Did you find a PDF for Kenny? Happy to read it with you. — Banno
Yeah, I mean I might as well posit the idea of door frame propositions, because even hinge propositions have to have a stable set of facts to work with, so as to remain stationary in use. In which case, I'll then have to have wall propositions, as door frames have to be constructed from... so on and so on...... — Garrett Travers
I had written an essay on Wittgenstein the other day where I characterized his view on hinges entirely inaccurately. — Garrett Travers
I can't make sense of the idea of a proposition that does not have a truth value - not a proposition for which we don't know if it is true or false, but a proposition which is not eligible for truth or falsehood. — Banno
Yes, I see your point, but facts are not propositions, and this is what gives so many people the problem in understanding what supports the hinge propositions. Is it facts (objective reality), or attitude (subjective disposition) which supports hinges? People seem to be hesitant to consider that both are required, because it leads into dualism and a conception of reality which is far to complex for a simple mind to understand. — Metaphysician Undercover
So stick with what Siegel tells you Garrett, as a fair enough representation, and don't get drawn into the ambiguity of Wittgenstein. Allowing ambiguity (which is the only way to support the idea of a proposition without a truth value) to be a first principle of knowledge, is simply wrong, for obvious reasons. — Metaphysician Undercover
Wittgenstein's notion of "hinge proposition" is really useless. All propositions are "hinges"; "hinge" describes the use of a proposition. Some propositions just have a bigger weight hanging on them than others do. As time passes, and they hang around for a while, more and more stuff gets hung on them. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think a comparison with Heidegger’s notion of a frame of interpretation may be instructive here. Heidegger defines propositional logic and statement of belief in terms the ‘as’ structure of seeing something as something. — Joshs
Even though you are correct, technically speaking, the hinge proposition is actually accepted by the individual as having true premises. Or, humans couldn't use those propositions to inform action. — Garrett Travers
Hinge describes implicit presupposition. If one can call this is a use, it is a different use than rational belief.Duncan Pritchard suggests that hinge commitment is a more appropriate way to understand what Wittgenstein is getting at than hinge proposition. — Joshs
340. We know, with the same certainty with which we believe any mathematical proposition, how
the letters A and B are pronounced, what the colour of human blood is called, that other human
beings have blood and call it "blood". — sime
Let us imagine a language for which the description given by Augustine is right: the language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B. A is building with building stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass him the stones and to do so in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. —– Conceive of this as a complete primitive language.
If you go in this direction, then the hinge says something about the attitude of the subject rather than saying something about the world (something objective). Therefore it could not be a basic presupposition or proposition forming a foundation for knowledge about the world, objective knowledge. It would be a type of psychological principle only. — Metaphysician Undercover
The 'hinge proposition', as an objective fact about the world, would be "human beings have blood". The "hinge commitment" would be 'I have faith that my belief that human beings have blood is true'. The latter is not what Wittgenstein is saying, because attitudes, even strong ones like faith can be doubted, whereas Wittgenstein is talking about something we cannot doubt. Therefore it is the former, something we believe to be an objective fact about the world, not a subjective attitude toward a proposition, like a commitment. — Metaphysician Undercover
despite Banno's cherry picking to make Wittgenstein appear to be intelligible, Banno doesn't even seem to understand what it means to have a changing proposition. — Metaphysician Undercover
How could a proposition which changes over time (therefore necessarily ambiguous) have a truth value? — Metaphysician Undercover
the implicit link between the language game and the bits and pieces around the building site. — Banno
If the game only occurs if block is indubitable — Fooloso4
For this purpose they make use of a language consisting of the words “block”, “pillar”, “slab”, “beam”. A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. —– Conceive of this as a complete primitive language.
... your conclusion doesn't follow. — Banno
But if you regard this as being adamant an superfluous, I'll leave it there. — Fooloso4
k but to do the correct thing with it. — Fooloso4
Note that "doing the correct thing" with a block rests on the hinge proposition "This is a block". — Banno
How can the game be played, how can they work, if the command is in doubt? — Fooloso4
B brings the stone which he haslearnt to bring at such-and-such a call.
This is where we differ. I am not denying the indubitability of what a block is. I am arguing that not doubting what a block is is not sufficient for doing the correct thing. — Fooloso4
Unless you hold with Heidegger and Wittgenstein that any such separation between subjective attitude and objectivity is incoherent. It is the hinge that makes the world objectively intelligible in the first place. — Joshs
“One’s hinge certainty, in normal circumstances, that one has hands would not be the least bit affected by the recognition that one has no rational basis for the truth of this proposition. This reflects the fact that, for Wittgenstein, such commitments are not rooted in ratiocination at all. Indeed, this is manifest in how we acquire our hinges. We are not explicitly taught them, but rather ‘swallow them down’ (OC, §143) with everything that we are explicitly taught, as part of the worldview that is thereby acquired. No-one teaches you that you have hands, for example; you are rather taught to do things with your hands, which presupposes their existence.” — Joshs
“On the one hand, hinge commitments are completely unresponsive to rational considerations, in the sense that they are commitments that we would retain, and be no less certain of, even if we became aware of the fact that we have no rational basis for their truth. In
particular, our continued certainty in them would be manifest in our actions, so that even if we might claim to doubt them, this ‘doubt’ would be in an important sense fake. On the other hand, however, hinge commitments clearly can change over time, and change in ways that seem to be at least superficially rational. Indeed, the very same proposition can be at one time a hinge commitment and another time an ordinary belief, where this change seems to involve a rational response to changed circumstances.” — Joshs
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