:up:

By the same logic, if it is a proposition then it must be justifiable, dubitable and capable of being known, because that is just what a proposition is. Yet hinge propositions are none of these things. — Luke

Nuh. That'd be the anti-realist error.

But a proposition that cannot be justified, known or doubted isn’t a contradiction in terms? — Luke

That's right.

SO what we have here is a problem with our understanding of "proposition". Seems as we differ.

By the same logic, if it is a proposition then it must be justifiable, dubitable and capable of being known, because that is just what a proposition is. — Luke

No, being justifiable, dubitable, or capable of being know are not part of the standard definition of a proposition. A proposition, in contemporary philosophy, is something which has a truth-value, a bearer of truth/falsity.

So we could have an unknowable, indubitable, or unjustifiable proposition (and it doesn't take much imagination to think of examples of each of these)... but not a proposition lacking a truth-value.

I’m aware. I’m “urging” the further distinction that they do not have a truth value either. — Luke

And again, that can't be the case, since a proposition without a truth-value is a contradiction in terms.

But a proposition that cannot be justified, known or doubted isn’t a contradiction in terms? — Luke

Right. Again, a proposition is a bearer of truth-value. And W explicitly refers to these as propositions. So they have a truth-value. He argues that Moore cannot say he knows these propositions, because these propositions cannot be justified, and justification is a condition for knowledge.

This may be of some use here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/

Your argument is that a hinge in one game need not be a hinge in another, and I agree; but one cannot thereby conclude, as you would, that there are no hinges. — Banno

If hinges are defined as propositions which it is unreasonable to doubt, or, are indubitable, then there are no hinges. Each person is involved in numerous different games and it is only unreasonable to doubt a supposed hinge, from within the game that it is a hinge. From another game, in which the proposition is not a hinge, it is not unreasonable to doubt that proposition. Therefore it is not unreasonable for a person to doubt a hinge.

There is no language use that is outside language games. Looking at the relationship between language games is yet another language game. Philosophers who think they can step outside language while still using language are mistaken. — Banno

A relation between two games is not itself a game. That would just imply a third game between the two, but then we'd require two more games to account for the relation between the third game and the first game and the third game and the second game. And we'd need more games to account for the relations between these games, ad infinitum. This is the type of infinite regress Aristotle demonstrated would be the result of mischaracterizing the difference (or relation) between two things, as a third thing. That infinite regress is the result here, is evidence that the description is faulty. The relation between two games is not a third game.

So it is not a matter of philosophers thinking that they can step outside of language, when using language, it is just a matter of demonstrating that language consists of more than just games. So a philosopher can place oneself outside of any particular game, and therefore potentially outside of every game, yet still be using language. Wittgenstein's intentional use of ambiguity is clear evidence of the act of a philosopher putting oneself outside of the games.

No, being justifiable, dubitable, or capable of being know are not part of the standard definition of a proposition. A proposition, in contemporary philosophy, is something which has a truth-value, a bearer of truth/falsity. — Seppo

This may be of some use here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/ — Seppo

Thanks for the link. Its opening paragraph states:

The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences.

So the article you cited in support of your claims does not limit the definition of a proposition to being only “a bearer of truth/falsity”. The article you cited explicitly states that a proposition is also the object of belief, doubt and other “propositional attitudes”. So it appears that the capacity to be doubted is also part of the definition of a proposition in contemporary philosophy. It’s not a huge leap to infer that the capacity to be known and justified could also be included.

As the article rightly states:

The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words like ‘proposition’, may be to stipulate a definition and proceed with caution, making sure not to close off any substantive issues by definitional fiat.

If we can agree that the definition of a proposition includes being the bearer of truth/falsity and having the capacity to be doubted, known and justified, then the question remains why hinge propositions should differ from ordinary propositions in one (or three) respect(s) but not the other.

If hinges are defined as propositions which it is unreasonable to doubt, or, are indubitable, then there are no hinges. Each person is involved in numerous different games and it is only unreasonable to doubt a supposed hinge, from within the game that it is a hinge. From another game, in which the proposition is not a hinge, it is not unreasonable to doubt that proposition. Therefore it is not unreasonable for a person to doubt a hinge. — Metaphysician Undercover

*sigh*.

You've misunderstood, again, and as usual.

Doubt takes place within a language game.

What you suggest above is tantamount to someone, learning chess, complaining that they could move the bishop anywhere they like; and that hence they are a sceptic as concerns keeping the bishop on its own colour.

Now I am pretty confident that you will not grasp this. And that's why i don't usualy address your comments. But have a go.

Do you acknowledge that ordinary propositions are not the same as hinge propositions?
— Luke

Well, the way you set this up, no. — Banno

If you cannot acknowledge that ordinary propositions are not the same as hinge propositions, then it appears that you don't know what a hinge proposition is.

And if a proposition is to be taken as undoubted - and that seems to be the case - then by that very fact it is true. — Banno

Hinge propositions are not merely "undoubted"; they are indubitable. More accurately, they cannot be an object of doubt, and (hence) neither can they be an object of knowledge.

A proposition - stated or no - is the sort of thing that can have a truth value... — Banno

Then that true proposition is (or should be) knowable. But hinge propositions are unknowable.

Moore doesn't know whether "here is a hand", not because "here is a hand" is neither true nor false (how could it be neither true nor false? What is a proposition without a truth-value, other than a contradiction in terms?), but because "here is a hand" is, to use your previous analogy, one of the rules of the game: that here is a hand is one of the hinges upon which our evaluation of other propositions swings. — Seppo

93. The propositions presenting what Moore 'knows' are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why anyone should believe the contrary. E.g. the proposition that Moore has spent his whole life in close proximity to the earth.— Once more I can speak of myself here instead of speaking of Moore. What could induce me to believe the opposite? Either a memory, or having been told.— Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite.

94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.

95 . The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules. — Witt, On Certainty

93 shows that Wittgenstein is talking about Moorean (hinge) propositions at 94. 94 shows that hinge propositions are the background against which we distinguish between true and false (and therefore lack a truth value themselves). 95 shows that hinge propositions needn't be articulated (and 87 does the same).

All of this adds weight to the suggestion that hinge propositions are unlike ordinary propositions in that hinge propositions are indubitable, unknowable, unjustifiable and lack a truth value.

I can imagine Wittgenstein drawing an analogy and questioning whether we can attribute a truth value to (e.g.) the law of identity, or to the rule of a game, while leading us in the direction of a negative answer. (And that these examples are equally not the objects of doubt, knowledge, or justification.)

Doubt takes place within a language game. — Banno

That's what you might think, but quite obviously "doubt" is created when the appropriate language game cannot be determined. That's what Plato demonstrated. This is the nature of ambiguity, the word appears as if it could be employed according to multiple different games, and there is uncertainty as to which game is the correct one.

The idea of doubt "within a language game" doesn't even make sense. Think about it, there can be no doubt as to how to use the word from within the game, just like there can be no doubt about the moves of the chess piece. There can be doubt as to whether one's moves will be successful or not, but that's a completely different type of doubt, far more general, and far outside of any language use. It's the doubt as to whether my actions will be successful or not. That form of doubt is obviously not confined to within a language game.

Doubt within a language game would be like doubt as to whether one's logic is valid or not. Such a judgement is very decisive, either it is or is not valid logic, and there is no room for doubt. One could be in doubt in such a judgement, if the rules of the logic being employed were not known by the person, or if the propositions were ambiguous, but that's what constitutes being outside the game. From within the game there can be no doubt, that's what constitutes being within the game.

Now I am pretty confident that you will not grasp this. — Banno

That's right, I cannot grasp it because what you've said is completely nonsensical. It appears like you have no idea what "doubt" is. Do you recognize "doubt" as indecisiveness, uncertainty in relation to a required judgement? If one is playing chess, i.e. "within the game", there can be no doubt as to how to move the bishop. If the person was doubting how to move the bishop we could not say that the person is playing the game. So how does your example put doubt within the game?

Doubt within the game makes no sense. The person might have doubt with respect to strategy, but strategy is not "within" the game, it's what the individual brings to the game by way of experience and intuition.

Perhaps we could start a mutual understanding through a distinction between "the game", and "playing the game". Do you accept that "playing the game" is not the same as "the game", because the former refers to what an individuals is doing, or what individuals are each doing, and the latter refers to a unity of the actions of the individuals? If so, do you see that "doubt" is proper to the individual, not to the game?

So the article you cited in support of your claims does not limit the definition of a proposition to being only “a bearer of truth/falsity”. The article you cited explicitly states that a proposition is also the object of belief, doubt and other “propositional attitudes”. So it appears that the capacity to be doubted is also part of the definition of a proposition in contemporary philosophy. — Luke

Well, no, not exactly; doubt is a propositional attitude, and being the object of propositional attitudes is part of how a proposition is typically defined (it sort of follows from the fact that they are bearers of truth-value, since propositional attitudes just are the different positions we may take wrt the truth or falsity of a proposition)... but that doesn't necessarily mean that every proposition can coherently be the object of every propositional attitude at all times. Think of Descartes and his cogito, "I exist" is a proposition, but it cannot coherently be doubted (since doubting something entails that you exist to do the doubting). So the suggestion that a proposition cannot be doubted isn't the same as the suggestion that a proposition can lack a truth-value.

f we can agree that the definition of a proposition includes being the bearer of truth/falsity and having the capacity to be doubted, known and justified, then the question remains why hinge propositions should differ from ordinary propositions in one (or three) respect(s) but not the other. — Luke

There's nothing that says a proposition has to be able to be known or justified, and as above a proposition needn't necessarily be able to be doubted either. There are certainly unknowable propositions, and apparently indubitable ones, but there are no propositions that lack a truth-value. And hinge propositions differ from ordinary propositions in that they cannot be justified.

Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite. — Witt, On Certainty

I want to use this to support some claims about hinges before:

It is not that a hinge cannot be doubted, but that they are not doubted. So much hangs and turns around them that there would have to be a major change in the riverbanks of knowledge to make a hinge doubtful.

Hinges are not all timeless and immutable. It was only a few years later, in 1961, that a man had been far from the earth.

They have not functioned as hinges for all peoples everywhere.

All of this adds weight to the suggestion that hinge propositions are unlike ordinary propositions in that hinge propositions are indubitable, unknowable, unjustifiable and lack a truth value. — Luke

I do not think it is the case that hinges are unknowable and lack truth value:

655. The mathematical proposition has, as it were officially, been given the stamp of
incontestability. I.e.: "Dispute about other things; this is immovable - it is a hinge on which your
dispute can turn."

Certainly we know that 12x12=144 and that this is true.

All of this adds weight to the suggestion that hinge propositions are unlike ordinary propositions in that hinge propositions are indubitable, unknowable, unjustifiable and lack a truth value. — Luke

No, not the lacking a truth-value part. There are no propositions that lack a truth-value, any more than there are triangles that lack three sides.

But hinge propositions are indubitable (in a sense), unjustifiable, and in virtue of being unjustifiable, unknowable... because they form part of the background against which we doubt, justify, or come to know propositions in general (and hence themselves being subject to those processes would involve circularity).

Well, no, not exactly; doubt is a propositional attitude, and being the object of propositional attitudes is part of how a proposition is typically defined (it sort of follows from the fact that they are bearers of truth-value, since propositional attitudes just are the different positions we may take wrt the truth or falsity of a proposition) — Seppo

I would say that the only “different positions” we can take wrt the truth or falsity of a proposition is that a proposition is either true or false. I don’t see how being an object of a propositional attitude, such as doubt, follows from the fact that propositions are bearers of truth-value. That a proposition is an object of doubt, and that we have propositional attitudes more generally, is something in addition to a proposition simply being a bearer of truth-value.

... but that doesn't necessarily mean that every proposition can coherently be the object of every propositional attitude at all times. — Seppo

Nowhere in the SEP definition of a proposition does it refer to “every propositional attitude at all times”. According to the SEP article you provided, a proposition is defined in contemporary philosophy as being not only a bearer of truth-value, but also as being an object of doubt (and other propositional attitudes).

Your argument was that a hinge proposition must have a truth-value by definition (SEP). By the same logic, a hinge proposition must also be an object of doubt (and other propositional attitudes) by definition (SEP). However, a hinge proposition cannot be an object of doubt because a hinge proposition is indubitable. Therefore, if a hinge proposition does not meet the SEP definition of a proposition wrt being an object of doubt, then why must a hinge proposition meet the SEP definition of a proposition wrt to being a bearer of truth-value? Hinge propositions are not the same as the (ordinary) propositions defined in the SEP article, so you cannot justify that a hinge proposition must bear a truth-value based on the definition of an ordinary proposition.

Think of Descartes and his cogito, "I exist" is a proposition, but it cannot coherently be doubted (since doubting something entails that you exist to do the doubting). — Seppo

“I exist” might be the ultimate example of a hinge proposition, and the fact that a hinge proposition cannot be an object of doubt is precisely the point, because it contradicts the SEP definition of a proposition. Conforming to the definition of a proposition is the only argument you have offered for why a hinge proposition must be the bearer of a truth-value. If hinge propositions do not conform to the SEP definition of a proposition wrt being an object of doubt, then why must hinge propositions conform to the SEP definition of a proposition wrt being a bearer of truth-value? That is, if the definition can be contradicted by not being an object of doubt, then it can also be contradicted by not being a bearer of truth-value. Hinge propositions are not ordinary propositions.

Your argument is that hinge propositions must be bearers of truth-value because they are propositions (e.g. as defined by the SEP). Using the same logic, hinge propositions must also be objects of doubt because they are propositions (e.g. as defined by the SEP). However, hinge propositions are not objects of doubt (as W demonstrates), so your argument fails. Hinge propositions needn't have a truth-value merely because they are propositions (e.g. as defined by the SEP). In fact, hinge propositions are not propositions (e.g. as defined by the SEP).

There's nothing that says a proposition has to be able to be known or justified, and as above a proposition needn't necessarily be able to be doubted either. — Seppo

Now you are contradicting the SEP article that you cited. If you are to insist that a proposition must be the bearer of a truth-value due to the definition, then you must equally insist that a proposition must be an object of (propositional attitudes such as) doubt due to the definition. After all, you provided the definition.

Can anyone provide a clear explanation of the difference between a hinge proposition, and a self-evident truth? That might be a good start toward understanding what a hinge proposition is supposed to be.

Several folk hav, but you haven't understood it.

Doubt is a language game. Sometimes, you verge on making sense, as here:

there can be no doubt as to how to use the word from within the game — Metaphysician Undercover

Or here:

Doubt within a language game would be like doubt as to whether one's logic is valid or not. Such a judgement is very decisive, either it is or is not valid logic, and there is no room for doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

But as with your perverse view of instantaneous velocity, the next step illudes you.

I'm sorry, Meta, but there is nothing in your posts.

you don't know what a hinge proposition is. — Luke

I don't think that problem belongs to me. Indeed, your comments concerning propositions show some deep misconceptions.

Yeah, reading Luke's latest post, I'm afraid this is a bit of a lost cause (and it goes without saying that talking to MU about Wittgenstein is an exercise in futility).

The misconceptions around propositions are odd, and appear to be becoming more common.

I am beginning to think the construct "hinge proposition" is problematic in that it changes the focus form doubt and certainty to something like grammatical structure; so we look for the common structure within a proposition as if it made it a hinge, rather than at the role it takes in the wider language game.

Doubt is a language game. — Banno

No, doubt is not a language game. It is an attitude of uncertainty which does not require language for its existence. Likewise, certitude is an attitude of confidence which does not require language for its existence.

So for example, when I'm hiking and come to a brook, I might have certitude, and be confident that I can, or cannot, jump across it. Or, I might have doubt as to whether I can, meaning I am uncertain. It's not language which facilitates the attitude which I have in this case, and that attitude is completely independent of any language game.

You continue to demonstrate that you really have no idea as to what doubt actually is. So you simply create a fictitious description of doubt which fits into your game analogy, instead of attempting to understand what doubt really is, and how the game analogy is incapable of capturing it. Uncertainty, doubt, negates the will to act, rendering games, which are activities, as relevant only by an extrinsic relationship. In the example above, if I am certain that I can jump across the brook, or certain that I cannot, I will act accordingly. But doubt leaves me indecisive and unwilling to act.

No, doubt is not a language game. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not being able to see that this is wrong is why you have presented such nonsense here, and why you have thoroughly failed to grasp what Wittgenstein found.

Well Banno, I take your reply as a joke. You have put no effort into it, being afraid to look at anything which is inconsistent with what you claim. As you have not been able to indicate to me how I am wrong, I will conclude that you are just stubbornly adhering to a description of "doubt" which was created by your imagination, for a particular purpose, rather than by looking at the way the word is actually used by people in the world.

It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
about on a surface according to certain rules . . ."—and we replied:
You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those
games.

That's what you do with "doubt", define it in a way which expressly restricts it to being a language game. What about all the other times we use "doubt", to refer to non-academic instances of uncertainty?

Indeed, your comments concerning propositions show some deep misconceptions. — Banno

Such as?

Yeah, reading Luke's latest post, I'm afraid this is a bit of a lost cause — Seppo

What's wrong with the argument?

A reminder of the definition that you introduced into the discussion:

The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences. — SEP article on Propositions

You have argued that a hinge proposition is a bearer of truth-value because all propositions are bearers of truth-value.

The same argument could be made that a hinge proposition is an object of belief and other "propositional attitudes" (including doubt) because all propositions are objects of belief and other "propositional attitudes" (including doubt).

However, a hinge proposition is not an object of belief and other "propositional attitudes" (including doubt), because a hinge proposition excludes doubt:

341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.

342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted. — OC

Therefore, a hinge proposition need not be an object of belief and other propositional attitudes (including doubt).
Therefore, a hinge proposition need not have a truth-value.

ETA:

What interests us now is not being sure but knowledge. That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one. — OC 308

What's wrong with the argument? — Luke

Its sort of a trainwreck of non-sequiturs, and in this post you've simply reiterated things that I already addressed in my last post, as if you didn't read what I said. So, I think the conversation is a lost cause. Maybe Banno has more patience/spare time.

The misconceptions around propositions are odd, and appear to be becoming more common — Banno

yeah, and silly me for thinking that posting the SEP article on propositions would help clarify things... :yikes:

not what I expected, but live and learn I guess...

Such as? — Luke

They are many and varied. With I and Seppo have tried to show you some of the issues.

Maybe Banno has more patience/spare time. — Seppo

No. The problem goes beyond Luke to a half-dozen threads hereabouts. It seems to be an issue of basic literacy; as if folk have lost the capacity to follow or construct a sequence of expressions that lead to a conclusion...

...a trainwreck of non-sequiturs... — Seppo

indeed.

Its sort of a trainwreck of non-sequiturs, and in this post you've simply reiterated things that I already addressed in my last post, as if you didn't read what I said. — Seppo

You're right, I didn't read closely enough. You said in your last post:

But hinge propositions are indubitable (in a sense), unjustifiable, and in virtue of being unjustifiable, unknowable... because they form part of the background against which we doubt, justify, or come to know propositions in general (and hence themselves being subject to those processes would involve circularity). — Seppo

You make a distinction here between hinge propositions and "propositions in general". This is the same distinction that I have been trying to get you and @Banno to acknowledge. If hinge propositions are different from "propositions in general", then hinge propositions need not bear a truth-value. Or, at least, you cannot use the definition of a "proposition in general" to support any claims about a hinge proposition.

As Daniele Moyal-Sharrock points out (here), a hinge proposition is not a proposition at all, but a rule of grammar:

Hinges are really logical bounds of sense or rules of grammar; they form ‘the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language)’ (OC 401). For Michael Williams (2001, 97) and many epistemologists, to ask for the ground of a belief is to ask for yet another belief, for only propositional beliefs (and other intentional states) can stand in logical relation to other propositional beliefs. What Wittgenstein makes clear is that this is an invalid assumption; for grammatical rules can stand in logical relation to propositional beliefs – as, indeed, they must: as the necessary enablers or determinants of sense. I cannot come to the belief that ‘It is indeed a hand I see on a blurry photograph’ unless I am ‘hinged’ on the grammatical rule that ‘This is what we call “a hand”. — Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Wittgenstein's Hinge Certainty

If hinge propositions are different from "propositions in general", then hinge propositions need not bear a truth-value. — Luke

Well, no, they need to differ in some way. But if they are propositions, then having a truth-value is not where they can differ, because having a truth-value is what propositions do. If hinge propositions don't have a truth-value, then they are not propositions. Hinge propositions not being propositions is self-contradictory.

Hinge propositions are set apart from other propositions not in virtue of lacking a truth-value (else they wouldn't be propositions at all), but in their inability to be justified, seeing as they are part of the background against which we evaluate and justify propositions in general, and so cannot themselves be so evaluated and justified on pain of circularity.

If hinge propositions are different from "propositions in general", then hinge propositions need not bear a truth-value. — Luke

That's not valid reasoning, and it's not cogent. All propositions are truth-bearing. If hinge propositions were sufficiently different to other propositions so as not to be truth bearing, they would arguably no longer be propositions.

a hinge proposition is not a proposition at all, but a rule of grammar: — Luke

I'm not sure one can have a rule that is not a proposition. A rule presumably says how things should be, and how they should be is a possible state of affairs, and hence a proposition.

But what you quote here does not say "...a hinge proposition is not a proposition at all".