I think the approach of Bohr's was that it was pointless or impossible to say what the 'object' 'really is', apart from the act of measurement. — Wayfarer
Again your presumption of the reality of the object conditions your analysis - you presume that the object exists independently of any act of measurement, when that is precisely the point at issue! — Wayfarer
As for decoherence, the Wiki article you point to says 'Quantum decoherence does not describe the actual collapse of the wave function, but it explains the conversion of the quantum probabilities (that exhibit interference effects) to the ordinary classical probabilities.' The 'collapse of the wave function' is not at all a resolved issue. — Wayfarer
As far as readings are concerned, try A Private Vew of Quantum Reality, Chris Fuchs, co-founder of Quantum Baynesianism (QBism). Salient quotes:
Those interpretations (i.e. Copenhagen, Many Worlds) all have something in common: They treat the wave function as a description of an objective reality shared by multiple observers. QBism, on the other hand, treats the wave function as a description of a single observer’s subjective knowledge. — Wayfarer
I believe his [i.e. Norbert Wiener's] assertion that information is more than matter and energy is wrong. DNA is made up of matter and energy. All life is made up of matter and energy and stores information.
— Philosophim
Again, your dismissal is simplistic. How DNA came into existence is still not something known to science. — Wayfarer
The fact that living things are able to maintain homeostasis, heal from injury, grow, develop, mutate and evolve into new species, all involve processes and principles that may not be explicable in terms of physics and chemistry, as there's nothing in the inorganic domain. — Wayfarer
I feel your definition is not concise enough to give a clear and unambiguous identity. "something it is like to have it in and of itself" is too many words. I can't make sense of it.
So if I'm seeing, I'm not trying to describe or identify what I'm seeing, I'm just in the moment per say.
"What it is like to have experience". Now, I'm not saying that was your intention, but it was the closest I could get to with the definition.
What I was noting is that there didn't seem to be a discernible difference between qualitative experience and qualia.
I tried to pare this down again. "Qualia is just a stream of qualities that we experience. This is not just any experience though, but experience that we nominally single out to meaningfully navigate our lives".
Do we give attention to certain experience over others?
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Or is this about definitions/identities we create out of the stream of experience we have?
"Qualia is what its like to experience". Is this right?
This leaves me now with a question of what quantitative experience is. I'm going to confess something. Words which have the first few letters the same as another are something my brain easily mixes up. I looked back briefly and am not sure that I did not accidently do that between the words quantitative and qualitative. It is something I've worked on a long time, but I still slip up occasionally.
So I want to bring back the discussion to quantitative for a second. If a quantitative experience is an experience, is there something that has that experience? For lack of a better term, this would be an "unconscious experience"?
In the case of blindsight, the person would unconsciously see the object, but has no actual qualia, or conscious experience of doing so.
Qualia/qualitative experience is simply subjective consciousness while quantitative analysis is simply objective consciousness. There's really no difference between them
When you say we can tell objectively that a being observes, identifies, and acts upon its environment, you are describing a quantitative being through-and-through (or at least that is the conceptual limit of your argument: it stops at identifying Pzs)--not any sort of qualitative experience. — Bob Ross
Yes, I agree with this fully.
Quantitative analysis (Objective consciousness) occurs when we can know that something that is not our qualia is also experiencing qualia with identification.
The problem in knowing whether something is qualitatively conscious is that we cannot experience their qualia.
Quantitative consciousness then requires the addition of one other term, "Action". Only through a thing's actions can we ascertain that it can observe and identify
So there we go, in the end we went about defining a few terms which are semantically no different from one another. :)
The reflected light still enters the eyes, stimulates the rods and cones, leading to neural signals travelling to the brain and stimulating the visual cortex, but there is no subjective awareness of seeing.
All those processes I just outlines are quantitative processes, equivalent in a way to the operation of a camera. You can keep asserting that it is the case that there is qualitative seeing, but I'm not seeing any explanation from you that could convince me of that.
There is no reason to think that there are not many things in your visual field right now that you are not aware of at all, even though the light from those things is being reflected into your eye and neural signals are being received by your visual cortex. I don't think it makes any sense at all to call all that visual data we are not aware of "qualitative seeing".
We can be self-reflective on the small percentage of the overall visual data we have been consciously or unconsciously aware of
but since there is no recall at all the experience os seeing I just don't see any way in which it could make sense to call it qualitiative.
Think of it this way, although a crude and oversimplified example, if you flick a domino to start a 1,000,000 domino chain of them hitting each other one-by-one, there is nothing it is like to be those dominos hitting each other. They just hit each other: they are unconscious.
An “unconscious experiencer”, like an AI, is just a more complex version of this: it is mechanical parts hitting each other or transferring this or that—it is quantitative through-and-through just like the domino’s hitting each other. There is nothing it is like to be an AI in the sense like there is something to be like a qualitative experiencer: qualia (in the sense of instances of qualitative experience) have a “special” property of there being something it is like to be it (or perhaps to have it). — Bob Ross
I don’t see, upon looking at the empirical experiments of blindsight people, why one would conclude that they no longer qualitatively experience. Just because they don’t identify as seeing doesn’t mean that they aren’t still having it. — Bob Ross
The sense of sight (as a qualitative experience) has something it is like in and of itself. In other words, even if I don’t understand that I am qualitatively seeing, there is still something it is like for me to be qualitatively seeing. — Bob Ross
In other words, your qualitative experience is really a steady flow of experiences with no distinct boundaries between them; and you single out, or carve out, experiences to compare to others nominally. — Bob Ross
Do we give attention to certain experience over others?
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Or is this about definitions/identities we create out of the stream of experience we have?
I would say both. — Bob Ross
So I want to bring back the discussion to quantitative for a second. If a quantitative experience is an experience, is there something that has that experience? For lack of a better term, this would be an "unconscious experience"?
There is nothing it is like to have unconscious experience because it isn’t qualitative; and I think this is where we begin to disagree. — Bob Ross
Qualia/qualitative experience is simply subjective consciousness while quantitative analysis is simply objective consciousness. There's really no difference between them
Show me knowledge today of something that exists that is not matter and energy. If you do that, then I will concede. If you cannot, then my point stands. — Philosophim
Show me knowledge today of something that exists that is not matter and energy. If you do that, then I will concede. If you cannot, then my point stands.
— Philosophim
The number 7 is not matter or energy, yet it exists. — Wayfarer
how could it not exist as matter and energy? — Philosophim
The representation, the symbolic form, exists as matter, but the idea is real independently of it’s symbolic form. This is shown by the fact that the same idea can be represented by different forms, but 7=7 is true in all possible worlds. And that is so whether you think of it, or not, or whether it’s written down, or not. — Wayfarer
But this begs the question - it assumes what needs to be proven. — Wayfarer
Again your presumption of the reality of the object (the idea of 7) conditions your analysis - you presume that the object exists independently of any act of measurement, when that is precisely the point at issue! — Wayfarer
Aren't you assuming that 7=7 is independent of any brain that can think or process that symbology? — Philosophim
It's not an assumption, it's an axiom. The law of identity and other such principles of logic are assumed by the laws of inference. If they didn't stand, then you wouldn't be able to propose any kind of 'if:then' argument. They're woven into the very fabric of language and reason. — Wayfarer
The law of identity, number and "other such principles of logic" are axioms of human reason, and as such say nothing about what exists independently of human reason. — Janus
Ok, I think I've finally narrowed down the problem. We have two different uses of quantitative. We have a quantitative observation and a quantitative experience.
The word quantitative can only be used as an objective outside observation, not an internal one.
Lets not use blindsight yet, but something more basic that we can all relate to. There is a nerve that by passes a cell in your lower leg. Its constantly there sending signals, but you're not conscious of it. We can describe this quantitatively of course. But its still a part of you isn't it? Unlike a row of dominos falling (I thought the analogy was quite fine Bob :) ) I can become conscious of that nerve at that cell if I receive a cut. I can have a subjective experience of that nerve cell eventually. I can never have the subjective experience of a set of falling dominos.
Also, something that we have an unconscious embodiment of can only be known quantitatively until we can know it qualitatively. This would match with the finding here
Regardless, I have the view that the law of the excluded middle and other such basic elements of reason, are not dependent on human faculties, but because we have the faculty of reason we are able to discern them. It's precisely the ability of humans to grasp such facts which constitutes reason. — Wayfarer
Indeed, nothing can be said about what exists independently of human faculties (including reason) as whatever that might be, is beyond the scope of knowledge. — Wayfarer
As for your example, it doesn't stand, as the various forms of water are known a posteriori, whereas the law of identity is known a priori i.e. independently of experience. — Wayfarer
I was referring to the instinctive belief in the 'mind-independent nature' of objects, which is just what has been called into question by quantum physics, where the act of measurement determines the outcome of the observation. — Wayfarer
In the case of 7=7 could I not also say H20=H20, or "real physical properties" = "real physical properties"? Since real physical properties are equal to real physical properties, this is known apriori, or independently of experience right? — Philosophim
Indeed, nothing can be said about what exists independently of human faculties (including reason) as whatever that might be, is beyond the scope of knowledge. Regardless, I have the view that the law of the excluded middle and other such basic elements of reason, are not dependent on human faculties, but because we have the faculty of reason we are able to discern them. It's precisely the ability of humans to grasp such facts which constitutes reason. — Wayfarer
Sure, for subjective reasons you like to believe that logical laws are independent of human reason, but you don't like to believe that material objects are. — Janus
Subjective consciousness creates a subjective reality. Subjective reality does not alter objective reality. — Philosophim
our logic is derived from generalizing from the analysis of our experience of material objects, — Janus
our logic is derived from generalizing from the analysis of our experience of material objects,
— Janus
So empirical philosophers say, but the counter to that is that we would not be able to generalise or abstract without the prior existence of the rational faculty to count, compare, abstract and reason — Wayfarer
Suffice to refer to enactivism. 'Enactivism rejects the traditional dualistic view that separates subjective and objective aspects of experience. Instead, it proposes an embodied and situated perspective, where subjectivity and objectivity are intertwined and mutually constitutive.' Subjects and objects co-arise and are mutually dependent. — Wayfarer
A person with visual agnosia cannot report on what they have no awareness of experiencing
The only evidence we have of qualitative experience is our awareness of our own and the reportage of others' awareness of their own.
Now you can say that the body experiences the physical effects or data that enables the better than random guessing of the person with visual agnosia, in the sense that I have already outlined, but that is not subjective experience, it is equivalent in kind to saying that the stone experiences the weathering effects of the wind and rain.
Correct. So why say they aren’t qualitatively experiencing? This just proves my point. — Bob Ross
For example, I only come to know that there is a chair in my room via my senses, but it does not follow that that chair only exists as my senses. — Bob Ross
What do you mean by “subjective experience”? I have a feeling you mean higher order meta-consciousness (e.g., self-reflective introspective, etc.). That isn’t consciousness proper.
No, a person qualitatively experiencing without introspective access is not equivalent to a stone experiencing nor quantitative experience. — Bob Ross
You obviously didn't read what I wrote above what you quoted, which was that the only way we have of knowing about qualitative experience is being aware of our own or listening to the reports of others about their own. The person with visual agnosia cannot report on any qualitive visual experience because they are not aware of any such thing, so we have no evidence to suggest that they have any qualitive visual experience.
”The only evidence we have of qualitative experience is our awareness of our own and the reportage of others' awareness of their own.” – Janus
Correct. But that doesn’t mean that it is contingent on our awareness of our qualitative experience. For example, I only come to know that there is a chair in my room via my senses, but it does not follow that that chair only exists as my senses. Likewise, you are claiming that because we only come to know we qualitatively experience via introspection, that introspection is required to qualitatively experience: same error.
Firstly, you are changing the subject. Qualities are necessarily not independent of subjective human experience, whereas chairs may not be.
Actually, I would have thought you believed that the chair is not independent of human experience; I thought that has been the very thing you are arguing.
So again, you are not really providing any counterarguments; instead, you just keep asserting the same things over and over. You should be able to understand my argument above, and if you cannot provide any cogent counterargument then our discussion will go precisely nowhere.
Subjective experience, and along with that qualitative experience, may be a post hoc self-reflective rationalization and thus not a suitable descriptor of what is immediately perceived, but I am not claiming that is so, I just see it as a possibility.
The body/ brain responding to visual stimuli can be observed, even when the subject is not aware of what is affecting the body, and that is one way of speaking about what the body/ brain experiences.
For example, how would it differ from the body/ brain reacting in measurable and modelable ways, ways however of which the subject has no awareness, to visual stimuli?
However, I was using it in the sense that you were before: mere awareness (i.e., observation, identification, and action). ...In this case, there is no contradiction in terms because you can have a being which observes and has no qualitative experience. — Bob Ross
Observation is the receipt of some type of information. This could be a sense, sensation, or even a thought. Another way to look at is is "undefined experience". — Philosophim
The point is that your objective consciousness is only this sort of quantitative experience, where “experience” is mere awareness/observation. — Bob Ross
The word quantitative can only be used as an objective outside observation, not an internal one.
I think I agree: an AI is said to have no internal ‘experience’ (in the sense you are now using it) but is understood as still able to observe, and its ability to observe is explained via quantitative measurements. Is that what you are saying? — Bob Ross
So, although I understand what you are saying, I think you are conflating consciousness proper with meta-consciousness; to keep it brief, there is a difference between having introspective access to one’s qualitative experiences and simply having them. Think of a beetle, they are such a low form of life that they have 0 introspective access to their experience, but they are nevertheless experiencing (qualitatively). — Bob Ross
From your perspective, I think you are inclined to say that the qualitative experience was gone during those blackouts, and that I was essentially a PZ during those moments. But, to me, we are thereby conflating the ego with the true ‘I’: I was still experiencing (e.g., folding my clothes, conversing with people, watching TV, etc.) but my ‘ego’ had left the chat, so to speak. — Bob Ross
I think that you see the objective and subjective as two sides of the same coin, but you equally hold that the objective doesn’t prove the subjective—and these two claims are incoherent with each other. — Bob Ross
I stand by the basic claim that numbers, logical principles, and the like, cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter. That reason comprises the relationship of ideas, not the relations between material entities. — Wayfarer
You can say that the weight of two 500 gram apples equals the weight of one 1Kg melon, but that's because you're mathematically literate and can grasp the meaning of 'the same as' or 'equal to'. — Wayfarer
It's those intellectual operations, which we rely on for all manner of reasoned inference, which I say can't be explained in terms of matter and energy. — Wayfarer
I think this was a misunderstanding of an implicit part of the definition of observation. As I defined it was always intended to be qualitative experience.
Observation is the receipt of some type of information. This could be a sense, sensation, or even a thought. Another way to look at is is "undefined experience".
The AI is the observer and identifier, the camera merely provides the information for the AI
Regardless of our opinions on what definitions to use, we cannot use the term 'quantitative experience'. This simply does not work
If you note that a being can have a quantitative experience, then you are conceding that we can know what a beings subjective experience is like through objective means.
No, I noted that an AI is an observer and identifies.
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We objectively know it is conscious because we quantitatively, or by math, understand how it observes and identifies information through functions and algorithms. But do we know what its like to experience being an ai as it observes and identifies? No.
It is not that the objective does not prove that other beings have subjective experiences. It is only that the objective cannot prove what it is like to BE that subjective experiencer.
But do we know what its like to experience being an ai as it observes and identifies? No.
I think one mistake we've talked past a bit on is what I mean by consciousness. My points are not concerned with higher levels of consciousness or meta consciousness.
They really are just about whether there is an experiencing being or a mechanical process which has no experience.
To ease confusion and simplify our points, meta-consciousness should not be brought up as I don't see the need for it. When considering consciousness then, we are discussing the minimally viable level to be conscious. That would be experiencing qualia, which requires an "I".
First, there is the question as to whether you were conscious, but you didn't remember that you were conscious. From my point of view, consciousness does not require a memory of being conscious. But does it require memory? For our discussion, I suppose it doesn't. Memory would perhaps involve higher level consciousness, but for base consciousness, no
Is it that you didn't remember being conscious, or were you actually unconsciously doing things and no one around you knew?
Are they conscious and do not remember being conscious, or can the unconscious mind also observe and identify?
Ironically, my citation of brain scans can give us that answer. if it is the case that brain scans can detect that the unconscious mind is shaping what your conscious mind is about to do, then the answer is obvious.
I think this nails the issue down. In the common use of unconscious and conscious, there needs to be the "I", or ego
So to be explicit, a conscious being is an "I" which observes and identifies.
The question still remains as to whether you simply forgot your conscious experience, or if even an unconscious experience has a subjective viewpoint that we are unaware of.
There is a deeper question here as well. Just because "I" am not experiencing, does that mean that the subconscious has a subjective experience that we are simply unable to know?
You and I disagree on the definition of consciousness. I require a subjective "I". If I understand correctly, in your view the unconscious still has qualia, which I consider needing a subjective "I" to experience.
In your view however the unconscious subject is still an "I" in the sense that this unconsciousness is potentially accessible to the conscious (speaking generally, I understand there are exceptions).
Even if you note that the unconscious experiences qualia, the brain scans detecting what the unconscious is thinking about proves it still comes from the brain.
What is your reason for believing that consciousness is not caused by the brain?
The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness
How will this line of thinking help society?
Or is it merely that you just don't see the logical connections, and believe such conclusions are premature and prevent us from discovering the real alternative?
My approach to philosophy has always been to make greater sense of the general understanding of the world. To take our common language, clarify it, and get rid of the skepticism or ambiguity that causes confusion at a deeper level.
Paradigm shifts like yours seem like radical departures from the norm, and I've always wondered at the motivation for such
This disagreement is also done in full respect Bob! Fantastic thinking was had by all sides, and I have a much better respect for your position now that I understand better the nature of your definitions and outlook.
it did not counter my point which refutes that. — Philosophim
I've shown it — Philosophim
I stand by the basic claim that numbers, logical principles, and the like, cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter. — Wayfarer
Do you think that computers do not deal with numbers and apply logical principles, or do you think that the processes occurring in computers cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter, or...? — wonderer1
The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts* one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions. — Thomas Nagel
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