So what do "is red" mean? What is the physical state of being red? — Michael

Logic is normative. As an inferentialist, I take it that 'red' gets its meaning from the claims involving the concept. The key point is which inferences involving red are allowed.

Then you don't appear to be a realist of any sort, let alone a direct realist. — Michael

There's one real world that we live in and talk about. I find it funny that that's not supposed to be realism.

I think I just don't fit into your categories yet. But I'm not coming from nowhere. I have well-known influences.

There's one real world that we live in and talk about. I find it funny that that's not supposed to be realism. — plaque flag

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-sem-challenge/

According to metaphysical realism, the world is as it is independent of how humans or other inquiring agents take it to be. The objects the world contains, together with their properties and the relations they enter into, fix the world’s nature and these objects [together with the properties they have and the relations they enter into] exist independently of our ability to discover they do. Unless this is so, metaphysical realists argue, none of our beliefs about our world could be objectively true since true beliefs tell us how things are and beliefs are objective when true or false independently of what anyone might think.

Well I guess I don't embrace metaphysical realism.

At least that description pretends that promises and divorces aren't real. Nor are scientific norms. Does the past exist ? Was it real ?

But wait a minute ! Not even metaphysical realism is real.

At least that description pretends that promises and divorces aren't real. — plaque flag

I've said this many times before: antirealism isn't unrealism. Being a realist about something doesn't just mean that you believe that thing is real. You need to get past the use of the word "real" in the name.

I've said this many times before: antirealism isn't unrealism. Being a realist about something doesn't just mean that you believe that thing is real. You need to get past the use of the word "real" in the label. — Michael

I've read Braver's A Thing of this World. But I don't like all this ism talk. I like Hegel & Heidegger, so yeah I guess I could be classed as an antirealist. But I embrace direct realism, try to use a minimal amount of jargon.

I've been trying to defend direct realism from a position that takes the philosophical situation itself as the only meaningful center of reality.

I take people reasoning about a shared world as the center of the circle, that legit fixed social-Cartesian starting point. To reason is to both appeal to semantic-inferential norms and propose the modification of those norms. A self is held responsible for telling a coherent story. I can disagree with you but not with me.

The world is that which is the case. True claims articulate the world (describe it), but we can believe a claim and turn out to be wrong.

The claim [not the concept ] is the semantic atom. This is because we can only take responsibility for claims, not for concepts. Individual concepts, like protons (subatomic), get their meanings from the roles they play in claims. If we look at the inferential relationships of claims, we find a single inferential nexus, so that all concepts are linked inferentially and have interdependent meanings.

We are constantly negotiating semantic norms (which requires appealing to them), so logic is liquid or malleable. As discursive timebinders, we tend to enrich the lifeworld, increase its complexity. As Goethe put it, we are the ancients, thickened by sedimented cultural memory, living also among ruins and inherited infrastructure. Divorces and promises and handshakes are real, as real as anything else. All concepts 'live' in the same system. No inferentially isolated concept or entity is intelligible (please propose counterexamples that occur to you).

We talk about the world we care about --- the world we all live in together. — plaque flag

I talk about my social world, which is something I care about. I talk about the external world, Planet Earth, etc, which is something I care about.

There are different worlds that I talk about.

Two people in the same room see the world through different pairs of eyes. But it's the same world. — plaque flag

Again, more than one world. The world from the person's perspective ,"see the world through different pairs of eyes" and the external world, "the same world".

The fact that I see a stick bent in water doesn't mean that in the external world the stick is bent in water.

Our talk has always been directed toward others and about the one and only world, so it's pretty strange to invent internal images of the world just to explain the fact that people can be mistaken sometimes. — plaque flag

If you see a stick bent in water, you are not mistaken in that you actually see a stick bent in water, but are mistaken in believing that the stick is actually bent in water

If what you saw is not an image, then you would be directly seeing the actual object in the external world.

Then how to explain the contradiction that on the one hand you are not seeing an image of a stick bent in water but directly seeing a stick bent in water and on the other hand are not seeing a stick bent in water.

How are you talking about it then ? It's a product of language, an empty negation. — plaque flag

The external world is not a product of language

I don't need language to be able to see things, there are many things I see that I don't know the name of.

There's nothing strictly wrong about indirect realism talk. It's just clumsy.............My view is that linguistic sociality is absolutely fundamental. — plaque flag

That we have language is not an argument against Indirect Realism

Indirect Realism is the view that you quoted in discussing Reid.

In perception, external objects such as rocks and cats causally affect our sense organs. The sense organs in turn affect the (probably, non-material) mind, and their effect is to produce a certain type of entity in the mind, an 'idea.' These ideas, and not external objects, are what we immediately perceive when we look out at the world. The ideas may or may not resemble the objects that caused them in us, but their causal relation to the objects makes it the case that we can immediately perceive the objects by perceiving the ideas.

As the passage shows, Indirect Realism isn't about the nature of language.

I've been trying to defend direct realism from a position that takes the philosophical situation itself as the only meaningful center of reality. — plaque flag

But you're not defending direct realism. Direct realism claims that there are mind-independent objects, with mind-independent properties, and that these mind-independent objects and their mind-independent properties manifest themselves in conscious experience such that conscious experience provides us with information about the nature of mind-independent objects and their mind-independent properties.

Your position doesn't defend this view, and so doesn't defend direct realism. Your position doesn't seem to say anything about perception at all.

In perception, external objects such as rocks and cats causally affect our sense organs. The sense organs in turn affect the (probably, non-material) mind, and their effect is to produce a certain type of entity in the mind, an 'idea.' These ideas, and not external objects, are what we immediately perceive when we look out at the world. The ideas may or may not resemble the objects that caused them in us, but their causal relation to the objects makes it the case that we can immediately perceive the objects by perceiving the ideas. — RussellA

This quote highlights the problem with indirect realism. First, specific terms the community of language users all understand is used like “rocks” and “cats”. Second, the metaphysical theory is introduce, sometimes obfuscated with current scientific theories of perception (probably to give it credibility). Third, these ideas are perceived directly that are claimed to be certain which cannot be doubted. The next step is where a lot of confusion is introduced. Those initial terms we all understood are now in doubt, the external objects may or may not resemble the ideas. So, all the indirect realist can say is “some object caused an idea of rock” and “some object caused an idea of cat.” Which then reduces to “some object caused an idea of some object.” We are left with some trivial generality that does not say much.

Welcome to metaphysics!

Those initial terms we all understood are now in doubt, the external objects may or may not resemble the ideas. So, all the indirect realist can say is “some object caused an idea of rock” and “some object caused an idea of cat.” — Richard B

That's precisely why the indirect realist says that there is an epistemological problem of perception.

I would argue that our modern scientific understanding of the world, such as that of quantum mechanics, the Standard Model, string theory, etc. supports that conclusion above. The world is a mass of fundamental wave-particles, bouncing around, interacting with each another, and when the right stuff interacts in the right way, there's the conscious experience of seeing a red apple.

But you're not defending direct realism — Michael

I think I am. I believe I've already explained and argued for this above. It's true however that I'm not a metaphysical realist as described in the quote you provided.

The key point is that one sees the apple and not an image of the apple. Hence 'direct.'

So, all the indirect realist can say is “some object caused an idea of rock” and “some object caused an idea of cat.” Which then reduces to “some object caused an idea of some object.” We are left with some trivial generality that does not say much.

Welcome to metaphysics! — Richard B

:up:

There's just a mass of fundamental wave-particles, bouncing around, interacting with each another, and when the right stuff interacts in the right way, there's the conscious experience of seeing a red apple. — Michael

I understand why that view is plausible, but I think it doesn't hold up. Kant was shrewd enough to make the hidden Real completely indeterminate. The scientific image, from within a dualist perspective, is still just that: it is image or mind or consciousness. It is map, not territory.

The key point is that one sees the apple and not an image of the apple. Hence 'direct.' — plaque flag

That's an impoverished account of what it means for perception to be direct.

What does it mean to see an apple? What does it mean so see an image of an apple? What does it mean for the schizophrenic to hear voices?

Your position doesn't seem to say anything about perception at all. — Michael

My position is minimal. To me philosophy is not psychology. Instead it's more like hermeneutical phenomenology, which is to say a making explicit of what we are already doing anyway --- which is giving and asking for reasons.

I say we see the apple and not an image of the apple. The apple is red even when our eyes are closed. Even blind people can figure out the apple is red. Concepts are linguistic norms.

That's an impoverished account of what it means for perception to be direct. — Michael

That's its virtue.

That's its virtue. — plaque flag

No, that's why it fails to address the philosophical disagreement between direct and indirect realism. I've already shown you the SEP articles. There is simply far more to the argument than the overly simplistic grammatical issue that you are asserting.

What does it mean to see an apple? What does it mean so see an image of an apple? What does it mean for the schizophrenic to hear voices? — Michael

I've referred to inferentialist semantics several times by now.

A mentally ill person might mistakenly think they heard voices.

A mentally ill person might mistakenly think they heard voices. — plaque flag

They do hear voices. They mistakenly believe that the voices originate outside their head. You confuse experience itself with our interpretation of experience. There is a difference between seeing and thinking, between perception and cognition.

No, that's why it fails to address the philosophical disagreement between direct and indirect realism. I've already shown you the SEP articles. There is simply far more to the argument than the overly simplistic grammatical argument that you are asserting. — Michael

I can elaborate in some directions but strategically leave the wrong kinds of questions unanswered.

I am defending a minimal direct realism in an unusual way. I doubt that all direct realists agree on the details of direct realism or on their defense strategies.

They do hear voices. They mistakenly believe that the voices originate outside their head. You confuse experience itself with our interpretation of experience. There is a difference between sensations and an inner monologue. — Michael

It's not confusion. I'm well aware that the linguistic norms are less decided here. My position (if memory serves) is close to Sellars' position. Consider that you saying they hear voices is just you joining them in their madness. I see why it's tempting, but I think it's cleaner the other way.

Indirect realism wants every mistake about the world to get something right about a private image or private experience. I think that's messy.

I thought the shadow was a dog, but it was just a shadow. I did not see a dog.

Consider that you saying they hear voices is just you joining them in their madness. I see why it's tempting, but I think it's cleaner the other way. — plaque flag

It's not me joining them in their madness. The primary auditory cortex in their brain really does activate. It's just that it activates without being sent signals by the cochlea.

There is a difference between seeing and thinking, between perception and cognition. — Michael

I agree. So it's not crazy to adopt a metaphysics of intermediaries (fake voices, fake apples). It's not like saying 2 + 2 = 3. I just think it's less clean than direct realism, especially since we intend and talk about the worldly social object. So it's nice to be consistent.

It's not me joining them in their madness. In the case of schizophrenics who hear voices, the primary auditory cortex really does activate. It's just that it activates without being stimulated by signals sent from the de. — Michael

Sure. But there aren't any voices. People can be fooled (by their own nervous systems) into making incorrect judgments about the world. It's not disastrous if you want to talk about fake internal voices. We can and do work them into an inferential network. Seems better the other way, though. We don't have to have two kinds of everything.

You have no way to assess how the construction of your own CNS compares to the source of the stimulus. — frank

That pretty much says it all.

In order to know that A is not equal to B, one must have access to both. By definition, an indirect realist stipulates that we cannot have direct access to the world. Kant's distinction between Noumenal and phenomenal suffers the same fatal flaw. Arguments outright denying objectivity based upon the idea that everything ever believed, known, and/or stated come through a subject do as well.

Untenability by virtue of being strung up by one's own hamstrings.

The result renders the distinctions/dichotomies themselves meaningless/useless in that they cannot be used as a means to draw and maintain the distinctions of their own namesake.

So, all the indirect realist can say is “some object caused an idea of rock” and “some object caused an idea of cat.” Which then reduces to “some object caused an idea of some object.” We are left with some trivial generality that does not say much. — Richard B

The Indirect Realist would not say "some object caused an idea of some object", as that is presupposing objects like rocks exist in the external world. The Indirect Realist would say that "something caused the idea of a rock". From the position of Neutral Monism, that something is elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time.

One could reword as "something in the external world caused an idea of a rock in the mind"

But one could also say "something in the external world caused the idea of a pain in the mind".

I doubt that anyone would say that pains exist in the external world independently of any sentient being, so why suppose that rocks exist in the external world independently of any sentient being.

Why suppose that just because we perceive something it must exist in the external world.

People can be fooled (by their own nervous systems) into making incorrect judgments about the world. — plaque flag

The point is that them hearing and them making a judgement are two different things. Hearing voices happens when the primary auditory cortex is activated. We then judge this to either be a response to external world sounds or to be an hallucination. In neurological terms, first the temporal lobe is activated (we hear), and then the frontal lobe is activated (we make reasoned judgements about what we hear).

I like Democritus:

By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention hot, by convention cold, by convention colour; in reality atoms and void.

But...also by convention...atoms and void.

We articulate the life world, and the scientific image is a system of claims we are confident in that tend to describe relatively stable features of our world. So we believe our tables are made of atoms, and are no less tables for all that. Our wives are made of quarks, but the marriage is as real as quarks.

We believe in atoms because folks appealed to scientific norms which we made possible by atoms. Circularity, interdependence, a single inferential nexus with no foundation except that we cannot doubt as philosophers what makes philosophy possible.