind is not the product of external events I had no hand in. (Therefore, not A)
4. If my mind is a material thing, then it is the product of external events I had no hand in (if C, then A)
5. Therefore, my mind is not a material thing (Therefore, not C).
6. If my mind is not a material thing, then it is an immaterial thing (if not C, then D)
7. Therefore, my mind is an immaterial thing (therefore D)

Free will requires a soul then. And a soul I am. And a soul you are. Which means you're morally responsible for the way you have been thinking above.

kill Sarah your intention does not need to have resulted in Sarah's death, it is sufficient that you formed it. Obviously. — Bartricks

Obviously not. In that example, you still attempted to kill Sarah. If you hadn't attempted you did nothing wrong. Even if you had every intent to kill Sarah. As long as you don't act on the intention, you did nothing wrong. Because morality applies to actions.

Not a great friend of Consistency are you? — Bartricks

You're just not a great friend of understanding. You sound so self assured I feel sorry for you because you always end up looking like an idiot when shown the obvious thing you've been missing.

This is a derailing move as whether epiphenomenalism is plausible or not is demonstrably irrelevant to the free will question. — Bartricks

Not derailing. Just a separate question I was curious about. Though I understand it may be difficult for you to keep two separate questions in mind at the same time.

It applies to more than actions, and some mental activities are actions and is essential to all actions. So, you know, well done. — Bartricks

You know that I mean. Physical actions. I just don't understand what you gain by trying to make such a stupid very easily dismissible "objection".

1. If my mind is the product of external events that I had no hand in, then I am not morally responsible for anything about my mind or anything it is caused to do. (If A, then B) — Bartricks

This premise is just false. You don't know if your mind is material or immaterial at this junction correct? If your mind WAS immaterial, then it could be the product of external events you had no hand in, but still not be caused to do anything as a result (be undetermined).

Even if your mind was material, it could be that indeterminism is the case, in which case, again, you would be responsible for what it does, regardless of whether or not it was created by factors outside your control.

Remember your original argument for this? It was "In order to be morally responsible my actions must not fully trace to external causes".

Remember: I agree with Strawson over 1. I agree that to be morally responsible, your decisions must not trace to external causes — Bartricks

Well if your mind is undetermined (either by it being immaterial or by it being material and indeterminism being the case), then it could be a product of external events, yet still your decisions would not all trace to external causes.

So it is simply false that if your mind is the product of external events that that leads to your decisions tracing to external causes which leads to you not being morally responsible. Your mind can be the product of external events, without your decisions tracing to external causes if indeterminism is the case. So your mind can be caused by external factors while you retain moral responsibility.

This is in addition to the fact that I don't even accept the premise to begin with. Even IF your actions traced to external events you're still responsible for them depending on the events.

↪Bartricks
kill Sarah your intention does not need to have resulted in Sarah's death, it is sufficient that you formed it. Obviously.
— Bartricks

Obviously not. In that example, you still attempted to kill Sarah. If you hadn't attempted you did nothing wrong. — khaled

To be morally responsible for forming an intention to do X does not depend on whether X itself occurs. It isn't a difficult point to grasp and it is obviously true. I just explained the point to my plate of fish fingers and I think even one of them got it. So, you know, up your game.

You're just not a great friend of understanding. You sound so self assured I feel sorry for you because you always end up looking like an idiot when shown the obvious thing you've been missing. — khaled

Dunning and Kruger.

It applies to more than actions, and some mental activities are actions and is essential to all actions. So, you know, well done.
— Bartricks

You know that I mean. Physical actions. I just don't understand what you gain by trying to make such a stupid very easily dismissible "objection". — khaled

No, what you said was just plain false. Morality applies to more than actions. It applies to states of affairs and character traits as well, neither of which are actions (the moral properties of rightness and wrongness apply exclusively to actions, but those are not all the moral properties that there are). And all actions have a mental element, for actions are the exclusive preserve of agents, and agents are minds and an action is caused by certain kinds of mental event. So you were totally and utterly wrong. I mean, it's actually quite impressive to have packed so many mistakes into so few words. I'm impressed.

1. If my mind is the product of external events that I had no hand in, then I am not morally responsible for anything about my mind or anything it is caused to do. (If A, then B)
— Bartricks

This premise is just false. You don't know if your mind is material or immaterial at this junction correct? If your mind WAS immaterial, then it could be the product of external events you had no hand in, but still not be caused to do anything as a result (be undetermined). — khaled

On what grounds do you reject premise 1? Present a deductively valid argument that has the negation of 1 as a conclusion. I cannot understand from what you've said on what grounds you are rejecting it. You seem to be thinking that as my mind could be immaterial and still the product of external causes, this somehow shows premise 1 to be false. Er, how? What the argument shows is that being immaterial is 'necessary' for being morally responsible (and thus having free will). It does not show that it is sufficient.

Even if your mind was material, it could be that indeterminism is the case, in which case, again, you would be responsible for what it does, regardless of whether or not it was created by factors outside your control. — khaled

Why on earth would I be responsible for what my mind does if its activities are indeterministic? If it was indeterministic what height I would achieve, or what eye colour I would have, would that make me morally responsible for those matters? Obviously not. The same is true when the indeterminism infects my mind. You can't plausibly go from not being morally responsible for something to being morally responsible for it just by the addition of indeterministic causation.

Remember your original argument for this? It was "In order to be morally responsible my actions must not fully trace to external causes". Well if your mind is undetermined (either by it being immaterial or by it being material and indeterminism being the case), then it could be a product of external events, yet still your actions would not all trace to external causes. — khaled

False. Indeterministic causation is still causation. When an event is undetermined, it is not uncaused. It was caused, just indeterministically. Imagine that it was indeterministic whether the bullet would hit me or not. It hits me and blows my arm off. Well, what was the cause of my arm blowing off? The bullet, yes?

It isn't a difficult point to grasp and it is obviously true. — Bartricks

It's very easy to grasp. And obviously false. Again:

If a bedridden paralyzed patient who can't move any muscle in his body intends to donate to charity, but since he can't move he doesn't, has he done something moral? Similarly if he decides to kill someone, but since he can't move he doesn't, has he done something immoral? — khaled

Answer these questions honestly. And you'll have your answer.

And all actions have a mental element for actions are the exclusive preserve of agents, and agents are minds and an action is caused by certain kinds of mental event. — Bartricks

Would be to assume epiphenomenalism is false. And I thought it shouldn't matter whether or not it is true for your position....

Why on earth would I be responsible for what my mind does if its activities are indeterministic? — Bartricks

Because it doesn't trace to external causes. That was YOUR standard. And it is met.

False. Indeterministic causation is still causation. When an event is undetermined, it is not uncaused. It was caused, just indeterministically. — Bartricks

But any given action you do indeterministically does NOT trace to external causes. You can take all the causes into account, and it wouldn't be enough to cause action A or action B. There is an additional element.

But just to be clear: to you "traces to external causes" is the case even if indeterminism is the case? Sure. Even though no combination of the external causes can ever decide the result, apparently the result still traces to external causes. Gotcha.

Literally no idea what your point is. On what grounds do you reject premise 1? Present a deductively valid argument that has the negation of 1 as a conclusion. — Bartricks

Why is the burden of proof on me? The premise doesn't appear to be true. It's nonsense. And regardless, I've explained why it is false. Because indeterminism means (precisely) that actions do not trace fully to external causes. Which was your standard.

1- If indeterminism is the case, actions do not trace fully to external causes (if A then B)
2- If actions do not trace fully to external causes you are morally responsible (if B then C)
3- If indeterminism is the case, you are morally responsible (if A then C)
4- If your mind is the product of external causes, and indeterminism is the case, you are still morally responsible (If A and D, A -> C: then C)
5- It is not the case that If your mind is the product of external events that you had no hand in, then you are not morally responsible (proof by counterexample 4)

I just explained the point to my plate of fish fingers and I think one of them got it. — Bartricks

I mean.... I could see why you would have no one to talk to but talking to your food? You should consider therapy.

And no wonder only fish fingers seem to get you. Since you are of similar intelligence.

Some people just can't be helped it seems.

First let us assume determinism is correct, consider the following:

1. Individual A says “I have free will.”

2. Individual B says “We don't have free will but we are determined”

All determinism can say in both cases is that they were determined to say this due to some prior cause. And to say that the cause was some enlightening rational argument is not understanding determinism. So the very arguments to support determinism are undermined by the very idea of determinism since it is an idea that is arational by nature.

But just to be clear: to you "traces to external causes" is the case even if indeterminism is the case? Sure. Even though no combination of the external causes can ever decide the result, apparently the result still traces to external causes. Gotcha. — khaled

Yes, Finger, that's right. Although causes do not 'decide' a result as decisions are mental events and causes aren't minds. But apart from that misuse of language (and the conceptual confusion it expressed) yes, indeterministic causation is still causation and if indeterminism is true events still have causes. And thus if it was indeterministic what kind of mind my mind would be, that does precisely nothing to make me morally responsible for it. Obviously.

:roll:

Cheers. Hope you get help. You need to stop talking to your food, though I know it's hard to find anyone else that agrees with you.

if indeterminism is true events still have causes. — Bartricks

But don’t trace fully to the causes. That’s the point. That was your standard and it is met.

No, they trace fully to the causes. If indeterminism is true events are not thereby 'less' caused (as even my fish finger recognizes).

All determinism can say in both cases is that they were determined to say this due to some prior cause. And to say that the cause was some enlightening rational argument is not understanding determinism. So the very arguments to support determinism are undermined by the very idea of determinism since it is an idea that is arational by nature. — Richard B

Correct. Determinism is a religion, not a philosophy.

Yes we may be influenced by external factors, but at the end of the day it's our own active choice. It’s your choice to be influenced by your environment.

I think in some cases, people do not know any better, the environment they reside in is all they know and fear/conformity can play a role in some choices - is this truly freedom of will?

Yes, people may act badly because they did not know better. The question merely is "Could we have done anything differently if we could somehow rewind our lives?"

I say this, as I travel Europe often and experience racism, and realise that many do not have resources to education and experience like I do, I do not hate them instead I feel sorry for them. They are conforming to their societies norms and do not know better. But I guess they do have a choice to be better people and spread love and not hate...

What do you mean, can you further elucidate?

Was everything you’ve done in your life, up until now, a result of events that happened before it? Or is part of our decision-making free from the past? Have you made decisions that you could have made differently? Could you have chosen to become a doctor instead of what you chose to become?

ah, I see, well everything I have done I have chosen to do, I am lucky enough to have a job I thoroughly enjoy and wake up doing what I love. But in saying this, everything of my past shaped what I do, not in a predetermined way, but it made the path for me today...

I guess you could say it was causation in a way, I met the right people at the right time, and it had a domino effect. But I still make my own choices, I can do choose to do as I want

Just to confirm, you mean it influenced you partially, but not entirely? I.e. there are parts of your decision-making that are not a consequence of earlier decisions or experiences?

yes, partially!

I believe we make decisions (not necessarily all ones) free from causation as well.

I basically believe what you do today, shapes tomorrow, then the day after etc...

Well, that's fine if her view is that blame and praise come with the same control and origination requirements (I am not sure if that is her view - though it has also been a while since I read anything by her, and the last thing I read was her Freedom within Reason, which is quite old so perhaps her views have changed or perhaps the view I attributed to her was not her view). But from memory her view there was that someone born evil is not morally responsible for their subsequent evil acts, whereas someone born good is morally responsible for their subsequent good acts. And if that's right, well, it seems prima facie implausible. — Bartricks

That seems to be somewhat of a distortion of Wolf's view. What might be rather more consistent with her views, I think, is the claim that someone born with (or, more plausibly, who has at a later stage of her maturation from infancy come to acquire) a rational capacity to differentiate good from evil is thereafter suited to be held responsible for her actions. The very idea of someone being born evil -- having no capacity whatsoever to be good, or to mend her ways -- may be incoherent. Someone being born innocent, and not having yet matured out of this stage of innocence, as is the case with human infants and non-human animals, rather is a condition that makes one incapable of being either good or evil, and hence also unsuited to be held personally responsible for their actions, except proleptically in the case of very young human children who we expect to be on their way towards rational autonomy, and towards whom our reactive attitudes (such as those we express with praise and blame) scaffold the growth of their capacities for rational and moral judgement.

That seems to be somewhat of a distortion of Wolf's view. — Pierre-Normand

Yes, perhaps. But if she's defending a symmetrical view then there's not much that's new or interesting in her view. She's just a standard compatibilist, a capacity junky who thinks that all we need to be morally responsible is to be running on a certain programme or to be behaving in ways that express our values or what have you. All the time ignoring the elephant in the room, which is that if we are wholly the creation of alien forces then it doesn't matter what other capacities we have, we are not morally responsible for anything. You need to be alive before a healthy diet can improve your life, and you need to be morally responsible for how you are before the addition of this or that rational capacity can make you morally responsible for how you use it.

One can choose an evil path through life even though he/she possesses free will.

The “will” is another abstraction of the human being. How could it be otherwise? Whenever I look for the genesis of human action, and follow it through to it’s execution, I need not avert my eyes to any other being, state, or idea in the entire universe but the one committing the action. That a determinist must retreat into his mind to find some other cause is enough for me to be suspicious of the position.

A mind is a thing. An object. — Bartricks

Don't think that can be right.
Objects tend to be breakable (under conservation), whereas things associated with mind are interruptible (experiences, thinking, etc).
So, processes, occurrences, though maybe memory is an exception.
The quote looks like a category mistake, and that's going by evidence mind you.