How does phantom limb syndrome work? — Michael
The world is whatever we as philosophers are talking about..........The philosopher's intention to articulate the truth is intrinsically social and worldly in a strategically indeterminate sense...Wittgenstein is trying to dig deeper, say something about 'eternal' logical-linguistic structure.. — plaque flag
For the Direct Realist, the world we see around us is the real world itself. — RussellA
if all observers are directly observing the same facts in the external world, then why do different observers make different judgements about the moment when one fact changes into a different fact. — RussellA
I don't think that in reality you are a Direct Realist, but someone who has the position that the world exists fundamentally in language. — RussellA
My question to the Direct Realist is, if all observers are directly observing the same facts in the external world, then why do different observers make different judgements about the moment when one fact changes into a different fact. — RussellA
If we have an indirect access to whatever that is that is not consciousness, then it seems we have a direct access to consciousness by comparison. In this set up consciousness is a real illusion which is indirectly related to whatever it is that is outside of consciousness, while consciousness itself is direct. — Moliere
Is there no distinction to be drawn and maintained between a direct realist and a naive one? — creativesoul
Could you rephrase this question by dropping "facts" and "external world" out of it? — creativesoul
It is through these respective worldviews that people 'see' the world. — creativesoul
:up:It does not follow from the fact that different people have different accounts of what happened that they did not all watch the same set of events unfolding in real time. — creativesoul
Yes. We might use the metaphor of a distorting lens. — plaque flag
People can disagree about the world and be wrong about the world, but they are seeing and talking about the world and not their images of it. — plaque flag
If all Direct Realists are immediately and directly seeing the same world, on what grounds can they disagree about what they see. — RussellA
But why do you believe in the apple in the first place ? — plaque flag
They both see the apple directly, but differently. — plaque flag
Then how can there be a public language about apples and the colour red if our private experiences of apples and the colour red are different. — RussellA
How have (or could) you establish “my private experience of apple is different to yours”? — Richard B
We all pass out our lives in private perceptual worlds. The differences in our sensory and perceptual experiences often go unnoticed until there emerges a variation (such as ‘The Dress’) that is large enough to generate different descriptions in the coarse coinage of our shared language. In this essay, we illustrate how individual differences contribute to a richer understanding of visual perception, but we also indicate some potential pitfalls that face the investigator who ventures into the field.
Here are some good points against indirect realism, IMO. — plaque flag
How have (or could) you establish “my private experience of apple is different to yours”? — Richard B
If a belief can be justified only on the basis of another belief, and beliefs only exist in the mind, then there can be no connection of any kind between the mind and the world. This is more an argument for Idealism than Realism. — RussellA
When I see the colour red, I don't believe that I see the colour red, I know without doubt that I see the colour red. I don't need to justify my belief as it is not a belief in the first place.
IE, the Indirect Realist doesn't need to justify what they perceive through their senses. — RussellA
Concepts are public. Concepts are norms. How else could you even ask me that question with a sense of being entitled to an answer ? A tacit commitment to the philosophical situation is prior to every other issue. I touch on that in my new thread, if you want to join. — plaque flag
Beliefs and claims that are propositionally contentful are neces-
sarily representationally contentful because their inferential ar-
ticulation essentially involves a social dimension. That social
dimension is unavoidable because the inferential significance of a
claim, the appropriate antecedents and consequences of a doxastic
commitment, depends on the background of collateral commit-
ments available for service as auxiliary hypotheses. Thus any speci-
fication of a propositional content must be made from the
perspective of some such set of commitments. One wants to say
that the correct inferential role is determined by the collateral
claims that are true. Just so; that is what each interlocutor wants to
say: each has an at least slightly different perspective from which
to evaluate inferential proprieties. Representational locutions
make explicit the sorting of commitments into those attributed
and those undertaken—without which communication would be
impossible, given those differences of perspective. The representa-
tional dimension of propositional contents reflects the social
structure of their inferential articulation in the game of giving and
asking for reasons.
.
Nevertheless Beetles do matter when it comes to the perspectival and idiosyncratic aspects of language that are relative to each individual who must individually adapt their mother tongue in a bespoke inferential fashion to match their own worlds; such beetles are necessary, but lie beyond the aperspectival limitations of social norms and communication. — sime
Concepts are public. Concepts are norms. — plaque flag
I touch on that in my new thread — plaque flag
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