To be a horse is to be an equine animal only because we use the word "horse" to refer to equine animals. — Michael

No, you're mixing up the meaning with the word being used.

This is wrong; the meaning of 'X' is determined by how we use 'X', but what it means to be X is not. What it means to be X is what allows you to identify X. Consider this scenario; you are out in the country by yourself and you see a horse. How do you know it is a horse? Because you know what it means to be a horse, but that is not merely a matter of knowing how we use 'X' in the sense of following a rule, it is also a matter of being able to recognize the situations in which it is appropriate to use 'X', and that recognition is partly at least pre-linguistic and thus cannot be exhaustively given by knowledge of rules of language use alone.

What it means to be a horse consists in a set of perceptible physical characteristics, not in language games. So your argument really is making no point at all, other than that common nouns are just common nouns, and could in principle be interchanged with one another. This is a trivial point insofar as the interchanging of common nouns can have no significant effect on the state of the world.

This is true (to an extent -- it has to do with the speech community, not just you), but names are different from common nouns. — The Great Whatever

It doesn't matter if the name starts with a capital or a small letter or if it refers to an individual or to a group. The logic is the same.

No. Horses were horses, because they had certain characteristics, long before any such word existed.

You seem to think that I'm saying that this animal belongs to the group of equine animals iff we call it "horse". That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that equine animals belong to the group "horse" because we use the word "horse" to name the group of equine animals.

No, you're mixing up the meaning with the word being used. — Marchesk

Tell me where this is wrong: we used the word "gay" to refer to the light-hearted and carefree, and so at that time the sentence "to be gay is to be light-hearted and carefree" was true; we now use the word "gay" to refer to the homosexual, and so at this time the sentence "to be gay is to be homosexual" is true.

What it means to be a horse consists in a set of perceptible physical characteristics, not in language games. — John

And why are those the characteristics that are what it means to be a horse? Because we use the word "horse" to name things which have those characteristics.

So as I said, to be a horse is to be an equine animal (to have those set of perceptible physical characteristics) because we use the word "horse" to refer to equine animals (those that have that set of perceptible physical characteristics).

So your argument really is making no point at all, other than that common nouns are just common nouns, and could in principle be interchanged with one another. This is a trivial point insofar as the interchanging of common nouns can have no significant effect on the state of the world.

It was never meant to be anything but trivial. It was a simple remark that The Great Whatever then latched onto and claimed to be absurd/ridiculous/incoherent/nonsense. I've just being trying very hard to point out the simplicity of it.

If "P" means "man" then The Great Whatever is a P.

Yes, it's trivial. But I'm not the one who's then claiming "but the Great Whatever isn't a letter of the alphabet, so what you're saying is idiotic!".

It doesn't matter if the name starts with a capital or a small letter or if it refers to an individual or to a group. The logic is the same. — Michael

Of course it matters. Proper names and common nouns are different sorts of words, and the latter are property-denoting while the former aren't. Although I should say even with that said, the way you formulated it is not quite right: you are a Michael only because you are called 'Michael;' but even if you were called 'Andrew,' you would still be Michael, viz. since you are Michael, you would still be yourself even if you were called something different.

You seem to think that I'm saying that this animal belongs to the group of equine animals iff we call it "horse". That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that equine animals belong to the group "horse" because we use the word "horse" to name the group of equine animals. — Michael

You said that to be a horse consists of having certain qualities only because we use the word 'horse' in a certain way:

To be a horse is to be an equine animal only because we use the word "horse" to refer to equine animals.

Yet there were horses before there were any words at all, and they were still horses in virtue of having those exact same qualities. So you're wrong. Our use of words has no effect on which things are horses. It is not as if what words we use to label animals affects what sorts of animals they are; they were already horses before we called them anything.

Or again, I will put this argument to you, which you still have not addressed:

(1) "Horse" means "equine animal."
(2) Equine animals were equine animals before we called them "horse."
(3) Therefore, equine animals were horses before we called them "horse."

Please explain to me what is wrong with this argument, and do not ignore it again. (2) is clearly true, but to say (2) just is to say (3), since "horse" and "equine animal" are synonyms. Yet you are inconsistent in affirming (2) yet denying (3).

You seem to think that I'm saying that this animal belongs to the group of equine animals iff we call it "horse". That's not what I'm saying. I'm saying that equine animals belong to the group "horse" because we use the word "horse" to name the group of equine animals. — Michael

Another way of putting this: to belong to the group of horses just is to belong to the group of equine animals: these are the very same thing. So you cannot say, on the one hand, that an animal is not an equine animal simply because we call it "horse," but on the other, say that it is a horse simply because we call it "horse." This is a contradiction.

Or again, I will put this argument to you, which you still have not addressed:

(1) "Horse" means "equine animal."
(2) Equine animals were equine animals before we called them "horse."
(3) Therefore, equine animals were horses before we called them "horse."

Please explain to me what is wrong iwth this argument, and do not ignore it again. — The Great Whatever

There's nothing wrong with this argument. It just doesn't address what I'm saying. I'll paraphrase what I said to John:

If "P" means "man" and if you are a man then you are a P.

So if "horse" means "rabbit" and if Thumper is a rabbit then Thumper is a horse.

The problem you're having is that you're interpreting the conclusion of the second sentence as "Thumper is the sort of animal that we race in the Grand National" (which is of course false), but that's like interpreting the conclusion of the first sentence as "you are a letter" (which is of course false).

Your interpretation is wrong, and your criticism depends on this interpretation. Therefore your criticism is against a straw man.

There's nothing wrong with this argument. It just doesn't address what I'm saying. I'll paraphrase what I said to John: — Michael

It addresses what you are saying because you have repeatedly denied the conclusion of the argument. So now are you saying you accept it? If there were horses before we called them "horse," it cannot be, as you have claimed, that certain kinds of creatures are horses only because we use the word "horse" in a certain way, since those sorts of creatures were already horses prior to this use. You cannot maintain this conclusion and accept the argument.

So if "horse" means "rabbit" and if Thumper is a rabbit then Thumper is a horse. — Michael

No, this is not true; If "horse" means "rabbit," then Thumper is a rabbit that is the appropriate referent of the word "horse." That does not make him a horse. Thumper is a rabbit, and not a horse -- hopefully we can agree on this much. Now, changing what he was called would not make him a horse -- rather, he would still be a rabbit. The fact that "horse" now means "rabbit" means that he can be called "horse" as well as "rabbit" -- but that does not make him a horse. He is still only a rabbit.

The problem you're having is that you're interpreting the conclusion of the second sentence as "Thumper is the sort of animal that we race in the Grand National", but that's like interpreting the conclusion of the first sentence as "you are a letter". — Michael

If he is a horse, then he must be such an animal, because to be that sort of animal and to be a horse are the very same thing. You cannot have one and not the other.

If "P" means "man" and if you are a man then you are a P.

What's wrong with this?

It's false, is what is wrong with it. If "P" means man and you are a man, then you are a man, and you can be called "P." It does not make you a P. For example, if the word "pig" meant "man," I would not thereby become a pig. I would still be a man, although I could be called "pig," since "pig" would mean "man."

A pig is a certain sort of animal, and I would not become that sort of animal just because I could now be called "pig." To become a pig and to become that sort of animal are the very same thing; and since obviously the latter would not happen, neither would the former. I would simply stay a man, and not be a pig, although a new word, which used to refer to pigs alone, would now refer to men as well, and so I could be called by that word, too. You seem to think this would make me a pig; but it would not, since I would be a man, and not a pig.

I'm done with this discussion. Clearly you can't see simple reasoning. You're just engaging in equivocation and so straw men interpretations.

Michael, given that a pig is a certain sort of animal, explain to me how I can become a pig without becoming that sort of animal. You seem to think I could become a pig, without changing into an animal; that is, that I could become a pig, without becoming a pig.

Again, being called a "pig" does not make you a pig; being a certain sort of animal makes you a pig. To be that sort of animal, and to be a pig, are the very same thing.

If "P" means "man" and if you are a man then you are a P.

What's wrong with this? — Michael

For anyone interested in this topic still, this argument is a textbook case of a simple use-mention error:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Use–mention_distinction

Michael,

It seems to me everybody in this thread, including you, agree on 90% of the basic underlying assumptions regarding the conventional element in meaning attributions to words of language. Much of the difficulty comes from your using "is" as a word that signals an implicit stipulation about linguistic meaning (i.e. a copula, as in A is the referent of "B") rather than identity.

For instance, you take the two following sentence to mean the same thing:

(1) If "horse" was used to refer to rabbits, then rabbits would be properly called "horses"
(2) If "horse" was used to refer to rabbits, then rabbits would be horses.

The trouble is that you alone are interpreting the meaning of the consequent in the second counterfactual conditional (i.e. "rabbits would be horses") to be interpreted according to the use that is stipulated in the antecedent (i.e. '"horse" was used to refer to rabbits'). The trouble is that everybody else in this thread understand (correctly, in my view) the words "rabbits" and "horses" to have their ordinary (actual) meanings as used in the consequent of (2), and the phrase "would be" to signify identity rather than meaning stipulation. There indeed can't be any meaning stipulation there since there is no mention of the words "rabbits" or "horses".

Rather, in the consequent: "then rabbits would be horses", all the words are being used. And your interpretation of them as being used in accordance with the stipulation that figures in the antecedent of the counterfactual conditional makes nonsense of most ordinary counterfactual conditional statements.

So, almost all of the disagreement in this thread stems from your using the verb "to be", and your interpreting the consequent clauses in counterfactual statements, in non-standard ways. So, you are right that many of your claims are being misinterpreted, but you have some responsibility for that, and you equally often misinterpret their claims for the very same reasons.

The trouble is that you alone are interpreting the meaning of the consequent in the second counterfactual conditional (i.e. "rabbits would be horses") to be interpreted according to the use that is stipulated in the antecedent (i.e. '"horse" was used to refer to rabbits'). The trouble is that everybody else in this thread understand (correctly, in my view) the words "rabbits" and "horses" to have their ordinary (actual) meanings as used in the consequent of (2), and the phrase "would be" to signify identity rather than meaning stipulation. — Pierre-Normand

Yes, I'm aware that this is going on, and have tried to point this out. But contrary to what you say here, it is in fact wrong to understand the word "horse" according to its current meaning rather than according to its stipulated meaning in the antecedent.

Consider the example I have already offered: If "P" means "man" and if The Great Whatever is a man then The Great Whatever is a P. This is a valid argument. To read "is a P" according to the current meaning of "P" – "is the letter 'P'" – and so therefore reject the conclusion because The Great Whatever isn't the letter P is to equivocate. For the purpose of the argument "P" must be understood according to the stipulated definition in the antecedent, and so to be a P must be understood as to be a man.

Yes, Pierre-Normand this hinges on a use-mention error on Michael's part. He is under the impression that a counterfactual claim about a word has consequences for the meaning of the word as it exists in the language now, when he tries to use, rather than mention, it. So he is moving from mention to use, and the argument is invalid -- everyone else sees this but he does not, and I expect this is because of his erroneous philosophical prejudices, something to the effect of 'For any predicate P, P means 'appropriate referent of 'P',' which it does not.

Consider the example I have already offered: If "P" means "man" and if The Great Whatever is a man then The Great Whatever is a P. This is a valid argument. — Michael

For reference, here is the invalid argument that hinges on a use-mention error.

He is under the impression that a counterfactual claim about a word has consequences for the meaning of the word as it exists in the language now — The Great Whatever

No I don't. This is a straw man.

If you do not make that assumption, the argument is invalid. As it stands the argument you continue to present as valid is clearly invalid, and so there must be some prejudice that leads you to think that it is valid. From the discourse it seems to be that you think the use rather than mention of 'P' in a consequent of a conditional must be interpreted according to the linguistic usage you have stipulated, rather than the language as it exists now; but this is nonsensical, since you are using English as it exists now, by definition. Whether you have stipulated that in some other hypothetical language that 'P' means something else does not matter, since you are not, and cannot be, speaking that language, since it doesn't exist. You can make claims about that hypothetical language counterfactually, such as 'In that language, 'TGW is a P' would be a true statement,' which would be true, but you cannot move from this to say, 'In that scenario, TGW would be a P.' For example, I would clearly not be a pig, but still a man.

For reference, here is the invalid argument that hinges on a use-mention error. — The Great Whatever

Not it's not. The use-mention error is when you say "'X' is the same as X" and so claim something like "rabbits are made up of seven letters".

What I'm doing is asserting the synthetic proposition that if "bachelor" means "unmarried man" then to be a bachelor is to be an unmarried man.

Whether you have stipulated that in some other hypothetical language that 'P' means something else does not matter, since you are not, and cannot be, speaking that language, since it doesn't exist. — The Great Whatever

This is simply wrong. I can use any kind of language I like; be it current English, current French, archaic English, or a stipulated pseudo-English where the word "horse" means "rabbit". You interpreting the conclusion according to its meaning in current English and so rejecting it is equivocation.

This conditional is true, but only because 'bachelor' actually means 'unmarried man.' It does not transfer over to the 'horse'-'rabbit' case. In fact, to be a bachelor is to be an unmarried man regardless of what the words 'bachelor' and 'unmarried man' mean; this is clear from the fact that even if there were no such words, bachelors would still be unmarried men, by definition.

No, you cannot, since we are speaking English. If you want to make up a new language and present an argument in that language, fine, but it would then have nothing to do with the issue we are discussing here. And obviously switching languages mid-argument, even mid-sentence, is equivocation.

No, you cannot, since we are speaking English. If you want to make up a new language and present an argument in that language, fine, but it would then have nothing to do with the issue we are discussing here. And obviously switching languages mid-argument, even mid-sentence, is equivocation. — The Great Whatever

I haven't switched languages. The entire argument is presented in the constructed language where "horse" means "rabbit". Your reading of the conclusion in English proper is the equivocation. When I conclude that rabbits are horses I am not saying that rabbits are one of two extant subspecies of Equus ferus. This reading of it, and so the subsequent rejection, is misplaced.

When I engage in symbolic logic and say "All As are Bs" you can't reject this by saying "we're speaking English, and in English the letters A and B are different".

I haven't switched languages. The entire argument is presented in the constructed language where "horse" means "rabbit". Your reading of the conclusion in English proper is the equivocation. When I conclude that rabbits are horses I am not saying that rabbits are one of two extant subspecies of Equus ferus. This reading of it, and so the subsequent rejection, is misplaced. — Michael

If the whole argument is in a constructed language (which you've never said before, I think because you didn't intend this to be the case), then what relevance does it have to us here? If we're all supposed to speak a different language temporarily, all you've said is that rabbits are rabbits, which means none of your linguistically-motivated arguments go through, since for them to be interesting, they would have to be expressed to us in English as we use it now. It is precisely this attempt that would make the conclusions non-trivial, and this is why you have not said before now that the whole thing is supposed to be in a made-up language.

And it is not equivocation not to use a made-up language rather than English, that's ridiculous, since you've never stipulated until right now that the whole argument isn't in English but in a made-up language. Equivocation happens only within a language with respect to different interpretations of the same symbols.

If your whole case depends on switching what language we're arguing in temporarily, then what is the point of any of this? You're not saying anything substantial about the way words work, and your original point is not made.

When I engage in symbolic logic and say "All As are Bs" you can't reject this by saying "we're speaking English, and in English the letters A and B are different". — Michael

"A" and "B" in this case are variables, which is a different thing entirely.

If the whole argument is in a constructed language (which you've never said before, I think because you didn't intend this to be the case), then what relevance does it have to us here? If we're all supposed to speak a different language temporarily, all you've said is that rabbits are rabbits, which means none of your linguistically-motivated arguments go through, since for them to be interesting, they would have to be expressed to us in English as we use it now. It is precisely this attempt that would make the conclusions non-trivial, and this is why you have not said before now that the whole thing is supposed to be in a made-up language.

And it is not equivocation not to use a made-up language rather than English, that's ridiculous, since you've never stipulated until right now that the whole argument isn't in English but in a made-up language. Equivocation happens only within a language with respect to different interpretations of the same symbols.

If your whole case depends on switching what language we're arguing in temporarily, then what is the point of any of this? You're not saying anything substantial about the way words work, and your original point is not made. — The Great Whatever

The premise explicitly tells you that the word "horse" is to be understood in a novel way. How much more apparent do I need to make it?

"A" and "B" in this case are variables, which is a different thing entirely.

It's no different. Whether "A" or "horse" we're using a string of symbols to denote something else.

The premise explicitly tells you that the word "horse" is to be understood in a novel way. How much more apparent do I need to make it? — Michael

Is that premise made in English or made-up-English? If the former, then you are wrong that the whole argument is in a pseudo-language, and as I said before only the consequent is. You are therefore switching languages mid-argument, which is equivocation, and so the argument fails.

If the latter, then the 'if' clause is superfluous, since if the language as you present it already has 'horse' and 'rabbit' being equal in meaning, then there is no need to stipulate conditionally that they are. You could simply say, ''horse' means 'rabbit''. But then, if you translate the argument back into regular English, it will not work, because your conclusion will be translated as 'rabbits are rabbits,' which is not what you intended to say.

If the latter, then the 'if' case is superfluous, since if the language as you present it already has 'horse' and 'rabbit' being equal in meaning, then there is no need to stipulate conditionally that they are. You could simply say, ''horse' means 'rabbit''. But then, if you translate the argument back into regular English, it will not work, because your conclusion will be translated as 'rabbits are rabbits,' which is not what you intended to say. — The Great Whatever

What I intend to say is that in those languages where "X" means "Y" the sentence "X is Y" is true. In those language where "bachelor" means "unmarried man" the sentence "bachelors are unmarried men" is true. In those languages where "gay" means "light-hearted and carefree" the sentence "gay people are light-hearted and carefree" is true. In those languages where "horse" means "rabbit" the sentence "horses are rabbits" is true.

What I intend to say is that in those languages where "X" means "Y" the sentence "X is Y" is true. — Michael

This is true. But it does not mean that X is Y, which is where the claim becomes substantive. And it undermines your original point, which was that what it means e.g. to be a horse depends on how people use the word, which is false.