But Plotinus is not introducing a personal God to witness the activities. We get with the program because we understand our situation, or we do not.

Your interpretation is at odds with the text, though, and every interpretation of the meaning of the Allegory of the Cave that I've read. — Wayfarer

My interpretation is in line with both the text and well known and well regarded interpretations of it.

So the education in question, is the education necessary to overcome their attachment to the illusory domain and to perceive the real (i.e. be closer to 'what is'): — Wayfarer

Quoting from the text:

... an image of our nature in its education and want of education ... (Republic 514a)

The nature of the education of the cave dwellers, that is, our education, is that:

... such men would hold that the truth is nothing other than the shadows of artificial things. (515c)

What is wanting is an education in the truth.

“Then, dear Glaucon,” ...

Note that in the middle of this passage you quote Socrates says of the story:

A god doubtless knows if it happens to be true.

A god would know if it happens to be true, but Socrates does not. And we do not.

Once seen, it is reckoned to be the actual cause of all that is beautiful and right in everything ... — Wayfarer

But this is not something that Socrates has seen and not something that we have seen. For us it too is an image, a story about something we have no experience of.

Anyone who is to act intelligently, either in private or in public, must have had sight of this.

And so, based on our education and want of education we do not have the knowledge to act intelligently. Such knowledge cannot be given to us by this or any other story.

“I also hold the same views that you hold,” he said, “after my own fashion, anyway.”

Glaucon makes the same mistake that you do. He holds a view about something he has not seen. He takes an image to be the truth.

I think 'the realm known by reason' — Wayfarer

If we follow the divided line this in not the realm known by reason. The realm is not known by reason (dianoia) but by nous. It is the realm of what is seen by the mind, not something known by reason. Not something that can be taught. Not something we have seen and not something we know to be true.

Added: I don't know which translation you are citing but the Bloom translation does not say "the realm known by reason".

Your interpretation is at odds with the text, though, and every interpretation of the meaning of the Allegory of the Cave that I've read. In the allegory 'prisoners' represent those ignorant of the forms:

For in the first place, do you think such people [i.e. the prisoners in the cave] would ever have seen anything of themselves, or one another, apart from the shadows cast by the fire onto the cave wall in front of them? — Wayfarer

That quoted passage says nothing about the "forms".

The translation is this https://www.platonicfoundation.org/republic/republic-book-7/

Quoting from the text:

... an image of our nature in its education and want of education ... (Republic 514a)

The nature of the education of the cave dwellers, that is, our education, is that:

... such men would hold that the truth is nothing other than the shadows of artificial things. (515c)

What is wanting is an education in the truth. — Fooloso4

Quoting selectively from the text. Those 'dwelling in the cave' only know the appearances (shadows on the wall), and the 'education in the truth' is described in the following:

“Now,” I said, “consider what liberation from their bonds, and cure of their ignorance, would be like for them, if it happened naturally in the following way. Suppose one of them were released, and suddenly compelled to stand up, crane his neck, walk, and look up towards the light. Would he not be pained by all this, and on account of the brightness be unable to see the objects whose shadows he previously beheld? And if someone were to tell him that he beheld foolishness before, but now he sees more truly, since he is much closer to ‘what is’, and is turned towards things which partake of more being, what do you think he would say?"

This is in reference to those who have 'ascended from the cave', and seen the true light of the good, compared here with the Sun

Again, what is the meaning of 'things which partake of more being'? What does it mean to be 'much closer to what is?'

A god would know if it happens to be true, but Socrates does not. — Fooloso4

But he says immediately afterward:

When it comes to knowledge, the form of the good is seen last, and is seen only through effort. Once seen, it is reckoned to be the actual cause of all that is beautiful and right in everything, bringing to birth light, and the lord of light, in the visible realm, and providing truth and reason in the realm known by reason, where it is lord. Anyone who is to act intelligently, either in private or in public, must have had sight of this.”

There is no suggestion that this is something he himself hasn't seen.

That quoted passage says nothing about the "forms". — Janus

'When it comes to knowledge, the form of the good is seen last, and is seen only through effort.'

But Plotinus is not introducing a personal God to witness the activities. — Paine

Of course not, but there are echoes of his doctrines in Christianity, due to the considerable influence of platonism on later Christian theology (for better or worse). I read recently that it's possible that Plotinus and Origen (one of the Church Fathers) were both disciples of the same teacher.

Your interpretation is at odds with the text, though, and every interpretation of the meaning of the Allegory of the Cave that I've read. In the allegory 'prisoners' represent those ignorant of the forms: — Wayfarer

That quoted passage says nothing about the "forms".
— Janus

'When it comes to knowledge, the form of the good is seen last, and is seen only through effort.' — Wayfarer

I was referring to the passage you presented as a rebuttal of this

The escape from the cave is an escape from the bonds of our education, an escape from the images of the truth. Replacing an image with another image, one of a transcendent realm of Forms, is not to escape the cave, but to remain bound within it. — Fooloso4

which I quoted.

Of course not, but there are echoes of his doctrines in Christianity, due to the considerable influence of platonism on later Christian theology (for better or worse). — Wayfarer

Yes, and Augustine said Plotinus was a better Platonist than Plato was in the City of God. But that sense of what is a natural good was still separated from the grace that only God could bestow upon a believer.

Perhaps. But I don't know if the 'form of the Good' could be described in terms we would now call naturalistic although I agree there's nothing corresponding to 'divine grace' in Plato's dialogues.

At best, with respect to phenomena, it can only be said that the priority in the mind is the antecedent conceptual conditions by which they are possible, which is the deduction of the pure conceptions, better known as the categories. — Mww

I do not agree with your interpretation of Kant here. The categories are produced by judgement, and I think that Kant does not properly characterize judgement. This is where the issues of his system are evident, and Kant runs into problems. I think you and I have discussed the nature of judgement before.

The conditions for sensibility, phenomena, are the pure intuitions of space and time. And "intuition" is not well defined by Kant. It is not even implied that intuition is necessarily within the mind. But these pure intuitions are necessarily prior to phenomena. But the categories are created, or discovered as a means for judging phenomena. They are not necessarily prior to phenomena, as Kant described them as conforming to the appearance of phenomena. Nor are the categories properly called "intuitions" because they are already judgements of some sort, and judgement is posterior to intuition. But then he seems to want to assert that such tools of judging phenomena are prior to phenomena, though he formulates his categories as conforming to phenomena.

'universals are not thoughts, though when known they are the objects of thoughts.' ~ Bertrand Russell — Wayfarer

As an "object" of thought, we can ask where that object exists. Thinking occurs within the mind, and we can conclude that the object of thinking, the goal or end, is within the mind as well, as directing the thought. Other objects of thought must exist within as well.

The problem with Plato's analogy, comparing the good with the sun, and the intelligible object with the visible object, is that the sun and visible object are external to the mind. This may create the impression that the good and the intelligible object are external to the mind as well. I believe the proper interpretation of the analogy is to compare the internal "realm" of thinking, mind, and intellect, with the external "realm" of sensation. This places the good, the intellect, and the intelligible object as internal to the mind.

However, since there is ambiguity as to how the intelligible object, and the intelligible realm are to be understood, there is also ambiguity as to the proper location of "the good". Accordingly, Aristotle distinguished between the apparent good, and the real good. This distinction is commonly used, and misused in Christianity. It is often proposed that the real good is the external good, as supported by God, and the internal good is the apparent good. However, God cannot support the real good, as demonstrated by the Euthyphro problem. And it becomes evident from the problems of the immoral human being knowing what is good (as external good), yet acting in a contrary way (guided by the internal good), that the real good must be the internal good. This is "the good" which motivates the actions of a human being, therefore it is the real good, and the external good, the one supposedly supported by God is the apparent good, as other external objects are only appearances of objects as well.

What does it mean to be 'much closer to what is?' — Wayfarer

I think that is best interpreted as temporal priority, "what is", is the present, therefore what is meant is closer to the present. The shadows are the effect, therefore in the past. If you come to apprehend the causal role of the internal, then a vast realm of "inner space" with its own mode of relations, distinct from external relations, will be revealed to you. The temporal order, which is supported in some degree with science by the concept of spatial expansion, is from the inside outward. The future, with all its related features lies within the internal realm which the human mind partakes of in a very limited degree. The internal (future) manifests at the present in an outward process and this is what gives the internal intelligible objects causal capacity.

I do not agree with your interpretation of Kant here. — Metaphysician Undercover

Be that as it may…..I mean, you pretty much disagree with everybody…..it is clear that priority in the mind, as such, cannot be phenomena.

The point I wish to make is that the tension between the natural order and the truth of religion that occupied the Scholastic philosophers did not exist for Plotinus.

This disconnect is a separate one from the issue Gerson opines upon. The difference between Plotinus and Aristotle regarding matter undercuts Gerson's attempt to group their views as sharing a common view of the order of nature. Much of the Ennead's arguments are oppositions to Aristotle, sometimes expressed specifically as such but more often by citing as incorrect descriptions that resemble Aristotle's positions.

While Plotinus has positions that do not agree with Plato, he does not discuss those as differences. To the best of my knowledge, Plotinus always knows what Plato really meant.

Those 'dwelling in the cave' only know the appearances — Wayfarer

Those dwelling in the cave are just like us:

... you should compare our nature, in respect of education and lack of education, to a condition such as the following.

When Glaucon says how strange this image is Socrates replies:
They are just like us ...[/quote]

and the 'education in the truth' is described in the following — Wayfarer

This does not describe our education, the education of the dwellers:

“Now,” I said, “consider what liberation from their bonds, and cure of their ignorance, would be like for them, if it happened naturally in the following way. Suppose one of them were released, and suddenly compelled to stand up, crane his neck, walk, and look up towards the light.

How can the bonds that keep the prisoners from turning around release "naturally"?

A bit further on:

“And,” I said, “if someone were to drag him forcibly from there ...

If this someone forces a prisoner out of the prison then it does not occur naturally.

There is no suggestion that this is something he himself hasn't seen. — Wayfarer

In that case he would not say:

God knows whether it happens to be true, but in any case this is how it all seems to me.

It would not be how it seems to him, he would know that it is true. He would have divine knowledge rather than the human knowledge he professes. He would have the cure for his ignorance.

The point I wish to make is that the tension between the natural order and the truth of religion that occupied the Scholastic philosophers did not exist for Plotinus. — Paine

Good point. It's interesting, though, that in Eastern Christianity the nature/grace and reason/faith distinctions are not as stark as they are in the West. There does not seem to have been as much of a focus on Pelagianism in the East, and Augustine does not occupy such a central role.

This was a very interesting passage from Plotinus. Thanks for sharing.

Be that as it may…..I mean, you pretty much disagree with everybody…..it is clear that priority in the mind, as such, cannot be phenomena. — Mww

Sure, I might not be very agreeable, but if you read Stanford's article on a priori justification, you'll see that there are many problems with Kant\s system. So it's not just me.

The problem I have with the idea of a priori judgements, is that if the justification comes from within the mind, this just produces an infinite regress, as each a priori judgement would require an a priori justification, which would be an a priori judgement requiring a further a priori justification, and there would be no substance upon which all these justifications would be supported, just an implied infinite regress.

What Kant does do though, is grounds, or substantiate the a priori in intuition. However, this removes "intuition" from the mind, making it prior to the mind, as the basis for the a priori judgements within the mind. But intuition is also the necessary condition for phenomena. Therefore he provides no real principles which would place a priori judgements as prior to phenomena in the mind. In reality, he just uses "intuition" in an ambiguous, obscure way, to hide the problems with his proposed system.

Have it your way.

My pleasure.

Is there a philosopher (or more than one) from the Orthodox side you see as a counterpoint to the western Scholastics?

Perhaps another way to ask that is, was there a parallel equivalent of the Renaissance on the other side of the Schism?

Is there a philosopher (or more than one) from the Orthodox side you see as a counterpoint to the western Scholastics? — Paine

There is an interesting book by Martin Laird that grew out of his dissertation. It is called Gregory of Nyssa and the Grasp of Faith. I think it strikes a counterpoint to Augustine, and to my knowledge it is characteristic of the Cappadocian Fathers as a whole (Basil, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory of Nazianzus).

Perhaps another way to ask that is, was there a parallel equivalent of the Renaissance on the other side of the Schism? — Paine

There very much was. The Palamite or Hesychast controversy took place the 14th century and began with the disagreement between Gregory Palamas and Barlaam of Calabria. Barlaam was one of many renaissance thinkers in the East who were hearkening back to Greek philosophy and learning, and encouraging a more syncretistic approach.

A common Eastern narrative would say that the West accepted the renaissance of Greek and Aristotelian thinking in the medieval period whereas the East rejected it, and this deepened the schism. I think that is simplistic, but there is some truth to it.

Much to consider in your comments. I will try to get up to speed.

The irony here is that although with the image of the cave Plato is warning against the persuasive power of images he does so using images. And this is often taken to be not an image but the truth itself. — Fooloso4

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