….(to) teach a girl that females are bad at math….. — frank

….is just to be a bad teacher.

...apples can only exist in the mind. — RussellA

Well, your enamoured with that picture, despite the misgivings expressed. A theory that implies a conclusion as misguided as that just quoted doesn't have much merit.

In answer to the question posed in the OP, We Are Math?, the answer is yes, we are math. — RussellA

And fish are mortgages.

I’ve had a dozen occupations, both professional and incidental, yet I’m still just lil’ ol’ me. — Mww

That'll be that we treat names as rigid designators. Your properties change, yet you remain Mww. That's as distinct from there being some group of properties that set out what it is to be Mww. Individuals need not have an essence.

Individuals need not have an essence. — Banno

According to Kripke, they always do.

Individuals, not kinds.

Yes. If being made of wood is essential to what you mean by "that lectern" then that's an essential property, even though you learn about it a posteriori.

Mww and I were just talking about long-term memory, and we could say Mww's evolving memory is an essential feature of the guy in question, even though things could have been different.

It's tricky, but cool.

It's tricky, but cool. — frank

Yep.

One can suppose that Mww might have had different memories - or have lost them all together. Now if you ask "Who is it that lost their memory?" the answer has to be "Mww". Hence his memories are not essential to his being Mww.

So without his memories Mww would be a different Mww? Possible world semantics would say he has different properties, but still be Mww.

Hence his memories are not essential to his being Mww. — Banno

They are if they're essential to the Mww we're talking about. Look back at the aposteriori necessity.

But what about the argument I presented? Who is it who lost their memory? If it was Mww, then he remains Mww even without his memories, and so they are not essential to him. If it is not Mww, then Mww did not lose his memory, and we have the contradiction that Mww did and did not lose his memory.

I suppose you could maintain that Mww was only Mww up until the time he lost his memory, after which he was someone else. But in that case it is not Mww who has no memory, but someone else. The sentence "Mww has lost his memory" could not be about Mww.

When we say his memories are essential, we're saying that in all possible worlds where this particular Mww exists, he has these memories. It's basically part of our definition of him.

Just like Kripke's wood lectern. In every possible world where that lectern exists, it's wood. That's why wood becomes essential. It's a matter of the object of the statement.

If Mww subsequently loses his memory, what is now essential? It's all a matter of what we're trying to say.

Your properties change, yet you remain Mww. (…) Individuals need not have an essence. — Banno

I am this, my properties change, therefore the this I remain is not my properties.
I am an individual, but I don’t need an essence.
I am not my properties, and my essence is not necessary.

Then I have absolutely nothing by which to judge myself, thus I cannot know anything about myself.

Yet, I do.

It's basically part of our definition of him. — frank

But then Mww would cease to be an individual, rigidly designated by "Mww".

"That wooden lectern" is a description, not a name. So yes, obviously, in every possible world in which that wooden lectern exists, it is a wooden lectern. In possible worlds in which the lecture is stone, it's a different lectern.

Again, who has lost their memory?

Then I have absolutely nothing by which to judge myself — Mww

You still have properties. Judge yourself as you see fit. Those properties are just not essential.

But then Mww would cease to be an individual, rigidly designated by "Mww". — Banno

That's incorrect. It appears that you ignored most of the essay.

Then correct me. Set out my error.

"Mww" is a rigid designator. It picks out the same individual in every possible world. It picks out Mww in those possible worlds in which Mww lost his memory.

Hence we might say "Mww lost his memory", and not resort to "There was someone who was once Mww, but they lost their memory, and so are no longer Mww".

This bit: A rigid designator does not pick out an individual in virtue of some set of properties of that individual.

Are you, @frank, saying that this is incorrect?

It's just clear that who you are is culturally and chemically mediated. Whether you are a lawyer or a gangster, that stuff depends on your environment. Was there lead in the water you drank as a child? Did you inherit schizophrenia? Were you sexually abused? Was your father a billionaire? Did you become a heroin addict?

You'll be a very different person in each of these cases, with very different emotions and cognitive functioning. This leads us to ask what the homunculus is supposed to be. — frank

I don't see how this is relevant. The homunculus is what allows oneself to adapt to such a wide range of environmental factors, like what you describe. Without such an "inner being" the living creature would not be able to change itself in the ways required to make the best of those various different circumstances. Simply put, it allows us to learn, which is to make changes to ourselves. So it is the homunculus itself which allows for what you describe, that every person is a very different person according to one's adaptations, yet still a person.

"Mww" is a rigid designator. It picks out the same individual in every possible world. It picks out Mww in those possible worlds in which Mww lost his memory. — Banno

Remember that possible world semantics is about analyzing particular statements. This starts with understanding what a speaker intends.

It looks like you're trying to pin down "Mww" to the same meaning in every statement. It doesn't work that way.

Hence we might say "Mww lost his memory", and not resort to "There was someone who was once Mww, but they lost their memory, and so are no longer Mww". — Banno

Sure. This does not preclude the making of statements in which a particular memory, or a particular evolution of memory is essential to the subject of the statement.

The homunculus is what allows oneself to adapt to such a wide range of environmental factors, like what you describe. — Metaphysician Undercover

It looks like you're pretty firmly wedded to the idea of a Cartesian theatre. I'm not, but it does occasionally jar me to know that I'm a product of chemicals and customs. :grimace:

Remember that possible world semantics is about analyzing particular statements. This starts with understanding what a speaker intends. — frank

An odd tangent.

We know that a rigid designator picks out the very same individual every possible world. We agree that "Mww" is a rigid designator. We agree that there are possible worlds in which Mww lost his memory. We agree that "Mww might have lost his memory" is a sentence about Mww.

In contrast, if having certain memories were essential to Mww's being Mww, and without those memories Mww is no longer Mww, then absurdly "Mww has lost his memory" is not a sentence about Mww.

It looks like you're trying to pin down "Mww" to the same meaning in every statement. — frank

Well, that's the point of using rigid designators.

Sure. This does not preclude the making of statements in which a particular memory, or a particular evolution of memory is essential to the subject of the statement. — frank

So you assert. The argument presented here seems to suggest otherwise.

We know that a rigid designator picks out the very same individual every possible world. — Banno

In every possible world where that individual occurs. When we say Nixon might have lost the election, the only possible worlds we're looking at are the ones in which he ran. That he ran for office is made essential to "Nixon" by the intentions of the speaker.

I'm not going to explain that again. Just read the essay.

It looks like you're trying to pin down "Mww" to the same meaning in every statement.
— frank
Well, that's the point of using rigid designators. — Banno

Oh dear.

In every possible world where that individual occurs. When we say Nixon might have lost the election, the only possible worlds we're looking at are the ones in which he ran. — frank

Sure. That's a plain English rendering of accessibility. Worlds in which Nixon lost are only accessible from worlds in which he ran.

But so what? Nixon remains Nixon in worlds in which he lost his memory...

Oh dear. — frank

Oh dear indeed.

Again, who is the sentence "Mww lost his memory" about? I say it is about Mww. But if his memory is what determines that "Mww" refers to Mww, as you appear to be saying, then who is it about?

But if his memory is what determines that "Mww" refers to Mww, — Banno

I didn't say that. The intentions of the speaker determines what "Mww" refers to.

The intentions of the speaker determines what "Mww" refers to. — frank

Oh, dear.

:lol: Read the essay.

You still have properties. Judge yourself as you see fit. Those properties are just not essential. — Banno

Then I am left to judge myself by that which changes, which makes explicit I cannot know myself as a singular self, insofar as my self must change as do the properties of me. And insofar as it is always and only myself that judges, and that which judges, and that which is judged by, always changes, then it is impossible for there to be a singular identifiable self which is judging.

What a mess am I.

Read the essay. — frank

You’ve linked to trope theory and Cartesian theater. Which of these is the essay?

We were talking about Naming and Necessity, by Kripke. Banno got the naming part, the necessity part, not so much.

I have. What’s odd is that you do not appear to recall the several threads in which we read the text together.
:chin:

I'm surprised you remember. I think there's something specific you wanted out of it and you ignored the rest.

Naming and Necessity, by Kripke — frank

Oh. Language philosophy. Hard pass.

I speak, you listen. You speak, I listen. Figure out whatever differences there might be.

End language philosophy 101.