I think the approach of Bohr's was that it was pointless or impossible to say what the 'object' 'really is', apart from the act of measurement. — Wayfarer

I agree completely with you.

Again your presumption of the reality of the object conditions your analysis - you presume that the object exists independently of any act of measurement, when that is precisely the point at issue! — Wayfarer

I would say this another way. Obviously there's something there to measure. If not, we wouldn't get a measurement. What we do with measurements is create identities. Identities are fully shaped by us. There is nothing within reality that insists that anything must be identified in any particular way. However, in relation to ourselves, certain identities end up being more useful than others. In general, the most useful identities are those which have a clear difference in behavior than the existence around it.

A sheep eats grass for example. There is nothing in reality apart from our observation that necessitates that we identify the sheep and the grass as separate. We could just as easily group the sheep and the grass together. If then we can identify anything in whatever way we want, why do so? Because it turns out reality exists independently of our identities. If I think that rotten looking apple is healthy to eat, it makes me sick. If I identity a 40 foot drop as save to jump down to, I die. So how do we decide what identities work? We decide based on whether reality contradicts them or not.

I could go much more in depth with this in my theory of knowledge paper, you might actually like the ideas contained within. Long story short, we believe our identities represent something in reality as reality will prove us wrong otherwise. In the case of the quantum realm, we're in a serious case of not being able to accurately measure reality. We're working with what we have, which is a lot of probabilities.

As for decoherence, the Wiki article you point to says 'Quantum decoherence does not describe the actual collapse of the wave function, but it explains the conversion of the quantum probabilities (that exhibit interference effects) to the ordinary classical probabilities.' The 'collapse of the wave function' is not at all a resolved issue. — Wayfarer

If you read my conclusions again you'll see I concluded this as well.

As far as readings are concerned, try A Private Vew of Quantum Reality, Chris Fuchs, co-founder of Quantum Baynesianism (QBism). Salient quotes:

Those interpretations (i.e. Copenhagen, Many Worlds) all have something in common: They treat the wave function as a description of an objective reality shared by multiple observers. QBism, on the other hand, treats the wave function as a description of a single observer’s subjective knowledge. — Wayfarer

Yes, but we must be very careful not to translate this into the common meanings of the terms. Notice he's looking at the function, or the identity. Unlike bouncing light off of a sheep, bouncing particles off of quantum particles is going to affect the outcome. If the observation impacts the object, then of course the observation and the object are intertwined. If I push a sheep over for fun, then say, "The sheep will objectively fall over at this spot when someone touches it," that doesn't work objectively. If you touch the sheep with X force at Y velocity at Z location, then the outcome will happen.

A problem with quantum measurement is the sheep is constantly moving, writhing like a mass of worms, and we're trying to aim and hit the same spot every time without anyway to confirm exactly where we hit it. We can't. Don't take the analogy too literally, its just an easy thought comparison. It doesn't meant the sheep wouldn't fall over if the same exact force were applied in the same exact location and all of its internal forces were known. Quantum mechanics doesn't half of that to make a repeatable objective outcome. At best, it has to analyze the limits of possibilities, very much like chaos theory.

The entire point behind all of this conjecture really, is that identities don't create reality, reality impacting other reality is the reality. And sometimes the only identity which can be made is the identity of a reality impacting another reality. It doesn't mean that we cannot identify much of reality without changing it. Eyes are passive receptors of light bouncing off an object. Whether we are here or not, that light is affecting the object in the same way.

I believe his [i.e. Norbert Wiener's] assertion that information is more than matter and energy is wrong. DNA is made up of matter and energy. All life is made up of matter and energy and stores information.
— Philosophim

Again, your dismissal is simplistic. How DNA came into existence is still not something known to science. — Wayfarer

Simple does not mean wrong Wayfarer. In fact, it is my experience the best way to explain complex things is to put many simple things together. Don't mistake my notion that everything being matter and energy explains how something came to be. I don't know if you are a religious person, but none of my arguments refute the notion of a God or some creator. If your hope is that somehow getting away from physicalism saves God, I wouldn't. You can very much argue for a creator or God through the idea that there is a reality independent from us. In fact, I think its far easier. And if you're not a theist, no matter. It just seemed an odd thing to point out when I had never implied that we actually knew how DNA came into being.

The fact that living things are able to maintain homeostasis, heal from injury, grow, develop, mutate and evolve into new species, all involve processes and principles that may not be explicable in terms of physics and chemistry, as there's nothing in the inorganic domain. — Wayfarer

To your earlier point Wayfarer, the "organic domain" is just an identity. While you may find some use in creating such a domain, there is nothing in reality that necessitates such an identity be apart from your world view. A more objective measure is to realize that the "organic domain" is simply when matter and energy behave in a different way. As I noted earlier, matter and energy create water. Think of lava, or complex crystal caverns. Why should any of that exist? Its magic. Same with life. Life is just yet another expression of matter and energy in particular combinations. You see some special difference, but I don't. Its all part of the wonderful reality of existence, something that has no right or reason to exist in the first place.

I much appreciate the link, its a good refresher on Husserlian phenomenology. I have my own theory of identity and knowledge I wrote here some time again. Here's a rewrite in which I greatly simplify the original that Bob and I poured over for almost a year. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context

Good thing I looked to, I had a reply and never saw it until now. :(

This is the original with Bob and I. It might be worth while if you have questions, you can read our back and forth. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/9015/a-methodology-of-knowledge

Hello Philosophim,

I feel your definition is not concise enough to give a clear and unambiguous identity. "something it is like to have it in and of itself" is too many words. I can't make sense of it.

No worries. You can think of it like this:

So if I'm seeing, I'm not trying to describe or identify what I'm seeing, I'm just in the moment per say.

The sense of sight (as a qualitative experience) has something it is like in and of itself. In other words, even if I don’t understand that I am qualitatively seeing, there is still something it is like for me to be qualitatively seeing.

"What it is like to have experience". Now, I'm not saying that was your intention, but it was the closest I could get to with the definition.

I think for now this is ok, but I have a feeling I may end up disagreeing depending on how you tie it to the blindsight example.

What I was noting is that there didn't seem to be a discernible difference between qualitative experience and qualia.

The only difference is that the qualia is the instance of it:

I tried to pare this down again. "Qualia is just a stream of qualities that we experience. This is not just any experience though, but experience that we nominally single out to meaningfully navigate our lives".

In other words, your qualitative experience is really a steady flow of experiences with no distinct boundaries between them; and you single out, or carve out, experiences to compare to others nominally. For example, you get a cut and feel the pain, but that feeling of pain isn’t truly separable from your vision that you are having at the time, your thoughts, etc.--it is a steady stream of them all globbed together. Nevertheless, it is certainly meaningful to focus on the pain and try to come up with a solution to resolve it—but the qualitative pain is a part of a mush of a steady stream of qualitative experience. Does that make sense?

Do we give attention to certain experience over others?
…
Or is this about definitions/identities we create out of the stream of experience we have?

I would say both. We have the ability to focus our attention and cognitively assess our experiences, and those are likewise experiences of their own. When we focus on the pain, or we assess “that we are in pain” (as a thought), we are singling out a portion of a inextricable whole of qualitative experience.

"Qualia is what its like to experience". Is this right?

I would say that “there is something it is like to qualitatively experience, and qualia are the singled-out instances thereof (e.g., the feeling of pain)”. I think that’s generally what you are trying say here, but I wanted to be clear.

This leaves me now with a question of what quantitative experience is. I'm going to confess something. Words which have the first few letters the same as another are something my brain easily mixes up. I looked back briefly and am not sure that I did not accidently do that between the words quantitative and qualitative. It is something I've worked on a long time, but I still slip up occasionally.

Absolutely no worries my friend!

So I want to bring back the discussion to quantitative for a second. If a quantitative experience is an experience, is there something that has that experience? For lack of a better term, this would be an "unconscious experience"?

There is nothing it is like to have unconscious experience because it isn’t qualitative; and I think this is where we begin to disagree. You would say that a camera + AI (or what have you) has something it is like to be it, but to me that is only the case with qualitative experience—instances of which are qualia.

Think of it this way, although a crude and oversimplified example, if you flick a domino to start a 1,000,000 domino chain of them hitting each other one-by-one, there is nothing it is like to be those dominos hitting each other. They just hit each other: they are unconscious.

An “unconscious experiencer”, like an AI, is just a more complex version of this: it is mechanical parts hitting each other or transferring this or that—it is quantitative through-and-through just like the domino’s hitting each other. There is nothing it is like to be an AI in the sense like there is something to be like a qualitative experiencer: qualia (in the sense of instances of qualitative experience) have a “special” property of there being something it is like to be it (or perhaps to have it).

In the case of blindsight, the person would unconsciously see the object, but has no actual qualia, or conscious experience of doing so.

In terms of my view, I disagree. The blindsight person still qualitatively experiences (in this case sees) but they have lost the extra ability to understand that they are experiencing. Just like a squirrel, there is still something it is like to view the world through their experiential, qualitative sense of sight. Under my view, they don’t need to the extra cognitive or introspective access to their qualitative experience to be classified as qualitatively experiencing.

Under your view, I think you are saying that they have lost their qualitative experiencing, which I am not following why you think that. But that is what I am understanding you to be saying.

Qualia/qualitative experience is simply subjective consciousness while quantitative analysis is simply objective consciousness. There's really no difference between them

I was so close to agreeing with you here! But the last sentence through me off: there’s a big difference between them. If objective consciousness gives you only knowledge of quantitative experiencers, then you have no reason to believe that they have qualitative experience like yourself. That’s what I meant by there being no bridge between these two concepts of yours whereof you could safely connect them as two epistemic sides of the same coin.

Likewise, if you can’t know anything about other people than objective consciousness, then you are admitting that you cannot resolve the hard problem: you cannot reduce your own subjective consciousness to the quantitative brain because that requires the same objective consciousness inquiry that you agree only gets you to a PZ. So you can’t account for your subjective consciousness as reducible to some sort of objective consciousness.

Also, it wouldn’t make sense (to me) to try to reduce the quantitative to the qualitative, but that’s what is required if you are going to claim that subjective consciousness is produced by the brain.

Here’s where I get confused. You first agree with me that you can’t account for any sort of qualitative experience about other people:

When you say we can tell objectively that a being observes, identifies, and acts upon its environment, you are describing a quantitative being through-and-through (or at least that is the conceptual limit of your argument: it stops at identifying Pzs)--not any sort of qualitative experience. — Bob Ross

Yes, I agree with this fully.

And then immediately thereafter say:

Quantitative analysis (Objective consciousness) occurs when we can know that something that is not our qualia is also experiencing qualia with identification.

If you actually agree that your objective analysis of consciousness doesn’t provide insight into qualitative experience, then you can’t know that other people (through identification) are also experiencing qualia.

The problem in knowing whether something is qualitatively conscious is that we cannot experience their qualia.

And here is the conflation: again, there is a difference between not knowing their qualia (i.e., knowing how they experience their qualia) and knowing that they experience qualia. You can’t prove either of those, and sentences like the above quote make me think that you think the hard problem only applies to the former.

Quantitative consciousness then requires the addition of one other term, "Action". Only through a thing's actions can we ascertain that it can observe and identify

I don’t have a problem with using action, identification, and observance to determine if something is unconsciously experiencing: but this says nothing about “consciousness” in the sense of qualitative experience, and that’s all that matters for the hard problem.

So there we go, in the end we went about defining a few terms which are semantically no different from one another. :)

We are definitely getting closer, that is for sure (;

Bob

Hello Janus,

The reflected light still enters the eyes, stimulates the rods and cones, leading to neural signals travelling to the brain and stimulating the visual cortex, but there is no subjective awareness of seeing.

I don’t see, upon looking at the empirical experiments of blindsight people, why one would conclude that they no longer qualitatively experience. Just because they don’t identify as seeing doesn’t mean that they aren’t still having it.

All those processes I just outlines are quantitative processes, equivalent in a way to the operation of a camera. You can keep asserting that it is the case that there is qualitative seeing, but I'm not seeing any explanation from you that could convince me of that.

To me, long story short, I believe that other people are typically qualitatively experiencing and unless there’s evidence that a given person isn’t having that then I default to saying they do. Kind of like how I believe that everyone (that is a live) has a beating heart, and unless there’s evidence that a given person doesn’t then I default to saying they do.

Yes you can account for awareness with such quantitative processes, but you can’t quantitatively account for qualitative experience, which to me is “consciousness”, and so I think your approach is flawed. I don’t think you should be metaphysically viewing the scenario as if their qualitative experience is reducible to a quantitative brain.

There is no reason to think that there are not many things in your visual field right now that you are not aware of at all, even though the light from those things is being reflected into your eye and neural signals are being received by your visual cortex. I don't think it makes any sense at all to call all that visual data we are not aware of "qualitative seeing".

This is what I was referring to: qualitative experience is not only what ‘bubbles up’ to the ego. Take breathing: even if you didn’t have introspective access to your experience of your breathing (because you weren’t focusing on it), that doesn’t mean that you aren’t still qualitatively experiencing the breathing.

We can be self-reflective on the small percentage of the overall visual data we have been consciously or unconsciously aware of

Then you agree that qualitative experience (i.e., consciousness) extends beyond what we can self-reflect upon and introspectively access?

but since there is no recall at all the experience os seeing I just don't see any way in which it could make sense to call it qualitiative.

This doesn’t work: think of a squirrel. It has virtually 0 introspective and self-reflective access to its own qualitative experience: is it thereby not qualitatively experiencing? Of course not! The squirrel cannot recall its experiences of seeing—does that mean it isn’t experiencing qualitatively? Of course not!

Introspective and self-reflective access are extra aspects of consciousness and do not belong to concsiousness proper.

Bob

Think of it this way, although a crude and oversimplified example, if you flick a domino to start a 1,000,000 domino chain of them hitting each other one-by-one, there is nothing it is like to be those dominos hitting each other. They just hit each other: they are unconscious.

An “unconscious experiencer”, like an AI, is just a more complex version of this: it is mechanical parts hitting each other or transferring this or that—it is quantitative through-and-through just like the domino’s hitting each other. There is nothing it is like to be an AI in the sense like there is something to be like a qualitative experiencer: qualia (in the sense of instances of qualitative experience) have a “special” property of there being something it is like to be it (or perhaps to have it). — Bob Ross

Strings of dominos performing calculations.

This is some disappointing reasoning Bob. Different complex systems have different emergent properties/qualities. Trivializing and then ignoring the complexity of physical systems doesn't make for serious thinking on the subject IMO.

Hello Wonderer1,

The analogy that I gave was perfectly fine within the context that it was given. I understand and agree that different systems have different emergent properties: I didn't deny that in my assessment whatsoever. I would suggest you read my conversation with Philosophim in its entirety without taking certain quotes out of context.

Also, I don't see the relevance of your linked YouTube video: so what if they can have domino's perform calculations?

Bob

I don’t see, upon looking at the empirical experiments of blindsight people, why one would conclude that they no longer qualitatively experience. Just because they don’t identify as seeing doesn’t mean that they aren’t still having it. — Bob Ross

This is just going around the assertion merry-go-round now, Bob. I'm going to put my case once more in a nutshell and then leave it there. The only evidence we have of qualitative experience is our awareness of our own and the reportage of others' awareness of their own. A person with visual agnosia cannot report on what they have no awareness of experiencing.

Now you can say that the body experiences the physical effects or data that enables the better than random guessing of the person with visual agnosia, in the sense that I have already outlined, but that is not subjective experience, it is equivalent in kind to saying that the stone experiences the weathering effects of the wind and rain. Experience in that sense is not qualitative but quantitative; it can be observed, measured and modeled.

The sense of sight (as a qualitative experience) has something it is like in and of itself. In other words, even if I don’t understand that I am qualitatively seeing, there is still something it is like for me to be qualitatively seeing. — Bob Ross

I think after hearing your explanation again, qualia boils down to subjective experience for me. But, we may dive a little deeper into what subjective experience means because I can see you don't quite mean that either.

In other words, your qualitative experience is really a steady flow of experiences with no distinct boundaries between them; and you single out, or carve out, experiences to compare to others nominally. — Bob Ross

This matches my definition of consciousness. Observation and identification. However, we still have slightly different viewpoints here.

Do we give attention to certain experience over others?
…
Or is this about definitions/identities we create out of the stream of experience we have?

I would say both. — Bob Ross

Just a call back here Bob, but this is what a discrete experiencer does.

So I want to bring back the discussion to quantitative for a second. If a quantitative experience is an experience, is there something that has that experience? For lack of a better term, this would be an "unconscious experience"?

There is nothing it is like to have unconscious experience because it isn’t qualitative; and I think this is where we begin to disagree. — Bob Ross

Ok, I think I've finally narrowed down the problem. We have two different uses of quantitative. We have a quantitative observation and a quantitative experience.

I think we both agree on quantitative observations. If I observe a thing calculating, then the measurement of that would be quantitative.

However, a quantitative experience is a contradiction. You've designed the word quantitative to be something that has no internal experience. If it has no internal experience, it is not an experience. The word quantitative can only be used as an objective outside observation, not an internal one. Therefore it simply can never be an experience without a contradiction of its base term. While it would be easy to dismiss it there, I think you're still trying to nail down something in particular, and I want to invite you to think with me on this.

Lets not use blindsight yet, but something more basic that we can all relate to. There is a nerve that by passes a cell in your lower leg. Its constantly there sending signals, but you're not conscious of it. We can describe this quantitatively of course. But its still a part of you isn't it? Unlike a row of dominos falling (I thought the analogy was quite fine Bob :) ) I can become conscious of that nerve at that cell if I receive a cut. I can have a subjective experience of that nerve cell eventually. I can never have the subjective experience of a set of falling dominos.

So when you mean quantitative experience, I think you're referring to a set of mechanics in our body that we could potentially be conscious of. Or at the least, somehow impacts our consciousness. I'm not quite sure what to call it. But I can see where the word "experience" would tend to come in, because there's the desire for us to say that the nerve cell is us, even though we aren't currently having qualia of it at any particular time.

Initially I want to call it 'unconscious embodiment', or something like that. Some things we are unconscious of can potentially be made conscious of, but then some things within our body we'll never be able to be conscious of, only quantitatively. For example, I'll never be able to conscious of the cells that produce my nails to the point that I can grow my nails faster or slower. I can only quantitatively observe how fast or slow my nails grow.

Also, something that we have an unconscious embodiment of can only be known quantitatively until we can know it qualitatively. This would match with the finding here. https://qz.com/1569158/neuroscientists-read-unconscious-brain-activity-to-predict-decisions

In that article there is a link to the original research paper. As noted:
"Neuroscientists have long known that the brain prepares to act before you’re consciously aware, and there are just a few milliseconds between when a thought is conscious and when you enact it."

And here perhaps we have the missing link. We cannot qualitatively experience the unconscious portions of ourselves. If we do, it then becomes a conscious portion of ourself. That is what I identify as subjective experience. The difference between the quantitative and the qualitative is the objective and the subjective. And our unconscious mind is the qualitative part of us that eventually we become subject to.

The unconscious portion of ourself is not qualia. It is outside of our conscious experience, and this fits with your definition of qualia. Unconsciousness is not a stream of experience that I am deciding what to focus or not to focus on, it is the unbidden processing that eventually becomes a qualia that we can focus on, blur, or dismiss.

Since the unconscious mind is measured quantitatively, and we see that it has a repeatable and known cause of what we qualitatively experience, we have more proof that the brain causes our qualitative experience, or subjective consciousness. We can quantitatively measure the brain and predict qualitative, or conscious outcomes.

Back to blindsight. We cannot say the person experiences seeing an object that they have no subjective conscious experience of. This is part of their unconscious embodiment. Their unconscious embodiment influences their consciousness to say, "I guess it is this," and be correct. This can be quantitatively measured but the subject has no qualia of that experience.

With quantitative experience being a contradiction, I'm not sure where you can go from here Bob. I've shown how we can scan the brain during brain surgery and map the brains signals to a person's subjective experience. I've demonstrated that the unconscious brain can be evaluated to accurately predict what a person will consciously say or experience. I've demonstrated that drugs can affect the consciousness of a person. The only thing left to you, which we both agree on, is that we cannot objectively know what its like to have the subjective experience of a being subjectively experiencing. But this alone is not enough to override the other facts presented at this moment.

Qualia/qualitative experience is simply subjective consciousness while quantitative analysis is simply objective consciousness. There's really no difference between them

This was an ambiguous sentence on my part that you interpreted against what I meant. I meant there was no difference between qualia and subjective consciousness, and a quantitative analysis and an objective measure of consciousness.

I'll leave that here and see what you say Bob.

Show me knowledge today of something that exists that is not matter and energy. If you do that, then I will concede. If you cannot, then my point stands. — Philosophim

The number 7 is not matter or energy, yet it exists.

Show me knowledge today of something that exists that is not matter and energy. If you do that, then I will concede. If you cannot, then my point stands.
— Philosophim

The number 7 is not matter or energy, yet it exists. — Wayfarer

I admit to some disappointment that my last reply was not addressed here, but I'll address this. What is the number 7 Wayfarer? It is an identity of the mind. Your ability to part and parcel reality into different identities, or "one" identity multiple times, is something most humans are capable of. The brain is as I noted previously, made of matter and energy. Your mind is your living brain. So is the identity of the number 7.

If you mark it down on a piece of paper, it exists in the form of ink and a dead tree. If you say it, it exists as a soundwave before dissipating. And if you think it in your mind, it exists as the energy and matter of your brain processing what we call a thought.

So how could it not exist as matter and energy?

how could it not exist as matter and energy? — Philosophim

The representation, the symbolic form, exists as matter, but the idea is real independently of the symbolic form. This is shown by the fact that the same idea can be represented by different forms, but 7=7 is true in all possible worlds. And that is so whether you think of it, or not, or whether it’s written down, or not.

The representation, the symbolic form, exists as matter, but the idea is real independently of it’s symbolic form. This is shown by the fact that the same idea can be represented by different forms, but 7=7 is true in all possible worlds. And that is so whether you think of it, or not, or whether it’s written down, or not. — Wayfarer

Referring back to your own words:

But this begs the question - it assumes what needs to be proven. — Wayfarer

Again your presumption of the reality of the object (the idea of 7) conditions your analysis - you presume that the object exists independently of any act of measurement, when that is precisely the point at issue! — Wayfarer

Aren't you just assuming there are other possible worlds? Aren't you assuming that 7=7 is independent of any brain that can think or process that symbology? As for the same idea being represented in different forms, can water not exist as both vapor, liquid, and ice? If H20 does not come together, water does not exist. It has the potential to exist, just as 7=7 has the potential to exist within a thinking mind as an idea. But if there is no thinking mind, there is no 7=7. If there is no combination of H20, there is no water.

Aren't you assuming that 7=7 is independent of any brain that can think or process that symbology? — Philosophim

It's not an assumption, it's an axiom. The law of identity and other such principles of logic are assumed by the laws of inference. If they didn't stand, then you wouldn't be able to propose any kind of 'if:then' argument. They're woven into the very fabric of language and reason.

As for your example, it doesn't stand, as the various forms of water are known a posteriori, whereas the law of identity is known a priori i.e. independently of experience. You're comparing contingent facts, i.e. the fact that the combination of two elements produces water, with logical axioms.

But I don't expect that you will agree with this. What I expect is that you will translate it to your own specific system of reference, which has few reference points with the broader subject in philosophy.

//ps - also inserting 'the idea of 7' into that sentence from me, completely changes the meaning of the sentence. I was referring to the instinctive belief in the 'mind-independent nature' of objects, which is just what has been called into question by quantum physics, where the act of measurement determines the outcome of the observation. Discussion of ontology of numbers is a completely different matter.//

It's not an assumption, it's an axiom. The law of identity and other such principles of logic are assumed by the laws of inference. If they didn't stand, then you wouldn't be able to propose any kind of 'if:then' argument. They're woven into the very fabric of language and reason. — Wayfarer

The law of identity, number and "other such principles of logic" are axioms of human reason, and as such say nothing about what exists independently of human reason.

This is no different, in principle, than saying that the ideas about material objects are categories of human reason and say nothing about the existence of anything independent of human perception and judgement.

The law of identity, number and "other such principles of logic" are axioms of human reason, and as such say nothing about what exists independently of human reason. — Janus

Indeed, nothing can be said about what exists independently of human faculties (including reason) as whatever that might be, is beyond the scope of knowledge. Regardless, I have the view that the law of the excluded middle and other such basic elements of reason, are not dependent on human faculties, but because we have the faculty of reason we are able to discern them. It's precisely the ability of humans to grasp such facts which constitutes reason.

Hello Philosophim,

Ok, I think I've finally narrowed down the problem. We have two different uses of quantitative. We have a quantitative observation and a quantitative experience.

It seems as though you are using the term “experience” to refer strictly to “qualitative experience”, which is fine, and if so, then I completely agree with you that ‘quantitative experience’ is a contradiction in terms. However, I was using it in the sense that you were before: mere awareness (i.e., observation, identification, and action). So when I said “quantitative experience” I was keeping in conformance with your schema, which, at the time, was not using “experience” that strictly but, rather, more loosely to include any being which observes (essentially). In this case, there is no contradiction in terms because you can have a being which observes and has no qualitative experience.

All that you have done here is switched the meanings of the terms. The point is that your objective consciousness is only this sort of quantitative experience, where “experience” is mere awareness/observation.

The word quantitative can only be used as an objective outside observation, not an internal one.

I think I agree: an AI is said to have no internal ‘experience’ (in the sense you are now using it) but is understood as still able to observe, and its ability to observe is explained via quantitative measurements. Is that what you are saying?

Lets not use blindsight yet, but something more basic that we can all relate to. There is a nerve that by passes a cell in your lower leg. Its constantly there sending signals, but you're not conscious of it. We can describe this quantitatively of course. But its still a part of you isn't it? Unlike a row of dominos falling (I thought the analogy was quite fine Bob :) ) I can become conscious of that nerve at that cell if I receive a cut. I can have a subjective experience of that nerve cell eventually. I can never have the subjective experience of a set of falling dominos.

So, although I understand what you are saying, I think you are conflating consciousness proper with meta-consciousness; to keep it brief, there is a difference between having introspective access to one’s qualitative experiences and simply having them. Think of a beetle, they are such a low form of life that they have 0 introspective access to their experience, but they are nevertheless experiencing (qualitatively).

Perhaps the confusion lies in that I am not referring to the ‘I’ as the ego. As a subject, I am referring to myself as a complete organism (which I hold is a mind). With physicalist terms, think of it analogous to the ego vs. oneself as a physical organism: is the ‘I’ the ego—no! It is an extension of the ‘I’. So the nerve you are referring to, and all other organic processes of my body, are mind processes (under my view): my mind is having those experiences, but ‘me’ as the ‘ego’ does not have the introspective access to all of all the time. It doesn’t come into “consciousness” when I get cut there but, rather, into the sphere of access my ego has as the tip of the iceberg.

So, I agree that there is a difference between the set of falling dominos (which you won’t ever experience) and the nerve you were talking about; but by ‘you’ I am referring to the complete organism of yourself and that nerve is a part of the experience (and manifestation of your will) of yourself as mind, where when it gets cut, in most situations, it becomes introspectively accessible.

Let’s take a more extreme example to convey my point, when I was younger I tried THC from a dab pen; however, lo and behold, it turns out it was spice (which is a much more dangerous psychotic drug that is made synthetically with harmful chemicals). Not to derail into all the details, but I’ve never had that potent and horrifying sort of experiences in my life (and I hope I never do again): at some points I thought I was dead and others I thought I was going to be. Anyways, spice is so unpredictable and in my case I got its most potent affects, and part of that was going “unconscious” but functioning perfectly fine for large lengths of time. I would just “wake up” in the middle of conversing with someone or folding my clothes to put away in my closet, having every reason to believe I had been doing all this stuff with absolutely no “conscious” experience whatsoever. Philosophim, I think you would consider this an example of being, temporarily, a PZ.

From your perspective, I think you are inclined to say that the qualitative experience was gone during those blackouts, and that I was essentially a PZ during those moments. But, to me, we are thereby conflating the ego with the true ‘I’: I was still experiencing (e.g., folding my clothes, conversing with people, watching TV, etc.) but my ‘ego’ had left the chat, so to speak. Spice had, some way or another, inhibited my higher functioning capabilities, which includes the illusory ego and its introspective access to my qualitative experience. There was still something to be like me while I was blacked out, because by “I was blacked out” I am referring to the ego while by “something to be like me” I am referring to the true self. Hopefully that makes some sense. I use that example because it is the most extreme one I can think of that would prima facie work in your favor.

Also, something that we have an unconscious embodiment of can only be known quantitatively until we can know it qualitatively. This would match with the finding here

What you are saying does fit fine with the scientific discoveries that we make decisions before our ego is aware of them—but it fits equally (if not arguably better) to say that the “unconscious embodiment” is really qualitative experience proper, and the “conscious embodiment” (you are referring to) is the ego’s introspective access thereto and, consequently, it makes sense that we should expect to identify a person making decisions before their ego is aware of them: the ego is an illusion.

In terms of the rest of your post, I think it is better if we address the objective vs. subjective consciousness distinction more deeply before revisiting the rest, because at this point I will just be countering in the same manner as before (e.g., nothing about what you have said proves the brain produces consciousness, blindsight person isn’t unconscious, etc.). Once the distinction is thoroughly analyzed, I think the hard problem will start to naturally emerge out of it. This is because I think, after hearing your view thus far, that you are holding internal incoherencies with this objective vs. subjective dynamic.

The first thing we need to discuss about it is the conceptual bridge linking the two. I think that you see the objective and subjective as two sides of the same coin, but you equally hold that the objective doesn’t prove the subjective—and these two claims are incoherent with each other.

So let me ask you: do you think we can know a being is subjectively conscious if we know they are objectively conscious?

If not, then this means science, by your own lights, cannot prove someone is subjectively conscious. What does this mean? It means that everyone who knows they are subjectively conscious has no scientific explanation of what that is.

Take yourself, for example: you know you are subjectively conscious. However, you equally hold that objectively observing yourself only gets you to the conclusion that you are objectively conscious, which doesn’t prove anything beyond you being a PZ (at a minimum). This means that no objective can explain your subjective consciousness (since it only gets you to a PZ) and thusly you cannot reduce your subjective consciousness to objective inquiry of brain states.

Now, I think you hold that the brain produces subjective consciousness, even though you equally admit that it cannot since it can only provide that someone is a PZ, because we can affect consciousness by affecting the brain (and, quite frankly, the whole body). Is this correct?

If you agree with the previous paragraph, then you can’t equally claim that objective consciousness cannot give us the understanding that something is subjectively conscious (and thusly cannot claim that objective consciousness only gets us to PZs), or if you do think it only gets us to PZs, then you can’t agree with the previous paragraph: they are incoherent with each other.

Let’s start there.

Bob

Regardless, I have the view that the law of the excluded middle and other such basic elements of reason, are not dependent on human faculties, but because we have the faculty of reason we are able to discern them. It's precisely the ability of humans to grasp such facts which constitutes reason. — Wayfarer

Indeed, nothing can be said about what exists independently of human faculties (including reason) as whatever that might be, is beyond the scope of knowledge. — Wayfarer

Do you see how your own criticisms contradict your own statements? You claimed that "laws" exist apart from human reason, then in another reply you note that nothing can be said about what exists independent of our reason. Wayferer, how is that any different from humanities conclusion that physical objects exist apart from us, and we have the reason to discern them? Isn't precisely the human ability to grasp such facts which constitute reason? According to your own answer to Janus, your point is invalid.

As for your example, it doesn't stand, as the various forms of water are known a posteriori, whereas the law of identity is known a priori i.e. independently of experience. — Wayfarer

You're not comparing equivalent examples. "Can seven not exist in terms of bananas, dollars, and cars? " would be an equivalent comparison of a posteriori.

In the case of 7=7 could I not also say H20=H20, or "real physical properties" = "real physical properties"? Since real physical properties are equal to real physical properties, this is known apriori, or independently of experience right?

Personally, I do not believe in a posteriori or a priori as a good and clear separation of knowledge claims, but I will go with your separation for now. All I ask is for you to apply your criticisms against an outside physical world to your own ideas of the mental world equivalently.

I was referring to the instinctive belief in the 'mind-independent nature' of objects, which is just what has been called into question by quantum physics, where the act of measurement determines the outcome of the observation. — Wayfarer

That doesn't argue for the mind-independent nature of objects at all though. It notes that our ability to measure, which is applying X to Y and reading the bounce back, affects the outcome. It also notes that because we cannot track the exact location of an object due to very small objects vibrations and fluctuations, we use probability with limits to guess what the particles' location and velocity is to begin with. These are all physical realities, not mind-independent realities.

I stand by the basic claim that numbers, logical principles, and the like, cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter. That reason comprises the relationship of ideas, not the relations between material entities.

In the case of 7=7 could I not also say H20=H20, or "real physical properties" = "real physical properties"? Since real physical properties are equal to real physical properties, this is known apriori, or independently of experience right? — Philosophim

Notice in all those examples, you're appealing to the law of identity. But (as per the argument in the Phaedo) you already need to have the concept or idea of 'equals' in order to make that comparison. You can say that the weight of two 500 gram apples equals the weight of one 1Kg melon, but that's because you're mathematically literate and can grasp the meaning of 'the same as' or 'equal to'. It's those intellectual operations, which we rely on for all manner of reasoned inference, which I say can't be explained in terms of matter and energy.

Indeed, nothing can be said about what exists independently of human faculties (including reason) as whatever that might be, is beyond the scope of knowledge. Regardless, I have the view that the law of the excluded middle and other such basic elements of reason, are not dependent on human faculties, but because we have the faculty of reason we are able to discern them. It's precisely the ability of humans to grasp such facts which constitutes reason. — Wayfarer

Sure, for subjective reasons you like to believe that logical laws are independent of human reason, but you don't like to believe that material objects are. It could be both; our logic is derived from generalizing from the analysis of our experience of material objects, and they are thus both independent, or not, of our experience, depending on your preference.

The bottom line is, we don't and cannot know the answer to that question and are therefore left with going with what seems most plausible, or perhaps most agreeable, to us personally. Either that or we have the option of simply suspending judgement on the matter, which is my preferred option, since I don't believe the answer to an unanswerable question can be important to human life.

That said, the fact that we face an unanswerable question is a very important fact about human life, as it explains so much about us. And how we deal with that unanswerable question, that is what it leads us to believe is also important, as it can be the source of happiness and misery on a personal level, and ideology, repression, division, hatred, enslavement, torture and many other evils on the societal level. Perhaps the world would be a much better place if everyone could suspend judgement and give up arguing and even fighting over it.

So, you are wrong to say this is just more of my subjectivism; we are all subjectivists when it comes to how we deal with this unanswerable question, and you not liking that fact ain't going to change it one iota.

Sure, for subjective reasons you like to believe that logical laws are independent of human reason, but you don't like to believe that material objects are. — Janus

My reasoning is not subjective. I take it as axiomatic that the basic laws of logic are consistent everywhere. You will find they hold as much in Indian philosophy as in Greek.

The issue with the independence of the objects of perception is another matter. I've already pointed out the issue with this statement:

Subjective consciousness creates a subjective reality. Subjective reality does not alter objective reality. — Philosophim

but I got nowhere with it. Suffice to refer to enactivism. 'Enactivism rejects the traditional dualistic view that separates subjective and objective aspects of experience. Instead, it proposes an embodied and situated perspective, where subjectivity and objectivity are intertwined and mutually constitutive.' Subjects and objects co-arise and are mutually dependent.

our logic is derived from generalizing from the analysis of our experience of material objects, — Janus

So empirical philosophers say, but the counter to that is that we would not be able to generalise or abstract without the prior existence of the rational faculty to count, compare, abstract and reason

Your reasoning is necessarily subjective. The rules of logic are objective but they are rule-based procedures which guarantee validity even in the case of the most absurd syllogisms, and they tell us nothing about the nature of things.

our logic is derived from generalizing from the analysis of our experience of material objects,
— Janus

So empirical philosophers say, but the counter to that is that we would not be able to generalise or abstract without the prior existence of the rational faculty to count, compare, abstract and reason — Wayfarer

I said it could be both (with the implication that it could be either) but you conveniently omitted that part when you quoted me, in order it seems, as usual, to attempt to dismiss my arguments by characterizing them as some form of your despised positivism.

And the counter to your counter is that without the experience of the senses and embodiment we would have nothing to count, compare, abstract and reason about, and would thus never develop those faculties.

Suffice to refer to enactivism. 'Enactivism rejects the traditional dualistic view that separates subjective and objective aspects of experience. Instead, it proposes an embodied and situated perspective, where subjectivity and objectivity are intertwined and mutually constitutive.' Subjects and objects co-arise and are mutually dependent. — Wayfarer

I think this shows a misunderstanding of enactivism and phenomenology. Remember that Husserl brackets the question of the independent reality of the objective or external world, because that question is not its concern. So, of course, within human experience subject and object arise together, but that says nothing about what the in-itself reality of what appear to us as objects, including our own bodies and brains, is. That we cannot know what this in-itself reality is, is what Kant's philosophy is all about. I know it's a difficult point to get, it requires a shift away from our ordinary thinking, so I feel for you.

Hello Janus,

A person with visual agnosia cannot report on what they have no awareness of experiencing

Correct. So why say they aren’t qualitatively experiencing? This just proves my point.

The only evidence we have of qualitative experience is our awareness of our own and the reportage of others' awareness of their own.

Correct. But that doesn’t mean that it is contingent on our awareness of our qualitative experience. For example, I only come to know that there is a chair in my room via my senses, but it does not follow that that chair only exists as my senses. Likewise, you are claiming that because we only come to know we qualitatively experience via introspection, that introspection is required to qualitatively experience: same error.

Now you can say that the body experiences the physical effects or data that enables the better than random guessing of the person with visual agnosia, in the sense that I have already outlined, but that is not subjective experience, it is equivalent in kind to saying that the stone experiences the weathering effects of the wind and rain.

What do you mean by “subjective experience”? I have a feeling you mean higher order meta-consciousness (e.g., self-reflective introspective, etc.). That isn’t consciousness proper.

No, a person qualitatively experiencing without introspective access is not equivalent to a stone experiencing nor quantitative experience.

Bob

Correct. So why say they aren’t qualitatively experiencing? This just proves my point. — Bob Ross

You obviously didn't read what I wrote above what you quoted, which was that the only way we have of knowing about qualitative experience is being aware of our own or listening to the reports of others about their own. The person with visual agnosia cannot report on any qualitive visual experience because they are not aware of any such thing, so we have no evidence to suggest that they have any qualitive visual experience.

For example, I only come to know that there is a chair in my room via my senses, but it does not follow that that chair only exists as my senses. — Bob Ross

Firstly, you are changing the subject. Qualities are necessarily not independent of subjective human experience, whereas chairs may not be. If I don't subjectively experience a chair, then there is no qualitive experience of a chair, although of course the chair may be there nonetheless. Actually, I would have thought you believed that the chair is not independent of human experience; I thought that has been the very thing you are arguing.

So again, you are not really providing any counterarguments; instead, you just keep asserting the same things over and over. You should be able to understand my argument above, and if you cannot provide any cogent counterargument then our discussion will go precisely nowhere.

What do you mean by “subjective experience”? I have a feeling you mean higher order meta-consciousness (e.g., self-reflective introspective, etc.). That isn’t consciousness proper.

No, a person qualitatively experiencing without introspective access is not equivalent to a stone experiencing nor quantitative experience. — Bob Ross

You just keep making the same unargued assertions over and over. Subjective experience, and along with that qualitative experience, may be a post hoc self-reflective rationalization and thus not a suitable descriptor of what is immediately perceived, but I am not claiming that is so, I just see it as a possibility.

The body/ brain responding to visual stimuli can be observed, even when the subject is not aware of what is affecting the body, and that is one way of speaking about what the body/ brain experiences. The body/ brain experiences many, many things in this kind of sense of which we are not aware. I see visual agnosia as being like that: the body/ brain is affected by visual stimuli but the subject is not aware of it, so for me it makes no sense to speak of qualitive experience in that context.

If you have a different definition of qualitive experience, then we are talking past one another. And if you do have a different definition, you haven't yet revealed what that definition is. For example, how would it differ from the body/ brain reacting in measurable and modelable ways, ways however of which the subject has no awareness, to visual stimuli?

Hello Janus,

You obviously didn't read what I wrote above what you quoted, which was that the only way we have of knowing about qualitative experience is being aware of our own or listening to the reports of others about their own. The person with visual agnosia cannot report on any qualitive visual experience because they are not aware of any such thing, so we have no evidence to suggest that they have any qualitive visual experience.

Yes I did:

”The only evidence we have of qualitative experience is our awareness of our own and the reportage of others' awareness of their own.” – Janus

Correct. But that doesn’t mean that it is contingent on our awareness of our qualitative experience. For example, I only come to know that there is a chair in my room via my senses, but it does not follow that that chair only exists as my senses. Likewise, you are claiming that because we only come to know we qualitatively experience via introspection, that introspection is required to qualitatively experience: same error.

Firstly, you are changing the subject. Qualities are necessarily not independent of subjective human experience, whereas chairs may not be.

I didn’t change the subject: it was an analogy. I wasn’t saying those two scenarios are equivalent.

My point was that you are conflating our epistemic access to a thing with its contingency on us for its existence (viz., that we don’t have qualitative experience since we only know we have it when we have awareness of it). That is analogous to saying that the chair of which I see (which I only know via my sense of sight) is contingent on myself (in terms of its existence) thereby—it is a conflation.

Actually, I would have thought you believed that the chair is not independent of human experience; I thought that has been the very thing you are arguing.

I would say it is mind-dependent, but not on my mind. The chair I see is not dependent on my perceiving of it—it exists as an idea on a Universal Mind.

So again, you are not really providing any counterarguments; instead, you just keep asserting the same things over and over. You should be able to understand my argument above, and if you cannot provide any cogent counterargument then our discussion will go precisely nowhere.

I think I have provided ample counterarguments here: you just skipped the most important one when responding (which I re-quoted at the beginning).

Subjective experience, and along with that qualitative experience, may be a post hoc self-reflective rationalization and thus not a suitable descriptor of what is immediately perceived, but I am not claiming that is so, I just see it as a possibility.

I never said that qualitative experience is a ‘post hoc self-reflective rationalization’. You are arguing against a straw man here. Qualitative experience is, to me, defined negatively: the non-quantitative experience which there is something it is like to be such in and of itself.

The body/ brain responding to visual stimuli can be observed, even when the subject is not aware of what is affecting the body, and that is one way of speaking about what the body/ brain experiences.

Again, you are talking about meta-consciousness. A person can have zero introspective access, as the ego, to the mental events that are occurring. I don’t see how this is a “unargued assertion”.

For example, how would it differ from the body/ brain reacting in measurable and modelable ways, ways however of which the subject has no awareness, to visual stimuli?

Under Analytic Idealism, the body/brain “reacting in measurable...ways” is an extrinsic representation of the mentality which is fundamentally occurring. So the “subject” is that organism you see as a body, but that is its outward expression on the dashboard of your experience. What you are describing is the outward expression of a qualitatively experiencing being, which is not equivalent to the ego which sometimes has introspective access to the experiences (for some animals—not even all have it).

Bob

Great post Bob! I agree with you that at this time there are a few differences of definitions, and we both have to clarify what we mean to a point where we can say we completely understand each other's viewpoints first.

However, I was using it in the sense that you were before: mere awareness (i.e., observation, identification, and action). ...In this case, there is no contradiction in terms because you can have a being which observes and has no qualitative experience. — Bob Ross

I think this was a misunderstanding of an implicit part of the definition of observation. As I defined it was always intended to be qualitative experience.

Observation is the receipt of some type of information. This could be a sense, sensation, or even a thought. Another way to look at is is "undefined experience". — Philosophim

This misunderstanding is on trying to blend our different terms together. I had used the example of a camera and an AI as an observer and identifier. The AI is the observer and identifier, the camera merely provides the information for the AI. Of course, its easy to then say the "camera" is observing. I tried to pivot to your notion of quantitative for the camera, or that we simply observe the camera follows basic set processes of filtering light. I agreed with you that a camera does not have qualitative experience, therefore it is not an observer. At that point I should have switched from "being that observes" to "an observer" to fit better within your terms. A camera quantitatively processes data, but it is not an observer. I can agree with this understanding while also using your terminology.

The point is that your objective consciousness is only this sort of quantitative experience, where “experience” is mere awareness/observation. — Bob Ross

Regardless of our opinions on what definitions to use, we cannot use the term 'quantitative experience'. This simply does not work. Objective consciousness is a quantitative analysis of consciousness. Not an experience, ie subjective viewpoint. If you note that a being can have a quantitative experience, then you are conceding that we can know what a beings subjective experience is like through objective means.

The word quantitative can only be used as an objective outside observation, not an internal one.

I think I agree: an AI is said to have no internal ‘experience’ (in the sense you are now using it) but is understood as still able to observe, and its ability to observe is explained via quantitative measurements. Is that what you are saying? — Bob Ross

No, I noted that an AI is an observer and identifies. Therefore it is subjectively conscious under my initial definition. However, we must more clearly define that this AI must have an "I" which can evaluate as well. I'll go into more detail that later. We objectively know it is conscious because we quantitatively, or by math, understand how it observes and identifies information through functions and algorithms. But do we know what its like to experience being an ai as it observes and identifies? No.

So, although I understand what you are saying, I think you are conflating consciousness proper with meta-consciousness; to keep it brief, there is a difference between having introspective access to one’s qualitative experiences and simply having them. Think of a beetle, they are such a low form of life that they have 0 introspective access to their experience, but they are nevertheless experiencing (qualitatively). — Bob Ross

I think one mistake we've talked past a bit on is what I mean by consciousness. My points are not concerned with higher levels of consciousness or meta consciousness. They really are just about whether there is an experiencing being or a mechanical process which has no experience. To ease confusion and simplify our points, meta-consciousness should not be brought up as I don't see the need for it. When considering consciousness then, we are discussing the minimally viable level to be conscious. That would be experiencing qualia, which requires an "I".

If a beetle can experience and identify, then it is conscious according to my definition. But you make a fantastic point with your example of your unfortunate experience. I have had to step back and wonder if my definition of consciousness was not detailed enough and too implicit. First, there is the question as to whether you were conscious, but you didn't remember that you were conscious. From my point of view, consciousness does not require a memory of being conscious. But does it require memory? For our discussion, I suppose it doesn't. Memory would perhaps involve higher level consciousness, but for base consciousness, no.

Of course, we then come to the other question of your experience. Is it that you didn't remember being conscious, or were you actually unconsciously doing things and no one around you knew? We can site sleep walkers who do things unconsciously and note that in every case, another person can tell they lack some type of consciousness. Still, there has to be some experience and identifying going on with sleep walking. So the question remains. Are they conscious and do not remember being conscious, or can the unconscious mind also observe and identify?

Ironically, my citation of brain scans can give us that answer. if it is the case that brain scans can detect that the unconscious mind is shaping what your conscious mind is about to do, then the answer is obvious. The unconscious mind can observe and identify. But is it itself an observer? I'll get to that soon as well.

From your perspective, I think you are inclined to say that the qualitative experience was gone during those blackouts, and that I was essentially a PZ during those moments. But, to me, we are thereby conflating the ego with the true ‘I’: I was still experiencing (e.g., folding my clothes, conversing with people, watching TV, etc.) but my ‘ego’ had left the chat, so to speak. — Bob Ross

I think this nails the issue down. In the common use of unconscious and conscious, there needs to be the "I", or ego. As I noted, when I said "observe" there's really the implicit I in that statement. So to be explicit, a conscious being is an "I" which observes and identifies. The question still remains as to whether you simply forgot your conscious experience, or if even an unconscious experience has a subjective viewpoint that we are unaware of.

So what does this change? Not much, but it does clarify. The unconscious portion of yourself would be "you", or what you are potentially able to access consciously, while the conscious part would be the ego "I" part of yourself. This would be your subjective consciousness. Where does that leave objective consciousness then? We would just expand our objective test to see by actions things that only a person with an I could do.

Now that I understand you don't divide the "I" between conscious and unconscious, I find your ideas more intriguing and understand some of the earlier points you were making. Also explicitly noting that subjective consciousness requires an I from me does make some of my earlier statements incomplete. I stated that a camera and an AI would be conscious, but no. At minimum it could be unconscious! We would need to have an AI that also would meet the standard for what an "I" is. Consciousness is a next step evaluation of unconscious processing (observing and identifying) that forms an "I".

There is a deeper question here as well. Just because "I" am not experiencing, does that mean that the subconscious has a subjective experience that we are simply unable to know? Schizophrenia is a condition in which a person can express multiple personalities. I've seen it first hand. What if Schizophrenia is a condition where certain unconscious portions of the mind which would normally stay unconscious suddenly enter into the realm of consciousness? Same with "voices" in one's head that don't seem to be one's own.

This is the natural consequence of not being able to determine what it is like for something to experience from its viewpoint. But if an unconscious mind does have a view point that our "I" is unaware of, does that change the notion of consciousness and unconsciousness? I'll need time to think on that personally. At least we both agree on something. It is impossible to know what another things subjective experience is like.

I think that you see the objective and subjective as two sides of the same coin, but you equally hold that the objective doesn’t prove the subjective—and these two claims are incoherent with each other. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify. It is not that the objective does not prove that other beings have subjective experiences. It is only that the objective cannot prove what it is like to BE that subjective experiencer. I've noted brain scans and surgery, which I understand you do not want to accept. If you cannot accept that your mind is caused by your brain, then of course we will have to agree to disagree here.

So I think we can conclude a few things from our excellent discussion.

1. You and I disagree on the definition of consciousness. I require a subjective "I". If I understand correctly, in your view the unconscious still has qualia, which I consider needing a subjective "I" to experience. In your view however the unconscious subject is still an "I" in the sense that this unconsciousness is potentially accessible to the conscious (speaking generally, I understand there are exceptions).

2. You and I disagree on whether or not the brain causes consciousness. A large part of this may be due to your definitions of qualia and consciousness. While you state you believe I have not given enough evidence to prove that the brain causes consciousness, under my terms I have. I have not seen the citations I've given be refuted in any way. Even if you note that the unconscious experiences qualia, the brain scans detecting what the unconscious is thinking about proves it still comes from the brain.
Perhaps it is true that the unconscious has a personal "I", just one that we are not privy too. I would need to look more into the study of the unconscious to make a decision here.

Since I'm not sure there's much more that can be said with these differences, I would like to explore another question. What is your reason for believing that consciousness is not caused by the brain? How will this line of thinking help society? Or is it merely that you just don't see the logical connections, and believe such conclusions are premature and prevent us from discovering the real alternative? My approach to philosophy has always been to make greater sense of the general understanding of the world. To take our common language, clarify it, and get rid of the skepticism or ambiguity that causes confusion at a deeper level. Paradigm shifts like yours seem like radical departures from the norm, and I've always wondered at the motivation for such. Obviously I am not in agreement with it, but it doesn't mean that I can't try to understand it.

This disagreement is also done in full respect Bob! Fantastic thinking was had by all sides, and I have a much better respect for your position now that I understand better the nature of your definitions and outlook. I look forward to your reply.

I stand by the basic claim that numbers, logical principles, and the like, cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter. That reason comprises the relationship of ideas, not the relations between material entities. — Wayfarer

Its fine if you wish to stand by that, but it did not counter my point which refutes that. I can respect this however. You've demonstrated your reasons, which has at least helped me to see why you have the view you do. I approach discussions not with the goal of convincing someone else to take another view point because people will believe what they want to believe. I view a discussion as challenging my own logic, and once I believe its been adequately addressed by the other person, I am satisfied.

You can say that the weight of two 500 gram apples equals the weight of one 1Kg melon, but that's because you're mathematically literate and can grasp the meaning of 'the same as' or 'equal to'. — Wayfarer

Right, but this equally applies to discussion of water as I noted earlier. My point is that the ability to identify is the same in both instances. The ability to identify in no way proves that we cannot misidentify. If the mind was independent of objects, then we would not fear misidentifying as a threat to our existence. If I misidentify water versus oxygen when I breath, I'm going to die. My mind cannot prevent that. Therefore it is a logical conclusion that there are objects independent of the mind.

It's those intellectual operations, which we rely on for all manner of reasoned inference, which I say can't be explained in terms of matter and energy. — Wayfarer

You may say this, but I've shown it is. Your brain is made up of matter and energy. Incredulity, disbelief, or the inability to comprehend something does not negate its reality. Until you can show that intellectual operations can exist apart from matter and energy, its not a valid claim.

Hello Philosophim,

I think this was a misunderstanding of an implicit part of the definition of observation. As I defined it was always intended to be qualitative experience.

Observation is the receipt of some type of information. This could be a sense, sensation, or even a thought. Another way to look at is is "undefined experience".

Oh I see: the issue I would have here is that a “sense” can be purely quantitative (unless perhaps you also define it as having to be qualitative?). For example:

The AI is the observer and identifier, the camera merely provides the information for the AI

Although, yes, the camera doesn’t identify anything, both the AI and the camera can be explained by reduction to its parts and relations of those parts, and thusly there is no qualitative experience needed to be positing to explain anything.

I think, in the case that I am right that there is no qualitative experience for the AI (and camera), you would classify it as not ‘observing’ because that word entails for you ‘qualitative experience’. However, to me, something can be interpreting its environment (which is what I mean by ‘observation’) and have no qualitative experience (i.e., ‘observation’ in your sense of the term). If I use your terms here, then I would say the AI isn’t an observer (because it isn’t qualitatively experiencing), but it does interpret and navigate its environment (regardless of the fact that it isn’t qualitatively experiencing). I think you would just have to come up with a new term for the latter if you re-define the former in that manner.

Regardless of our opinions on what definitions to use, we cannot use the term 'quantitative experience'. This simply does not work

It doesn’t work within your terms (now that I know that you mean ‘qualitative experience’ by ‘experience’), but the point is that you can have an ‘observer’ in the sense of being capable of comprehending its environment (i.e., it is ‘aware’) and yet doesn’t qualitatively experience. So, to me, you could have a ‘quantitative experiencer’ in this sense.

If you note that a being can have a quantitative experience, then you are conceding that we can know what a beings subjective experience is like through objective means.

Not quite. I am saying quantitatively experiencing beings, which I only mean by that a being which can interpret its environment, have no subjective experience because is no subject. The AI is not a subject, but it can gather, via quantitative processes, information about its environment. There is nothing to be like an AI from the AI perspective because it doesn’t have a perspective.

No, I noted that an AI is an observer and identifies.
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We objectively know it is conscious because we quantitatively, or by math, understand how it observes and identifies information through functions and algorithms. But do we know what its like to experience being an ai as it observes and identifies? No.

This goes back to the issue I was trying to get you to answer, so let me invoke your response here:

It is not that the objective does not prove that other beings have subjective experiences. It is only that the objective cannot prove what it is like to BE that subjective experiencer.

If the objective analysis of consciousness is only barred from knowing what it is like to be conscious as opposed to knowing that one is conscious, then I disagree with your distinction (between the objective and subjective analysis).

To go back to the other quote above, just because we can understand that a think can observe and identify information in a quantitative sense does not mean that they are a subject—that they have qualitative experience. This is equally barred from objective inquiry in the sense that I am understanding you to be talking about.

In other words, objective inquiry can tell me that the AI can receive and interpret information about its environment, but that says nothing about whether there even is something to be like it (as opposed to merely not knowing what it is like), because that says equally nothing about whether the being has qualitative experience. To prove that, I would have to be able to conceptually explain how the quantitative processes of the AI produce a stream of qualitative experiences.

But do we know what its like to experience being an ai as it observes and identifies? No.

You are assuming that there is something it is like to experience as an AI, because you are equally assuming that the AI is a subject proper.

I think one mistake we've talked past a bit on is what I mean by consciousness. My points are not concerned with higher levels of consciousness or meta consciousness.

That is fair, but I think here and there you conflate the two when countering my points—that’s the only reason I bring it up. I am not saying that consciousness proper is something which we have introspective access to as the ego, nor that it is the ego itself. I think sometimes you have been implicitly arguing against a view like that instead of mine (inadvertently).

They really are just about whether there is an experiencing being or a mechanical process which has no experience.

So in the sense of ‘experience’ that you are using here, I would say that the AI is a mechanical process which has no experience. However, it can interpret and navigate its environment nonetheless—and this isn’t incoherent with your definitions as you have set them up thus far.

To ease confusion and simplify our points, meta-consciousness should not be brought up as I don't see the need for it. When considering consciousness then, we are discussing the minimally viable level to be conscious. That would be experiencing qualia, which requires an "I".

Fair enough.

First, there is the question as to whether you were conscious, but you didn't remember that you were conscious. From my point of view, consciousness does not require a memory of being conscious. But does it require memory? For our discussion, I suppose it doesn't. Memory would perhaps involve higher level consciousness, but for base consciousness, no

It is always possible that I just don’t remember, but I do remember the areas where I was “awake” as the ego, so I doubt it.

I agree that consciousness proper does not require memory.

Is it that you didn't remember being conscious, or were you actually unconsciously doing things and no one around you knew?

I think I genuinely just, as the ego, didn’t have access to my conscious experience. I am pretty sure I wasn’t perfectly functioning (e.g., some slurred or delayed speech, etc.), but I was functioning enough to converse and do chores (like fold clothes). I was definitely impaired, and I would imagine people could guess I was; but the point is that, from my perspective as the ego, I had no introspective access to the qualitative experience.

Are they conscious and do not remember being conscious, or can the unconscious mind also observe and identify?

Ironically, my citation of brain scans can give us that answer. if it is the case that brain scans can detect that the unconscious mind is shaping what your conscious mind is about to do, then the answer is obvious.

The problem I have with this is that the brain scans can equally explain my position: the mind’s activity is expressed within perception as neural firings in the brain (and other indicators throughout the body): the body is the extrinsic representation of the mind. So, I don’t see how brain scans here exclusively pertain to your view that it is an unconscious mind shaping a conscious mind.

I think this nails the issue down. In the common use of unconscious and conscious, there needs to be the "I", or ego

To me, the ‘I’ and ‘ego’ are different. As long as there is an I, then it is consciousness—the ego doesn’t have to be there.

So to be explicit, a conscious being is an "I" which observes and identifies.

Then an AI isn’t conscious because it isn’t an “I”. Of course it mimicks what an ‘I’ does, but it is just mechanical processes with no true subject.

The question still remains as to whether you simply forgot your conscious experience, or if even an unconscious experience has a subjective viewpoint that we are unaware of.

I would say that the best explanation is neither of those: ‘i’ as the ego, as a higher function of consciousness, was inhibited by the drug and the ‘I’ was still there. ‘I’ was still conscious, but the ‘i’ was unconscious (if you will).

There is a deeper question here as well. Just because "I" am not experiencing, does that mean that the subconscious has a subjective experience that we are simply unable to know?

To me, the subconscious and unconscious are really different degrees of consciousness proper.

You and I disagree on the definition of consciousness. I require a subjective "I". If I understand correctly, in your view the unconscious still has qualia, which I consider needing a subjective "I" to experience.

No, I agree that consciousness requires a subject, I am saying that the ‘I’ is not the ego and the body is an extrinsic representation of mind operations of that ‘I’.

The ‘I’ isn’t unconscious.

In your view however the unconscious subject is still an "I" in the sense that this unconsciousness is potentially accessible to the conscious (speaking generally, I understand there are exceptions).

Sort of. I would say that the ‘I’ is conscious and the ‘conscious’ aspects you are referring to are higher order aspects of consciousness (such as meta-consciousness: introspection and cognitive self-reflection: the ego). That is why I keep bringing up meta-consciousness, because I do think, in this quote, you are using the term ‘conscious’ to refer to ego-contingent introspective awareness, which is to conflate meta-consciousness with the consciouness proper that you claimed you were meaning by that term.

Even if you note that the unconscious experiences qualia, the brain scans detecting what the unconscious is thinking about proves it still comes from the brain.

Again, brain scans equally prove my theory just as much as yours. It doesn’t exclusively prove that the brain, as a mind-independent ‘thing’, produces the mind.

If our perceptions are representations of ideas and those ideas are from minds, then we should expect to see neural activity corresponding to that mental activity from the side of our perceptions (which would include our use of brain scans). We should expect that our bodies are extrinsic representations of our minds in short.

What is your reason for believing that consciousness is not caused by the brain?

Because one can never reduce one’s qualitative experience to the quantitative, which I outlined here:

The form is as follows: “consciousness is [set of biological functions] because [set of biological functions] impacts consciousness [in this set of manners]”. That is the form of argumentation that a reductive naturalist methodology can afford and, upon close examination, there is a conceptual gap between consciousness being impacted in said manners and the set of biological functions (responsible for such impact) producing consciousness

Because it isn’t reducible and granted a full enumeration of all possible metaphysical theories (i.e., physicalism, idealism, substance dualism, and property dualism), it is less parsimonious, in short, to posit the brain as producing mind as it is to account for the world as mind-dependent (within a universal mind). In short, idealism accounts for the world better than physicalism (and the other theories.

How will this line of thinking help society?

I think it helps the same way as any other view: it attempts to give the best explanation of what reality fundamentally is. It can be useful to have a metaphysical theory in one’s back pocket (although, admittedly, some people live just fine without it).

I think it also helps us get past the dogmatic physicalist slumber we have been in for a while (ever since the age of enlightenment). And now we explore non-dogmatically consciousness as, at least, a possible candidate of the fundamental structure of reality.

Or is it merely that you just don't see the logical connections, and believe such conclusions are premature and prevent us from discovering the real alternative?

This is true as well in a sense: most people nowadays just consider consciousness an aftermath of the real world, of which can be thusly easily passed over as not so important; but there is a lot we don’t understand, of which I think we scientifically could investigate just not in the traditional methods, about it: a copernican revolution awaits us.

My approach to philosophy has always been to make greater sense of the general understanding of the world. To take our common language, clarify it, and get rid of the skepticism or ambiguity that causes confusion at a deeper level.

My approach is similar, but less emphasis on conforming to societies norms and language. I try to keep it simple, but I do not fear venturing out if I need to to get at the truth.

Paradigm shifts like yours seem like radical departures from the norm, and I've always wondered at the motivation for such

To be honest, I think idealism could be just as intuitive to people as physicalism in a different society. I think that whichever becomes predominent, the other view is thereby way harder for the masses to comprehend because they can’t step out of their own metaphysical commitments to tackle the other metaphysical theory in its own terms. For me, I know that it took me a long time to take idealism seriously.

The motivation is to give the best general account of reality while increasing explanatory power and decreasing complexity. That’s pretty much it. I just think it accounts for the world in which we live better.

This disagreement is also done in full respect Bob! Fantastic thinking was had by all sides, and I have a much better respect for your position now that I understand better the nature of your definitions and outlook.

As always: same goes to you my friend! I always enjoy our conversations.

Bob

it did not counter my point which refutes that. — Philosophim

You did not refute it.

I've shown it — Philosophim

You did not show it.

Your arguments are idiosyncratic and you quote no sources.

I stand by the basic claim that numbers, logical principles, and the like, cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter. — Wayfarer

Saying this unironically, in the process of posting on the Internet, is hard to fathom from my perspective.

Do you think that computers do not deal with numbers and apply logical principles, or do you think that the processes occurring in computers cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter, or...?

Heh, ok Wayfarer. I know when I have or haven't countered something and I admit I'm wrong or mistaken rather often. Truth is more important to me then "winning". Believe it wasn't countered if you want, but it most certainly was.

If you want to go into detail explaining why my point didn't counter yours, feel free, I'll re-engage. Until then, no worry, I'll catch you in another thread.

Do you think that computers do not deal with numbers and apply logical principles, or do you think that the processes occurring in computers cannot be explained in terms of the interactions of matter, or...? — wonderer1

It's part of a larger argument, that I've tried to develop here and elsewhere.

First, as regards computers, I think their capacities can be explained solely in terms of the physical sciences, but then, they're human artefacts. Humans invented them to perform tasks, and they do that extraordinarily well, mainly through the miracle of miniturisation which has allowed billions of transistors to be accomodated on a chip the size of a fingernail. No argument that they're not physical, but then, they are not beings. They're devices that can now emulate, among other things, some aspects human intelligence (and indeed I am now using ChatGPT on a daily basis). The reason they exist is because we imbue them with some aspects of our own intelligence, and interpret their output by the same means.

The larger argument is that logic comprises solely the relationship of ideas, and cannot be reduced to the physical. Here I am drawing on the argument from reason. The argument from reason challenges naturalism, which is the belief that all phenomena, including human thoughts and reasoning, can be explained solely in terms of natural, physical processes (such as physical interactions). According to this argument, if naturalism were true, reasoning can be explained in terms of neurochemistry, on the basis of material or efficient causation. And it this is true, reason could be described as the output of physical processes, devoid of purpose or intentionality. But the very ability to reason and to engage in rational discourse presupposes the existence of intentionality and purpose, and the ability to grasp abstractions (such as if...then). Reasoning involves judgement, making logical inferences, and seeking truth. If our thoughts were simply the result of physical causation, they would lack the ability to genuinely apprehend truth or to be rationally justified. (I think this is why Daniel Dennett continually teases the idea of humans as moist robots.)

Arguments of this kind have been pursued by Christian apologists such as C S Lewis and Alvin Plantinga, however, I have no interest in using them for any theistic reason, only to show how materialism itself undercuts something essential about the nature of reason. A similar line of argument is found in Thomas Nagel's essay, Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, which argues in a similar vein about ascribing the faculty of reason solely to evolutionary biology:

The only form that genuine reasoning can take consists in seeing the validity of the arguments, in virtue of what they say. As soon as one tries to step outside of such thoughts* one loses contact with their true content. And one cannot be outside and inside them at the same time: If one thinks in logic, one cannot simultaneously regard those thoughts as mere psychological dispositions, however caused or however biologically grounded. If one decides that some of one's psychological dispositions are, as a contingent matter of fact, reliable methods of reaching the truth (as one may with perception, for example), then in doing so one must rely on other thoughts that one actually thinks, without regarding them as mere dispositions. One cannot embed all one's reasoning in a psychological theory, including the reasonings that have led to that psychological theory. The epistemological buck must stop somewhere. By this I mean not that there must be some premises that are forever unrevisable but, rather, that in any process of reasoning or argument there must be some thoughts that one simply thinks from the inside--rather than thinking of them as biologically programmed dispositions. — Thomas Nagel

*'Stepping outside' them means seeking to explain them in other terms, e.g. as the products of evolutionary adaptation or the result of neurochemical interactions.