Should that have been 'Well, the term "use" defines analyticity...' as in, are you claiming Witti defined analyticity in terms of use?
It's clear from the discussion here and in Sam's thread that hinge propositions need not be analytic. That's their point, really. — Banno
It's unclear what Mww is doing, especially given that he says "I agree with it" then "I don't"... — Banno
A guy that takes a metaphor and turns it into a riddle, by the employment of conceptions that contradict each other, re: “foundation walls carried by the whole house” is just wasting himself in doing crappy philosophy. — Mww
and this:250. My having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in evidence for it.
255. Doubting has certain characteristic manifestations, but they are only characteristic of it in particular circumstances. If someone said that he doubted the existence of his hands, kept looking at them from all sides, tried to make sure it wasn't 'all done by mirrors', etc., we should not be sure whether we ought to call this doubting. We might describe his way of behaving as like the behaviour of doubt, but this game would be not be ours.
103. And now if I were to say "It is my unshakeable conviction that etc.", this means in the present case too that I have not consciously arrived at the conviction by following a particular line of thought, but that it is anchored in all my questions and answers, so anchored that I cannot touch it.
159. As children we learn facts; e.g., that every human being has a brain, and we take them on trust. I believe that there is an island, Australia, of such-and-such a shape, and so on and so on; I believe that I had great-grandparents, that the people who gave themselves out as my parents really were my parents, etc. This belief may never have been expressed; even the thought that it was so, never thought.
What more empirical a demonstration could there be than Moore waving his hand at you? — Banno
Davidson would certainly not agree that language isn't necessary for knowing and believing — Banno
And Davidson would certainly not agree that language isn't necessary for knowing and believing. Nor I suspect would Wittgenstein.
But yes, doubt comes with propositional content and hence is also inherently a linguistic enterprise - a language game. — Banno
And Davidson would certainly not agree that language isn't necessary for knowing and believing. Nor I suspect would Wittgenstein.
But yes, doubt comes with propositional content and hence is also inherently a linguistic enterprise - a language game. — Banno
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