By the same logic, if it is a proposition then it must be justifiable, dubitable and capable of being known, because that is just what a proposition is. Yet hinge propositions are none of these things. — Luke
But a proposition that cannot be justified, known or doubted isn’t a contradiction in terms? — Luke
By the same logic, if it is a proposition then it must be justifiable, dubitable and capable of being known, because that is just what a proposition is. — Luke
I’m aware. I’m “urging” the further distinction that they do not have a truth value either. — Luke
But a proposition that cannot be justified, known or doubted isn’t a contradiction in terms? — Luke
Your argument is that a hinge in one game need not be a hinge in another, and I agree; but one cannot thereby conclude, as you would, that there are no hinges. — Banno
There is no language use that is outside language games. Looking at the relationship between language games is yet another language game. Philosophers who think they can step outside language while still using language are mistaken. — Banno
No, being justifiable, dubitable, or capable of being know are not part of the standard definition of a proposition. A proposition, in contemporary philosophy, is something which has a truth-value, a bearer of truth/falsity. — Seppo
This may be of some use here: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/propositions/ — Seppo
The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences.
The best way to proceed, when dealing with quasi-technical words like ‘proposition’, may be to stipulate a definition and proceed with caution, making sure not to close off any substantive issues by definitional fiat.
If hinges are defined as propositions which it is unreasonable to doubt, or, are indubitable, then there are no hinges. Each person is involved in numerous different games and it is only unreasonable to doubt a supposed hinge, from within the game that it is a hinge. From another game, in which the proposition is not a hinge, it is not unreasonable to doubt that proposition. Therefore it is not unreasonable for a person to doubt a hinge. — Metaphysician Undercover
Do you acknowledge that ordinary propositions are not the same as hinge propositions?
— Luke
Well, the way you set this up, no. — Banno
And if a proposition is to be taken as undoubted - and that seems to be the case - then by that very fact it is true. — Banno
A proposition - stated or no - is the sort of thing that can have a truth value... — Banno
Moore doesn't know whether "here is a hand", not because "here is a hand" is neither true nor false (how could it be neither true nor false? What is a proposition without a truth-value, other than a contradiction in terms?), but because "here is a hand" is, to use your previous analogy, one of the rules of the game: that here is a hand is one of the hinges upon which our evaluation of other propositions swings. — Seppo
93. The propositions presenting what Moore 'knows' are all of such a kind that it is difficult to imagine why anyone should believe the contrary. E.g. the proposition that Moore has spent his whole life in close proximity to the earth.— Once more I can speak of myself here instead of speaking of Moore. What could induce me to believe the opposite? Either a memory, or having been told.— Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite.
94. But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false.
95 . The propositions describing this world-picture might be part of a kind of mythology. And their role is like that of rules of a game; and the game can be learned purely practically, without learning any explicit rules. — Witt, On Certainty
Doubt takes place within a language game. — Banno
Now I am pretty confident that you will not grasp this. — Banno
So the article you cited in support of your claims does not limit the definition of a proposition to being only “a bearer of truth/falsity”. The article you cited explicitly states that a proposition is also the object of belief, doubt and other “propositional attitudes”. So it appears that the capacity to be doubted is also part of the definition of a proposition in contemporary philosophy. — Luke
f we can agree that the definition of a proposition includes being the bearer of truth/falsity and having the capacity to be doubted, known and justified, then the question remains why hinge propositions should differ from ordinary propositions in one (or three) respect(s) but not the other. — Luke
Everything that I have seen or heard gives me the conviction that no man has ever been far from the earth. Nothing in my picture of the world speaks in favour of the opposite. — Witt, On Certainty
All of this adds weight to the suggestion that hinge propositions are unlike ordinary propositions in that hinge propositions are indubitable, unknowable, unjustifiable and lack a truth value. — Luke
All of this adds weight to the suggestion that hinge propositions are unlike ordinary propositions in that hinge propositions are indubitable, unknowable, unjustifiable and lack a truth value. — Luke
Well, no, not exactly; doubt is a propositional attitude, and being the object of propositional attitudes is part of how a proposition is typically defined (it sort of follows from the fact that they are bearers of truth-value, since propositional attitudes just are the different positions we may take wrt the truth or falsity of a proposition) — Seppo
... but that doesn't necessarily mean that every proposition can coherently be the object of every propositional attitude at all times. — Seppo
Think of Descartes and his cogito, "I exist" is a proposition, but it cannot coherently be doubted (since doubting something entails that you exist to do the doubting). — Seppo
There's nothing that says a proposition has to be able to be known or justified, and as above a proposition needn't necessarily be able to be doubted either. — Seppo
Or here:there can be no doubt as to how to use the word from within the game — Metaphysician Undercover
But as with your perverse view of instantaneous velocity, the next step illudes you.Doubt within a language game would be like doubt as to whether one's logic is valid or not. Such a judgement is very decisive, either it is or is not valid logic, and there is no room for doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover
Doubt is a language game. — Banno
No, doubt is not a language game. — Metaphysician Undercover
It is as if someone were to say: "A game consists in moving objects
about on a surface according to certain rules . . ."—and we replied:
You seem to be thinking of board games, but there are others. You
can make your definition correct by expressly restricting it to those
games.
Yeah, reading Luke's latest post, I'm afraid this is a bit of a lost cause — Seppo
The term ‘proposition’ has a broad use in contemporary philosophy. It is used to refer to some or all of the following: the primary bearers of truth-value, the objects of belief and other “propositional attitudes” (i.e., what is believed, doubted, etc.[1]), the referents of that-clauses, and the meanings of sentences. — SEP article on Propositions
341. That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.
342. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted. — OC
What interests us now is not being sure but knowledge. That is, we are interested in the fact that about certain empirical propositions no doubt can exist if making judgments is to be possible at all. Or again: I am inclined to believe that not everything that has the form of an empirical proposition is one. — OC 308
What's wrong with the argument? — Luke
Maybe Banno has more patience/spare time. — Seppo
...a trainwreck of non-sequiturs... — Seppo
Its sort of a trainwreck of non-sequiturs, and in this post you've simply reiterated things that I already addressed in my last post, as if you didn't read what I said. — Seppo
But hinge propositions are indubitable (in a sense), unjustifiable, and in virtue of being unjustifiable, unknowable... because they form part of the background against which we doubt, justify, or come to know propositions in general (and hence themselves being subject to those processes would involve circularity). — Seppo
Hinges are really logical bounds of sense or rules of grammar; they form ‘the foundation of all operating with thoughts (with language)’ (OC 401). For Michael Williams (2001, 97) and many epistemologists, to ask for the ground of a belief is to ask for yet another belief, for only propositional beliefs (and other intentional states) can stand in logical relation to other propositional beliefs. What Wittgenstein makes clear is that this is an invalid assumption; for grammatical rules can stand in logical relation to propositional beliefs – as, indeed, they must: as the necessary enablers or determinants of sense. I cannot come to the belief that ‘It is indeed a hand I see on a blurry photograph’ unless I am ‘hinged’ on the grammatical rule that ‘This is what we call “a hand”. — Daniele Moyal-Sharrock, Wittgenstein's Hinge Certainty
If hinge propositions are different from "propositions in general", then hinge propositions need not bear a truth-value. — Luke
If hinge propositions are different from "propositions in general", then hinge propositions need not bear a truth-value. — Luke
a hinge proposition is not a proposition at all, but a rule of grammar: — Luke
Get involved in philosophical discussions about knowledge, truth, language, consciousness, science, politics, religion, logic and mathematics, art, history, and lots more. No ads, no clutter, and very little agreement — just fascinating conversations.