His a priori assumption is that there are elementary propositions. That in the final analysis we have a configuration of simple names of simple objects. — Fooloso4

Where the logical atomism of the Tractatus differs from that of Russell is that Russell took individuals to be basic, while in the tractatus it is facts. The "final analysis", in the Tractatus is not the names of objects. "Only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning." Names only have significance within propositions, not vice versa.



And this is one of the the crucial differences between the Tractatus and the PI. The Tractatus sought to build a description of the world from atomic propositions, while the Investigations recognised that what counts as simple, atomic or axiomatic depends on what one is doing.

The "final analysis", in the Tractatus is not the names of objects. — Banno

I agree. What I said is:

That in the final analysis we have a configuration of simple names of simple objects. — Fooloso4

2.0231 For these are first presented by the propositions—first formed by the configuration of the objects.

2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.

3.21 The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs
in the propositional sign.

Ok. We agree.

Then the salient stuff is that this is a large part of what is different about PI. The Tractatus is of interest in consideration of how it feeds into the Investigations.

It might be worth mentioning the penultimate paragraphs:

My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)

He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. — 6.54

Any insights on what 'surmounting these propositions' means (discounting the logical positivist interpretation)?

4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said. 


The tractatus is showing us how things are, not saying how things are.

I think much more could be said, but I won’t press the point,

The tractatus is showing us how things are, not saying how things are. — Banno

That's an important point often overlooked. W. is doing both in the T., viz., showing using metaphysical propositions (which is why we throw the ladder away at the end of the book), and also telling us that the limit of what can be said amounts to the whole of natural science. The showing part is all the metaphysical language used in the T. Once you take the journey with him, then you can toss all the metaphysical propositions away in terms of what can be said. He treats the metaphysical propositions as normal at first, but once you understand him (T 6.54) you can discard them.

The showing part is all the metaphysical language used in the T. — Sam26

An example being.....

The first proposition (T 1) is a kind of metaphysical basis for truth. Any proposition that doesn't fit the world of facts is metaphysical.

With regard to the saying showing distinction:

4.022 A proposition shows its sense.
A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand.

but:

4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said.

What is it that a proposition shows but cannot be said?

4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.
Propositions show the logical form of reality.
They display it.

6.13 Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world.
Logic is transcendental.

There are two reasons why Wittgenstein attempts to draw the limits of language.

From the preface:

It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense.

On the one side is what language shows and on the other what it does not show. This other side is not called nonsense because it is of no importance but because propositions about what lies on this side lacks sense (Sinn). There is nothing in the world that they show.

But:

6.41 The sense (Sinn) of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.

6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.

6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

What is higher of the greatest importance. It is nonsense (Sinn) for the very reason that it is higher than what is in the world.

Wittgenstein make a distinction between 'the world', that is, the factual world, and 'my world'.

5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

5.62 The world is my world: this is manifest [zeigt sich (shows itself)] in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.

Far from rejecting what cannot be said, he points to limits of what can be said in order to able to "see the world aright". (6.54) That is, to see what no proposition can show.

I think much more could be said, but I won’t press the point, — Wayfarer

Push all you wish, this is one of the common themes between Tractatus, Investigations and Certainty. And the source of my angst with your otherwise excellent posts - the tendency to tell us stuff that really can only be shown. That fuzz on the edge of language. Here be dragons is better than inventing new continents. Or is it?

it’s that there is the suggestion of something important ‘over the horizon’, so to speak, in those pregnant concluding aphorisms, such as:

Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. Propositions cannot express anything higher.

6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.

Ethics is transcendental.

(Ethics and aesthetics are one.)

You can see how this lends itself to the positivist’s ‘boo/hurrah’ theory of ethics - that there are no intelligible criteria for ethical judgements and that they’re simply matters of feeling. I’m sure that was not what he meant but it’s easy to read it that way. (Elsewhere I’m sure we’ve discussed the Stuart Greenstreet article on the folly of logical positivism.)

More broadly, language has many functions beyond the descriptive. There’s poetic language, there’s symbolic and metaphoric language, there’s literature and drama; and the perplexities of existence are due to much more than just ‘confusions of speech’. Apophatic silence has a place but it’s not, pardon the irony, the last word.

I notice in the Greenstreet article there’s another pregnant phrase “The great problem round which everything I write turns is: Is there an order in the world a priori, and if so what does it consist in?” (Notebooks p.53)’ That is a question of great interest to me, so I’d love to know where he explores it.

Sure. Ethics isn't said, it's done.

(It's the difference between praising National Socialism and working in a hospital ward.)

Apophatic silence has a place but it’s not, pardon the irony, the last word. — Wayfarer

Yeah, it is. Because we don't know. But then there is what we do.

Precious little is done on an online forum. It’s all talk.

Yep. Not good. But it's raining, and cold.

All this by way of getting myself arsed enough to make lunch.

Swap you, I’m on grandparent duties :scream:

As I said in page 7 of this thread I'm trying to complete a series of videos starting with a summary of the Tractatus, a summary of his transitional period (starting around 1930), a summary of the PI, and ultimately ending with an in depth look at OC. I'm not sure I'll finish it, but I'm giving it a go.

What follows is the beginning of my work on OC, it's a revision of a paper I wrote some years back. I'll post at least some of it here.

edited on 5/15/23
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Post 1

Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance

In what follows, I will try to set out an epistemological theory that enunciates a particular set of propositions, which are derived from Wittgenstein’s final notes called On Certainty (OC published in 1969). These bedrock propositions (often called hinge propositions) were identified mainly by Wittgenstein in the final years of his life (1949-1951). I am not claiming anything original in my thesis except to point out that these statements or bedrock beliefs (as I refer to them) have an important epistemological role that will advance the subject of epistemology in ways that few philosophers, if any, before the writing of OC, have considered.

Bedrock beliefs form the substructure of our epistemic language. In other words, they provide the bedrock to create sophisticated epistemological language constructs or language-games. For example, our understanding of knowledge and how we use phrases like “I know that such and such is the case” and “I doubt that such and such is the case” in certain social linguistic contexts and not in others; and how not understanding the proper use of words like know and doubt can cause conceptual or linguistic confusion. The underpinnings of these beliefs are crucial to understanding what it means to know and where justification ends with our epistemology. Answering such questions helps clarify the limits of reasoning (the infinite regress problem), and it also solves the problem of circularity.

As pointed out, many of the ideas presented here, are derived from OC, which begins as a response to Moore’s papers, A Defense of Common Sense (1925), and Proof of an External World (1939) in which Moore lists several propositions that he claims to know with certainty. Propositions such as the following: “Here is one hand” and “There exists at present a living human body, which is my body.” These propositions supposedly provide Moore a proof of the external world, and as such, they seem to form a buttress against the radical skeptic. Moore says, “I can prove now, for instance, that two human hands exist. How? By holding up my two hands, and saying, as I make a certain gesture with the right hand, ‘Here is one hand’, and adding, as I make a certain gesture with the left, ‘and here is another’. And if, by doing this, I have proved ipso facto the existence of external things, you will all see that I can also do it now in numbers of other ways: there is no need to multiply examples. But did I prove just now that two human hands were then in existence? I do want to insist that I did; that the proof which I gave was a perfectly rigorous one; and that it is perhaps impossible to give a better or more rigorous proof of anything whatever. …(G.E. Moore, Proof of an External World, 1939).”

It is undoubtedly the case that OC goes beyond Moore’s propositions, so it is not just about Moore; it is about knowing, doubting, making mistakes, reality, empirical statements, certainty, acting out beliefs, rule-following, etc., so it covers a range of topics in relations to what we know, and how it fits into our language. So, it is essential to note that not everything in OC should be seen as a response to Moore.

It is not only Moore’s claim to knowledge that Wittgenstein criticizes but his use of the word know. Wittgenstein also spends much of his time critiquing the radical skeptics, specifically, their use of the word doubt. Wittgenstein emphasizes an essential relationship between the word know and the use of the word doubt as part of the language games of everyday epistemology.

Even though Wittgenstein levels his attack against Moore’s argument, he is not entirely unsympathetic. However, he argues that Moore’s propositions do not accomplish what Moore thinks they do, namely, to provide proof of the external world, which in turn is supposed to undermine the doubts of the radical skeptic.

OC begins with the following statement:

“If you do know that here is one hand, we’ll grant you all the rest (OC 1).”

Wittgenstein grants that if Moore knows what he claims to know, then Moore’s conclusion follows. Nevertheless, Wittgenstein argues throughout his notes that Moore does not know what he thinks he knows. However, we are all inclined to agree with Moore; at least our intuition seems to lean in Moore’s direction. After all, if we do not know this is a hand, then what do we know? This inclination to use the word know, as Moore uses it, causes Wittgenstein to question Moore’s argument. Is Moore justified in believing his claims are true? It certainly seems so, but Wittgenstein has other ideas.

“From it seeming to me—or to everyone –to be so, it doesn’t follow that it is so.

“What we can ask is whether it can make sense to doubt it (OC 2).”

We begin with Wittgenstein’s juxtaposition of the word know against the word doubt, that is, if knowing does not make sense in Moore’s context, then does doubting make sense as a rebuttal against Moorean propositions.

If there never arose a doubt in connection with a knowledge claim, would it be a knowledge claim? What would be the purpose of a justification if a doubt never arose, or if the question “How do you know?” never raised its head?

“We just do not see how very specialized the use of “I know” is.

“—For “I know” seems [my emphasis] to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One always forgets the expression “I thought I knew”.

“For it is not as though the proposition “It is so” could be inferred from someone else’s utterance: “I know it is so”. …[F]rom his utterance “I know…” it does not follow that he does know it
“That he does know takes some shewing (OC 11-14).”

It is certainly the case that one’s knowledge does not follow from the mere assertion that one knows. As if the truth of a statement follows from merely uttering “It is so.” It is this tendency to emphasize one’s conviction with the phrase “I know…” as if it guarantees that our statement is a piece of knowledge. However, as Wittgenstein points out, “That [we] do know takes some [showing] (OC 14).”

Wittgenstein puts Moore’s statements into the category of an expression of conviction because it seems obvious to Moore that we know these propositions (I will often go back and forth between saying these propositions are propositions, as opposed to what I believe they are, viz. basic beliefs), even though Moore offers a kind of proof. It is often the case that we claim to know that something is the case, but later find out that we were wrong. Hence, Wittgenstein’s pointing out the phrase “I thought I knew (OC 12).” Understanding this points to how a doubt can enter our claims of knowledge, but the doubt must be justifiable. It cannot be used in the same way that Moore is using the word know, that is, as an expression that can stand alone without demonstrating how it is that one knows. In other words, “I know that something is the case,” should be justifiable, just as doubting should be justifiable, it is just how the language-games of knowing and doubting work, at least as a function of how Moore is presenting his argument, and also as a function of the criticisms of Moore’s argument, that is, the radical skeptics criticism.

Horror of horrors.

I mean to get back to a close analysis of Danièle Moyal-Sharrock's book.

What I think it of the utmost import to note is that On Certainty is a work in progress. I think therefore that any exegesis which supposes itself to present a definitive conclusion is jumping the gun, since it is not clear, indeed it is doubtful, that Wittgenstein himself had reached such a conclusion.

Hence your cautious approach is appropriate.

Ya, there is no way to know what passages would have been eliminated if he had edited those notes.

I mean to get back to a close analysis of Danièle Moyal-Sharrock's book. — Banno

Let me know what you think because her views are very similar to my own.

At PI 217 Wittgenstein says:

Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”

His spade is not turned when he hits a proposition that is bedrock but when he has exhausted propositions used to justify his acting in this way when complying with a rule. He can go no further.

From On Certainty:

166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.

And:

358. Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality,
but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.)
359. But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or
unjustified; as it were, as something animal.

Most succinctly:

482. It is as if "I know" did not tolerate a metaphysical emphasis.

Rather than bedrock we should consider the river and its banks:

96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid;
and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became
fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I
distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.

This is not the final edited form of this paper.

continuing with...

Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance
(Post 2)

Moore’s proof is supposed to show that the conclusion follows necessarily, and if it does, then the skeptic’s doubts are rebutted. The proof would look something like the following:

1) Moore knows that he has two hands.
2) Moore makes the inference from the fact that he has two hands, to the conclusion that there exists an external world.
3) Hence, Moore knows that an external world exists.

Wittgenstein challenges the first premise, namely, that Moore knows that he has two hands. How does Moore know that he has two hands, that is, what is his justification? And do we justify these very basic beliefs? This is at the core of Wittgenstein’s criticism. Do I know that I have hands because I check to see if they are there every morning? Do I make a study of my hands, and thereby conclude that I do indeed have hands? I know chemistry, physics, history, epistemology, and other subjects, and there are ways to confirm my knowledge. However, in our everyday lives do we need to confirm that we have hands? Do we normally doubt these kinds of statements?

Consider the following:

“I know that I am a human being.” In order to see how unclear the sense of this proposition is, consider its negation. At most it might be taken to mean “I know I have the organs of a human”. (E.g. a brain which, after all, no one has ever yet seen.) But what about such a proposition as “I know I have a brain”? Can I doubt it? Grounds for doubt are lacking! Everything speaks in its favour, nothing against it. Nevertheless it is imaginable that my skull should turn out empty when it was operated on (OC 4).”

Even the sense of these kinds of propositions (I do not think they are propositions. I refer to them as very basic foundational beliefs.) is unclear according to Wittgenstein. This is not to say that we cannot imagine a situation in which they have a clear sense, or that there are contexts in which it is reasonable to doubt such statements. It just means that these statements have a unique place in our language of knowing and doubting. The uniqueness of Moorean statements seems to be what Wittgenstein is pointing at in the following quote.

“Now do I, in the course of my life, make sure I know that here is a hand—my own hand, that is (OC 9)?”

The idea here is clear, we do not as a matter of course, make “…sure [we] know that here is a hand—[our] hand…,” and this applies to many, if not all, of the Moorean statements; and although there are exceptions, which Wittgenstein concedes (OC 23), these exceptions are irrelevant in Moore’s context. The point is to answer the skeptic in relation to what can sensibly be doubted.

“Now, can one enumerate what one knows (like Moore)? Straight off like that, I believe not.—For otherwise the expression “I know” gets misused. And through this misuse a queer and extremely important mental state seems to be revealed (OC 6).”

The disputes with Moore’s propositions are not only problematic, but they are also very subtle disputes, which means that they are difficult to flesh out. One of the problems is that we sometimes fail to see the connection between the use of the word know, and the use of the word doubt, and the logic behind that use. The connection between knowing and doubting, that is, the logical connection, is a crucial point. It is the kind of logical link that is also seen between rule-following and making a mistake - one is logically dependent on the other, that is, they are necessarily logically intertwined.

I know this thread was mostly supposed to be about the Tractatus, but it seems I've shifted gears a bit.

Although I quote Wittgenstein quite a bit, I'm trying to give an account of where I believe his thoughts lead. There is no way to know where Wittgenstein would have gone with OC, and no way to know which passages would have been left in or out in some final version of OC. All we can do is work out where they might take us, and try to fit his mostly original thinking into our epistemology ideas.
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Continuing with...

Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance
(Post 3)

One of the problems with Moore enumerating what he knows, is that it seems to amount to more of a conviction of what he believes, than a statement of what he knows. How does this happen? It happens because the beliefs Moore is claiming to know are not normally part of the language-game of knowing, that is, what he is retailing as part of what we know does not normally fit the role of what we justify. Moore’s use fits the role of someone expressing one’s conviction, and this seems to be the mental state that Wittgenstein is pointing out in OC 6. We often see the use of the word know as an expression of someone’s conviction, but this is not an epistemological use of the word. It expresses more of a subjective certainty, a feeling of being correct, an intuition, or a mere belief. Moore did not intend that his use of know be an expression of a conviction, but that is what his use amounts to. The evidence that this is so is seen in the relationship between the expression of what we claim to know, and the question, “How do you know?” - which is the expression of a doubt or a challenge to justify your claim.

“When Moore says he knows such and such, he is enumerating a lot of empirical propositions which we affirm without special testing; propositions, that is, which have a peculiar role in the system of our empirical propositions.

“Even if the most trustworthy of men assure me that he knows things are thus and so, this by itself cannot satisfy me that he does know. Only that he believes he knows. That is why Moore’s assurance that he knows…does not interest us. The propositions, however, which Moore retails as examples of such known truths are indeed interesting. Not because anyone knows their truth, or believes he knows them, but because they all have a similar role in the system of our empirical judgments.

“We don’t, for example, arrive at any of them as a result of investigation (OC 136-138).”

The main thrust of Wittgenstein's argument is that these Moorean propositions (my claim is that they are not propositions, but expressions of belief shown mostly in our actions) have a "peculiar role," as Wittgenstein says, in our language-games.

This peculiar standing that Moore's beliefs have, is that they function as foundational or bedrock supports (not all foundational supports are bedrock), which is similar to how the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces give life to the game of chess. Moore’s beliefs have a similar role in the language-games of epistemology (although their function is probably much broader). In Moore’s context such beliefs are in no need of justification, that is, there is no need to justify Moore’s claim that he has hands, no more than a rule of chess needs a justification that stipulates bishops move diagonally. It just is the case, as part of the contingent background of reality, that Moore has hands, or that bishops move diagonally. It is not a matter of knowing, namely, justifying a claim, but a matter of contingent bedrock beliefs that support many of our language-games of knowing, justifying, and making truth claims, which is the whole of epistemology. Hence, their peculiar role.

I recently bought a book called An Essay In Aid of a Grammar Assent by John Henry Newman. If you remember, Wittgenstein references Newman in OC 1. I was interested in finding out what influence this book had on W.'s thinking. I haven't read it yet, but it's calling to me.

Post 1 above of Bedrock Beliefs and Their Epistemic Importance has been edited and clarified. Hopefully this paper will clarify my position on OC. My position is not supposed to be some exegetical defense of Wittgenstein notes. It's supposed to be my thoughts on where some of Wittgenstein's thinking seemingly leads.

Any thoughts on where I might need clarification, whether you agree or not, are appreciated.

One of the problems with Moore enumerating what he knows, is that it seems to amount to more of a conviction of what he believes, than a statement of what he knows. How does this happen? — Sam26

OK, a distinction is being made here, a “conviction” vs “a statement of knowledge”? Declaring “I have two hands” falls under the category of “conviction” But Wittgenstein finds this odd to say this in front of a bunch of philosophers rather than saying it after, say, a car crash. Should it even be called a “conviction” when our concepts have been removed from its common use? What about whether this is an example of a “statement of knowledge”? Again, what circumstances would this become knowledge? I have a job that requires someone to have two hands to operate a piece of machinery; so on the job application I declare “I have two hands.” Is this not providing my knowledge of my biological state to someone who can confirm my assertion?

OK, a distinction is being made here, a “conviction” vs “a statement of knowledge”? — Richard B

Yes, Wittgenstein is pointing out that Moore's propositions seem to be more like statements of conviction, rather than epistemological assertions.

Declaring “I have two hands” falls under the category of “conviction” But Wittgenstein finds this odd to say this in front of a bunch of philosophers rather than saying it after, say, a car crash. — Richard B

Declaring "I have two hands," may or may not fall under the category of conviction, i.e., there are contexts where it might be appropriate. Yes, he does find it odd to say it in front of philosophers, especially as an epistemological statement as Moore does.

Should it even be called a “conviction” when our concepts have been removed from its common use? — Richard B

Well, there is a use of "I know..." that is not an epistemological use, and you hear it all the time. It's used to emphasize one's subjective certainty (their strong conviction) about their belief. It's often confused with objective certainty, which can often be used as a replacement for the epistemological use of "I know..."

Again, what circumstances would this become knowledge? — Richard B

One's conviction, viz., one's subjective certainty can become knowledge when one has the appropriate justification for one's belief or claim. Moore's use of "I know I have hands," would never become a piece of knowledge. It's not a matter of knowing, which means I have the proper grounds. Moore of course beliefs he has a proof, but Wittgenstein is challenging this use of know. Justifying these kinds of Moorean beliefs would be akin to justifying the rules of chess, the board, and the pieces. They are just there as part of the background allowing chess to be played. In the same way, our background, the reality we find ourselves in, is the background that allows for epistemological language-games, and other kinds of language-games. In fact, language arises out of this background, i.e., our conceptual framework is dependent, in many ways, on this background.

I have a job that requires someone to have two hands to operate a piece of machinery; so on the job application I declare “I have two hands.” Is this not providing my knowledge of my biological state to someone who can confirm my assertion? — Richard B

No, and this Wittgenstein's point, i.e., it's not a matter of epistemology, generally speaking.

So what is a “statement of knowledge”? Can you provide an example?

If you can’t, what distinction can one be making between “ a conviction” and “a statement of knowledge”

So what is a “statement of knowledge”? Can you provide an example? — Richard B

A statement of knowledge is a statement that's justified in some way, and there are various kinds of knowledge statement based on different language-games. We justify our knowledge using logic (inductive and deductive arguments). I'm assuming you know many e.g.'s of these. We justify knowledge claims based on sensory experiences. For example, "How do you know the orange juice is sweet?" - because I tasted it. There is knowledge based on testimonial evidence, and this is wide spread, given in books by experts, lectures, testimony in courts of law, etc. So, there are many e.g.s.

The Earth has one moon is a statement of knowledge. The Earth is the third planet from the Sun, on and on. I'm not going to list them, but they're all over the place. Why would you ask this?

A conviction on the other hand is just one's strong belief, which is expressed as a strong subjective feeling, that's not justified or it's based on very little evidence. You here this from many religious people. For e.g., "I know X is true." How do you know? - "I just know it," it's a matter of faith. It's just a expression of one's religious conviction. It's not an epistemological statement.

Why would you ask this? — Sam26

I have a job that requires someone to have two hands to operate a piece of machinery; so on the job application I declare “I have two hands.” Is this not providing my knowledge of my biological state to someone who can confirm my assertion?
— Richard B

No, and this Wittgenstein's point, i.e., it's not a matter of epistemology, generally speaking. — Sam26

So is this not

We justify knowledge claims based on sensory experiences. — Sam26

?