I didn't ask you to evaluate the claim only for the meaning of "illusions" in your statement. What you're reply says is nothing but 'I don't like the sound of it'. — 180 Proof
Do you agree that, for pragmatic reasons, most humans act as-if Matter is Reality? If so, how do you explain the behavior of a few feckless philosophers, or romantics, who act as-if there is a realm of Ideality, apart from the tangible substances they know from hard experience?A cryptic answer to my question. I'm not sure I follow you. — Tom Storm
FYI, is not interested in Philosophical opinions, only Physical facts. :joke:I was reading a paper by Chalmers last night in response to your reply. You might be interested in it.
https://consc.net/papers/debunking.pdf — RogueAI
The existence of things in themselves is an inference from the invariance and intersubjective commonality of sensations.
And I submit to you that all ideas of substance are groundless. The world seems physical and substantial and from that experience and the reificational potentiality of language we naturally extrapolate the notion of substance. We really have no idea what either physicality or mentality are in any substantial sense.
Out of interest - let's assume we do accept analytic idealism as our ontological situation - what practical changes would this initiate in terms of human behavior? How much changes in terms of morality, human rights, climate change, political discourse, in short, how we live?
Things-in-themselves can be inferred the possibility of sensations in general a priori. The thing as it appears, and from which sensation is given, makes the non-existence of that particular thing-in-itself impossible
Transcendental analysis of the conditions for human knowledge doesn’t care about ontology; all that is represented exists necessarily, all we will ever know empirically is given from representations, therefore all empirical knowledge presupposes extant things.
The only reason for positing the thing-in-itself, is to grant that even if things are not perceived, they are not thereby non-existent.
It is meant to qualify the semi-established dogmatic Berkeley-ian purely subjective idealist principle esse est percipi, by stipulating that it isn’t necessary that that which isn’t perceived doesn’t exist, but only for that which is not perceived, empirical knowledge of it is impossible. It just says existence is not conditioned by perception, but knowledge most certainly is.
Oh, that’s easy: once this thing, whatever it is, appears to perception, that thing-in-itself, whatever it was, disappears, that thing no longer “in-itself”, as far as the system is concerned.
Can’t be substance, insofar as substance is never singular, which implies a succession, which implies time, which is a condition for knowledge, and by which the imposition makes the impossibility of knowledge contradictory.
Permanence is that by which the thing-in-itself, is of. Which makes the notion that if I’m not looking at the thing it isn’t there, rather foolish.
The real world for us, is just how we understand what we are given. The world is only as real as our intellect provides. Whatever the world really is, we are not equipped to know, and if it really is as we understand it, so much the better, but without something to compare our understands to, we won’t know that either.
If it’s not a thing, why does it have to exist in a thing? That which exists in a thing is a property thereof, and logic is not a property. All I’m going to say about it, is that logic resides in human intelligence, and attempts to pin it down in concreto ultimately ends as illusory cognitions at least, or irrational judgements at worst.
There’s no legitimate reason to think that, insofar as it contradicts the notion that the universal mind does no meta-cognitive deliberations, which it would have to do in order to determine what laws are, and the conditions under which they legislate what it can do, which determines what it is.
In other words, the Universal Mind, if it doesn’t exist, cannot be legislated by law, which means if it is legislated by law it must exist. Which means it cannot be merely an idea.
But all universals are ideas……AAAARRRRGGGGG!!!!!!
Out of interest - let's assume we do accept analytic idealism as our ontological situation - what practical changes would this initiate in terms of human behavior? How much changes in terms of morality, human rights, climate change, political discourse, in short, how we live? — Tom Storm
In order to always have a secure compass in hand so as to find one's way in life, and to see life always in the correct light without going astray, nothing is more suitable than getting used to seeing the world as something like a penal colony. This view finds its...justification not only in my philosophy, but also in the wisdom of all times, namely, in Brahmanism, Buddhism, Empedocles, Pythagoras [...] Even in genuine and correctly understood Christianity, our existence is regarded as the result of a liability or a misstep. ... We will thus always keep our position in mind and regard every human, first and foremost, as a being that exists only on account of sinfulness, and who is life is an expiation of the offence committed through birth. Exactly this constitutes what Christianity calls the sinful nature of man. — Schopenhauer's Compass, Urs App
Any view can lead to nihilism, although some more than others, and anyone can be happy under any of them—nihilism is a reflection of one’s psychology and nothing more. — Bob Ross
But the underlying philosophical point is mistaking the illusory for the real, although of course for that to be meaningful, there must be some kind of inkling of a higher reality, which is also pretty non-PC in today's culture. — Wayfarer
One’s political views are going to be dependent on one’s morals and amoral goals—no metaphysical view in-itself tells us what to do here, but it can end up being what formulates our morals (e.g., if we shouldn’t hurt what is a part of ourselves and we are of the same mind, then we shouldn’t hurt each other). — Bob Ross
I've been reading the Google preview of that book, and have just now ordered the hard copy. It is an account of Schopenhauer's reading of the Upaniṣads, of which he had a Latin copy, translated from a Persian edition. According to this book, published 2014, they along with Plato and Kant were the major formative influences on Schopenhauer's mature philosophy. — Wayfarer
This concedes my point about Kant: he is using phenomena to reverse engineer that there are things-in-themselves while claiming that phenomena do not tell us anything about things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross
They can’t be groundless if you consider reason a valid method of gaining knowledge, which you will have to if you agree with science. — Bob Ross
No, I won't have to concede that, because I don't think reason without sense data produces knowledge. It is not a valid inference from the fact that sense data combined with reason produces knowledge to a claim that reason on its own can produce knowledge. — Janus
Kant says he is an empirical realist and a transcendental idealist. I think for Kant sensory appearances are real. — Janus
Isn't climate change ultimately coming to liberate us from the cycle of death and rebrith? Why act to prevent it? — Tom Storm
Things-in-themselves can be inferred the possibility of sensations in general a priori. The thing as it appears, and from which sensation is given, makes the non-existence of that particular thing-in-itself impossible, re:
“…. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears—which would be absurd….”
Transcendental analysis of the conditions for human knowledge doesn’t care about ontology; all that is represented exists necessarily, all we will ever know empirically is given from representations, therefore all empirical knowledge presupposes extant things. — Mww
So to break this down, Kant seems to be saying we have no choice but to accept empiricism even if it isn't a reflection of things as they are in themselves?
I'm not quite sure how sensory experiences are 'real' given his model - does this mean they are all that is available to us and produced by our interaction with noumena which are real? The reality of sense data seems to be a 'translation' or interpretation of the real. — Tom Storm
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