His a priori assumption is that there are elementary propositions. That in the final analysis we have a configuration of simple names of simple objects. — Fooloso4
The "final analysis", in the Tractatus is not the names of objects. — Banno
That in the final analysis we have a configuration of simple names of simple objects. — Fooloso4
2.0231 For these are first presented by the propositions—first formed by the configuration of the objects.
2.0272 The configuration of objects produces states of affairs.
3.21 The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs
in the propositional sign.
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.)
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly. — 6.54
The tractatus is showing us how things are, not saying how things are. — Banno
4.022 A proposition shows its sense.
A proposition shows how things stand if it is true. And it says that they do so stand.
4.1212 What can be shown, cannot be said.
4.121 Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them.
What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
What expresses itself in language, we cannot express by means of language.
Propositions show the logical form of reality.
They display it.
6.13 Logic is not a theory but a reflexion of the world.
Logic is transcendental.
It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense.
6.41 The sense (Sinn) of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists—and if it did exist, it would have no value.
If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case. For all that happens and is the case is accidental.
What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.
It must lie outside the world.
6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.
Propositions can express nothing that is higher.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)
5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.
5.62 The world is my world: this is manifest [zeigt sich (shows itself)] in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.
I think much more could be said, but I won’t press the point, — Wayfarer
Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. Propositions cannot express anything higher.
6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed.
Ethics is transcendental.
(Ethics and aesthetics are one.)
Yeah, it is. Because we don't know. But then there is what we do.Apophatic silence has a place but it’s not, pardon the irony, the last word. — Wayfarer
Once I have exhausted the justifications, I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: “This is simply what I do.”
166. The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing.
358. Now I would like to regard this certainty, not as something akin to hastiness or superficiality,
but as a form of life. (That is very badly expressed and probably badly thought as well.)
359. But that means I want to conceive it as something that lies beyond being justified or
unjustified; as it were, as something animal.
482. It is as if "I know" did not tolerate a metaphysical emphasis.
96. It might be imagined that some propositions, of the form of empirical propositions, were
hardened and functioned as channels for such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid;
and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hardened, and hard ones became
fluid.
97. The mythology may change back into a state of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift. But I
distinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself;
though there is not a sharp division of the one from the other.
One of the problems with Moore enumerating what he knows, is that it seems to amount to more of a conviction of what he believes, than a statement of what he knows. How does this happen? — Sam26
OK, a distinction is being made here, a “conviction” vs “a statement of knowledge”? — Richard B
Declaring “I have two hands” falls under the category of “conviction” But Wittgenstein finds this odd to say this in front of a bunch of philosophers rather than saying it after, say, a car crash. — Richard B
Should it even be called a “conviction” when our concepts have been removed from its common use? — Richard B
Again, what circumstances would this become knowledge? — Richard B
I have a job that requires someone to have two hands to operate a piece of machinery; so on the job application I declare “I have two hands.” Is this not providing my knowledge of my biological state to someone who can confirm my assertion? — Richard B
So what is a “statement of knowledge”? Can you provide an example? — Richard B
Why would you ask this? — Sam26
I have a job that requires someone to have two hands to operate a piece of machinery; so on the job application I declare “I have two hands.” Is this not providing my knowledge of my biological state to someone who can confirm my assertion?
— Richard B
No, and this Wittgenstein's point, i.e., it's not a matter of epistemology, generally speaking. — Sam26
?We justify knowledge claims based on sensory experiences. — Sam26
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