A Case for Moral Subjectivism

Bob Ross

With all the threads I have made pertaining to metaethics, I have settled on a metaethical theory called 'moral subjectivism', and this is a defense of that theory. Any critiques or contentions are more than welcome!

Introduction

This essay makes its case for moral subjectivism; that is, that moral judgments are (1) truth-apt, (2) some are true, and (3) they express something subjective. It outlines a positive case for the falsity of moral realism from an ontological is-ought gap argument and demonstrates the plausibility of moral subjectivism by providing positive cases for each prong of its thesis. Thereafter, it contends with common objections to moral subjectivism and sheds some rational light on the position.

Prerequisites to Metaethics

Before deriving the nature of moral properties and decipher the implications thereof, it is equally, if not more, important to clarify and outline the important aspects of its discussion (so as to efficiently work towards obtaining answers). The metaethical discourse around and about moral properties is such that it requires two main preliminary considerations: (1) a theory of truth and (2) a theory of ‘moral’ predication—both being theories which one imports into the metaethical dialogue and does not extract it therefrom. The former being a theory about what ‘truth’ is, what the properties of ‘trueness’ and ‘falseness’ entail or imply, and what ‘facticity’ is; and the latter being a theory about what ‘moral’ language predicated to a subject (in a sentence) is supposed to express (fundamentally). Without carefully outlining both of these, it is nearly impossible to discuss any metaethical topics (such as moral realism vs. anti-realism, or moral cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism).

Brief Exposition of a Correspondence Theory of Truth
Within this essay, for intents and purposes of later metaethical considerations, a correspondence theory of truth is presupposed: ‘truth’ is the ‘correspondence/agreement of thought with reality’, such that:

"falsity is the assertion that that which is is not or that that which is not is and truth is the assertion that that which is is and that that which is not is not" – (Metaphysics, Gamma 7, p. 107)

‘trueness’ is the property ascribed to statements of which what they allege of (refer to about) reality correspond/agree with reality with respect to that specific regard; and ‘falseness’ is when the statement’s referent disagrees (or does not correspond) properly with reality. ‘Objectivity’ is ‘state-of-affairs which exist mind(stance)-independently’ and ‘subjectivity’ is the 'states-of-affairs which exist mind(stance)-dependently' (where by 'state-of-affair' it is meant any 'arrangement' of existent entities in reality, which is not limited to spatial or temporal relations). Likewise, a ‘fact’ is a ‘statement which is true’ or, more precisely, ‘a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality’.
I will not linger on these points, although there is much one could contend with or discuss, because the dispute about this section is out of the scope of metaethics, and so any disagreement, albeit indirectly relevant to metaethics, is not a matter or concern hereof.

Brief Exposition of the Meaning of Moral Language
‘Moral’ language, according to my theory, signifies ‘what one should find permissible, omissible, or obligatory’, whereof, most notably, they are normative statements (judgments) that are subject-referencing—it is not enough for a statement to be normative to be moral but, rather, it must convey, at least in principle, something which is binding to the subject (at-hand).
A ‘moral fact’, then, is a subject-referencing normative statement which corresponds to reality such that there mind(stance)-independently exists the alleged (normative) content of the claim. In other words, the moral statement corresponds to a state-of-affairs in reality such that what the statement purports about reality (i.e., those states-of-affairs) actually is the case. E.g., if ‘one ought not torture babies for fun’ is a moral fact, then there is a state-of-affairs, which exists mind(stance)-independently, in reality such that one ought not torture babies for fun.

A Case for Moral Anti-realism

The first major discussion about moral judgments is whether or not they are factual, and thusly whether or not they are ‘real’ (where ‘real’ is simply defined as something factual): hence moral realism vs. anti-realism. Anti-realism is standardly defined negatively as ‘not moral realism’, and moral realism is a three pronged thesis (at a minimum):
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something objective [moral objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].

The rejection of any of the aforesaid prongs of the moral realism thesis lands one in anti-realist territory: denying only prong-1 entails a form of moral non-cognitivism, prong-2 a form of moral subjectivism, and prong-3 a form of moral nihilism (aka: error theory). This essay will contend with prong-2 by providing an ‘ontological is-ought gap’ argument against it.

Ontological Is-Ought Gap

The argument against prong-2 is as follows:

P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.
C: Therefore, moral facts cannot exist.

P1 affirms a subtle and fairly intuitive notion that whatever the state-of-affairs are in reality (i.e., in the totality of existence) it simply does not inform us how they should be—what should be the case is despite what is the case. However, if moral facts exist, then they are exactly that: states-of-affairs that inform us of how reality should be—which entails that what should be the case is not despite what is the case. Therefore, P1 precludes the existence of moral facts as defined in P2. If moral facts cannot exist, then it is impossible for any true moral judgments, if they exist, to be expressing something objective and, thusly, prong-2 of the moral realist’s thesis is denied if the above argument is affirmed. It seems as though the moral realist must deny P1 to salvage moral facticity (from this argument), but this seems like an incredibly expensive maneuver: if states-of-affairs about reality can inform us how it ought to be, then it appears as though the question “it is the case, but should it be the case?” is not a universally valid question (which seems very implausible). Likewise, when one is presented with such a state-of-affairs that ground, objectively, a moral fact-of-the-matter called, let’s say, M, they cannot, if P1 is false, validly ask “it is the case that M, but should it be the case that M?”. However, this seems like a legitimate question: just because it is the case that there is such a state-of-affairs that (allegedly) grounds a moral fact, it does not seem to follow that it should be that way or that another state-of-affairs would not have been better. Nevertheless, this is the bullet a moral realist must bite: some state-of-affairs are simply what should be, and they cannot be questioned further about what they should be themselves.

Objections: Answered
There are various objections a moral realist can make that are worth noting. One could, as mentioned before, bite the bullet and deny P1; one could deny the underlying theory of truth required for P2 and adopt an alternative theory (e.g., pragmatist account, coherentism, deflationary account, etc.); or one could deny what is sometimes called the ‘direction-of-fit’ with respect to the statement and reality such that it is reversed: if, in P2, a moral fact has a ‘world-to-statement’ ‘direction-of-fit’, then, at least in principle, they are not statements about reality but rather exist as informants of reality. The first objection has already been addressed and the second is out of the scope of this essay, but the third is worth addressing further. By ‘direction-of-fit’ of a fact, it is meant as a specifier of the direction by which one should correspond the statement and reality. There are two options: a ‘reality-to-statement’ or ‘statement-to-reality’ direction-of-fit: the former implies that one attempts, in order to decipher the truth, to ‘fit’ (or correspond) reality with the statement (such that a state-of-affairs in reality makes the statement true) and the latter implies an attempt at ‘fitting’ the statement with reality (such that the statement is true if it agrees with a state-of-affairs in reality but isn’t immediately made true by a state-of-affairs). An example of the former is a human desire: if one desires X, then it is true that they desire X and this is made true solely because of the state-of-affairs responsible for generating a desire for X—there is no matching of the statement ‘I desire X’ with reality but, rather it is just true in virtue of its own creation; whereas an example of the latter is ‘I ran today 5 miles’: that statement is true iff there was a state-of-affairs in the past (today) which contained one running 5 miles—there is a matching of the statement with reality, and the statement is not true in virtue of some process(es). The moral realist, who takes this route, will say that moral judgments are like the former and not the latter, and P2 is assuming the latter. To this, I deny the validity of a ‘reality-to-statement’ direction-of-fit for anything: every proposition is true iff that statement corresponds to a state-of-affairs in reality and, as such, is made true only by matching with reality and never by some virtue of its own creation. Consequently, ‘I desire X’ is true iff I actually desire X: it is not true in virtue of me stating or thinking it. There is simply no such thing as a fact of which its truthity is sui generis.
Another worthy objection, albeit a misapprehension, is that this is an argument from Hume’s is-ought gap and, consequently, objections are directed towards this argument by proxy of objections raised to Hume’s, or some neo-Humian’s, is-ought gap argument. It is imperative that the reader understands that Hume’s Guillotine is an epistemic argument which does not negate the possibility of moral facts but, rather, notes that one cannot validly, in logical form, derive an prescriptive statement from an indicative statement; whereas the argument set out hereon is far bolder, being a ontological argument, that contends with the notion of a moral facts being impossible in virtue of normativity and objectivity being two different ontological categories.
The last noteworthy objection is a misunderstanding stemming from the term ‘reality’ and ‘states-of-affairs’: some moral non-naturalists will agree with my argument and merely add that it does not contend with their moral realist theories because they identify moral properties with supersensible, supernatural, or non-natural properties—thusly, they have no problem admitting that the way reality is never entails how it should be. However, this misunderstands the deployment of the terms ‘reality’ and ‘states-of-affairs’ in this argument: it is not referencing nature, the universe, or the world but, rather, the ‘totality of existence’—and ‘states-of-affairs’ is not referencing mere temporal nor spatiotemporal ‘states’ within reality but, rather, is any ‘arrangement’ of existent entities within reality. Consequently, for example, theistic and platonistic moral realist positions are not exempt from this argument.

A Case for Moral Subjectivism

Moral subjectivism is a three pronged thesis, which is equivalent to the moral realist’s thesis with the denial of prong-2:

1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].

Each of these prongs must be defended, but, before that, a preliminary look into the view is in due.

Within moral subjectivism, the moral judgment is a belief which is the upshot of one’s psychology and it is proposition which is indexical—e.g., ‘I believe one ought not torture babies for fun’ is a moral judgment, and the belief about the belief attempts to determine the truth of the claim: either I believe one ought not to torture babies for fun or I don’t. In this manner, the proposition itself is not purporting that the moral judgment is about something factual in reality beyond one’s psychology and, thusly, is not a moral fact: the belief that ‘one ought not torture babies for fun’ is the expression of one’s psychological state such that one disapproves of ‘torturing babies for fun’. Within this metaethical theory, it is technically invalid, unless it be a short-hand, to claim that ‘one ought not torture babies for fun’ is cognitive, true, and a moral judgment because this is a factual statement which does not reference one’s psychology: instead, it would have to be (technically) rewritten as ‘I believe one ought not torture babies for fun’. Now on to the defense of the thesis.

A Case for Moral Cognitivism [Prong-1]
Moral cognitivism is the metaethical position that moral judgments are truth-apt (i.e., propositional), and moral non-cognitivism is its counter-part. The argument that will be presented for moral cognitivism is from logical validity and intelligibility:

P1: If moral non-cognitivism is true, then ‘If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi’ is not a logically valid and intelligible conditional statement.

P2: ‘If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi’ is a logically valid and intelligible conditional statement.

C: Therefore, moral non-cognitivism is false.

If moral non-cognitivism is true, then moral judgments are not truth-apt; and if they are not truth-apt, then they cannot be used as propositions in logic. Consequently, it is perfectly unintelligible and invalid, under moral non-cognitivism, to place a moral judgment as an antecedent in an if conditional because the moral judgment lacks the capacity to be true or false. However, hypotheticals which contain moral judgments are perfectly intelligible, such as ‘If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi’, and, therefore, moral non-cognitivism must be false (and cognitivism true).

A Case for True Moral Judgments [Prong-3]
For there to be true moral judgments, is just to say that we have good reasons to believe that some of the truth-apt (cognitive) moral judgments we have are true and thusly binding. The argument that will be presented for the existence of true moral judgments is from implicit action:

P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to ‘lie down and starve to death’.

P2: People do not ‘lie down and starve to death’.

C: Therefore, some moral judgments must be true.

Since ‘moral’ language signifies ‘what one considers permissible, omissible, or obligatory’, it follows that any action a person commits implicitly concedes some moral truth. For example, if one makes themselves a sandwich and eats it, then they have, at the very least, implicitly conceded that they find it morally permissible or omissible to do so. If they find that all subject-referencing normative statements are false, then they cannot perform any actions, since none of them are permissible, omissible, or obligatory—which leads no room for any decisive action. They would have to essentially ‘lie down and starve to death’ if all moral judgments are false.

A Case for Moral Non-objectivism [Prong-2]
If moral judgments are truth-apt (prong-1) and some of them have to be true (prong-3), then in virtue of what makes them true? It cannot be something grounded in a fact (or facts), because we demonstrated (previously) that prong-2 of moral realism is false; so true moral judgments must be non-factual beliefs which are the upshot of one’s psychology:

P1: If there are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective, then they must be an expression of something subjective.

P2: There are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective.

C: Therefore, true moral judgments must be an expression of something subjective.

Either something is an expression of something objective (and in virtue of that at least a candidate of being factual) or it is subjective; therefore, if prong-2 of moral realism is false and there are true moral judgments, then they must be beliefs of which are the upshot of one’s psychology.

Objections: Answered
Various objections have been raised to moral subjectivism, and it is worth noting and contending with the major ones.
The first common objection is that common language utilizes truth-apt moral judgments as if they are expressions of something objective, and so, all else being equal, moral subjectivism seems false. I merely contend that, upon what has been stated hereon, it should be clear that if prong-2 of moral realism is false but prong-1 and prong-3 are true, then this is going to land one in moral subjectivist territory which will supersede any superficial linguistic interpretations of morality that conflict with it. For moral subjectivists, they are not expressing something objective when stating ‘one ought not torture babies for fun’ because it is colloquial short-hand for ‘I believe one ought not torture babies for fun [and that is an upshot of my psychology]’. If a moral subjectivist is deploying those sort of moral judgments as if they express something objective, then they simply aren’t moral subjectivists (or they are confused).
The second common objection is that enforcing preferences (i.e., non-factual moral judgments) is unfair, wrong, and impermissible. I note two counter points: firstly, ‘unfairness’, ‘wrongness’, and ‘impermissibility’ are morally loaded terms and as such beg the question (for if ‘wrongness’ itself is tied to subjectivity, then it is perfectly unintelligible to imply it is objectively wrong to impose preferences on each other), and, secondly, moral realists typically don’t even consistently nor coherently abide by such a principle (for the truth is that it is impossible to not impose some preferences on each other). With regards to the first, if the person is objecting with some sort of morally factual consideration, then I contest its existence in the first place; and if they are noting a preference they have, then they are defeating their own contention. With regards to the second, it is uncontroversial, even among moral realists, in axiology, as opposed to morality, that imposition of tastes is (1) necessary and (2) perfectly fair. For example, I always give the moral realist who is having a hard time agreeing with enforcing (some) preferences, in principle, on other people this scenario to demonstrate a point: imagine that I want to torture a baby for fun. Now, imagine that you (the moral realist I am discussing with) find me right before the act of torturing the baby and try to stop me. First, you say “Stop! You shouldn’t torture babies for fun!”. I say “Why?”. You say “Because it is a moral fact that you shouldn’t torture babies for fun!”. I say “that’s true, but I don’t care about the moral facts.”. Now we have not a dispute about morals but about values, and how are you going to justify and impose your valuing of the moral facts themselves on me without either (1) applying circular reasoning by invoking a moral fact or (2) just imposing your preference that people should care about the moral facts on me in virtue of you simply having that preference? I propose and suggest that you (the moral realist I am discussing with) will, at least implicitly in action, shove your valuing of the moral facts down my throat in this scenario and force me not to torture the baby, even though there is nothing irrational with accepting the truth of a moral judgment as factual while denying any worth to it; and, consequently, you will implicitly concede that it is permissible, at least with regards to certain preferences, to impose them on other people. I merely transfer the same thinking to morals as we both do to axiology: I impose moral judgments that I care enough about to warrant enforcing them, no different than how you (that moral realist) care enough about moral facticity to impose that preference on other people.
The third most common objection is that there is no moral disagreement if moral subjectivism is true, and this seems implausible. If ‘I believe one ought not torture babies’ is a moral judgment which expresses something subjective, then it appears as though one person can affirm this proposition (validly) and another disaffirm it (validly): so what disagreement could possibly be had if there is no fact-of-the-matter to dispute? I contend that this is an invalid importation of a moral realist’s metaethical framework, of which is baked-into, implicitly, the concept of ‘disagreement’. There is still disagreement in morals even if moral judgments express something subjective and it is useful to have moral conversations: it just doesn’t quite look the same under a moral subjectivist’s metaethical framework—the concept of ‘disagreement’ looks different. When one affirms ‘one ought not do X’ and someone else disaffirms it, then they can engage in a fruitful moral discussion thereof which looks something like the following:

1. One can try and tease out false beliefs that the other has about themselves. The other person may say “I don’t believe that I ought not do X” but, under moral subjectivism (being that moral judgments are cognitive beliefs which are the upshot of one’s psyche), that doesn’t thereby make it true (even relative to themselves). Most people are really bad at psycho-analysis, and if one can tease out to the other person that they actually do believe that ‘one ought not do X’, then they have succeeded in their own goal of enforcing that preference.

2. One can latch onto higher prioritized moral beliefs that the other person has, and show that accepting that higher-prioritized hypothetical imperative logically or plausibly entails that ‘one ought not do X’. The other person may initially be against being obligated not to do X, but if one can get that person to agree to another hypothetical imperative and show that person that it is logically inconsistent or otherwise incoherent with that person’s denial of the contended hypothetical imperative [that one ought not do X], then that person is forced to choose or reject both. Most likely, since the former is higher prioritized, that person will flip their position on the latter and one has succeed in their own goal of enforcing that preference.

3. One could dispute the supplemental non-moral facts. It could be that both people agree about the underlying moral judgments that one is using to commit themselves to ‘I ought not do X’ but that the supplementing non-moral fact is disputed. This aspect of the conversation follows the normal realist discussion that a moral realist wants for moral judgments (just with respect to non-moral judgments), since there is a fact-of-the-matter about the non-moral facts.

4. If 1-3 don’t work, then one may try other nuanced tactics, but, for brevity, I will not include them here.

5. The last resort, for moral realists and anti-realists alike, is violence.

For the moral realist to view moral subjectivist moral discussion as essential ‘throw your hands up in the air’ is clearly a straw man of the position.
The final objection worth noting is one from sociology implications: if people were to behave as though moral judgments express something subjective, then this is worse for society than if they thought it expressed something objective. Firstly, I disclaim that this in no way contends with the truth of the matter about moral subjectivism: it is entirely possible for the position to be true and it to harm society. Secondly, I would contend that we already axiologically, which is more fundamental with respect to society than morality, behave this way. Everyone imposes there preferences to some extent on society, and axiology is commonly accepted as subjective. When someone says that they think society should operate such that ‘one ought to tell the truth’, this is a moral fact, and that they care so much about moral facts that they are prepared to shove it down peoples’ throats, no one bats an eye; but if someone says ‘one ought to tell the truth’ because they care so much about telling the truth, there is an uproar. Thusly, the dangers of moral subjectivism on society is merely in its misapplication and misapprehension and is not inherent to the position itself.

Mww

↪Bob Ross

I always kinda figured you’d end up here.

Bob Ross

↪Mww

:grin:

Where is your head at these days? I would presume a Kantian with respect to ethics as well, so probably upholding his maxim of universalizability as an objective moral principle?

Mww

↪Bob Ross

Oh, I been in the back of the room, keeping my head down, taking notes.

A Kantian with respect to moral subjectivism I’ll admit. Ethics is more than that, I think.

Objective moral principle is like world peace. One can wish for it, visualize it, even figure out how to do it, but understands even if he does it, there’s precious little reason to expect anybody else to follow suit.

Bob Ross

↪Mww

Oh, I been in the back of the room, keeping my head down, taking notes.

:lol:

A Kantian with respect to moral subjectivism I’ll admit. Ethics is more than that, I think.

Objective moral principle is like world peace. One can wish for it, visualize it, even figure out how to do it, but understands even if he does it, there’s precious little reason to expect anybody else to follow suit.

I see: are you saying you still adhere to Kant's ethics but with modifications to accommodate to moral subjectivism? Or would you just say you agree with only Kant's metaphysics that are not about ethics?

Leontiskos

Since ‘moral’ language signifies ‘what one considers permissible, omissible, or obligatory’, it follows that any action a person commits implicitly concedes some moral truth. — Bob Ross

I think this is a fairly good OP. I think it improves significantly on your previous account. I am glad to see that you are trying to get away from the taste-based idea we discussed a few days ago. Your ability to revise your views is laudable.

I think this idea that the sphere of morality encompasses all acts is absolutely correct, and you are the first TPF member I have seen to explicitly accept this view. I also think your arguments for moral cognitivism are sound.

P2: There are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective. — Bob Ross

This could be the central contradiction in your system. I think this commits you to the idea that there are objective truths which are not grounded in objective realities, which seems to be a contradiction. More concisely, "subjective truth" is chimerical (i.e. it is something which may seem attainable at first, but always fades into the horizon like a mirage). More on this. . .

For moral subjectivists, they are not expressing something objective when stating ‘one ought not torture babies for fun’ because it is colloquial short-hand for ‘I believe one ought not torture babies for fun [and that is an upshot of my psychology]’. If a moral subjectivist is deploying those sort of moral judgments as if they express something objective, then they simply aren’t moral subjectivists (or they are confused). — Bob Ross

When one states, "I believe one ought not torture babies for fun," I would interpret that to mean, "I believe it is objectively true that one ought not torture babies for fun." After all, what is the "truth" of moral cognitivism if not objective truth? Isn't all truth 'objective' in this relevant sense?

The second common objection is that enforcing preferences (i.e., non-factual moral judgments) is unfair, wrong, and impermissible. — Bob Ross

A non-factual moral judgment is not a preference. More, a preference is not a judgment of truth. To affirm a moral proposition is to make a judgment, not to have a preference. Preferences are not judgments and judgments are not preferences.

The third most common objection is that there is no moral disagreement if moral subjectivism is true, and this seems implausible. If ‘I believe one ought not torture babies’ is a moral judgment which expresses something subjective, then it appears as though one person can affirm this proposition (validly) and another disaffirm it (validly): so what disagreement could possibly be had if there is no fact-of-the-matter to dispute? I contend that this is an invalid importation of a moral realist’s metaethical framework, of which is baked-into, implicitly, the concept of ‘disagreement’. There is still disagreement in morals even if moral judgments express something subjective and it is useful to have moral conversations: it just doesn’t quite look the same under a moral subjectivist’s metaethical framework—the concept of ‘disagreement’ looks different. When one affirms ‘one ought not do X’ and someone else disaffirms it, then they can engage in a fruitful moral discussion... — Bob Ross

This seems like a denial of cognitivism. Propositions which are true or false can be argued about in a straightforward way. Your five workarounds would be possible but not necessary on such a case.

A basic problem that I see in this account is the way that it founders on the subjective/objective distinction (which is not an ultimately coherent distinction in the first place). For the realist a truth, such as 12*12=144, is objective and subjective, in the sense that it is objectively true and yet it is always and only ever known and appropriated by an individual subject. Objective truths are known by subjects. For the moral realist it is the same. "Do not torture babies for fun," is an objective truth, known by a subject.

The related problem is similar. If a truth is not universally knowable, then it cannot be universally binding; and if the ground of a truth is accessible to only a single subject, then it is not universally knowable. Offhand I can think of two kinds of subjective truths: truths known by a subject on the basis of private information; and truths made true by a subject's intentions. For example, "I enjoy pock-marked lilies," and, "Tomorrow I am going to wear my ugly Christmas sweater." The first sort cannot function as a universally binding moral truth because it is not universally known to all. The second sort cannot function as a universally binding moral truth because moral truths are not thought to be contingent on any human will. Apparently some moral subjectivists think certain instances of the second sort, such as the decree of a king, could function as a subjective moral truth. This is more plausible than any other account I can think of, but I haven't yet met anyone who takes the King's decree to be morally binding.

Logically, Prong-2.P2 is the heart of subjectivism and yet it receives no positive support or elaboration. You don't even say what a subjective, binding truth is supposed to be, or how it could work. Your argument is purely negative. Your disjunctive syllogism is something like, "A or B or C. We have good reasons to reject A and B. Therefore, C." The problem is that we also have good reasons to reject C.

Mww

Or would you just say you agree with only Kant's metaphysics that are not about ethics? — Bob Ross

Metaphysics is general, although Kant’s ethics, more inclined toward what he called empirical anthropology and the moderns call cultural or the stronger even more modern sociocultural, has some quite repulsive stuff regarding women, other races, etc., which was not so out-of-tune for his day. But on the other hand, human aesthetics, the ground of purely subjective moral dispositions, hasn’t changed since his time, insofar as that requires the lapsed time of natural evolution.

Still, the crowd influences the individual; it does but it shouldn’t and it wouldn’t if the individual would just grow a pair. It is the growing which is the same for us these days as Kant’s moral philosophy espoused. It is the fact we in general are too weak to grow a pair, and that alone reduces practical moral subjectivist philosophy to junk.

Bob Ross

↪Leontiskos

Hello Leontiskos,

I appreciate your elaborate, substantive, and thought-provoking response! Hopefully, I can adequately respond.

I think the heart of our disagreement (and correct me if I am wrong) is twofold:

1. A lack of a positive account of pronge-2 P2 of the moral subjectivist thesis; and
2. The implications of true moral judgments expressing something subjective (e.g., is that even possible?).

So, I will try to address those hereon; but, first, let me address some (perhaps) less crucial points that I think are still worth mentioning.

I am glad to see that you are trying to get away from the taste-based idea we discussed a few days ago.

I honestly haven’t (: . I think maybe my diction is just confusing to other people, because I take a ‘preference’ to be synonymous with a ‘taste’--it seems like other people think the former is a superficial instance of the latter. If there is any confusion with my use of ‘taste’, then I am more than happy to replace it with the word ‘preference’.

I think this idea that the sphere of morality encompasses all acts is absolutely correct, and you are the first TPF member I have seen to explicitly accept this view. I also think your arguments for moral cognitivism are sound.

:up:

Your ability to revise your views is laudable.

Although I am unsure as to whether I actually revised my position like you think I did; I will say again that I am only in the interest of obtaining the truth, like you, and will happily concede any point if my contender provides reasons I agree with for disbanding from that point.

Alright, with that out of the way, let me first address #1.

Logically, Prong-2.P2 is the heart of subjectivism and yet it receives no positive support or elaboration. You don't even say what a subjective, binding truth is supposed to be, or how it could work.

Firstly, I do think it is a fair critique that I didn’t expound incredibly clearly how the relation between truth and the subjective moral judgments work—I did give some examples I didn’t analyze them that thoroughly, so I will take a note to add that in later. I will likewise give an account here as well (in a little bit).

Secondly, the positive support for prong-2 P2 is the argument against prong-2 P2 of the moral realist thesis and the argument for true moral judgments in the subjection for prong-3 of the moral subjectivist thesis:

P2: There are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective.
…
Either something is an expression of something objective (and in virtue of that at least a candidate of being factual) or it is subjective; therefore, if prong-2 of moral realism is false and there are true moral judgments, then they must be beliefs of which are the upshot of one’s psychology.

If one accepts that there are true moral judgments (and thusly that they are propositional) and that those moral judgments do not express something objective (which is derived from the is-ought ontological argument against prong-2 of the moral realist thesis), then the only option left is that they express something objective. Sure, this is a negative argument, in a sense, but either one has to deny that there are true moral judgments (or more fundamentally that they are not propositional) or that they do not express something objective. In the case of the former, they must find something wrong with the argument I gave in prong-3 of my thesis; and in the case of the latter something with the is-ought ontological argument I gave against moral realism. If they accept them, then, by my lights, they can’t reject that moral judgments express something subjective because that is all that is left.

Your disjunctive syllogism is something like, "A or B or C. We have good reasons to reject A and B. Therefore, C." The problem is that we also have good reasons to reject C.

My point is that A, B, and C are exhaustive options; so one can’t reject all three: they must bite a bullet somewhere if they don’t want to accept C since they are accepting !A and !B.

My only point here is that if you believe that we have good reasons to reject C, then you can’t agree with me that !A and !B: I think you will then have to contend with either the is-ought ontological gap argument or the argument I gave for there being true moral judgments if you want to reject C.

In terms of what good reasons we have to reject C, I don’t think we have any; but let me respond to some that I think you were alluding to, which segues nicely into #2.

This could be the central contradiction in your system. I think this commits you to the idea that there are objective truths which are not grounded in objective realities, which seems to be a contradiction. More concisely, "subjective truth" is chimerical (i.e. it is something which may seem attainable at first, but always fades into the horizon like a mirage). More on this. . .

Your problem, and correct me if I am wrong, with moral judgments being true and expressing something subjective is that they seem to be incoherent or inconsistent with each other: if it is true, then that pertains to something objective, so it can’t be expressing something subjective, right? That’s what I got out of your various responses on that matter, so if I am misunderstanding then please correct me.

My response is that the belief is the moral judgment and our beliefs about those beliefs are the facts about our psychology. Granted, I should have been much more explicit in my elaboration of this in the OP, and I will make a note to add a section in on that.

So…

After all, what is the "truth" of moral cognitivism if not objective truth? Isn't all truth 'objective' in this relevant sense?
…
This could be the central contradiction in your system. I think this commits you to the idea that there are objective truths which are not grounded in objective realities, which seems to be a contradiction. More concisely, "subjective truth" is chimerical (i.e. it is something which may seem attainable at first, but always fades into the horizon like a mirage). More on this. . .

Under moral subjectivism, when taken literally, ‘one ought not torture babies for fun’ is not true, not cognitive, and not a (valid) moral judgment but, rather, must be rewritten as ‘I believe one ought not torture babies for fun’. The latter is cognitive (being a fact about one’s psychology), is true in my case, is a valid moral judgment.

For you, I would imagine, ‘one ought not torture babies for fun’ is cognitive, is true, and is a valid moral judgment because its truth-maker is an objective feature about reality...I have no such analogous situation going on in my moral subjectivist theory: it is, afterall, at the end of the day, a moral anti-realist position.

I think this is the crux of the confusion slash debate we have about moral judgments: I think you are thinking of them in terms of a moral realist’s perspective whereas I am thinking of it totally differently (like the above).

So, to answer you question, truth is always absolute and expressing something objective, the difference between us is what the moral judgment actually is. For you it is sentences which at least validly purport facts which do not pertain to our psychology, where for me it is exactly that. Hopefully that helps clear things up, but let me if it doesn’t.

So, going back, :

When one states, "I believe one ought not torture babies for fun," I would interpret that to mean, "I believe it is objectively true that one ought not torture babies for fun."

I wouldn’t interpret it that way, I would say “I believe one ought not torture babies for fun” is a fact about their psychological state of mind such that they disapprove of torturing babies for fun. Adding in the ‘objectively true’ seems to question beg to me.

Similarly:

A non-factual moral judgment is not a preference. More, a preference is not a judgment of truth. To affirm a moral proposition is to make a judgment, not to have a preference. Preferences are not judgments and judgments are not preferences.

Admittedly, I need to spruce up my terminology on this point in the essay, because I see how I made this part a bit confusing. By non-factual moral judgment, I just meant that the disapproval, the preference, which underlies the psychological fact that “I believe one ought not torture babies”, is non-factual (which is exactly why I call it a preference). Technically, saying they are non-factual moral judgments is contradictory to what I outlined above as a moral judgment (which is the belief, not the underlying non-factual preference). So, yes, I agree that preferences are not moral judgments, but I would say that moral judgments are the upshot of those preferences. I will add this to the essay in a little while (when I have time).

For the realist a truth, such as 12*12=144, is objective and subjective, in the sense that it is objectively true and yet it is always and only ever known and appropriated by an individual subject. Objective truths are known by subjects. For the moral realist it is the same. "Do not torture babies for fun," is an objective truth, known by a subject.

True. I am saying, as a moral subjectivist, that we are not subjectively coming to know or approach the limit of knowing what is wrong or right, because moral judgments are the upshot of our psychology—not some fact-of-the-matter beyond our pyschology...not some moral fact out there.

If a truth is not universally knowable, then it cannot be universally binding;

That’s true. I should have made this more clear in the OP: the truth is the indexical belief which is universal insofar as either one does indeed have the belief or they don’t, thusly making truth absolute and expressing something objective (even though it is just a fact about one’s psychology, which is an upshot of non-factual dispositions a person has).

‘I believe one ought ...’ is universal insofar as either it is true that the person being referenced by the indexical statement does believe one ought … or they don’t. However, the belief itself, being just an upshot of one’s psychology, is not expressing something objective: it is not latching onto a moral fact out there.

Offhand I can think of two kinds of subjective truths: truths known by a subject on the basis of private information; and truths made true by a subject's intentions. For example, "I enjoy pock-marked lilies," and, "Tomorrow I am going to wear my ugly Christmas sweater." The first sort cannot function as a universally binding moral truth because it is not universally known to all.

I don’t think there is such a thing as ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ truth: truth is absolute, and it is the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity such that thought corresponds with reality. I take it to be two different claims to say “truth is objective/subjective” vs. “this proposition expresses something objective/subjective”.

I look forward to your response,

Bob

Bob Ross

↪Mww

:up:

Wayfarer

This could be the central contradiction in your system. I think this commits you to the idea that there are objective truths which are not grounded in objective realities, which seems to be a contradiction. More concisely, "subjective truth" is chimerical (i.e. it is something which may seem attainable at first, but always fades into the horizon like a mirage). — Leontiskos

Here I would like to add a point about making distinction between 'subjectivity' and 'subjecthood'. It's an awkward distinction to make, but it attempts to distinguish between 'subjective' as in 'pertaining only to an individual' and 'subjective' as in 'pertaining to the state of being a subject', and to facts which can only be truly understood in the first person.

If a truth is not universally knowable, then it cannot be universally binding; and if the ground of a truth is accessible to only a single subject, then it is not universally knowable. — Leontiskos

This describes the subjective in the former sense. But what if those truths - like life-lessons or existential facts - that can only be understood 'in the first person'? Those that are not objective in the sense of corroborated by third-person measurement but real nonetheless?

If a truth is not universally knowable, then it cannot be universally binding; and if the ground of a truth is accessible to only a single subject, then it is not universally knowable. Offhand I can think of two kinds of subjective truths: truths known by a subject on the basis of private information; and truths made true by a subject's intentions. — Leontiskos

A valedictory for Joseph Pieper, the Thomist philosopher, said

Our minds do not—contrary to many views currently popular—create truth. Rather, they must be conformed to the truth of things given in creation. And such conformity is possible only as the moral virtues become deeply embedded in our character, a slow and halting process. We have “lost the awareness of the close bond that links the knowing of truth to the condition of purity.” That is, in order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort. The full transformation of character that we need will, in fact, finally require the virtues of faith, hope, and love. And this transformation will not necessarily—perhaps not often—be experienced by us as easy or painless. Hence the transformation of self that we must—by God’s grace—undergo “perhaps resembles passing through something akin to dying.”

'In order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort'.

Leontiskos

I appreciate your elaborate, substantive, and thought-provoking response! Hopefully, I can adequately respond.

I think the heart of our disagreement (and correct me if I am wrong) is twofold:

1. A lack of a positive account of pronge-2 P2 of the moral subjectivist thesis; and
2. The implications of true moral judgments expressing something subjective (e.g., is that even possible?). — Bob Ross

Yes, but more precisely than (2), "P2: There are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective." It is precisely the non-objectivity that I am concerned with.

...then the only option left is that they express something objective. Sure, this is a negative argument, in a sense,... — Bob Ross

It is entirely negative. It is a disjunctive syllogism, as noted above.

My only point here is that if you believe that we have good reasons to reject C, then you can’t agree with me that !A and !B... — Bob Ross

My point is that rejecting A and B is insufficient when C is also implausible. C must be supported positively.

Under moral subjectivism, when taken literally, ‘one ought not torture babies for fun’ is not true, not cognitive, and not a (valid) moral judgment but, rather, must be rewritten as ‘I believe one ought not torture babies for fun’. The latter is cognitive (being a fact about one’s psychology), is true in my case, is a valid moral judgment. — Bob Ross

[Important]

In your OP, in the section, "A Case for Moral Cognitivism [Prong-1]," you state something quite different. You give a moral proposition about driving drunk and claim it is truth-apt. If we are to argue about this moral proposition then it must be objectively truth-apt.

What you do here is pivot to instead talk about belief. "George believes such-and-such." This is not a moral proposition, but it is truth-apt and objectively true or false. Yet the subject of cognitivism (and binding morality) is moral propositions, not belief propositions.

This is the same sort of thing as the example I gave in my last, "Tomorrow I am going to wear my ugly Christmas sweater." This statement is true in virtue of the agent's intention. Your statement is true in virtue of the agent's belief. But neither is a moral proposition. Neither one pertains to normative judgments about actions "permissible, omissible, or obligatory." According to your own OP, mere statements about someone's beliefs are not part of moral language.

For you it is sentences which at least validly purport facts which do not pertain to our psychology... — Bob Ross

No. As noted in your previous thread, I reject your exclusive distinction between what is moral and what is psychological. Beliefs are always psychological, as is the mathematical belief I set out in my last post. No one believes we have non-psychological beliefs. The truth of a moral statement regards the truth of a moral judgment, and statements about belief are not moral statements. The statement, "Jane believes one should not torture babies," is not a moral statement, it is only a statement about what Jane believes. Jane's statement, "One should not torture babies," is a moral statement, because it pertains to what is "permissible, omissible, or obligatory."

Note that if you claim that Jane's belief is "psychological" in the sense that it is grounded by one of her values, then the exact same question applies to that value. We must then ask if the value is truth-apt, and if so, if it is true or false. Only if the value is true can the moral statement be true (and therefore binding).

Admittedly, I need to spruce up my terminology on this point in the essay, because I see how I made this part a bit confusing. By non-factual moral judgment, I just meant that the disapproval, the preference, which underlies the psychological fact that “I believe one ought not torture babies”, is non-factual (which is exactly why I call it a preference). Technically, saying they are non-factual moral judgments is contradictory to what I outlined above as a moral judgment (which is the belief, not the underlying non-factual preference). So, yes, I agree that preferences are not moral judgments, but I would say that moral judgments are the upshot of those preferences. I will add this to the essay in a little while (when I have time). — Bob Ross

Okay, good. Again, the key here is that preferences are not judgments and judgments are not preferences. The corollary is that truth-apt judgments cannot flow from non truth-apt preferences, unless the judgment is merely about the preference/belief (as explained above). Yet if it is merely about the preference/belief, then it cannot be moral in the sense you set out (pertaining to what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory).

That’s true. I should have made this more clear in the OP: the truth is the indexical belief which is universal insofar as either one does indeed have the belief or they don’t, thusly making truth absolute and expressing something objective (even though it is just a fact about one’s psychology, which is an upshot of non-factual dispositions a person has).

‘I believe one ought ...’ is universal insofar as either it is true that the person being referenced by the indexical statement does believe one ought … or they don’t. However, the belief itself, being just an upshot of one’s psychology, is not expressing something objective: it is not latching onto a moral fact out there. — Bob Ross

Statements about belief cannot be binding at all because they are not moral statements. They don't pertain to what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory. Thus they are non-universal, but also non-binding by their very nature.

I don’t think there is such a thing as ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ truth: truth is absolute, and it is the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity such that thought corresponds with reality. I take it to be two different claims to say “truth is objective/subjective” vs. “this proposition expresses something objective/subjective”. — Bob Ross

And do you go on to say that the moral subjectivist believes that moral propositions express something subjective?

Best,
Leontiskos

Leontiskos

This describes the subjective in the former sense. But what if those truths - like life-lessons or existential facts - that can only be understood 'in the first person'? Those that are not objective in the sense of corroborated by third-person measurement but real nonetheless? — Wayfarer

I see the distinction you are trying to make, but I am not convinced that your second category does not collapse back into your first category. Presumably your second category is something along the lines of qualia. But the difficulty is that qualia can be understood through language. I can speak about the perception of red, and you will know what I am talking about given your experiences.

'In order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort'. — Wayfarer

Yes, but this is a rather rarefied point. Presumably this is what you mean by your second category? This illustrates the very difficult gulf between ancient ethics and modern ethics. I have not yet found a way to bridge it. I mostly attempt to speak to moderns through their own paradigm.

Also, the "subjectivists" on this forum don't seem to be saying at all what Pieper is saying. On a related note, "Situation ethics" is interesting, and has some similarities with Aristotelianism, but this too is not something I have seen promoted on these forums.

Wayfarer

↪Leontiskos

To describe it in terms of "qualia" trivialises the issue. "Qualia" is jargon used in contemporary philosophy of mind to try and describe the irreducibly subjective, first-person nature of experience (or being) in third-person terminology.

Yes, but this is a rather rarefied point. — Leontiskos

I think it's a fundamental point, but one that has been lost sight of.

Leontiskos

I think it's a fundamental point, but one that has been lost sight of. — Wayfarer

Agreed, but I am at a loss as to how to bring it back into sight.

javra

Here I would like to add a point about making distinction between 'subjectivity' and 'subjecthood'. It's an awkward distinction to make, but it attempts to distinguish between 'subjective' as in 'pertaining only to an individual' and 'subjective' as in 'pertaining to the state of being a subject', and to facts which can only be truly understood in the first person.

"If a truth is not universally knowable, then it cannot be universally binding; and if the ground of a truth is accessible to only a single subject, then it is not universally knowable." — Leontiskos — Wayfarer

I see the distinction you are trying to make, but I am not convinced that your second category does not collapse back into your first category. Presumably your second category is something along the lines of qualia. But the difficulty is that qualia can be understood through language. I can speak about the perception of red, and you will know what I am talking about given your experiences. — Leontiskos

Consider the distinction between "an object of awareness" and "a subject of awareness". At least some specific objects of awareness can then be classified as subjective in the sense of "pertaining only to an individual". But would one then also classify the actuality of a subject of awareness's being (subjectivity in the sense of "pertaining to the state of being a subject") as a) strictly only an object of awareness sans any subject of awareness or, else, as b) strictly pertaining only to one individual (such that it is not an actuality equally applicable to all co-existent individual beings; i.e., such that solipsism is concluded)?

If yes, I so far fail to understand the reasoning to this. But if not, then one obtains a category of subjecthood - which, if absolutely nothing else, will include the attribute of being a subject of awareness - that is not deemed to be subjective in the first sense addressed. This such that the proposition of "all individual beings are subjects of awareness" can be deemed equally objective to the proposition "rocks exist in the world".

Were morality to have anything to do with suffering and its absence, for example, and were this to itself be included in the objective category of subjectood as just mentioned, then the truth of morality could be appraised as grounded in subjectood - and this such that it could be universally knowable in principle.

Leontiskos

Were morality to have anything to do with suffering and its absence, for example, and were this to itself be included in the objective category of subjectood as just mentioned, then the truth of morality could be appraised as grounded in subjectood - and this such that it could be universally knowable in principle. — javra

For example:

A1. Ceteris paribus, I should not cause suffering for myself
A2. Others are like me
A3. Therefore, ceteris paribus, I should not cause suffering for others — Leontiskos

The question in this case is whether, "Suffering is evil," is a subjective or objective truth. As noted above, I think, like 12*12=144, this is an objective truth known by a subject. The ontological reality of suffering differs in certain ways from the ontological reality of mathematics, but I think both propositions are objectively true.

(Again, I don't think the subjective/objective distinction ultimately holds up.)

Bob Ross

↪Leontiskos

Yes, but more precisely than (2), "P2: There are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective." It is precisely the non-objectivity that I am concerned with.
…
It is entirely negative. It is a disjunctive syllogism, as noted above.
…
My point is that rejecting A and B is insufficient when C is also implausible. C must be supported positively.

Non-objectivity is subjectivity EDIT: (sort of); and I agree it is negative. However, my argument for moral judgments expressing something subjective is that (1) they are not expressing something objective (which was positively argued for) and (2) that there are true moral judgments (which was positively argued for): what else would be required, in terms of a positive argument, to affirm C?

In other words, affirming prong-1 and prong-3 while disaffirming prong-2 of the moral realist thesis is moral subjectivism: this entails that moral judgments are expressing something subjective because they exist, some of them are true, and they aren’t expressing something objective. You would have to contend with that even if you think we have good reasons to also reject moral judgments as expressing something subjective.

If I say either A, B, or C are true and A is false and B is false, then C must be true. If you turn around and say ‘I also think C is false’, then you are wrong about one of them being false. If you think C is false, then which of the other two do you think is true?

In your OP, in the section, "A Case for Moral Cognitivism [Prong-1]," you state something quite different. You give a moral proposition about driving drunk and claim it is truth-apt. If we are to argue about this moral proposition then it must be objectively truth-apt.

That’s fair. I actually edited this with my addition of an elaboration on how moral judgments express something that is subjective.

This is not a moral proposition, but it is truth-apt and objectively true or false. Yet the subject of cognitivism (and binding morality) is moral propositions, not belief propositions.

That’s the whole point of contention: moral subjectivism allows moral judgments to be beliefs.

‘I believe one ought not ...’ is the moral judgment under moral subjectivism and not ‘one ought not...’. It still meets my definition of ‘moral’ signification because it is still a subject-referencing normative statement which expresses ‘what one ought to find permissible, omissible, or obligatory’.

According to your own OP, mere statements about someone's beliefs are not part of moral language.

Where did I say that in the OP? I need to revise that if I did.

No. As noted in your previous thread, I reject your exclusive distinction between what is moral and what is psychological. Beliefs are always psychological, as is the mathematical belief I set out in my last post. No one believes we have non-psychological beliefs.

I am not saying that we have non-psychological beliefs, I am saying that moral judgments are not expressing something objective: the belief we have, which is always pyschological, is an upshot of our psychology (in general)...it is an upshot of other beliefs, intentions, desires, etc.

The truth of a moral statement regards the truth of a moral judgment, and statements about belief are not moral statements. The statement, "Jane believes one should not torture babies," is not a moral statement, it is only a statement about what Jane believes. Jane's statement, "One should not torture babies," is a moral statement, because it pertains to what is "permissible, omissible, or obligatory."

Hmmm…isn’t “Jane believes one should not torture babies” refer to what is ‘permissible, omissible, or obligatory’? Seems to be to me, even if it is just an expression of what jane subjectively believes.

Note that if you claim that Jane's belief is "psychological" in the sense that it is grounded by one of her values, then the exact same question applies to that value. We must then ask if the value is truth-apt, and if so, if it is true or false. Only if the value is true can the moral statement be true (and therefore binding).

In this sense of ‘value’ you are describing, I would say it is going to bottom out at something not truth-apt, although first and second principles (etc.) could be other beliefs and thusly truth-apt.

Okay, good. Again, the key here is that preferences are not judgments and judgments are not preferences.

Correct. Judgments are beliefs.

The corollary is that truth-apt judgments cannot flow from non truth-apt preferences, unless the judgment is merely about the preference/belief (as explained above)

I would say that it is the latter in my case, if I am understanding correctly. This is what I mean by the moral judgment (the belief) being an upshot of one’s pyschology and not a moral fact out there.

Yet if it is merely about the preference/belief, then it cannot be moral in the sense you set out (pertaining to what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory).

Why? “I believe one ought not ...” is expressing something pertaining to what one ought to hold as permissible, omissible, or obligatory, no?

Statements about belief cannot be binding at all because they are not moral statements

Moral judgments (which are beliefs about what one ought to be permissible, omissible, or obligatory under my view) are binding to the subject at hand. I can’t say “I believe one ought not torture babies” and then in the next breath say “but I don’t believe that it is impermissible to torture babies”: which one is it?

And do you go on to say that the moral subjectivist believes that moral propositions express something subjective?

Yes. I am not sure what the contention was here: perhaps I am misunderstanding you. So prong-2 of my thesis is that they express something subjective: a sentence expressing something non-objective is to express something subjective—they mean the same thing to me. Are you saying something could be non-objective and not subjective?...Actually, I see now: truth, under my view, would be an example of this (:

Perhaps I could revise it to expound more on how moral judgments expressing something non-objective entails it is expressing something subjective. To me, it seems like it is impossible for a statement to express something that is non-objective and non-subjective: truth, on the other hand, is an emergent property, so to speak, of statements’ relationship to reality and is beyond those bounds.

javra

The ontological reality of suffering differs in certain ways from the ontological reality of mathematics, but I think both propositions are objectively true. — Leontiskos

I'm in full agreement with what you've replied.

Leontiskos

↪javra

- :up:

Leontiskos

Hmmm…isn’t “Jane believes one should not torture babies” refer to what is ‘permissible, omissible, or obligatory’? Seems to be to me, even if it is just an expression of what jane subjectively believes. — Bob Ross

No, it refers to what Jane believes to be permissible, omissible, or obligatory. There is a crucially significant difference. From, "Jane believes X," one cannot infer anything about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory; just as from, "Jane believes 28^28=33.13*10^39," one cannot infer anything about mathematics. Therefore, "Jane believes X" (regardless of what 'X' is) is not about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory. It is about the fact that an opinion is held, and has no bearing on the question of whether that opinion is true or false.

If I say either A, B, or C are true and A is false and B is false, then C must be true. If you turn around and say ‘I also think C is false’, then you are wrong about one of them being false. If you think C is false, then which of the other two do you think is true? — Bob Ross

Fair enough. I am limiting my involvement, arguing that C is false.

That’s fair. I actually edited this with my addition of an elaboration on how moral judgments express something that is subjective. — Bob Ross

Hmm, okay...

That’s the whole point of contention: moral subjectivism allows moral judgments to be beliefs. — Bob Ross

All judgments are beliefs. Again, "12*12=144" is a judgment, but it is simultaneously a belief. To judge that something is true is at the same time to believe that it is so.

‘I believe one ought not ...’ is the moral judgment under moral subjectivism and not ‘one ought not...’. It still meets my definition of ‘moral’ signification because it is still a subject-referencing normative statement which expresses ‘what one ought to find permissible, omissible, or obligatory’. — Bob Ross

This is equivocal. "I believe X" usually means, "I believe that X is true." You want it to mean, "I happen to hold belief X." You want it to be parallel to, "She believes X." But in the third-person case the ambiguity disappears, because there is no implication that the speaker (the "I") also believes/judges regarding X.

Correct. Judgments are beliefs. — Bob Ross

Heh. Thank you. This turns out to be quite relevant. :wink:

I would say that it is the latter in my case, if I am understanding correctly. This is what I mean by the moral judgment (the belief) being an upshot of one’s pyschology and not a moral fact out there. — Bob Ross

I am skipping these sorts of quotes because they just go back to the question about Jane.

Why? “I believe one ought not ...” is expressing something pertaining to what one ought to hold as permissible, omissible, or obligatory, no? — Bob Ross

This goes back to that equivocation and I vs. She (and, in the first-person case, belief qua belief vs. belief qua judgment).

Statements about belief cannot be binding at all because they are not moral statements. — Leontiskos

Moral judgments (which are beliefs about what one ought to be permissible, omissible, or obligatory under my view) are binding to the subject at hand. I can’t say “I believe one ought not torture babies” and then in the next breath say “but I don’t believe that it is impermissible to torture babies”: which one is it? — Bob Ross

A moral judgment is not a statement about belief, it is a statement about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory. It makes no difference that a belief ends up being about what is moral. If a statement is about [the fact of a belief being held] then it is not about [the specific determination or judgment that the belief contains]. I can say, "She believes X," without myself believing X, and there is a subtle (but precarious) manner in which something analogous also applies to the first-person case.

The other thing to note is that to judge that (no)one ought torture babies, is to judge that everyone is bound to not-torture babies (and not merely myself).

Yes. I am not sure what the contention was here: perhaps I am misunderstanding you. So prong-2 of my thesis is that they express something subjective: a sentence expressing something non-objective is to express something subjective—they mean the same thing to me. Are you saying something could be non-objective and not subjective? — Bob Ross

And so what is the subjective thing that a moral proposition expresses?

Perhaps I could revise it to expound more on how moral judgments expressing something non-objective entails it is expressing something subjective. To me, it seems like it is impossible for a statement to express something that is non-objective and non-subjective: truth, on the other hand, is an emergent property, so to speak, of statements’ relationship to reality and is beyond those bounds. — Bob Ross

I do agree that truth bursts these boundaries. That was my point with the 12*12=144 example.

Bob Ross

↪Leontiskos

I think the crux of our disagreement about beliefs and judgments is as follows. Let’s take the example of the proposition “Jane believes X” and call it Y.

You seem to think that X is the judgment and Y is the belief; whereas, I am saying that Y in relation to X is a judgment about X: the belief and judgment are intertwined such that one cannot have one without the other.

Likewise, you seem to be saying that Y does not entail truth about X, which is only true in the case that X is about something beyond out psychology. E.g.,:

There is a crucially significant difference. From, "Jane believes X," one cannot infer anything about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory; just as from, "Jane believes 28^28=33.13*10^39," one cannot infer anything about mathematics

If X in “Jane believes X” was “vanilla ice cream tastes good”, then I don’t think you have a hard time seeing why your analogy to math fails. Some beliefs, which are also necessarily judgments, are not about facts out there in the world but, rather, are projections of our psychology. So I agree in the case of your math example, but disagree that it is analogous to morality because, well, that’s exactly what’s in contention in moral realism vs. anti-realism!

Likewise, if you are saying that Y is a belief which is not a judgment but X is a belief that is a judgment, then we can validly expand “Jane believes X” to “Jane believes that Jane believes X” which is either redundant or, and this one I am more inclined towards, it is now just a second order belief (i.e., a belief about beliefs) which has nothing to do with X itself.

Fair enough. I am limiting my involvement, arguing that C is false.

That’s fair enough as well. I am more than happy to discuss why you believe C to be false and perhaps you will convince me.

That’s fair. I actually edited this with my addition of an elaboration on how moral judgments express something that is subjective. — Bob Ross

Hmm, okay...

I was just noting that I adjusted it as I said I would, and just wanted to let you know that’s fixed now. However, does my refurbishment undermine my argument for moral cognitivism? I think probably for you, yes, and for me, not really (;

This is equivocal. "I believe X" usually means, "I believe that X is true." You want it to mean, "I happen to hold belief X." You want it to be parallel to, "She believes X." But in the third-person case the ambiguity disappears, because there is no implication that the speaker (the "I") also believes/judges regarding X.

I am not sure I followed this part, to be honest. I would say that “I believe X” is a belief state of the subject at hand, which is a judgment about X. When I say “I believe X” I am thereby judging that X is true...you seem to be saying that it is a belief that isn’t making a judgment but, rather, the judgment is in X.

This goes back to that equivocation and I vs. She (and, in the first-person case, belief qua belief vs. belief qua judgment).

I would say “I believe X” is a belief qua belief and qua judgment.

A moral judgment is not a statement about belief, it is a statement about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory. It makes no difference that a belief ends up being about what is moral.

This would be true if I accepted moral realism. The belief is what makes the judgment true in moral subjectivism.

For example, let’s go back to the “Jane believes ice cream tastes good”: does this belief not in virtue of its own judgment make it true? I think so. Sure, it is an upshot of also conative aspects of one’s pysche, but the belief also factors in.

I can say, "She believes X," without myself believing X,

That’s true and expected under moral subjectivism: ‘She believes X’ is indexical.

The other thing to note is that to judge that (no)one ought torture babies, is to judge that everyone is bound to not-torture babies (and not merely myself).

Yes, so this goes back to our dispute about subjective vs objective universalization: I find nothing incoherent with “Jane believes everyone should not torture babies” even though it is only true relative to herself—I would imagine you beg to differ on that one (;

And so what is the subjective thing that a moral proposition expresses?

Cognitive approval/disapproval, which is an upshot of other cognitive and conative aspects of one’s psyche.

Philosophim

Hello Bob, I'm happy to explore morality with you on multiple fronts here, as its a very deep topic and requires a lot of consideration from all possible sides. This is a good breakdown of your theory and seems very well written and clear. However, I see some issues with a few of the statements. Lets start at the top.

First, I agree with your pre-requisite to Meta-ethics section! Its good grounds to start and needed for the discussion. If I were to say one thing, it is to go back and clearly define what you mean by objective and subjective as well. Onto the discussion!

P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.
C: Therefore, moral facts cannot exist. — Bob Ross

In very simple terms, this doesn't work because you forgot the possibility of different states of reality. If we took a frozen snapshot of existence, or how things are, without any other comparisons; you would be correct. But if we have seen multiple states of existence, we can compare different states and claim, "That state of reality is superior to this state of reality."

Lets flesh out your statement so that its conclusion can be true.

P1: The way reality is at any moment, in isolation of any other consideration of other potential states of reality, does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be. This requires a consideration of states of reality in comparison to the current state of reality.
C: Therefore, if we consider a state of reality in isolation of all other potential states of reality throughout time, moral facts cannot exist.

And I would agree with this. But lets include other potential states of reality.

P1: The way reality is at any moment, in isolation of any other consideration of other potential states of reality, does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: But, if we include other potential states of reality, we can compare them to declare that one state is better over another.
P3: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.
C: We do not have the criteria yet for "what is better" so cannot determine at this time if it is objective or subjective.

So I do not see the original conclusion: "Therefore, moral facts cannot exist." once you introduce comparative potential states of reality. Still, lets continue onto your argument for subjective morality, as the above argument is simply a clarification of what must be considered when addressing morality, and does not make any claims to whether moral claims are subjective or objective.

1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism]. — Bob Ross

Lets agree with points 1 and 2 and see if it necessarily leads to your conclusion.

First, this is really going to come down to your definition of what is objective and subjective.

"Something is subjective if it is dependent on a mind (biases, perception, emotions, opinions, imagination, or conscious experience).

Something is objective if it can be confirmed independent of a mind."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectivity_and_objectivity_(philosophy)

I think these are fairly uncontroversial and straight forward definitions, so lets start here.

Lets now go back to your definition of truth which I agree with:

‘truth’ is the ‘correspondence/agreement of thought with reality’ — Bob Ross

Now, is truth subjective, or objective? If it is subjective, then it cannot be determined independently of a mind. If it is objective, then it can be confirmed independently of a mind.

If truth is merely the correspondence of thought with reality, then it needs no mind. Truth is simply a 'state'. "Thought is in correspondence with reality". If we were able to be aware of this, we might call it knowledge. But truth does not require knowledge. Truth is simply a state of being that is unconcerned if there is an observer there to realize it.

Thus truth is best described as "objective'. With this, we can now examine your conclusion.

3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism].[/quote]

If there is a true moral judgement, then it must be an objective moral judgement. If moral judgements are subjective, and only subjective, your conclusion does not follow. For there to be a true moral judgement, a moral judgement must be objectively in line with reality. But if there is a moral judgement that is in line with reality, it is objectively true, not subjectively true. The subjects opinion to the matter is irrelevant.

But, can we salvage the intent of your theory? Lets try.

(Subjectivity and objectivity continued from the wiki citation)

"If a claim is true exclusively when considering the claim from the viewpoint of a sentient being, it is subjectively true. For example, one person may consider the weather to be pleasantly warm, and another person may consider the same weather to be too hot; both views are subjective. The word subjectivity comes from subject in a philosophical sense, meaning an individual who possesses unique conscious experiences, such as perspectives, feelings, beliefs, and desires, or who (consciously) acts upon or wields power over some other entity (an object).

If a claim is true even when considering it outside the viewpoint of a sentient being (how ?), then it is labelled objectively true. Scientific objectivity is practicing science while intentionally reducing partiality, biases, or external influences. Moral objectivity is the concept of moral or ethical codes being compared to one another through a set of universal facts or a universal perspective and not through differing conflicting perspectives. Journalistic objectivity is the reporting of facts and news with minimal personal bias or in an impartial or politically neutral manner."

Lets examine the idea of 'subjective truth'. Person A states, "Its hot" while person B states, "Its cool". From their perspectives, this is true. But how is it true? How is it 'in correspondence with reality" if we've claimed truth is objective?

Its because we've left out the implicit information within their statements.

Person A: From my subjective experience, I feel its hot.
Person B: From my subjective experience, I feel its cold.

These are both subjectively true, because it is objective. The feelings of a subject in reference to itself are objectively true. What one's subjective experience entails, is objectively true. We have a non-truth when this happens:

Person A: From my subjective experience, I feel its hot, therefore I will claim it is hot for everyone else.
Person B: From my subjective experience, I feel its cold, therefore I will claim it is cold for everyone else.

At this point, the conclusion is not objectively true. Its a subjective belief.

How do we tie this then back into a subjective morality? Lets examine your claim about subjective morality:

Within moral subjectivism, the moral judgment is a belief which is the upshot of one’s psychology and it is proposition which is indexical—e.g., ‘I believe one ought not torture babies for fun’ is a moral judgment, and the belief about the belief attempts to determine the truth of the claim: either I believe one ought not to torture babies for fun or I don’t. — Bob Ross

Bob Ross: From my subjective viewpoint, I believe moral judgements are based on psychology, therefore all moral judgements are based on psychology.

As we can see, this is a subjective claim, and not objective. Just because you personally believe moral judgements are based on psychology, this does not make it true objectively or subjectively. While you could create a subjective truth by simply claiming, "From my subjective viewpoint, I believe moral judgements are based on psychology.", it is your claim that this is a truth that all people must objectively conclude about morality that makes it objectively and subjectively false.

I also wanted to address a couple of your points/counterpoints, but not go too long on this initial reply.

For there to be true moral judgments, is just to say that we have good reasons to believe that some of the truth-apt (cognitive) moral judgments we have are true and thusly binding. — Bob Ross

Your own definition of truth counters this statement. Your definition of truth indicated no necessity that a person have knowledge or justification of something being true. A true moral judgement simply needs to be in correspondence with reality. The only thing you can state with your definition of truth is:

"For there to be true moral judgments, is just to say that our moral judgement corresponds to reality."

Another point:

P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to ‘lie down and starve to death’. — Bob Ross

This statement is a contradiction. If there are no moral judgements, then there is nothing one has to do. Therefore one would not have to 'lie down and starve to death'.

Finally:

P1: If there are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective, then they must be an expression of something subjective. — Bob Ross

Except that if something is true, it is in correspondence with reality objectively. The subjective knowledge or lack of knowledge is irrelevant. Therefore if there are true moral judgements, then they are objective.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

Hello Bob, I'm happy to explore morality with you on multiple fronts here, as its a very deep topic and requires a lot of consideration from all possible sides.

I always enjoy our conversations and look forward to your take on my OP!

I think I need to provide some clarity on my position:

1. By ‘objective’, I mean ‘that which exists mind(stance)-independently’; and by ‘subjective’, I mean ‘exists mind(stance)-dependently’.

2. I do not think truth is objective nor subjective but, rather, absolute and emergent from both subjectivity and objectivity. Here’s my thread on that. More on this later.

3. My correspondence theory of truth, which can be summarized as ‘truth is correspondence of thought with reality’, requires both a subject and object; otherwise, one would have to concede that thoughts can originate from non-subjects and reality is not objective.

With that out of the way, let me try to adequately respond to your points.

In very simple terms, this doesn't work because you forgot the possibility of different states of reality.

I don’t think comparing potential states of affairs (of reality) helps get around P1. P1 is the claim that it doesn’t matter what is the case about reality at all when it comes to what ought to be: what ought to be is despite what is. If someone says “yes, that’s true, but potential states of affairs do relate to what ought to be”, then I think that is perfectly compatible with P1 but affords no moral facticity: (mind-independent) potential states-of-affairs cannot be what a moral statement corresponds to such that it is true because they don’t exist. If the person insists that moral facts are grounded in potential states-of-affairs, then the real premise in contention is P2, not P1.

"Something is subjective if it is dependent on a mind (biases, perception, emotions, opinions, imagination, or conscious experience).

Something is objective if it can be confirmed independent of a mind."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectivity_and_objectivity_(philosophy)

I think these are fairly uncontroversial and straight forward definitions, so lets start here.

More or less I would agree to these terms (notwithstanding the definitions I gave above), but I would quibble with “can be confirmed” part of the definition of ‘objectivity’: that makes it sound like we can confirm things that are completely sans any subject. I would just say that objectivity is that which exists mind(stance)-independently and we come to know it subjectively because we are subjects—what tool can we use that isn’t ultimately contingent on us observing it?

Now, is truth subjective, or objective?

Neither. It is absolute; meaning that any proposition one has, it is either true or false and that proposition is not true relative to a subject.

If there is a true moral judgement, then it must be an objective moral judgement.

No. I think you are conflating a moral judgment with what it expresses. Moral judgments are always subjective, irregardless of whether one is a moral realist or anti-realist. This is because judgments are formulated by subjects—they aren’t floating out there mind-independently in reality. Prong-2 of my thesis and the thesis of moral realism is aimed at ‘what does those moral judgments express?’. Are those moral judgments true in virtue of corresponding to some mind(stance)-independent state-of-affairs in reality? Or are they true in virtue of corresponding to some mind(stance)-dependent state-of-affairs in reality (such as our psychologies)?

A moral judgment being true just means that some state-of-affairs in reality corresponds with it such that it makes the judgment true—but this could be just a fact about one’s psychology, which is just a projection of one’s own psyche: it is a stance-dependent state-of-affairs.

"If a claim is true exclusively when considering the claim from the viewpoint of a sentient being, it is subjectively true. For example, one person may consider the weather to be pleasantly warm, and another person may consider the same weather to be too hot; both views are subjective. The word subjectivity comes from subject in a philosophical sense, meaning an individual who possesses unique conscious experiences, such as perspectives, feelings, beliefs, and desires, or who (consciously) acts upon or wields power over some other entity (an object).

If a claim is true even when considering it outside the viewpoint of a sentient being (how ?), then it is labelled objectively true. Scientific objectivity is practicing science while intentionally reducing partiality, biases, or external influences. Moral objectivity is the concept of moral or ethical codes being compared to one another through a set of universal facts or a universal perspective and not through differing conflicting perspectives. Journalistic objectivity is the reporting of facts and news with minimal personal bias or in an impartial or politically neutral manner."

I would just say that something is subjective if it exists mind(stance)-dependently and objective if it exists mind(stance)-independently.

Lets examine the idea of 'subjective truth'. Person A states, "Its hot" while person B states, "Its cool". From their perspectives, this is true. But how is it true? How is it 'in correspondence with reality" if we've claimed truth is objective?

If someone claims something “is hot” and another claims that other something “is cool” then either (1) they need to be more precise with what they are claiming and they both are right (e.g., when I say “it is hot” I really mean the proposition “it feels hot to me” which certainly can be true, given truth is absolute, while another person claims it is false since ‘me’ is indexical) or (2) one of them is wrong:

Its because we've left out the implicit information within their statements.

Person A: From my subjective experience, I feel its hot.
Person B: From my subjective experience, I feel its cold.

Exactly!

Bob Ross: From my subjective viewpoint, I believe moral judgements are based on psychology, therefore all moral judgements are based on psychology.

As we can see, this is a subjective claim, and not objective.

I am not claiming that it is subjectively true that “moral judgments are the upshot of one’s psychology”, that is a true proposition and it is absolute.

Also, in the claim “I believe moral judgments are based on psychology”, the belief does not itself make it true that “moral judgments are based on psychology” so I agree that it could be true that I believe it and it is false. This is not the case with moral judgments: I believe one ought not torture babies is the cognitive attitude (or disposition) which makes it true because it is just an upshot of my psychology. For example, by analogy, “I believe chocolate ice cream is the best ice cream flavor” is true (relative to me, but absolute statement because it refers an indexical pronoun ‘I’) in virtue of me believing it (as an upshot of my pyschology) which is very different than “I believe that 1+1 = 2” since “1 + 1 = 2” is not true in virtue of my cognitive disposition.

Your own definition of truth counters this statement. Your definition of truth indicated no necessity that a person have knowledge or justification of something being true. A true moral judgement simply needs to be in correspondence with reality. The only thing you can state with your definition of truth is:

"For there to be true moral judgments, is just to say that our moral judgement corresponds to reality."

By ‘good reasons’ I was referring to our epistemic access to ‘true moral judgments’ and not referencing truth. I was saying to epistemically claim there are true moral judgments, we must have good reasons to believe that there are true moral judgments, and I don’t see anything wrong with that.

P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to ‘lie down and starve to death’. — Bob Ross

This statement is a contradiction. If there are no moral judgements, then there is nothing one has to do. Therefore one would not have to 'lie down and starve to death'.

Not quite. I was claiming that doing something entails at a minimum the concession that it is morally permissible; so if one can’t even agree that it is permissible to do X, then they can’t do X because they don’t affirm that it is permissible. I think you would have to contend with the collapse of morals into actions to say that one can do something even if they don’t find it morally permissible.

P1: If there are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective, then they must be an expression of something subjective. — Bob Ross

Except that if something is true, it is in correspondence with reality objectively. The subjective knowledge or lack of knowledge is irrelevant. Therefore if there are true moral judgements, then they are objective.

Again, I think you are conflating moral judgments with what they express. I am talking about what makes the moral judgment true: obviously, it is a state-of-affairs in reality, but are those state-of-affairs mind(stance)-independent? If they are preferences we have, then they aren’t and are thusly true in virtue of something subjective. It corresponding to reality is going to be an absolute calculation: either it does or it doesn’t, and this is not contingent on what I or you believe; but the state-of-affairs that it corresponds to certainly can be something projected by our psyches. E.g., “I believe ice cream tastes so good” is true in virtue of facts about my pyschology, which are subjective judgments themselves.

Philosophim

After reading I think this all comes down to the terms subjective and objective. Now that I've seen your definition, its necessary they be included in your 'pre-requisites' section. If you do not define them specifically, then people are going to assume they are the traditional definitions of subjective and objective. The argument won't go anywhere because they'll think you mean the normative terms, not your revisions.

Can you clarify what the (stance) means as well?

As is, your statements about subjective and objective veer wildly from their original intent. The terms objective and subjective generally refer to statements. Thus there is an objective statement and a subjective statement. When you state the term objective means "that which is mind independent", what is 'that'? Is it existence?

Even further, this begs the question that your definition of subjective and objective are true. Why do we need to redefine these terms? Is it so you can use the word 'subjective', even though it would have nothing to do with the original meaning of the term subjective? This would be a widely misinterpreted argument to give to others if you've deviated strongly from the terms' original meaning without very carefully clarifying what you mean.

If you mean to simply clarify the difference between an object and a subject, this can be done without changing the meaning of the original words. An object can make no objective or subjective judgements. Only a subject can. The reason we have the terms objective and subjective are to give meaning to the judgements a subject makes. When you make objective and subjective as 'not a subject' vs 'a subject' it just changes the entire meaning of the terms. If you want to make that argument, I would suggest making the argument with subjects and objects and not use the terms objective or subjective at all to ease confusion and clarify the argument.

I'll wait for you to clarify the exact intent of your use of subjective and objective. Your argument may very well be correct if I understand the meaning behind your terminology. Once I understand, I'll re-examine your argument with that in mind and see if I reach some different conclusions.

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

Sorry, I didn’t get a notification of this response!

After reading I think this all comes down to the terms subjective and objective. Now that I've seen your definition, its necessary they be included in your 'pre-requisites' section

This is already in the OP under ‘Brief Exposition of a Correspondence Theory of Truth’, which, I would say, is where it should be:

‘Objectivity’ is ‘that which exists mind(stance)-independently’ and ‘subjectivity’ is the negation of objectivity.

The only quibble I have with myself is technically I need to change ‘subjectivity’ to ‘that which exists mind(stance)-dependently’ and not a negation of objectivity, because I consider certain things emergent from both which are certainly not just one or the other. So I will modify that part.

If you do not define them specifically, then people are going to assume they are the traditional definitions of subjective and objective. The argument won't go anywhere because they'll think you mean the normative terms, not your revisions.
…
As is, your statements about subjective and objective veer wildly from their original intent.

I think you are assuming that Wiki is the standard of how people use the terms—I don’t. People in colloquial speech use those terms very ambiguously and inconsistently. In metaethics, I don’t think my definitions are very controversial granted a correspondence theory of truth.

Can you clarify what the (stance) means as well?

A stance is a disposition, attitude, belief, preference, etc. that a subject has formulated.

Even further, this begs the question that your definition of subjective and objective are true. Why do we need to redefine these terms?

Honestly, I don’t think I am redefining them outside of the norm in metaethics, and I do not grant that people use them in any precise manner at all in colloquial speech. However, I am not all that interested in derailing into semantics, so if someone, at the end of the day, affirms my moral subjectivism while stipulating that I use the term ‘subjective’ weird, then I am fine with that.

This would be a widely misinterpreted argument to give to others if you've deviated strongly from the terms' original meaning without very carefully clarifying what you mean.

The misinterpretation lies in the ambiguity and inconsistency of their deployments in colloquial speech: my definitions are highly refined (or at least so I think (; ).

An object can make no objective or subjective judgements. Only a subject can. The reason we have the terms objective and subjective are to give meaning to the judgements a subject makes.

You are saying the same thing I am saying, but less refined. I say there is no such thing as an objective statement because all statements are subjective, you are merely predicating that subjective statement with ‘objective’ if it is true in virtue of corresponding to some mind-independently existing state-of-affairs.

The reason we have the terms objective and subjective are to give meaning to the judgements a subject makes

Correct. But the judgment is not objective, which is what it would technically mean when you say “there are objective judgments”. What I think you are actually conveying is that judgments are subjective and they can either express something objective or subjective themselves; and this is perfectly compatible and precisely conveyed with my terminology.

When you state the term objective means "that which is mind independent", what is 'that'? Is it existence?

A state-of-affairs in reality to be specific, which are ‘arrangements’ of existent entities: I do not tie ‘state-of-affair’ to temporal or spatial relations only. I can also modify that in the OP as well.

Philosophim

After reading I think this all comes down to the terms subjective and objective. Now that I've seen your definition, its necessary they be included in your 'pre-requisites' section

This is already in the OP under ‘Brief Exposition of a Correspondence Theory of Truth’, which, I would say, is where it should be: — Bob Ross

My apologies! I reskimmed and missed it. Your argument is dense, so I did not retain it after I had finished reading your OP the first time. That's on me. :)

You are saying the same thing I am saying, but less refined. I say there is no such thing as an objective statement because all statements are subjective, you are merely predicating that subjective statement with ‘objective’ if it is true in virtue of corresponding to some mind-independently existing state-of-affairs. — Bob Ross

If you wish to define subjective this way, that's fine. But if this is true, what's the point of the word? If all statements are subjective, why not just say "statement"? "Subjective statement" is redundant at that point as there is no contrast. The term subjective is only uniquely useful in contrast with an "objective statement". If you eliminate the vocabulary of objective statement, then you may as well eliminate the term "subjective statement" as well.

Finally, the elimination of these terms does not eliminate the original concepts they embodied. There is still the question of making a statement in regards to utilizing only your personal viewpoint, or making a statement that can be logically agreed upon by all potential viewpoints. But if this is your choice, that is fine. I'll re-examine your argument using what you've provided.

‘trueness’ is the property ascribed to statements of which what they allege of (refer to about) reality correspond/agree with reality with respect to that specific regard — Bob Ross

What you've done here is make trueness subjective. I did read your other post, and your conclusion that truth is a merge of the two doesn't fit. Either something is mind independent, or mind dependent. This is the clear binary you've created. A statement is mind-dependent. I see your intention is to say, "I'm taking this objective thing, having a subjective stance about this objective thing, and if the two correspond, this is true." Really, this is the same as saying you take an object and subjectively identify it in a way that corresponds with reality. I have no issue with this. But to say that it is neither objective nor subjective is false. To be mind independent is to be free of any mind. To be mind dependent is to have at least an iota of mind in there. :) It is still mind dependent, as without a mind, you cannot make a true statement.

A statement from a mind that is true = Subjective
A statement from a mind that is false = Subjective

I have no problem with this as long as the definitions are consistent and logically flow. This is again the problem of 'everything is now subjective' and it devalues any meaning to the term. I'm addressing this now as it will become relevant soon.

Addressing P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.

(Me) In very simple terms, this doesn't work because you forgot the possibility of different states of reality.

(You) I don’t think comparing potential states of affairs (of reality) helps get around P1. P1 is the claim that it doesn’t matter what is the case about reality at all when it comes to what ought to be: what ought to be is despite what is. — Bob Ross

If the intention is, "What ought to be is despite what is", I agree. This assumes that what is could be something different, which is a core consideration of a moral statement.

I would just say that objectivity is that which exists mind(stance)-independently and we come to know it subjectively because we are subjects—what tool can we use that isn’t ultimately contingent on us observing it? — Bob Ross

You cannot come to know something objective according to your terminology. Objectivity is mind independent. Meaning that its existence is what is without any mind ever attempting to correspond to it. Once any attempt at correspondence is made, it is now subjective, or mind dependent. You can say 'an object' exists independently, and we can come to know that object subjectively. Again, since subjectivity is simply the act of a mind, or a subject, trying to know the object, we can eliminate the word subjectivity and simply state "An object exists independently and we can come to know that object truthfully". Nothing is lost by removing the term subjectivity when it is a redundant term.

I read the rest of your comments and think I understand what you are going for now, so I'll restart from my original critique again. As always, please correct me when I'm off!

P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.
C: Therefore, moral facts cannot exist. — Bob Ross

Now that I believe I much better understand your approach to subjectivity, I do not understand how you arrived at your conclusion here.

P1 is fine with the clarification that it means "What ought to be is despite what is". This implicitly includes states. For example, reality now vs reality one minute later. There is nothing within the current state explicitly which states it should be some other state. That is for us to judge when comparing this state with another possible state.
P2 is also fine. But lets clarify what you stated in your own terminology.

(

Likewise, a ‘fact’ is a ‘statement which is true’ or, more precisely, ‘a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality’. — Bob Ross

Therefore, we can refine P2 to mean:
Moral facts are judgements that a particular state of reality is preferable over another possible state of reality, and that these judgements are true.

These two statements alone do not lead to your conclusion that moral facts cannot exist. We're missing some steps! All you've done is create definitions. These definitions do not lead to this conclusion. P1 does not lead to any conclusions about P2. You would need to prove that P2 is false before you reached your conclusion. As is, P2 is merely a definition without an assertion of its truth or falsity.

If I had to guess what you were originally going for, I think you were neglecting potential states as part of the moral consideration and simply noting that reality at any time/state could not indicate what it should be in the next state. I understand the intention this way, but it doesn't work because morality does not only consider the current state of reality.

But perhaps the above is irrelevant if we look at your next argument.

1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism]. — Bob Ross

Lets translate this into simpler terms:

1. Moral judgements are made by subjects (minds)
2. Moral judgements are expressions of subjects.
3. At least one moral judgement corresponds with reality.

The problem is this isn't anything meaningful. I can replace "moral judgements" with the word statements, and statements meaning "Any thought, word, belief, or expression".

1. Statements are made by subjects
2. Statements are expressions of subjects.
3. At least one statement corresponds with reality.

Of course, we haven't actually proved number 3 with our setup. The only real conclusion we can make is:
"Either at least one statement is true, or none are true."

I believe you prove that at least one statement is true if you amend the language of the subject to be self-referential, which is fine.

As we can see, all this argument notes is that we can think say or do things, and maybe they correspond with reality. This indicates nothing that should be done. It does not address states of reality as they should be. It does not indicate any criteria as to what defines morality. Is what "should" be done central to the individual, or is there something universal we can all agree on with logic? This is again a problem when you reduce "subjective" to meaning, "Any statement by a subject".

As a comparison with my knowledge theory, if you recall I noted that all knowledge starts with a discrete experience. Which means that all knowledge, language, etc. comes from an experiencer, or a subject. I did not belabor that point. Its very quickly addressed and moved on from because its just a starting point to fix problems from. The idea that you need a subject to think or say anything is a given. The idea that subjects are what consider any moral question is also a given. What can we logically conclude about morality from that starting point? Is there a logic that we must all rationally agree upon which leads to a morality everyone can logically ascertain? Or is morality simply what each individual wants, an expressed desire for singular or cultural ego?

Let me address the remaining points where relevant.

Moral cognitivism is the metaethical position that moral judgments are truth-apt
P1: If moral non-cognitivism is true, then ‘If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi’ is not a logically valid and intelligible conditional statement.

P2: ‘If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi’ is a logically valid and intelligible conditional statement.

C: Therefore, moral non-cognitivism is false. — Bob Ross

Let me break this down further:

1. Moral cognitivism is the idea that there are true moral judgments
2. Assume moral cognitivism is false, that there are no moral judgements which are true.
3. I have the moral statement: "When I am drunk, I shouldn't drive and instead call a taxi."
4. Holding to point 2, this moral judgement is not true.
5. But point 3 is true.
C: Therefore moral cognitivism is true.

The problem is point 5 has not been proven to be true. A logically valid and intelligible conditional statement may very well not be true. What is true is a correlation with reality. A logically valid and intelligible conditional has not been proven to always be true.

But, you then attempt to prove that there is at least one moral judgement that is true. And if that is the case we can replace point 3 with that true statement and the argument will work.

P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to ‘lie down and starve to death’.

P2: People do not ‘lie down and starve to death’.

C: Therefore, some moral judgments must be true. — Bob Ross

Here was my original statement and your reply.

P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to ‘lie down and starve to death’. — Bob Ross

(Me)This statement is a contradiction. If there are no moral judgements, then there is nothing one has to do. Therefore one would not have to 'lie down and starve to death'.

(You) Not quite. I was claiming that doing something entails at a minimum the concession that it is morally permissible; so if one can’t even agree that it is permissible to do X, then they can’t do X because they don’t affirm that it is permissible. I think you would have to contend with the collapse of morals into actions to say that one can do something even if they don’t find it morally permissible. — Bob Ross

But if there are no true moral judgements, then we don't have to consider that there is anything morally permissible. There is nothing to permit or deny. Meaning my objection still holds.

Alright, a rather long one from me! I'm still off for the holidays so I have time on my hands. I'm enjoying the exploration Bob, keep at it!

AmadeusD

I think you would have to contend with the collapse of morals into actions to say that one can do something even if they don’t find it morally permissible.
— Bob Ross

But if there are no true moral judgements, then we don't have to consider that there is anything morally permissible. There is nothing to permit or deny. Meaning my objection still holds. — Philosophim

I'm unsure whether this little observation i'm about to make is really relevant, so apologies if something in the exchange I have missed would indicate i'm being redundant..

If there are no true moral judgements, one need not include 'morality' in their considerations of an action. I'm unsure how a lack of 'true' moral judgements would entail inaction. It merely means one cannot use morality as a worthy benchmark for action or inaction.
I understand the whole donkey w/two foods TE, but that assumes an equal morality in the two options. If there is not a true moral position to be taken, what's the obstacle to action?

Bob Ross

↪Philosophim

My apologies! I reskimmed and missed it. Your argument is dense, so I did not retain it after I had finished reading your OP the first time. That's on me. :)

Absolutely no worries! I do the same thing all the time!

If all statements are subjective, why not just say "statement"? "Subjective statement" is redundant at that point as there is no contrast. The term subjective is only uniquely useful in contrast with an "objective statement".

I think you are thinking that the term ‘subjective’ only has any meaning in relation to a statement itself, which I don’t agree with. Of course, a ‘subjective statement’ is redundant, but a ‘statement that expresses something subjective’ is not.

Subjectivity is useful insofar as it is contrasted with objectivity, which statements are categorized under the former. Statements are always contingent on the stance and mind of a subject...unless your are a platonist (;

If you eliminate the vocabulary of objective statement, then you may as well eliminate the term "subjective statement" as well.

I never used the term ‘subjective statement’: I would just say ‘statement’. I am not sure what the contention is here. Moral subjectivism has three prongs to its thesis, and prong 2 is that moral judgments express something subjective: this is not redundant.

There is still the question of making a statement in regards to utilizing only your personal viewpoint, or making a statement that can be logically agreed upon by all potential viewpoints.

I would say there is no such thing as analyzing a statement completely sans one’s viewpoint. A statement is generated by one’s viewpoint; and the use of logic doesn’t make the statement objective: the statement can express something which is objective, such as the use of logic.

‘trueness’ is the property ascribed to statements of which what they allege of (refer to about) reality correspond/agree with reality with respect to that specific regard — Bob Ross

What you've done here is make trueness subjective.

Not at all. The statement is subjective, and it’s correspondence is what it true; and that truth is not dependent on the statement.

But to say that it is neither objective nor subjective is false. To be mind independent is to be free of any mind. To be mind dependent is to have at least an iota of mind in there. :) It is still mind dependent, as without a mind, you cannot make a true statement.

This is by-at-large a fair critique. I would say that the correspondence of thought and reality is itself objective because that relationship exists mind-independently. My original reasoning was that truth being the correspondence of thought with reality would make it dependent on thought and reality and therefore it is neither subjective nor objective but, rather, a mixture of both. However, I recognize that the actual relationship (which is truth) of thought and reality such that they correspond exists mind-independently. So truth is objective and absolute. Good point Philosophim!

This is again the problem of 'everything is now subjective' and it devalues any meaning to the term.

I was just saying that statement are subjective, not that everything is now subjective. The statement can be expressing something objective, and there are things that are objective which are never uttered in a statement.

If the intention is, "What ought to be is despite what is", I agree. This assumes that what is could be something different, which is a core consideration of a moral statement.

The idea is that normativity and objectivity are exclusive categories. It doesn’t matter what is the case nor what potentially could be the case nor what would be the case but, rather, only what should be the case.

You cannot come to know something objective according to your terminology. Objectivity is mind independent. Meaning that its existence is what is without any mind ever attempting to correspond to it.

I disagree. We come to know what is objective through reasoning and observance. We intuit that there is stuff which exists without us trying to think about them and that is what is objective.

Once any attempt at correspondence is made, it is now subjective, or mind dependent

No. The claim or statement is trying to express something objective. Of course, we only approach the limit of what objectively is out there; but that doesn’t mean that it doesn’t exist nor that we don’t have good reasons to believe it does. It is uncontroversial that we are subjects and everything we directly know is mind-dependent because that is the filter by which we come to know the objective things—this doesn’t mean that those objective things aren’t there.

"An object exists independently and we can come to know that object truthfully".

This just begs the question by invoking “truthfully”; as truth is the correspondence of thought (subjectivity) with reality (objectivity).

Likewise, a ‘fact’ is a ‘statement which is true’ or, more precisely, ‘a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality’. — Bob Ross

Therefore, we can refine P2 to mean:
Moral facts are judgements that a particular state of reality is preferable over another possible state of reality, and that these judgements are true.

Moral facticity is not just what you described there. If a fact is a statement that corresponds to reality such that what it purports thereof is and ‘moral’ language signifies ‘what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory’, then a moral fact is a statement which accurately purports a state-of-affairs about reality that in virtue of which makes the moral judgment true (and thusly a fact). This means that there are states-of-affairs, if there are moral facts, that do inform us how reality ought to be, which violates P1.

As is, P2 is merely a definition without an assertion of its truth or falsity.

P2 is a description of what a ‘moral fact’ is based off of my correspondence theory of truth and my analysis of what ‘moral’ language signifies. To disagree with it is to disagree with one or both of those theories which are prerequisites to my metaethical theory. We can certainly discuss those if you would like!

If I had to guess what you were originally going for, I think you were neglecting potential states as part of the moral consideration and simply noting that reality at any time/state could not indicate what it should be in the next state

A potential state of reality in the sense of what could possibly happen due to the current state does not inform us of what ought to be either. You could tell me “this ball will probably hit this other ball” and I would not know from that claim anything normative, although I would know something about the next potential state of reality.

Likewise, you telling me “well, this could happen and if combine with what is happening then this should happen” and I don’t think that is valid: I cannot infer from something possibly happening nor what is happening what ought to happen.

But perhaps the above is irrelevant if we look at your next argument.
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism]. — Bob Ross

Just for clarification, this is not an argument I gave—it is a thesis. The arguments for those three prongs of the thesis are different and after this portion of the OP.

Lets translate this into simpler terms:
1. Moral judgements are made by subjects (minds)
2. Moral judgements are expressions of subjects.
3. At least one moral judgement corresponds with reality.

#1 here is not a summary of prong-1 (of the thesis). Prong-1 is moral cognitivism, which is the view that moral judgments are truth-apt statements (i.e., propositions) and not that moral judgments are made by subjects.

#2 is also false. Moral judgments expressing something subjective is not the same thing as judgments being expressions of subjects. Again, this is a conflation between statements and judgments being subjective and whether or not they express something objective/subjective.

#3 True! (:

The problem is this isn't anything meaningful. I can replace "moral judgements" with the word statements, and statements meaning "Any thought, word, belief, or expression".

Each prong is meaningful because it takes a stance on each relevance metaethical dilemma:

1. Are moral judgments propositional? i.e., are they truth-apt? Moral non-cognitivists, like emotivists, will say no...they are conative aspects of our psychology.

2. Are moral judgments expressing something objective? i.e., if there are true moral judgments, then are they true because they correspond to a mind-dependent or mind-independent state-of-affairs?

3. Is there at least one true moral judgment? i.e., do any moral judgments we make, even if they express something objective or subjective, actually correspond to a state-of-affairs in reality? Moral nihilists say no. They say that, yes, moral judgments express something objective but none of them are true.

Of course, we haven't actually proved number 3 with our setup.

Again, my thesis isn’t an argument. The arguments for each prong are titles with that prong number and the name that was in brackets.

As we can see, all this argument notes is that we can think say or do things, and maybe they correspond with reality. This indicates nothing that should be done.

It indicates what moral properties subsist in or of and what their nature is. Of course it doesn’t indicate what should be done, because it isn’t a normative ethical theory. That’s what I was trying to convey in the other thread! Metaethical theories should not be conflated with normative theories!

It does not indicate any criteria as to what defines morality

Depends on what you mean. It certainly answers what the nature of morality is and what moral properties subsist in or of and answers various metatethical concerns underpinning normative ethics.

Is what "should" be done central to the individual, or is there something universal we can all agree on with logic?
…
Is there a logic that we must all rationally agree upon which leads to a morality everyone can logically ascertain?

This is a false dilemma. Logic is just the form of an argument, and the logic involved in any substantive and sophisticated metaethical theory is going to be sound. Something being logically consistent does not make it something one should believe.

I agree, for example, that the logic is sound with moral non-naturalism; but that doesn’t make the theory true.

1. Moral cognitivism is the idea that there are true moral judgments.
…
But, you then attempt to prove that there is at least one moral judgement that is true. And if that is the case we can replace point 3 with that true statement and the argument will work.

No. Moral cognitivism is that moral judgments are statements that are truth-apt. Whether or not any of them are true needs a different argument because it is a different claim.

1. Moral cognitivism is the idea that there are true moral judgments
2. Assume moral cognitivism is false, that there are no moral judgements which are true.
3. I have the moral statement: "When I am drunk, I shouldn't drive and instead call a taxi."
4. Holding to point 2, this moral judgement is not true.
5. But point 3 is true.
C: Therefore moral cognitivism is true.

The problem is point 5 has not been proven to be true

That’s fine, the point was to provide a basic syllogism that gives an argument for why one would be a moral cognitivism. At the end of the day, this is going to boil down to intuitions. It seems to be very clear that P2 is true, but of course you could deny that. It seems perfectly logically valid: I see nothing wrong with it with respect to its logical form; but if moral cognitivism is true then there has to be something wrong with its logical form because it is non-propositional.

But if there are no true moral judgements, then we don't have to consider that there is anything morally permissible. There is nothing to permit or deny. Meaning my objection still holds.

I think you are trying to step outside of morality, but I say that action implicitly concedes that morality exists. You cannot go and eat a sandwich without implicitly, in action, conceding it is morally permissible to do. You can say “morality doesn’t exist”, but your actions do not match your words.

Alright, a rather long one from me! I'm still off for the holidays so I have time on my hands. I'm enjoying the exploration Bob, keep at it!

As always, great points! I always enjoy our conversations!

Bob

Leontiskos

If X in “Jane believes X” was “vanilla ice cream tastes good”, then I don’t think you have a hard time seeing why your analogy to math fails. — Bob Ross

But “Vanilla ice cream tastes good,” is nothing like, “One ought not torture babies.” Only from the latter can we infer something about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory. According to your own definitions, the former is not a moral statement. Again, the simple fact that someone believes something cannot make anything permissible, omissible, or obligatory. This is all the more obviously the case when it comes to claims about other moral agents, such as the general permissibility of torturing babies.

The belief is what makes the judgment true in moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross

A belief never makes a moral judgment true. “Why is it impermissible for me to torture babies?” “Because I believe it is.” That’s simply not a valid reason. No one is obliged to not-torture babies because you believe it to be so.

For example, let’s go back to the “Jane believes ice cream tastes good”: does this belief not in virtue of its own judgment make it true? I think so. — Bob Ross

The example is irrelevant because it is non-moral, having nothing to do with what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory.

But the tangential point is that you are confusing all sorts of things even in this case. “Jane believes ice cream tastes good,” is a third-person proposition, and what you say of it is obviously false. A first-person statement like, “I feel pain,” is infallible, but belief statements are not like this. To say, “I believe I feel pain,” is therefore already confused, and is therefore an unused sort of locution. The same holds with, “I enjoy ice cream”/“I believe I enjoy ice cream.” Infallible statements are usually not belief statements, and to make them so is to stretch the sense of 'belief'. But again, these are non-moral according to your definition in the OP.

I find nothing incoherent with “Jane believes everyone should not torture babies” even though it is only true relative to herself—I would imagine you beg to differ on that one (; — Bob Ross

Of course I differ. On your account Jane utters self-apparent falsehoods. If I said, “Leontiskos believes everyone has brown hair,” this would be a false statement, and particularly problematic insofar as I know that not everyone has brown hair. Saying that it is “true relative to myself” is a non-response. The statement is about people other than myself, and therefore its truth value must take into account more than just myself. Appeals to subjective reasons for supra-subjective claims are insufficient, and therefore irrational.

Cognitive approval/disapproval, — Bob Ross

The same contradiction arises here. If I disapprove of something for myself, it does not follow that I disapprove of it in others. And if I disapprove of it in others without sufficient reason to do so, then I am being irrational. Subjectivist reasons are insufficient reasons. It would be exactly as insufficient to say that someone should eat chocolate ice cream because I like chocolate ice cream. This is irrational. Private reasons for public claims are irrational reasons. A public claim requires a public reason.

Look, do you yourself even think personal/subjective reasons are able to justify claims about other persons? The reason it is irrational to say that someone should eat chocolate ice cream on the basis of my own idiosyncratic taste is because the putative reason does not have justificatory force for the sort of claim in question. This seems quite obvious, and I would be surprised if you are unwilling to admit it. Your deeper claim seems to be, "Yes, it is irrational. But your moral realism is irrational too, so I am justified in doing this." But even if moral realism were irrational, this would not justify you in doing irrational things.

AmadeusD

“Because I believe it is.” — Leontiskos

Is the only coherent justification for moral truth other than divine command presented, though.

Leontiskos

Is the only coherent justification for moral truth other than divine command presented, though. — AmadeusD

I was arguing that it is not coherent. No one would ever say, "Oh, well if you believe it, then I surely must accede."

The moral realist will say that you should follow the moral precept because it is true. It is true that you should not torture babies. This route is open to justification and reasoning. Unlike belief, truth is a sufficient reason. A belief matters if it is true, and it is never true merely because it is believed.

A Case for Moral Subjectivism

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