The explanatory gap' is a scientific problem rather than a metaphysical aporia. Concepts and interpretations of their presuppositions or implications are concerns of metaphysics and not matters of fact. — 180 Proof
But even if I concede the point (for discussion's sake), the "p-zombie" construct remains incoherent: to be a concept metaphysically identical to the concept of a conscious person is to be a concept that is indistinguishable from the concept of a conscious person. — 180 Proof
"A person who experiences no qualia" is not what is meant by a conscious person. — 180 Proof
Say something more about what 1 and 2 are. — Daemon
I do not find the idea conceivable. — Patterner
I’m leaning toward panpsychism. But even if it’s not that, something else is happening. And without that something else, why would a thing that looks like us, and has all the physical we have, act as though it has that something else? Why would it say the things it would have to say to make us think it was conscious if it was not? — Patterner
So try to conceive of a universe with exactly the same physical laws as ours, and similar enough to have an Earth with humans like us on it, — GrahamJ
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