Such Cartesian bullshit isn't going to help you understand how things are.

Then what will? And thanks to his bullshit it’s better to doubt then be certain, for certainty could also be BS.

Do you think the idea of a collapse is on the way out? — frank

Probably the idea of a physical collapse is on the way out, though I'm not sure it was ever in in the first place. Whereas the idea of a formal collapse is as prevalent as ever (in Copenhagen and neo-Copenhagen interpretations). From Wikipedia:

Heisenberg did not try to specify exactly what the collapse of the wavefunction meant. However, he emphasized that it should not be understood as a physical process.[11] Niels Bohr also repeatedly cautioned that we must give up a "pictorial representation", and perhaps also interpreted collapse as a formal, not physical, process.[12] — Wave function collapse - History and Context - Wikipedia

Also from physicists Peres and Terno:

Dirac (1947) wrote “a measurement always causes the system to jump into an eigenstate of the dynamical variable being measured.” Here, we must be careful: a quantum jump (also called collapse) is something that happens in our description of the system, not to the system itself. Likewise, the time dependence of the wave function does not represent the evolution of a physical system. It only gives the evolution of probabilities for the outcomes of potential experiments on that system (Fuchs and Peres, 2000). — Quantum Information and Relativity Theory - Peres, Terno

Is the most you can perhaps say, 'the nature of materialism isn't what we though it was' ? — Tom Storm

The nature of materialism? Or of matter?

This old armchair is solid, yet mostly space. And saying this is no contradiction, just a concatenation of descriptions taken from quite different circumstances.

Even if the chair is in some superposition - and I'm not convinced that any physicist worth their pay would make such a claim - the chair remains very real.

The nature of materialism? Or of matter? — Banno

I guess 'matter'.

This old armchair is solid, yet mostly space. And saying this is no contradiction, just a concatenation of descriptions taken from quite different circumstances. — Banno

Yeah. It makes no difference to our use of a chair or our world in general.

it’s better to doubt then be certain — Deus

But doubt presupposes certainty. One can doubt something, but one cannot coherently doubt everything. Descartes never doubted the language in which he framed his meditations.

But that's an old and well-worn discussion, and doubtless you are already familiar with Wittgenstein's On Certainty.

So hav we a new direction in which to move?

Unless you want to build chairs that you don’t want to break easily under certain conditions I.e collapse as QM alludes to

No new direction at all. Wittgenstein thought aligns itself quite well with the Copenhagen interpretation of QM.

the chair remains very real. — Banno

What, really real or emergently real?

What ontological commitment are you wanting to make in terms of “reality”. How much inconvenient metaphysics did you mean to sweep under the carpet?

It is right that reality looks different at different scales of interaction. And so that makes us ask which scale is foundational and which is emergent.

After that comes the realisation that all scales must be co-emergent. Which is where the metaphysical conversation really starts to fly.

But back to lumpen materialist statements about asses interacting with armchairs.

What, really real or emergently real? — apokrisis

Just real. Arses on armchairs.

And so that makes us ask which scale is foundational and which is emergent. — apokrisis

What is foundational depends on what one is doing.

(Congratulations on using "arse", not "ass")

Who?

Actually it does require we all see the same thing hence why Wigner's Friend threatens objectivity.

Just real. Arses on armchairs. — Banno

So no actual science. Just "ordinary language reality". The view suitably constrained to make predicate logic seem the philosophical theory of everything. Same old, same old. :up:

What is foundational depends on what one is doing. — Banno

You are conflating epistemology with ontology when the question becomes about what Nature is doing.

Rookie error.

It is right that reality looks different at different scales of interaction. And so that makes us ask which scale is foundational and which is emergent. — apokrisis

As a matter of convention, I think it makes sense to think of interactions at human scale as foundational, at least for bookkeeping purposes. It was at that level that the whole concept of reality was established. It's at that level that most people experience reality directly. It's at that level where noting weird is going on.

Whereas the idea of a formal collapse is as prevalent — Andrew M

I know it's prevalent. I was asking if it's declining in popularity.

I know it's prevalent. I was asking if it's declining in popularity. — frank

Not that I'm aware of.

As a matter of convention, I think it makes sense to think of interactions at human scale as foundational, at least for bookkeeping purposes. It was at that level that the whole concept of reality was established. It's at that level that most people experience reality directly. It's at that level where noting weird is going on. — T Clark

There is an argument to be had there. We can build the subjective anthropomorphic view into our metaphysics.

But how is that to be done in a way that simply doesn't serve to contradict all attempts by physics to then take the objective "view from nowhere" as its highly productive metaphysics? And what happens when that unreasonably effective route has to turn around and recover its own subjective point of departure?

That is how all the quantum mysticism arises. If the foundation is the human observer making measurements – regardless of whether it is with their wide bum, or a clock and ruler – then how does this "classical" picture account for whatever emergently leads to the collapse of the wavefunction?

So a commonsensical everyday metaphysics of "medium sized dry goods" and "bums in armchairs, cats on mats, stones kicked in the street" doesn't either lead to the objectivity science seeks, nor give it a secure place to make its return. As usual with Banno, it is naive realism concealing naive idealism.

There just "isn't a problem" we are told. Reality is whatever "I" see. It is "my" experience of it from doing all the things that "I" want to do.

And as I reminded elsewhere recently, Newtonian mechanics was deeply weird when the classical view of physics was actually crystallised in differential equations. It was not at all natural once you go beyond the everyday of billiard balls bouncing around a baize table.

Newton just junked Aristotle's impetus and Descartes' corpuscles. He enshrined Leibniz's teleological principle of least action. He did a whole lot of things that defied what had seemed commonsense principles.

Have you ever tried making sense of action and reaction as a symmetrically opposed pair of force vectors? Or is it only me that saw that as the answer to how rockets worked in a picture book when I was 7 years old and thought, hey, that's a completely bogus metaphysics! :razz:

So you were on the nose with your earlier remark about scales of observation. But my point here is about taking the ontology seriously once you have indeed sorted out your epistemology.

And naive realism that dissolves into naive idealism without even being aware of it is not a sorted-out epistemology. It is 1950s plain speaking bullshit.

So you were on the nose with your earlier remark about scales of observation. — apokrisis

It's what's happening to Schrodinger's cat when he's not being observed that's the problem. :razz:

There is an argument to be had there. We can build the subjective anthropomorphic view into our metaphysics.

But how is that to be done in a way that simply doesn't serve to contradict all attempts by physics to then take the objective "view from nowhere" as its highly productive metaphysics? And what happens when that unreasonably effective route has to turn around and recover its own subjective point of departure? — apokrisis

I think I'm trying to address a different issue than you are. It bothers me when everybody, even scientists, keep saying that the quantum mechanics is weird. It's not weird. It's just how things work. Why would you expect events at scales of 10 or 15 orders of magnitude smaller than ours to act the same way they do up here?

So, QM doesn't make the world weird. Apples are still apples and they still fall when you drop them and crunch when you chew them. Canada geese still honk and shit on your lawn. Nothing in your daily life get's any less real. There's no reason to get all excited.

On the other hand, I recognize there is a need for a broader context. Once everybody chills out we can work that out. Focusing on the weirdness of the quantum world makes it harder to understand. You can see the effects of that in this discussion.

That is how all the quantum mysticism arises. If the foundation is the human observer making measurements – regardless of whether it is with their wide bum, or a clock and ruler – then how does this "classical" picture account for whatever emergently leads to the collapse of the wavefunction? — apokrisis

I think it arises from people thinking that QM somehow undermines their experience of the world we see every day.

Have you ever tried making sense of action and reaction as a symmetrically opposed pair of force vectors? Or is it only me that saw that as the answer to how rockets worked in a picture book when I was 7 years old and thought, hey, that's a completely bogus metaphysics! — apokrisis

The law of conservation of momentum always made sense to me, although I'm sure I wasn't aware of it when I was 7. Or Newton's laws either. I'm even more sure I didn't know what metaphysics is. You clearly were a prodigy.

So you were on the nose with your earlier remark about scales of observation. But my point here is about taking the ontology seriously once you have indeed sorted out your epistemology. — apokrisis

As I said, I see the human scale standard as a convention. A place to stand while we take our measurements of phenomena much larger or smaller or much more or less energetic then where we grew up.

So no actual science. — apokrisis

It's a philosophy forum, so, yes.

You are conflating epistemology with ontology when the question becomes about what Nature is doing. — apokrisis

Better, the mooted distinction between epistemology and ontology is here misplaced. Always, already interpreted.

... naive realism that dissolves into naive idealism without even being aware of it is not a sorted-out epistemology. It is 1950s plain speaking bullshit. — apokrisis

:clap: :smirk:

Better, the mooted distinction between epistemology and ontology is here misplaced. Always, already interpreted. — Banno

What? :chin:

the mooted distinction between epistemology and ontology — Banno

If you're saying the distinction made between epistemology and ontology is arbitrary and unnecessary, I agree. If you're saying something else, I don't know what it is.

Why would you expect events at scales of 10 or 15 orders of magnitude smaller than ours to act the same way they do up here? — T Clark

It is the flat contradictions in the causality that creates the angst. Sure, you can take the epistemic or modelling perspective that says we simply construct the pragmatic story that captures sufficient truth at each level. So shut up and calculate.

But this invokes an ontology of emergent properties. And so you are just moving the metaphysical questions back to that next grounding level.

For example, you can get into the hierarchy theory debate about whether emergence is all about supervenience - so microstate realism about emergent macrostates - or instead the kind of Peircean holism that I always promote.

So why is quantum reality nonlocal and classical reality local? Why is quantum reality indeterminate or vague, and classical reality definite or crisp? Is it just epistemic accident we arrived at such contrasting causal axioms, or is it instead the big clue that shows there is a directly reciprocal relation in which reality emerges from the manifestation of that causal dialectic.

There is a productive conversation to be had about an ontology in which it is opposition that nature must manifest. Hence making the argument that this famous causal contradiction between the classical and the quantum is what a dialectical metaphysics predicts, rather than an unfortunate feature that more reductionist metaphysics must eliminate.

It's a philosophy forum, — Banno

Where folk are opining about classical and quantum models of reality.

If you want to participate productively in such a thread, then leave your lumpen realism behind. Let’s get properly metaphysical. Stop hiding behind Wittgenstein’s skirts.

Better, the mooted distinction between epistemology and ontology is here misplaced. Always, already interpreted. — Banno

So “philosophy” is taking everything at face value rather than digging into it. I realise that is indeed your philosophy. It is why you simply assert a position and avoid presenting some actual argument.

Cheers, Apo.

,

Have you noticed how folk tend to rely on this distinction as if it were an argument? I don't understand that. Ontology and epistemology are not like ought and is...

What am I missing?

Have you noticed how folk tend to rely on this distinction as if it were an argument? I don't understand that. Ontology and epistemology are not like ought and is...

What am I missing? — Banno

Geez louise. Don't be such a doink. Answer the ding dong question.

It is the flat contradictions in the causality that creates the angst. Sure, you can take the epistemic or modelling perspective that says we simply construct the pragmatic story that captures sufficient truth at each level. So shut up and calculate.

But this invokes an ontology of emergent properties. And so you are just moving the metaphysical questions back to that next grounding level.

For example, you can get into the hierarchy theory debate about whether emergence is all about supervenience - so microstate realism about emergent macrostates - or instead the kind of Peircean holism that I always promote.

So why is quantum reality nonlocal and classical reality local? Why is quantum reality indeterminate or vague, and classical reality definite or crisp? Is it just epistemic accident we arrived at such contrasting causal axioms, or is it instead the big clue that shows there is a directly reciprocal relation in which reality emerges from the manifestation of that causal dialectic. — apokrisis

To the extent I understand what you're talking about, it makes sense. I'm starting to get a feel for your description of how hierarchy's work - the idea of downward constraints and holism. But on the other hand, who cares? Sure, you do and I do and a bunch of other dorks do. Scientists and philosophers seem as confused about this as the low-lifes here on the forum. As I wrote, I think the taint of mystery and weirdness makes it harder for people to figure out what's up.

I don't even disagree with anything you said. I guess I just place the emphasis differently. People should realize the world is the world, not what they think it is or want it to be. They should get used to it.

Ontology and epistemology are not like ought and is... — Banno

... but more like (the study of) constants and functions, respectively.

Perhaps. It depends how that plays out.