Our cat sitting on the floor presents no problems to solve, creates no doubts that plague us, no needs to be satisfied, no questions to answer, no reason to think. — Ciceronianus the White

You're then habituated to the idea. Is that how you understand knowledge?

Yeah yeah but I wonder if you've actually studied any of my suggested 'improvers' (there are more)?

Nope, that's why I asked. I assume you have. And, are they improvers?

Most definitely. Like Schop's Critique of the Kantian Philosophy (Appendix, WWR vol. 1) who corrected and extended the transcendental paradigm. Or about a century later the fallibilists (Peirce, Dewey, Popper) who reject, if not refute, Kants 'transcendental certainties'.

Our cat sitting on the floor presents no problems to solve, creates no doubts that plague us, — Ciceronianus the White

True enough. Still, I wonder.....

I don't think we reason, or engage in scientific inquiry, or even think unless we encounter a problem — Ciceronianus the White

.....what may have been the problem needing to be solved, which inspired you to think we do not think unless there is one?

.... "and gets seventy-five miles to the gallon and was only ever driven by a little old lady to the store once a week!" You're sounding like a used-car salesman, and gumming the subject. Put some teeth into it.

Since you did not choose a single item, I will, from your reference.

"Ethics
Kant claimed that virtue results from practical reason.
(1) Schopenhauer claimed that, to the contrary, virtuous conduct has nothing to do with a rational life and may even be opposed to it, as with Machiavellian rational expediency.
Categorical Imperative
According to Schopenhauer, Kant's Categorical Imperative:
(2) Redundantly repeats the ancient command: "don't do to another what you don't want done to you."
(3) Is egoistic because its universality includes the person who both gives and obeys the command.
(4) Is cold and dead because it is to be followed without love, feeling, or inclination, but merely out of a sense of duty."

The above is a fair representation of Schopenhauer's views, or it is not. These four seem to me nonsense. "nothing to do with rational life," redundant," egoistic," "cold and dead." Care to rehabilitate these or any of them? Or, if not these, then any other from your reference you care to choose? In any case none seem to "improve."

Or even take on the ding an sicht selbst. Even as simply as this. I see a tree. What exactly do I actually see? Or anything you want. The idea is: Kant said this; I improve on it thus!

Read any or all of my references for yourself, tim. You claim to have not read any of them yet which reduces to mere uninformed doxa your suggestion (or dogma) that no one has 'improved' on Kant. Please. Transcendental idealism 'solves' the problem of Cartesian dualism which Spinoza had dissolved over a century before; and, in that wayward "Copernican" process, Kant tilts at the windmills of 'Newton's science' as if it consists of metaphysical (or epistemological) certainties. Like Plato, Aristotle or Descartes, Kant is a great philosopher with an anachronistic philosophy for today. Yeah, I may be wrong (by no means is this opinion not controversial or heterodox), but you won't know that yourself unless you read more widely, my friend.

You're then habituated to the idea. Is that how you understand knowledge? — tim wood

I think that most of our lives, our experiences, are non-reflective. We're not engaged in reasoning most of the time. We don't have to use our reason be aware of what's going on about us. I don't think knowledge is the use of reason or is confined to the results of its use as "knowledge" "know" or "knowing" is ordinarily used. When we define "knowledge" in that fashion we discount, or perhaps even ignore, most of our lives. Knowledge then becomes very limited and narrow. It's no wonder that such a narrow definition of "knowledge" leads to Skepticism and Idealism.

What we know, as we ordinarily use that word, can include what we're familiar with from past experience; it can include there results of reasoning or scientific inquiry; it can include what we've perceived. For me, the fact that what we know isn't limited to what results from the application of reasoning or scientific inquiry doesn't mean we don't "really" know in that case.

It's no wonder that such a narrow definition of "knowledge" leads to Skepticism and Idealism. — Ciceronianus the White

:up:

All agreed! But its not what Kant was about. It appears that you accept uncritically as knowledge that which you think you know. And fair enough, that's how a lot of the world's work and play get done. And it's also just a convenient surface. But Kant dug into it not least because as a then world-class physicist as well as philosopher he was perfectly aware that there were problems with the uncritical view.

What do you do when need to take a critical stance? That is, when you have to know for yourself? What do you dig into, how, and how and why do you rely on that? Kant's answer, as I read it, was it's this way (that he described) or no way. The this way takes reason, which in the case of perception, is simply no part at all of the thing-(in-itself-as-it-is-in-itself) perceived. And this is just kant digging way deeper than most folks go.

But a simple test, that I have asked a several times in these threads, is to explain exactly what is seen in the act of seeing. The language is simple; e.g., "I see a tree." What exactly does that simple language entail to be meaningful? Care to take a try at it? The one thing it cannot mean is that you see the tree. If you disagree, then make the case.

And just here a mini-lesson in the dangers of reading and relying on secondary sources, and even more on quoting excerpts. — tim wood

Like many philosophers, Kant could be interpreted, and quoted, from both sides of the religion question. Nominally, he was a conventional Lutheran. But some of his ideas would make his fellow Christians uncomfortable. It's true that his Critique of Human Reason, allowed room for Faith. But, he could also be critical of some religious beliefs.

My comment was only intended to show Ciceronianus that his interpretation might be looking only at one side of Kant's religious views : the notion of that which "transcends" reality. Which has been a common view among philosophers for thousands of years. Yet Kant was writing during a revolutionary transition period away from Idealism & Transcendentalism, toward Realism & Mundanism. And philosophical worldviews have swung back & forth since then with each new generation. Personally, I have no problem reconciling both views from the perspective of the BothAnd Principle. So, my worldview is both Ideal and Real, both Transcendental and Mundane. :smile:

PS___Since I have never met Kant, or read his works in the original language, all of my sources are secondary.

Thus Kant demythologizes the Christian doctrine of original sin.
https://iep.utm.edu/kant-rel/

Both/And Principle :
http://blog-glossary.enformationism.info/page10.html

There certainly are limits to human reason, but to claim the real is forever beyond our knowledge seems, to me, excessive, and unjustified. — Ciceronianus the White

Hence, your negative reaction to the notion of Transcendence. I will agree that denial of the mundane Reality of our direct experience is unjustified. But to deny that there is also something beyond the scope of our senses, is also unreasonable.

For example, scientists today accept many concepts that lie beyond (transcend) our direct knowledge, and must be taken on faith in the experts : String Theory, 11 dimensions, Parallel Universes, etc. I have no experience of such transcendental things, but I don't deny their possibility. I just don't have much use for that kind of transcendence.

However, the general notion of Transcendence, as a philosophical concept, is not a problem for me. And it can make sense of some perennial philosophical mysteries, such as : what existed "before" the Big Bang gave birth to space-time? :nerd:

All right. You have a utilitarian functional understanding of knowledge. All of which is granted, granted, granted. With such knowledge you can buy beer and groceries. Now a challenge: what do you say knowledge is? What is the case - or must be the case - to move from opinion to knowledge? Not in any particular sense, but in the general sense.

My own answer is that knowledge comes into being not when it comports with the world because 1) at least that comportment itself requires a judgment based on knowledge to judge it, 2) the world itself can be deceptive, and 3) judgment itself, as well as being possibly deceived, can itself be deceptive.

Knowledge comes into being with its own without-which-not. Kant - as I read and render him - says that's reason. No reason, no knowledge. And since reason is no part of the thing known, it remains that the thing known, known only through reason, without reason is not known.

In this, knowledge is constrained, bounded by, and limited to what reason can present.

right. You have a utilitarian functional understanding of knowledge. All of which is granted, granted, granted. With such knowledge you can buy beer and groceries. Now a challenge: what do you say knowledge is? — tim wood

Seems a disingenuously rhetorical formulation: why ask if you've already decided I'm a philistine?

Now a challenge: what do you say knowledge is? What is the case - or must be the case - to move from opinion to knowledge? Not in any particular sense, but in the general sense.

The convergence of a Peircean community of inquirers reasoning towards the best explanation of transformations of matters of fact or translations of/within formalisms. Knowledge, "in a general sense", is a commons, or warranted public concern, unlike "opinons" which are merely unwarranted, subjective noises.

In this, knowledge is constrained, bounded by, and limited to what reason can present.

A truism. Hardly a "Copernican revolution". Reason – discursive practices, or language – is public and not private (i.e. located in the 'Cartesian subject' as Kant mistakenly assumes and Hegel corrects!)

It appears that you accept uncritically as knowledge that which you think you know. And fair enough, that's how a lot of the world's work and play get done. — tim wood

Well, I can, if pressed, come up with reasons for my acceptance of my cat as a cat, just as one can come up with reasons why we know a chair is a chair. But my point is that those reasons and their recitation isn't required for there to be knowledge in such cases. There are times when reasoning and investigation are required for us to know. But those are instances different from what we know and act on regularly in our day to day lives.

What do you do when need to take a critical stance? That is, when you have to know for yourself? What do you dig into, how, and how and why do you rely on that? Kant's answer, as I read it, was it's this way (that he described) or no way. The this way takes reason, which in the case of perception, is simply no part at all of the thing-(in-itself-as-it-is-in-itself) perceived. — tim wood

We're justified in taking a critical stance where we have reason to doubt. But I would say if we don't have a reason to doubt, it's not appropriate to pretend there is one. This is Peirce's point in his criticism of Descartes and his exercise in doubting what he plainly didn't doubt if his existence and conduct is any guide.

I'm a fan of Pragmatism to a large extent as you may have guessed. Dewey referred to what he called the "philosophical fallacy" which roughly speaking is the neglect of context. According to Dewey, philosophers have a tendency to suppose that whatever may be the case in certain conditions will be the case under other conditions. The fact that reason is required to know in certain cases doesn't mean it's required in all cases.

The language is simple; e.g., "I see a tree." What exactly does that simple language entail to be meaningful? Care to take a try at it? The one thing it cannot mean is that you see the tree. If you disagree, then make the case. — tim wood

I find it hard to think of situations where I'd say "I see a tree." Perhaps I would if, for example, someone asked me what I see outside my window, and there's a tree outside my window. Or perhaps if they showed me a picture of a tree and asked "What do you see, a tree or a kangaroo?" In those contexts, it would be perfectly appropriate for me to say "I see a tree" and it would be a true statement.

But to deny that there is also something beyond the scope of our senses, is also unreasonable. — Gnomon

That's so. We know that to be the case. But this doesn't mean that there is in all cases something not only outside the scope of our senses, but something we can never know.

All right. I'll play for a while. Your claim is that on those occasions when you see a tree, saying that you see a tree is true. Question: if a wall between you and the tree, do you still see the tree? Of course not, but why not? The tree is not changed. You are not changed. Why do you not still see it?

Answer: because the wall is in the way. Question: in the way of what? And so on. And pretty quickly you're forced to admit that what you see is not the tree. If you think you do, please give an account of that.

There are times I wish that the formal study of philosophy I was exposed to in college dealt with such questions. I would at least recognize them. I have the feeling this is old stuff for you, but I don't know the routine, so I'm sure I'm missing the point you think is clear.

If there's a wall in front of me, I see a wall. If I saw a tree when I was in front of the wall, I saw a tree then. If I'm now behind the wall, I don't see a tree--I see a wall, now. I have no expectation of seeing the tree, nor, I think, would anyone expect me to see it. So, it isn't difficult for me to "admit" I don't see a tree in front of me when I see a wall.

That's so. We know that to be the case. But this doesn't mean that there is in all cases something not only outside the scope of our senses, but something we can never know. — Ciceronianus the White

I agree that Nescience is just as rare as Omniscience. So I muddle along somewhere in the middle, consoled by the knowledge than even Socrates admitted that "one thing I know is that I know nothing". But that was an intentionally paradoxical statement.

For Kant to say that, not everything, but merely the ideal ding an sich is unknowable, may sound defeatist to you. But to me, it's a wise form of philosophical humility : to avoid the self-conceit of a know-it-all. For an humble philosopher, most of the universe's potential knowledge is unknown to him. On the other hand, to know that there is much you don't know, leaves you with plenty to explore -- including the notion of Transcendence. :smile:

Socratic paradox :
Socrates begins all wisdom with wondering, thus one must begin with admitting one's ignorance. After all, Socrates' dialectic method of teaching was based on that he as a teacher knew nothing, so he would derive knowledge from his students by dialogue.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_know_that_I_know_nothing

"All knowledge and understanding of the Universe was no more than playing with stones and shells on the seashore of the vast imponderable ocean of truth." — Sir Isaac Newton

"Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp,. Or what's a heaven for?" ___Browning

Epistemology, the philosophical study of the nature, origin, and limits of human knowledge.

Transcendence : existence or experience beyond the normal or physical level.
"the possibility of spiritual transcendence in the modern world"
___Oxford

PS__I too, am skeptical of most claims about paranormal knowledge. But to claim that there is nothing "beyond the normal" leaves you open to be blindsided by a Black Swan. :cool:

The point is that your clam and understanding is that you see the tree. What does the wall interfere with that prevents that? No tricks here; it's all straightforward. You will simply come to realize it's not the tree you see, nor can possibly be.

What does the wall interfere with that prevents that? — tim wood

You can't see beyond/through it?

what may have been the problem needing to be solved, which inspired you to think we do not think unless there is one? — Mww

More "who" than "what." John Dewey.

In this, knowledge is constrained, bounded by, and limited to what reason can present. — tim wood

Yes. The paradox of human Reason is that it is the mechanism by which we come to know Reality, but it is also the ability to imagine worlds that don't exist in reality. So, it's the job of Philosophy and Science to sort-out the real from the unreal. But, it's a hard job, and there's still a lot of gray area for us to quibble about. :nerd:

Don Hoffman's : Why Evolution Hid the Truth From Our Eyes
From his studies, he has concluded that our sensory perceptions have “almost surely evolved to hide reality. They just report fitness”. Even so, humans have also evolved another form of “perception” that we call “conception”. And that’s where the philosophical debates divide. Via conception, we can imagine things we can’t see, and we sometimes find those subjective “ideals” to be more important than the objectively real objects of the physical realm. That sometimes leads to Faith, in which we “believe in things unseen”.
http://bothandblog6.enformationism.info/page21.html

Ok, thanks.

I don't think we reason, or engage in scientific inquiry, or even think unless we encounter a problem — Ciceronianus the White


.....what may have been the problem needing to be solved, which inspired you to think we do not think unless there is one? — Mww

This wasn't addressed to me, but it's such a funny kind of ironic question that I can't resist an answer. Surely the "problem" here would be the desire to understand why we bother thinking, wouldn't it? :wink:

the "problem" here would be the desire to understand why we bother thinking, wouldn't it? — Janus

Damned if I know. “I don’t think we reason....” is itself a thought, albeit with negative predication, so if we only think if there’s a problem, and “I don’t think” is thinking....there must have been a problem that needed solving. So I went out on the skinniest of limbs and inquired as to what it might be.

While it is true that in order to solve a problem one must think, the negation of that truth, re: absent a problem equates to absence of need for thinking, is patently false. And I fail to see how pragmatism is gonna fix the apparent absurdity in dismissing a fundamental human condition.

Furthermore....he said with an abundance of serious countenance.....just because we’re so accustomed to not being aware of something, is not sufficient reason for claiming there is no something there.

But I was told the problem is more who than what, and desire to understand is a what therefore hardly a who, so.....we’ve gained not a thing.

Glad you noticed.

:up: If natural human curiosity be considered a problem I guess the pragmatists may have a point.

pragmatists may have a point. — Janus

Maybe.

Stephen King has a catchphrase, born in the Dark Tower series.....”they have forgotten the face of their fathers”, a literary commentary on honor.

Pragmatists, and analytical philosophers in general, have forgotten their fathers, a philosophical commentary on teachings.

Progress, I suppose.

I wrote this before but cannot find it, so I'll write it again. This has to do with Kant's thing-in-itself-as-it-is-in-itself. You aver that you see the tree, implying that you, seeing the tree, know about the tree. And we agree that in any informal or uncritical sense this is exactly what happens. You see the tree.

But what actually happens? Light is incident on the tree - no light, no see tree - the light bounces off the tree and then enters your eye. In your eye the light stimulates your retina to send an electrical signal along your optic nerve to your brain. You brain then having received this signal does a bunch of things to somehow create an image, not least organizing and interpreting it, without which sensing, signaling, organization, interpretation, and presentation, no tree. And in course of time, you say, "Oh, that's a tree."

And so with all perception You think you hear a symphony, but what actually happens?

And it shouldn't be difficult to recognize that not only do you not hear or see or anything else in the commonly understood sense, but the thing as perceived, the image, being entirely created by you, is nothing to the thing itself as it is in itself. You may, e.g., argue that at least the tree is green, the light conveying information to you. Sure. Shine an orange light on the tree and what color is it? And if the color depends on the light - oh, and of course your ability to "see" light, which is limited - then what color is the tree in itself as it etc.?

What's more remarkable to me is that so many different brains can, apparently, agree on their products. Especially as no two are the same. I believe Kant attributes that to reason.

One might think in terms of a bakery. Milk, flour, sugar, eggs, flavorings are delivered by truck to the bakery where the baker assembles, mixes, makes, bakes, a cake. No two the same. What color is the truck driver's eyes?
.

You're not addressing the question "What do you see?" You're addressing an entirely different one: "How do you see?"

If I'm looking at a tree and someone asks me "What do you see?" I don't describe the process by which I see. As to hearing, if I'm listening to a symphony and I'm asked "What do you hear?" I say "I hear a symphony." If I'm asked "How do you hear (a symphony)?" There will be, of course, an entirely different answer.