Well, if you ask me, when I relate what is being said, I normally use phrases like "They say that ..." etc. and I know of no other way of putting it in everyday language. "They say that", "as they say", etc. simply indicates that something is being affirmed. It by no means signifies that what is being said is a mere "story". — Apollodorus

Hence my question to you (which I have asked multiple times):

How does one speak of things said without using phrases like “as they say”, “according to things said”, etc.
— Apollodorus — Apollodorus

Well, I DID attempt to answer this question in my previous post, but you obviously either didn’t notice I was answering, or just ignored it. So, I will attempt again, and I think I can respond to both these, your objection and question, in a single demonstration.

Let’s consider again the places in that passage (Apology, 40e-41c) where Socrates reminds us that the things he is relating are “spoken of”. The first is at 40e: “On the other hand, if death is like a journey from here to another place, and if the things that are said are true, that in fact all the dead are there,...” etc. Now, let’s consider if this phrase of Socrates’, “and if the things that are said are true,” is either necessary or expected in the context of this sentence. For I would assume—and correct me if I’m wrong—that if it is neither necessary nor expected, that it must be either extraordinary, or superfluous, or otherwise demanding of our attention.

How are we to answer this question? Well, one way might be to remove the phrase and see if it affects the sentence in any significant way: “On the other hand, if death is like a journey from here to another place,...[and] in fact all the dead are there,...” etc. Here, in order to make the elided sentence work, we have to drop “that” and add “and”—a mere procedural formality, I assume you would agree. Considering this new abbreviated sentence, what can we say about it? Is it now insufficient to convey the original meaning? I have my own opinion; I leave it to you to formulate your own.

Having treated the question of necessity, we still have that of expectedness to deal with: is “and if the things that are said are true” expected in this context? How are we to answer that? The only way to answer this question is to compare the passage at hand to similar passages elsewhere that deal with similar things in the same way—and we have such a passage close at hand, to be precise, at 28c-d, where Socrates speaks of “the demigods who met their end at Troy”. Let me reproduce that passage for our benefit out of West’s translation— a trusty one indeed, for it is an avowedly literal one. Socrates again speaks:

“For according to your speech, those of the demigods who met their end at Troy would be paltry, especially the son of Thetis [Achilles]. Rather than endure anything shameful, he despised danger so much that when his mother (a goddess) spoke to him as he was eager to kill Hector—something like this, as I suppose: ‘Son, if you avenge the murder of your comrade Patroclus and kill Hector, you yourself will die; for straightaway,’ she says, ‘after Hector, your fate is ready at hand.’—he, upon hearing this, belittled death and danger, fearing much more to live as a bad man and not to avenge his friends. ‘Straightaway,’ he says, ‘may I die, after I inflict a penalty on the doer of injustice, so that I do not stay here ridiculous beside the curved ships, a burden on the land.’”

I say this passage is similar to the first in that it deals with similar things in the same way as the first passage. The similar things are exactly the ones we’ve been talking about, “the things said,” the popular Athenian accounts of the gods, demigods or afterlife. The similarity in the way they are spoken of is that they are all spoken to either real or hypothetical men of Athens, and for purposes of admonition or instruction.

As to the difference between these two passages then, there is something that strikes me as particularly germane to our debate. Shall I say it? No. I would rather you tell me—if you are able and, especially, if you are willing.

To encourage you, if you answer my implicit question, you will have found my answer to your explicit one, the one you have so often asked of me. In addition, you will have discovered my response to your objection that there is nothing significant about Socrates having stated that such-and-such things are ones said.

Well, I DID attempt to answer this question in my previous post, but you obviously either didn’t notice I was answering, or just ignored it. — Leghorn

Well, I WAS going to say that your “answer” looks like Straussian hermeneutics to me but I resisted the temptation .... :smile:

But let’s try to simplify this. If I lived in 4th century BC Athens, where belief in afterlife was the prevalent position, and wanted to discuss the postmortem possibilities of (1) dreamless sleep (or “nothingness”) and (2) migration of the soul to another place, I would phrase it exactly as Socrates does. Wouldn’t you?

And, as already stated, we cannot ignore Socrates’ concluding remarks to the effect that God does not neglect a good man:

But you also, judges, must regard death hopefully and must bear in mind this one truth, that no evil can come to a good man either in life or after death, and God does not neglect him (41c-d).

IMO, this encapsulates Socrates’ belief in divine justice as expressed in Gorgias (526e), Republic (621c), Phaedo, etc.

Well, I WAS going to say that your “answer” looks like Straussian hermeneutics to me but I resisted the temptation .... :smile: — Apollodorus

I wouldn’t boast about resisting a temptation which I did not resist. I am scarcely at all familiar with “Straussian hermeneutics,” for I have barely read the man. The interpretation I have presented you with is my own, and I am disappointed that you not only didn’t respond to its particular points, but denigrated it as coming from a source you apparently despise, which isn’t even its source.

I think I have implicitly answered your most pressing question, as to how else one can relate things that are said without using phrases like, “it is said,” or “as they say,” etc. Sometimes things are so obvious that it is otiose to try to explain them. It’s like having to explain a joke.

But let’s try to simplify this. If I lived in 4th century BC Athens, where belief in afterlife was the prevalent position,... — Apollodorus

We don’t have to go back in time at all, O Apollodorus, to find a place like this. We are living in it now. You will not find one media spokesperson, on tv or radio, not one interviewer or interviewee, who doesn’t either agree with or fail to contradict statements like, “I know he is looking down on us now and smiling,” or, “now she is at last happy, reunited with her late husband whom she loved so much,” or, “he is in a better place,” etc.

A well-meaning acquaintance of hers recently told my sister—a staunch liberal and atheist—after the death of her husband, who died after a long debilitating illness, whose loss she yet grieves, that he was in a better place. My sister replied, “Well why don’t you kill yourself and go there and see how good it is!”—needless to say, my sister is in no position where she fears losing either status or a job.

...and wanted to discuss the postmortem possibilities of (1) dreamless sleep (or “nothingness”) and (2) migration of the soul to another place, I would phrase it exactly as Socrates does. Wouldn’t you? — Apollodorus

I only wish I could phrase things exactly as Socrates does, and I suppose many of the greatest philosophers who came after him wished the same thing. I suppose, after I had been convicted of impiety and sentenced to death, I would have crapped my pants and peeed all over myself. I suppose I would have wailed and sniveled and carried on much like an animal.

But if I had composed myself enough to speak to those who voted for my acquittal, I suppose I would have cried out something like this: “Why weren’t there more of you? more of the lenient sort who are not so stricken with fear of transgressing the divine laws? You all know that my only transgression has been asking innocent questions to fellow citizens in public places. I never meant to overturn the laws of the state. I just wanted to find out the truth about things for myself!” In other words, I would have ended up instead complaining to to those who voted for my conviction.

I would not have been the Socrates that Crito found, soundly sleeping on the eve of his execution.

There are many accounts of Socrates, O Apollodorus. I have not even read all of them, much less studied them all. But I have read and somewhat studied some of his interpreters, and that knowledge—or opinion—added to my own, is what I have to work with.

This I am sure of: that Socrates is to philosophy what Jesus is to theology. These are the two chief figures in the tradition of our understanding of things. To these two must we ultimately refer when answering questions about the nature of things. We must compare and contrast, I say, the differences and similarities between their thoughts and lives in order to understand the difference between a life based on reason as opposed to one based on revelation. There are both similarities and differences...

...and one of the differences is the way they endured death: Jesus prayed to God to relieve him of the necessity of having to undergo his sacrifice: “Take this cup from me,” he said, “if it be according to your will.” Socrates, on the other hand, though begrudgingly, accepted his fate without appeal to a god for salvation.

Socrates, on the other hand, though begrudgingly, accepted his fate without appeal to a god for salvation. — Leghorn

Before drinking the hemlock he ironically requests to pour a libation! (117b)

Socrates, on the other hand, though begrudgingly, accepted his fate without appeal to a god for salvation. — Leghorn

I don't think this is entirely accurate.

Socrates does actually pray to the Gods before drinking the hemlock:

But I may and must pray to the Gods that my departure hence be a fortunate one; so I offer this prayer, and may it be granted (Phaedo 117c)

I just don't think your interpretation sounds very convincing. Obviously, it isn’t your fault, it’s just that the evidence seems insufficient to establish that Socrates is an atheist.

But I do appreciate your effort.

Given what Socrates says about the body in the Phaedo and his seeming indifferent to how he is to be buried (115c), what are we to make of his bathing before he dies? (116a) Is the care for the body more important than he lets on? Is his care for the body part of rather than separate from his care for himself? His concern is with "my departure from here to There". But "in accordance with things said", it would not be Socrates' departure, but "a sort of change and migration of the soul from the place here to another place.” A soul that would no longer be Socrates'.

It should not go without notice that the man who administers the poison is recognized by Socrates as:

one who has knowledge of these things. (117a)

The only one recognized as having any knowledge of death is someone who knows about putting him to death.

Socrates, on the other hand, though begrudgingly, accepted his fate without appeal to a god for salvation.
— Leghorn

I don't think this is entirely accurate.

Socrates does actually pray to the Gods before drinking the hemlock:

But I may and must pray to the Gods that my departure hence be a fortunate one; so I offer this prayer, and may it be granted (Phaedo 117c) — Apollodorus

You quoted my words, and they are before your eyes, and yet you seem not to be able to make out the last two: “for salvation”.

I just don't think your interpretation sounds very convincing. — Apollodorus

Don’t I deserve then to learn from you where exactly it fails to convince? And I am not speaking of the large question, whether Socrates was an atheist, but the small one, whether he would ordinarily be expected to employ all those phrases reminding us that the popular Greek account of the afterlife consists of “things said”. I have been arguing that he would not be so expected. You appear to have given up attempting to refute my evidence. Does that mean we have come to a tacit agreement on that small point?

But "in accordance with things said", it would not be Socrates' departure, but "a sort of change and migration of the soul from the place here to another place.” A soul that would no longer be Socrates'. — Fooloso4

I don’t see, O Morosophos, how it follows that his soul would no longer be Socrates’ after this “change and migration” of it. Do you take that phrase (Apology, 40c) to mean that the soul changes its form or essence after death?

I don’t see, O Morosophos, how it follows that his soul would no longer be Socrates’ after this “change and migration” of it. — Leghorn

In the Phaedo he says that the soul of a man might be that of an ass in the next life, or an ant, or other animal. (82a-b) This of course raises problems for the myth of recollection. I've been reminded that I'm an ass, but do not recollect being that kind of animal in a previous life. It would be remarkable if an ass had knowledge of the Forms!

In the Phaedo he says that the soul of a man might be that of an ass in the next life, or an ant, or other animal. — Fooloso4

Again, reincarnation was an ubiquitious belief of the ancient Indo-European cultures. Pythagoreans certainly accepted it, and it was arguably accepted by Plato, hence the myths concerning recollections from previous lives. For various reasons, this mythology was suppressed in the early Christian era, around 400 AD by one of the Church councils. Thereafter it only survived in underground circles such as Catharism (and is generally the object of intense hostility whenever mentioned on this forum.)

Of course in the East it developed along entirely different lines, in the Buddhist world it is widely accepted that beings are reborn in one of the 'six realms' according to their karma (although the intricacies of Buddhist soteriology are rather difficult to understand, as there is no 'being who transmigrates', only a series of causal factors that give rise in repeated rebirths, the 'citta-santana' or mind-stream.)

You quoted my words, and they are before your eyes, and yet you seem not to be able to make out the last two: “for salvation”. — Leghorn

Socrates does pray to the Gods, does he not? And he believes in “salvation” (soteria) or “release” (lysis) of the soul by God or through righteous conduct (Rep. 621c; Phaedo 67a).

Don’t I deserve then to learn from you where exactly it fails to convince? And I am not speaking of the large question, whether Socrates was an atheist, but the small one, whether he would ordinarily be expected to employ all those phrases reminding us that the popular Greek account of the afterlife consists of “things said”. I have been arguing that he would not be so expected. You appear to have given up attempting to refute my evidence. Does that mean we have come to a tacit agreement on that small point? — Leghorn

I’m afraid there is little chance of any such agreement. His statements containing phrases like “as they say” do not in the least sound like “reminders” to me. They are simply statements of fact and do not constitute evidence of secret messages to atheist supporters in the jury (or among readers of Plato’s dialogues).

And anyway (just out of curiosity), if you are not arguing that Socrates is an atheist, what is it that you hope to achieve?

Again, reincarnation was an ubiquitious belief of the ancient Indo-European cultures. Pythagoreans certainly accepted it, and it was arguably accepted by Plato, hence the myths concerning recollections from previous lives. — Wayfarer

Correct. Myths are often interpreted as the basis of beliefs, but the reality is that more often than not it is the other way round: myths serve the purpose of illustrating existing beliefs.

IMO this certainly seems to be the case in Socrates and Plato.

arguably accepted by Plato — Wayfarer

Yes, it can and has been argued. The fact that it was a ubiquitous belief might be a good reason for why it appears in some of the dialogues, but it is a bad reason for assuming he therefore accepted it. It is "in accordance with things said". Things said are the basis for Socratic inquiry. Of course, such inquiry must fail to arrive at a definitive answer. Death may be nothing. That it is something must be without sufficient evidence. None of us recollect being dead.

Do you take that phrase (Apology, 40c) to mean that the soul changes its form or essence after death? — Leghorn

I think the idea that Socrates would no longer be Socrates has little basis.

It is true that according to Socrates some souls are “likely to pass into the bodies of asses and other beasts of that sort” but this refers to “those who have indulged in gluttony and violence and drunkenness, and have taken no pains to avoid them” (Phaedo 81e).

Clearly, it would not apply to Socrates who, by his own standards, has led an exemplary life.

On the contrary, those who (like Socrates) love learning and have pursued philosophy and have departed in a perfectly pure condition, join the race of the Gods (82b-c).

Socrates does pray to the Gods, does he not? And he believes in “salvation” (soteria) or “release” (lysis) of the soul by God or through righteous conduct (Rep. 621c; Phaedo 67a). — Apollodorus

So since Socrates 1) prays to the gods, and 2) believes in salvation, it follows that he prayed to a god for salvation after his conviction? Is that what you are saying? For what I said, in contrasting him and Jesus, was that the latter did, according to the Gospels, explicitly ask God for deliverance from his fate, while the former never did such a thing in regard to his own.

And anyway (just out of curiosity), if you are not arguing that Socrates is an atheist, what is it that you hope to achieve? — Apollodorus

It is a good thing you are a curious creature, O Apollodorus, for without the faculty of curiosity, how will we ever have a hope of learning anything? I hope you do agree at least with that. You might say, “just out of curiosity”, in order to denigrate that passion, but, as I said, if we are not curious to know anything, how will we ever learn?

As for myself, while reading that passage from the Apology, at 40e-41c, I happened to notice that Socrates kept reminding me that the things he was relating were ambiguously true. Of course this was, however, in the context of a contrast of these things with one other alternative: that death is like an eternal dreamless sleep. Socrates was telling me, it seemed to me, that death is either like this, or like that, giving me no other alternative than these two.

But it must be acknowledged that Socrates was not necessarily speaking to me—some unknown reader in the future—but rather to those who voted for his acquittal. So I must, then, place myself in their place if I am to understand his rhetoric.

Certainly they are disappointed in the verdict, and sympathetic with the condemned man. Maybe some are even outraged. What do such men want to hear from him? Outrages against the verdict? quarrels and carryings-on? Some, perhaps, would have delighted in those things, deeply sympathizing with him.

What they got instead was a reasoned explication of what befalls a man after death, and a proof that no ill can come to him in the life after, whichever way it be. But one possibility is more favorable to Socrates than the other, and gets longer shrift in the dialogue. I mean the possibility that life after death is spent among the dead in Hades. For, if the things that are said are true, when Socrates dies he will be able to conduct an afterlife that is, in his stated opinion, superior to the one he led while alive, while, if the things that are not said are true instead, that death is like an eternal dreamless sleep, then he will only be relieved of evils.

And on what, exactly, is his preference for the former alternative based? His argument seems to be based on the fact that, if he go to Hades and find all of the dead there, their collectivity will be superior to the narrowness of what he experienced as a temporal being on earth. For in the blip of time we are alive on this earth, how many superior contemporaneous beings do you think you might chance upon; whereas, if you are given free rein of heaven itself, where everyone who has ever lived dwells, I suppose you would even meet with about the best souls that could ever be?

But what is more, he will retain there, in the afterlife in Hades, the same eternal power of dialectic he possessed on this corruptible earth, and be able to question the true judges there, the ones so reputed to have been, about justice. I don’t suppose he would say to Palamedes or Aiax anything like, “Hey, the same thing happened to me! Let me tell you about it..,” but would rather question these two, whether their penalties were justified or not.

More than that, he would be able to question personally—in what we call “real time”— the ppl considered the greatest judges of all time, about justice, and decide for himself whether they spoke the truth or a lie. Remember, if you will: Socrates’ concern with justice was not how it personally effected anyone, as a temporal being, with corrupting passions and the sort—but what it was as an idea or form.

So since Socrates 1) prays to the gods, and 2) believes in salvation, it follows that he prayed to a god for salvation after his conviction? Is that what you are saying? For what I said, in contrasting him and Jesus, was that the latter did, according to the Gospels, explicitly ask God for deliverance from his fate, while the former never did such a thing in regard to his own. — Leghorn

Well, it was you who brought Jesus into it. Personally, I prefer to read Socrates (or Plato) on his own terms. Salvation may mean different things to different readers. For Socrates salvation or liberation (soteria, lysis) means a release (1) from a life of ignorance, (2) from the prospect of being found wanting by the divine tribunal in the afterlife, and (3) from the cycle of death and rebirth.

If this is his conception of salvation, then it seems reasonable to assume that this is at the back of his mind when he prays to the Gods that his transition from this to the other world may be attended by good fortune.

In fact, he himself says: “But I see clearly that to die and be released was better for me” (Apol. 41d). Clearly, he sees his death as a release (apallage). And he is confirmed in this by his daimonion, the inner divine voice that is his lifelong guide.

But one possibility is more favorable to Socrates than the other, and gets longer shrift in the dialogue. I mean the possibility that life after death is spent among the dead in Hades. — Leghorn

The possibility of life after death seems to be more consistent with Socrates’ views given in the dialogues. This is precisely why he gives the other option first, because he intends to focus on the second possibility, the possibility of life after death, which is in line with his beliefs and teachings.

In fact, my personal impression is that Socrates’ views of afterlife are very close to those of the Orphic tradition as may be seen from the myth of Er in the Republic, the account of afterlife in the Phaedo, etc. The true purpose of his elenctic procedure is to get his interlocutors to hold those beliefs only that (according to Socrates) have been shown through rational argument to be the most reasonable or plausible.

Your reminder that Socrates is not asking for a different life after death than the one he is having while alive does suggest he does not expect to be wandering around outside the cave of the Republic after his death.

The point of view reminds me of Unomuno in The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations where the desire for immortality is continuing to do the groovy things one was doing rather than turn the experience into anything else.

Personally, I prefer to read Socrates (or Plato) on his own terms — Apollodorus

How, dear fellow, can you read Plato, a most subtile and opaque writer, on his own terms, when you cannot even read me, a most crass and transparent one, on mine? Let me remind you, once again, what I said:

...and one of the differences is the way they endured death: Jesus prayed to God to relieve him of the necessity of having to undergo his sacrifice: “Take this cup from me,” he said, “if it be according to your will.” Socrates, on the other hand, though begrudgingly, accepted his fate without appeal to a god for salvation. — Leghorn

Your consideration in reading the above should not be what Socrates’ or Plato’s idea of salvation or swteria or lysis is, but what Leghorn’s is; for it is Leghorn, not Plato, neither Socrates, who said that.

Perhaps adding to your confusion is an ignorance of the story about Jesus, how he prayed in the Garden of Gethsemane on the eve of his crucifixion—I don’t know, of course, I’m just speculating. But if this is so, you can find the story in the three synoptic Gospels, Mark 14:26,32-42, Matt. 26:30,36-46, and Luke “22:39-46. To sum up the part that pertains to my statement, Jesus goes apart from his disciples and prays in private to God, asking Him to “take this cup from me” (I paraphrase: each of the three accounts says the same thing in a slightly different way).

Now I suppose that different readers have disagreed as to the meaning of Jesus’ words in these parallel passages, but it is clear to me from the context that he was asking God to deliver him from the necessity of being sentenced to death and having to pay the penalty, of being crucified.

Now, having educated yourself, if indeed you were ignorant about Jesus’ appeal “to God to relieve him of the necessity of having to undergo his sacrifice,” do you still believe that in the rest of my statement, what has to do with Socrates’ attitude toward his own indictment, when I said “salvation” I meant Plato’s notions of salvation or swteria or lysis? From the context of my entire statement, what do you think I meant by

Socrates, on the other hand, though begrudgingly, accepted his fate without appeal to a god for salvation. — Leghorn

?

Your reminder that Socrates is not asking for a different life after death than the one he is having while alive does suggest he does not expect to be wandering around outside the cave of the Republic after his death. — Valentinus

Have some scholars interpreted the metaphor of being led out of the darkness and opinion of the cave into the light of the natural sun as a migration after death into heaven or Hades? I am not familiar with that.

The point of view reminds me of Unomuno in The Tragic Sense of Life where the desire for immortality is continuing to do the groovy things one was doing rather than turn the experience into anything else. — Valentinus

I am not familiar with that work or author, Mr. Valentinus. Is he someone worth reading?

Have some scholars interpreted the metaphor of being led out of the darkness and opinion of the cave into the light of the natural sun as a migration after death into heaven or Hades? I am not familiar with that. — Leghorn

I am not aware of any account that puts the matter in that way. Some Neoplatonists say Plato is teaching a personal transformation while one is alive. How well you prepare the soul will relate to its future possibilities. If you get out of the cave while alive, you have options others do not. Proclus has his version of this idea. "Platonism", in that vernacular, is a theology. One better get ready for the next stage.

Your observation about how Socrates wants to live after death does not fit with such an explanation: not because it disproves it but because it is without reference to it.

Unomuno makes a similar observation regarding the Catholic version of immortality. He gets the idea being proposed. He doesn't care if he cannot continue being who he is exactly as he is as a result.

Your consideration in reading the above should not be what Socrates’ or Plato’s idea of salvation or swteria or lysis is, but what Leghorn’s is; for it is Leghorn, not Plato, neither Socrates, who said that. — Leghorn

Well, I disagree. Personally, I don't care about Jesus when I read Plato.

The discussion was about Socrates, not Jesus. If you want to talk about salvation in the context of Socrates then we are going to discuss it as seen by Socrates, not Jesus.

On the other hand, if it is Jesus you wish to discuss, then I think this would be best done separately.

If not, you always have @Valentinus and Foolo (or "Morosophos" as I think you prefer to call him) to discuss things with :smile:

Is he someone worth reading? — Leghorn

I believe the reference is to the Spanish philosopher Miguel de Unamuno:

Miguel de Unamuno - Wikipedia

Not my favorite author and not exactly ancient. But you can never know. You might find him to your liking.

Socrates' myths, some of which are "in accordance with things said" and some of which he makes up and some of which he makes up and claims to be in accordance with things said, always point back to to life. He tells these tales not to inform his listeners of a life beyond life, a life not he nor them nor us knows anything about, but rather as part of living the examined life.

Socrates condemns:

the biggest lies about the biggest things (Republic 377e)

He is referring to Hesiod's myth about Cronus and Uranus. He continues:

Even if they were true ... the best way would be to bury them in silence, and if there were some necessity for relating them, that only a very small audience should be admitted under pledge of secrecy ... to the end that as few as possible should have heard these tales.

The problem is, how do we know if they are true? The muses tell Hesiod that they speak lies like the truth. (Theogony 27) Socrates says:

When anyone images badly in his speech the true nature of gods and heroes, like a painter whose portraits bear no resemblance to his models. (377e)

What do they know of the true nature of gods? Where are the models to be found? The muses? The poets? Or are they to make them themselves?

But the truth is not Socrates' foremost concern. If the story of Cronus is true, it is something that only a few should known. The truth should be hidden and in place of the "biggest lies", they should be told noble lies.

Socrates states what is at issue:

Shall we, then, thus lightly suffer our children to listen to any chance stories fashioned by any chance teachers and so to take into their minds opinions for the most part contrary to those that we shall think it desirable for them to hold when they are grown up? (377b)

"Chance stories by chance teachers", in other words, "according to things said".

And the stories on the accepted list we will induce nurses and mothers to tell to the children and so shape their souls by these stories ... (377c)

Myths shape the soul. The obverse of Socrates' avoidance of the politics of the city is his active engagement with the politics of the soul. It is not just those who are chronologically children who benefit from the myths.The souls of children of all ages might still be shaped by stories of the gods and rewards and punishment.

I am not familiar with that work or author, Mr. Valentinus. Is he someone worth reading? — Leghorn

He is very much worth reading if you are interested in how the conditions of modern man relate to a desire for life as expressed through religious experience. The range of his scholarship is breathtaking and is an education even when one does not agree with him.

In chapter 10, Unamuno says:

And this relation with God, this more or less close union with Him, we call religion.
Yet what is religion? How does it differ from the religious sense and how are the two related? Every man's definition of religion is based upon his own inner experience of it rather upon his observation of it in others and it is impossible to define it without in one way or another experiencing it. — Unamuno, translated by Anthony Kerrigan

In the matter of longing for immortality, Unamuno does not like options he has been given. His work is an argument against the God he wishes to draw closer to. He refuses to go gently into the night.

In that respect, Unamuno's complaint differs greatly from Socrates' desire to keep living the same way as he had been doing. Socrates calmly swaggers toward the turnstiles, tipping his waiter on the way out.

... tipping his waiter on the way out. — Valentinus

His libation of hemlock? The master as servant to the servant? (Phaedo 63a)

Or, what might be the same thing, one hard-working Athenian saluting the virtue of another.

Or, what might be the same thing, one hard-working Athenian saluting the virtue of another. — Valentinus

You lost me here.

Socrates defended himself as a citizen of Athens, striving to do the best he could for its sake. In the Republic, the City is only possible because of different citizens doing and making what others cannot. Respect for that inter-dependency is respect for the people actually doing it; including, in this case, the one assigned to kill him.

I see. The one who administers the poison is just in so far as he is doing his job. On the model of the Republic, one man one job. Minding his own business.