What is a philosophical zombie?

Against the conceivability of p-zombines? I don't think you can argue against conceiving such a thing. The only arguments against p-zombies would have to be practical, because anyone can think of anything. In practical matters, I think it's safe to say we know nowhere near enough to be able to build such a thing. We don't understand how nematodes (small worm) turns to one side instead of another side. If we have trouble understanding why a worm moves to one side, how can we possibly build a p-zombie?

However, if someone thinks that AI will one day teach us about intelligence, or even that an AI will be smarter than a human being, then there's no argument to be had, I think.

Finally, we might do better in studying people who sleepwalk, which is something that actually happens and seems to resemble zombie behavior.

Conceiving of philosophical zombies appears to require it being obvious that we are each two things instead of one.

Sorry for bumping an older thread but this thought experiment presumes the thinker is not a zombie.

i dunno, one sees alot of them wandering around in Chico, particularly since the city started bussing more homeless in so it could get larger federal grants. Perhaps I meet too many of them as it is to give you a good answer :D

To be physically identical to a conscious person is to be a conscious person. "P-zombie" is, therefore, an incoherent concept (e.g. "identical to a triangle but without one angle"); and, on that basis, renders thought-experiments deploying the "p-zombie" counterfactual in order to promote mind-body duality or "the hard problem" also incoherent (and "panpsychism" nothing but a (compositional fallacy) solution in search of a problem).

It only has to be metaphysically possible, (as opposed to physically possible) to do the work it's intended to do. It clearly is.

'The explanatory gap' is a scientific problem rather than a metaphysical aporia. Concepts and interpretations of their presuppositions or implications are concerns of metaphysics and not matters of fact. But even if I concede the point (for discussion's sake), the "p-zombie" construct remains incoherent: to be a concept metaphysically identical to the concept of a conscious person is to be a concept that is indistinguishable from the concept of a conscious person.

The explanatory gap' is a scientific problem rather than a metaphysical aporia. Concepts and interpretations of their presuppositions or implications are concerns of metaphysics and not matters of fact. — 180 Proof

Chalmers acknowledges that science has the challenge of explaining consciousness. That's kind of the whole point of the hard problem.

Philosophy of mind isn't trying to take over that role. It's more about what doors should be opened or closed as science proceeds.

But even if I concede the point (for discussion's sake), the "p-zombie" construct remains incoherent: to be a concept metaphysically identical to the concept of a conscious person is to be a concept that is indistinguishable from the concept of a conscious person. — 180 Proof

It's just a person who experiences no qualia. That's pretty much the view of people like Dennett.

It's just a person who experiences no qualia. — frank

"A person who experiences no qualia" is not what is meant by a conscious person.

"A person who experiences no qualia" is not what is meant by a conscious person. — 180 Proof

You're including qualia as part of the meaning of "conscious." That's a common usage, but we can also distinguish between functional consciousness, like the ability to respond to light or sound, and the accompanying awareness in the form of visual and audio images.

Think about voice recognition software. It's performing functions of consciousness, but without any awareness. It can use "green" appropriately, but it doesn't have the experience of seeing green.

How about if we dive into details. P-zombies are about consciousness but that's not the whole story is it? We have two tiers of consciousness:

1. External awareness

and

2. Internal awareness (self-awareness)

It maybe hard to prove that a being physically identical to me, isn't "conscious" (1) but I sure can say that this being may not be self-aware (2). Heck, even I am not always, completely self-aware. In short we're ourselves q-zombies (lacking self-aware consciousness) for at least two-thirds of the time we're awake. Variations in that value (self-awareness index) will exist, separating the, how shall I put it?, truly conscious (1 & 2) and "unconscious" q-zombie (1 only).

Could there be something nonphysical about self-awareness? :chin:

Say something more about what 1 and 2 are.

Say something more about what 1 and 2 are. — Daemon

I'm afraid I'll need a mind upgrade which, at present, I can't afford for that!

That’s disappointing. Why are you here then?

Wittgenstein, vide beetle-in-a-box.

My understanding is that a p-zombie, despite not having subjective experience/being conscious, would act exactly like a person who does have subjective experience/is conscious. Behaving as though they feel pain, and see red, and hear music, instead of simple, or even extremely complex, stimulus and response. Though there is not something it is like to be one from its point of view, because it has no point of view, it behaves exactly like someone who does have a pov, and for whom there is something it is like to be.

I do not find the idea conceivable. No more than a square circle. Yeah, I can say the words “square circle.” But that doesn’t mean I can actually picture one. Nor can I picture a p-zombie. I do not believe our consciousness is a result of nothing but the laws of physics, and we just haven’t figured out the equations yet, or spotted the neuronal activity responsible. I’m leaning toward panpsychism. But even if it’s not that, something else is happening. And without that something else, why would a thing that looks like us, and has all the physical we have, act as though it has that something else? Why would it say the things it would have to say to make us think it was conscious if it was not?

We can give a robot equipment to detect all the things we detect with our senses, and to act in different ways when it detects different things. But it would not say it has subjective experience, is conscious, and behave in ways that would convince us. We would have to give it programming in addition to what it already has in order for it to say those things and behave in those ways.

Why would a p-zombie say those things and behave in those ways? It would need something else to actually be conscious, or to say those things and behave in those ways despite [/i]not[/i] being conscious.

OTOH, if physicalism is the explanation for our consciousness, and we simply haven’t figured out the math or spotted the neuronal activity responsible, then, again, p-zombies could not exist. Because there is nothing that could be missing from their entirely-physical existence that would make them less conscious than we are.

Hopefully explaining my thinking clearly enough.

:up: More or less my own objection to the "p-zombie" construct.

I do not find the idea conceivable. — Patterner

I agree with you, and would have said exactly the same, although I've recently come to understand it from a different perspective. In practical terms, I don't expect that such an artificial being could currently exist, but it's not a logical impossibility. The point of it is that, should there be a being entity which seems to have a subjective inner existence, but is just an exquisitely-tuned organic-looking robot, that could respond to questions like 'how do you feel?' with plausible answers, there would be no empirical way to ascertain whether it really was a subject of experience. The point being that the nature of subjectivity is not something that can be empirically ascertained.

Strong argument against the conceivability of p-zombies?

How can there be one, when successful arguments affirming such conception have been given?

Strong argument against the empirical reality of one, and recognizing it as such…..that may be inconceivable..

I’m leaning toward panpsychism. But even if it’s not that, something else is happening. And without that something else, why would a thing that looks like us, and has all the physical we have, act as though it has that something else? Why would it say the things it would have to say to make us think it was conscious if it was not? — Patterner

Do you believe the 'something else' affects behaviour in a way that disagrees with predictions from physics? If so, why haven't scientists noticed any discrepancies?

If not, the p-zombie would 'say the things it would have to say to make us think it was conscious' because ... physics. It would cry and laugh and complain about pain just like we do, and our first impression would be that it must be lying, pretending, acting. But no. We would be misinterpreting everything it did and said. Things wouldn't mean the same inside to the p-zombie.

By the way, I think it is better to try to conceive of a whole separate universe of p-zombies, instead of one walking among us. I also think it is better not to consider an exact copy: that leads to unnecessary distractions and confusions. So try to conceive of a universe with exactly the same physical laws as ours, and similar enough to have an Earth with humans like us on it, including scientists and philosophers. However, it is an Earth peopled with strangers, forging its own future. Must this universe contain your 'something else'?

As I said, “My understanding is…” In our universe, I don’t see the possibility of p-zombies, regardless of the nature of consciousness, in the same way I don’t see the possibility of square circles. But if we are supposed to be imagining universes that operate under different principles, then sure, I guess there could be p-zombies, and there could be square circles.

So try to conceive of a universe with exactly the same physical laws as ours, and similar enough to have an Earth with humans like us on it, — GrahamJ

I think this must be drawing a distinction between the 'laws' and the 'stuff' a universe is made of? In order for there to be any relevant difference, given that conscious humans are just pieces of universe, earth.

If not, the p-zombie would 'say the things it would have to say to make us think it was conscious' because ... physics. — GrahamJ

It would have to master semantics and syntax, among other things. How do you derive them from physics?

I wouldn't put it like that. I see it as a thought experiment which can clarify how much science someone accepts. It hasn't worked with @Patterner yet. @Wayfarer seems dubious about the science.

Usually, physicalists don't accept p-zombies whereas others do. Usually the arguments go the way Sean Carroll describes in section Passive Mentalism and Zombies in his essay Consciousness and the Laws of Physics in https://philarchive.org/rec/CARCAT-33 . This essay was a reply to the panpyschist Philip Goff.

Human bodies sometimes say things like "I'm conscious". Presumably your body has said or written that kind of thing at some point. There are casual reasons why your body might say or write such a thing.

If philosophical zombies are possible, that basically means that the reason for you saying or writing "I'm conscious" has nothing to do with the fact that you really are conscious. The fact that your body is saying it, and it's also simultaneously true, is a complete coincidence.

The anti-zombie stance is, I'm saying I'm conscious precisely because I am conscious. My consciousness is directly connected to the casual chain that causes my body to say or write "I'm conscious"

I don't think that's clear at all

Wayfarer seems dubious about the science. — GrahamJ

Pardon me - what science am I dubious about? "Because....physics" is not much to go on.

'...physics' was short for physics, chemistry, abiogenesis, biology, evolution, and so on. There are scientific theories of how language developed in hominids. Perhaps we don't have the right one yet, but I'm sure one exists.

So you mean ‘physicalism’. That’s a different thing to physics.