I guess I am unclear about how empiricism can be said to have a firm traction on reality if that reality is provisional or, shall we say, derivative? — Tom Storm
how is it inferred therefrom that there are multiple things-in-themselves and not a thing-in-itself? — Bob Ross
how can you infer that it is impossible that appearances aren’t of nothing? Is that simply absurd to you? — Bob Ross
I infer that the appearances are representations by comparison of other appearances (e.g., they inject me with a hallucinogen drug and my representations becomes significantly different than when I am sober, etc.). — Bob Ross
But if representations tell us nothing about things-in-themselves then it is odd to me that it can even be inferred that there is a dynamic of representations vs. things-in-themselves in the first place. — Bob Ross
I am a substance monist….. — Bob Ross
……so I am unsure by what you mean by “substance is never singular”: could you elaborate? — Bob Ross
So would it be fair to say that you think we are barred from metaphysics (other than transcendental inquiries)? — Bob Ross
The universal mind is not an idea, it is mind that has ideas and those ideas are the Platonic, eternal forms which are expressed within space and time, which are conditions of our minds. — Bob Ross
Kant had the idea that we can treat the objects of perception and knowledge as conforming to us, rather than us conforming our minds to them….. — Srap Tasmaner
…..but it also means that those objects must cooperate, must be capable of cooperating, of appearing to us, of revealing themselves to us or being revealed to us. — Srap Tasmaner
Look at what is posited. It is not the empty place-holder it was supposed to be, but is rich with its own structure of revealing and concealing — Srap Tasmaner
without which the formal description of knowledge hangs in the air. — Srap Tasmaner
You’re hinting at a limitation regarding the object (it doesn’t cooperate hence doesn’t appear) but I would rather think the limitation is in us, in that our physiology limits what can appear to us, re: only a specific range of wavelengths of light for visual appearances, etc., and also limits the effect that which can appear, has. — Mww
….in saying that there are somethings that appear to us (…) we are saying something about those things….. — Srap Tasmaner
….that they have this character of revealing or being revealed, and showing themselves to us is a potential or capacity of such things. — Srap Tasmaner
But what of the object that is revealed to us, at least partially? — Srap Tasmaner
there’s nothing added by saying they have a character of this kind or that, which could only be attributed to that which exists anyway. — Mww
How would we know the thing is only partially revealed? — Mww
You may choose to phrase it more carefully than I will,…. — Srap Tasmaner
…..the overall shape of that Kantian position is that something is revealed to us but something at the same time is concealed, namely how the thing is in itself rather than for us. — Srap Tasmaner
I hope it's the latter and not just business as usual. Which I guess is a Christian view - love your neighbour as you do yourself. The reason being we are all the same being... :wink:
I personally can't identify reasons to change how I interact with the world, regardless of the metaphysics or ontology posited. So I am wondering how useful it is to even have views on ontology, other than a common sense account, which may not be true, but has the virtue of working well enough as a frame.
No, Kant is merely saying that if there are appearances, then logically speaking, there must be things which appear, whatever the in itself existence of what appears might be.
…
We know there are things which appear as phenomena, but we also know that these appearances are not the things, and that we cannot know what the things are apart from how they appear to us.
No, I won't have to concede that, because I don't think reason without sense data produces knowledge. It is not a valid inference from the fact that sense data combined with reason produces knowledge to a claim that reason on its own can produce knowledge.
Working backwards: our representations are not all alike, therefore our sensations are not all alike, therefore the effects things have on sensibility are not all alike, therefore not all things are alike, therefore not all things-in-themselves are alike, insofar as for any thing there is that thing-in-itself.
Because appearances are necessarily of something? I’m kinda struggling with the triple negative. At any rate, appearances aren’t inferred, they’re given. Perception is, after all, a function of physics, not logic implied by inference.
First off, appearances are not representations, they are affects on the senses.
Not yet mentioned, is the speculative condition that appearance denotes only the matter of the thing as a whole, which leaves out the form in which the matter is arranged, the purview of productive imagination, from which arises the first representation as such of the thing, called phenomenon, residing in intuition.
Odd to me as well; there is no dynamic of representations vs. thing-in-themselves, they have nothing to do with each other. Empirically, the dynamic resides in the relation between things and the intuition of them. Logically, and empirically, the dynamic resides in the relation between things and the conceptions of them. There is another dynamic, residing in pure reason a priori, in which resides the relation between conceptions to each other, where experience of the conceived thing is impossible, re: eternal/universal Mind and the like.
We have intended, then, to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition, nor are their relations in themselves so constituted as they appear to us; and that if we take away the subject, or even only the subjective constitution of our senses in general, then not only the nature and relations of objects in space and time, but even space and time themselves disappear; and that these, as phenomena, cannot exist in themselves, but only in us
Working backwards: our representations are not all alike, therefore our sensations are not all alike, therefore the effects things have on sensibility are not all alike, therefore not all things are alike, therefore not all things-in-themselves are alike, insofar as for any thing there is that thing-in-itself.
You’d pretty much have to be, holding with a Universal Mind, right?
Nahhhh……metaphysics is an unavoidable pursuit, when reason seeks resolution to questions experience cannot provide. Transcendental philosophy merely points out the conditions under which such resolutions are even possible on the one hand, and the circumstances by which the resolutions may actually conflict with experience on the other. The mind is, as my ol’ buddy Golum likes to say, tricksie.
Ok, not an idea. If not an idea, and not a thing, for a human then, what is it? What does it mean to say it is mind, rather than it is a mind?
To say it is mind that has ideas makes it no different than my own mind.
To call it eternal mind adds a conception, but by which is invoked that which is itself inconceivable, re: mind that has all ideas, or, is infinitely timeless.
Still, as long as universal mind theory doesn’t contradict itself, it stands. If it contradicts other theories, then it’s a matter of the relative degree of explanatory power philosophically, or merely personal preference conventionally. There is the notion that reason always seeks the unconditioned, that abut which nothing more needs be said, which certainly fits here. It used to be a theocratic symbol having no relation to us, but it’s since graduated to an extension of us. Not sure one is any better than the other.
”….not all things are alike, therefore not all things-in-themselves are alike, insofar as for any thing there is that thing-in-itself.”
-Mww
I agree and think this is true if we were speaking about what you can empirically know…. — Bob Ross
…..but how do you know metaphysically there are things-in-themselves and not a thing-in-itself? — Bob Ross
By your own concession, we aren’t supposed to know reality fundamentally is…. — Bob Ross
By my lights, you cannot be certain that there are things-in-themselves just as much as I can’t be certain that there is a Universal Mind. — Bob Ross
….if you want to go the truly skeptical route that we are barred from metaphysics (or at least ontology) then to be consistent I think you would have to also rebuke transcendental philosophy — Bob Ross
This is no different than inferring that the best explanation of what reality fundamentally is is a Universal Mind—there’s no certainty in that either. — Bob Ross
First off, appearances are not representations, they are affects on the senses.
-Mww
Appearances are perceptions, which are representations that your mind generated of the sensations. — Bob Ross
are you saying that the “appearance” is just the impression of the thing-in-itself on you and the representation is the formulation of it according to your mind’s abilities? — Bob Ross
You are noting that there is an impression, an intuition, and then an understanding of the thing-in-itself…. — Bob Ross
So Kant can’t say stuff like:
“….We have intended, then, to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of phenomena; that the things we intuite, are not in themselves the same as our representations of them in intuition….” — Bob Ross
If the relations between the phenomena tell us nothing about the things-in-themselves, since they are just the “subjective constitution” of our senses…. — Bob Ross
Because this is an extroplation of the relations of phenomena: you are saying that this phenomena relates to another in a manner that suggests they are representations of different things. Kant is barring this (as seen in the above quote). — Bob Ross
I think that is what metaphysics is about—giving the best general account of reality. — Bob Ross
Man, after reading that, it appears you’re more familiar with this stuff than you let on when talking to me. Which makes much of what I say pretty much superfluous.
We are NOT amused!!!! (Grin)
Yes, exactly. Knowledge or possible knowledge a posteriori.
To know metaphysically is knowledge a priori, as opposed to empirical knowledge. Knowledge a priori as it applies to external reality, in Kant, is impure a priori, insofar as it has empirical conditions contained in the syllogism, and is thereby an inductive inference, a logical function, hence, at least for convenience, is metaphysical knowledge. Which is all the thing-in-itself was ever meant to indicate.
Such is the bane of all speculative metaphysics: there’s no empirical proofs, but only internal logical consistency and strict adherence to the LNC, the only form of certainty we have to guide our contemplations.
So we don’t know all things are appearances given from one thing-in-itself, or as many things-in-themselves as there are things that appear. Nevertheless, humans are capable of more than one sensation at a time, either from a single object or from a multiplicity of them. For single objects there’s no conflict, but for more than one sensation from more than one object, and knowledge of things-in-themselves is impossible anyway, we gain nothing by the one-for-all over the each-in-itself, which makes the all-for-one superfluous.
Maybe not, but the alternative is that I am necessary causality for the entire manifold of all that I perceive. Let the contradictions rampant in that scenario simmer awhile.
Absolutely**, but then, I don’t hold with being barred from metaphysical expositions. I just find ontology unnecessary as a discipline in transcendental philosophy, because the existence of things is never in question as is the manifestation of them in experience.
are you saying that the “appearance” is just the impression of the thing-in-itself on you and the representation is the formulation of it according to your mind’s abilities? — Bob Ross
Nope. Impression of the thing.
You are noting that there is an impression, an intuition, and then an understanding of the thing-in-itself…. — Bob Ross
Nope. Impression, intuition, understanding of the thing.
Hey, give him a break. He’s a seriously-genius Enlightenment Prussian. He’s just reminding the readers, maybe half a dozen of whom are his intellectual peers, that the things of intuition are not things-in-themselves. And things-in-themselves, if they contain or are constituted by relations, such must be relations-in-themselves. Continuing with the passage…..
The subjective constitution of our senses in general, which is to say regardless of whatever appears to us, is imagination and the two pure intuitions. Take away imagination the synthesis of matter to form and therefore the phenomenon is impossible; take away the pure intuitions and objects that should have appeared won’t, insofar as there is nothing for object to extend into, therefore they have no shape, and if they have no shape the can contain no matter, and if they contain no matter, they are not objects at all, and if they are not objects at all, there wouldn’t be anything to appear, a blatantly inexcusable contradiction.
Notice, too, that the nature of objects considered as thing-in-themselves, presupposes their existence. I mean….how could the nature of a thing be considered, even if the thing is considered as having the nature of a thing-in-itself, if it didn’t exist? But I think you’ve acceded that point, if I remember right.
the phenomenon of the horse is separate from but nonetheless related to the phenomenon of the fence
If you think about it, you can see the validity in it. You may have experience with horses, and with fences, and with things that move, but you’ve never seen a horse jump a fence. But you an still connect a horse to jumping a fence even though you’ve never seen it happen, thus have no experience of it. In short, you can easily conceptually image the motion, a certain indication it must be possible without contradicting the natural order, which is a purely logical deduction, which only understanding can provide, exemplifying the prime dualism in human cognition:
:smirk:Isn't climate change ultimately coming to liberate us from the cycle of death and rebrith? Why act to prevent it? — Tom Storm
:fire:Such is the bane of all speculative metaphysics: there’s no empirical proofs, but only internal logical consistency and strict adherence to the LNC, the only form of certainty we have to guide our contemplations. — Mww
:fire:Literally all of good metaphysics tries to extrapolate based off of the real world their best explanations of it and only bad metaphysics ventures so far beyond reality with merely LNC. — Bob Ross
Its a hard problem because we cannot currently objectively describe experiences. — Philosophim
But why should we find that even surprising on physicalism, let alone a hard problem? — wonderer1
If one takes Kant very seriously, by my lights, then there is no knowledge of things-in-themselves, and, consequently, they have to develop a post-modern pragmatist approach (such as using difference to gather knowledge)--like the American Pragmatist Pierce.
I am just curious how you get around this issue? Or is it even an issue to you? — Bob Ross
Kant isn’t doing anything differently here other than trying to keep his metaphysical research as close to ‘home’ as possible. — Bob Ross
To me, you just pointing out that if our representative faculty lost its two pure forms of intuition that we would not longer perceive the objects--but that doesn’t mean there aren’t any. — Bob Ross
It does not presuppose there existence as things-in-themselves. — Bob Ross
Yes, by why do you think there is a horse-in-itself and a fence-in-itself? — Bob Ross
I have no problem with this. — Bob Ross
To be honest, although he was very smart, he says these kinds of contradictory things so much in the CPR that I think he didn’t have the view fully fleshed out. — Bob Ross
If one takes Kant very seriously, by my lights, then there is no knowledge of things-in-themselves, — Bob Ross
This is where the obscurity sets in with Kant (for me): what do you mean “logically speaking”? If you can’t point to your experience of things being representations of other things, then why do you think they are representations at all? You can’t point to scientific inquiry into the brain: those are studies of phenomena which Kant thinks tells us nothing about what is being represented—but then why think there is something being represented in the first place? — Bob Ross
I see. This doesn’t work though. For example, if reason without sense data produces no knowledge, then you do not know that “every change has a cause”. You don’t know that “a = a”. You don’t know that “1+1=2” without counting your fingers (so to speak). You don’t even know that “reason without sense data produces no knowledge” without appealing to pure reason. Some things are a priori true, and that means they do not require sense data. — Bob Ross
So there is what Ned Block has characterized as the "Harder Problem of Consciousness." This speaks to Philosophim's point about experiencing other consciousnesses.. the problem as I understand it is: how can I know what it's like to be you, without actually being you. The physicalist rejoinder may be: well the brain stuff is the same, so the mental states must be the same.. but the brain stuff is only approximately the same, not exactly the same, and the difference in brain states means different mental states, and these mental states are simply not accessible to another, at least, not in an "experiential" way. — NotAristotle
In other words, what is it about this arrangement of physical matter and energy that allows consciousness, and how is it different from some other assortment of physical matter and energy that does not allow consciousness? That is, if we think consciousness arises from a physical substrata, what about that physical substrata gives rise to consciousness? — NotAristotle
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