Oh, I been in the back of the room, keeping my head down, taking notes.
A Kantian with respect to moral subjectivism I’ll admit. Ethics is more than that, I think.
Objective moral principle is like world peace. One can wish for it, visualize it, even figure out how to do it, but understands even if he does it, there’s precious little reason to expect anybody else to follow suit.
Since ‘moral’ language signifies ‘what one considers permissible, omissible, or obligatory’, it follows that any action a person commits implicitly concedes some moral truth. — Bob Ross
P2: There are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective. — Bob Ross
For moral subjectivists, they are not expressing something objective when stating ‘one ought not torture babies for fun’ because it is colloquial short-hand for ‘I believe one ought not torture babies for fun [and that is an upshot of my psychology]’. If a moral subjectivist is deploying those sort of moral judgments as if they express something objective, then they simply aren’t moral subjectivists (or they are confused). — Bob Ross
The second common objection is that enforcing preferences (i.e., non-factual moral judgments) is unfair, wrong, and impermissible. — Bob Ross
The third most common objection is that there is no moral disagreement if moral subjectivism is true, and this seems implausible. If ‘I believe one ought not torture babies’ is a moral judgment which expresses something subjective, then it appears as though one person can affirm this proposition (validly) and another disaffirm it (validly): so what disagreement could possibly be had if there is no fact-of-the-matter to dispute? I contend that this is an invalid importation of a moral realist’s metaethical framework, of which is baked-into, implicitly, the concept of ‘disagreement’. There is still disagreement in morals even if moral judgments express something subjective and it is useful to have moral conversations: it just doesn’t quite look the same under a moral subjectivist’s metaethical framework—the concept of ‘disagreement’ looks different. When one affirms ‘one ought not do X’ and someone else disaffirms it, then they can engage in a fruitful moral discussion... — Bob Ross
Or would you just say you agree with only Kant's metaphysics that are not about ethics? — Bob Ross
I am glad to see that you are trying to get away from the taste-based idea we discussed a few days ago.
I think this idea that the sphere of morality encompasses all acts is absolutely correct, and you are the first TPF member I have seen to explicitly accept this view. I also think your arguments for moral cognitivism are sound.
Your ability to revise your views is laudable.
Logically, Prong-2.P2 is the heart of subjectivism and yet it receives no positive support or elaboration. You don't even say what a subjective, binding truth is supposed to be, or how it could work.
P2: There are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective.
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Either something is an expression of something objective (and in virtue of that at least a candidate of being factual) or it is subjective; therefore, if prong-2 of moral realism is false and there are true moral judgments, then they must be beliefs of which are the upshot of one’s psychology.
Your disjunctive syllogism is something like, "A or B or C. We have good reasons to reject A and B. Therefore, C." The problem is that we also have good reasons to reject C.
This could be the central contradiction in your system. I think this commits you to the idea that there are objective truths which are not grounded in objective realities, which seems to be a contradiction. More concisely, "subjective truth" is chimerical (i.e. it is something which may seem attainable at first, but always fades into the horizon like a mirage). More on this. . .
After all, what is the "truth" of moral cognitivism if not objective truth? Isn't all truth 'objective' in this relevant sense?
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This could be the central contradiction in your system. I think this commits you to the idea that there are objective truths which are not grounded in objective realities, which seems to be a contradiction. More concisely, "subjective truth" is chimerical (i.e. it is something which may seem attainable at first, but always fades into the horizon like a mirage). More on this. . .
When one states, "I believe one ought not torture babies for fun," I would interpret that to mean, "I believe it is objectively true that one ought not torture babies for fun."
A non-factual moral judgment is not a preference. More, a preference is not a judgment of truth. To affirm a moral proposition is to make a judgment, not to have a preference. Preferences are not judgments and judgments are not preferences.
For the realist a truth, such as 12*12=144, is objective and subjective, in the sense that it is objectively true and yet it is always and only ever known and appropriated by an individual subject. Objective truths are known by subjects. For the moral realist it is the same. "Do not torture babies for fun," is an objective truth, known by a subject.
If a truth is not universally knowable, then it cannot be universally binding;
Offhand I can think of two kinds of subjective truths: truths known by a subject on the basis of private information; and truths made true by a subject's intentions. For example, "I enjoy pock-marked lilies," and, "Tomorrow I am going to wear my ugly Christmas sweater." The first sort cannot function as a universally binding moral truth because it is not universally known to all.
This could be the central contradiction in your system. I think this commits you to the idea that there are objective truths which are not grounded in objective realities, which seems to be a contradiction. More concisely, "subjective truth" is chimerical (i.e. it is something which may seem attainable at first, but always fades into the horizon like a mirage). — Leontiskos
If a truth is not universally knowable, then it cannot be universally binding; and if the ground of a truth is accessible to only a single subject, then it is not universally knowable. — Leontiskos
If a truth is not universally knowable, then it cannot be universally binding; and if the ground of a truth is accessible to only a single subject, then it is not universally knowable. Offhand I can think of two kinds of subjective truths: truths known by a subject on the basis of private information; and truths made true by a subject's intentions. — Leontiskos
Our minds do not—contrary to many views currently popular—create truth. Rather, they must be conformed to the truth of things given in creation. And such conformity is possible only as the moral virtues become deeply embedded in our character, a slow and halting process. We have “lost the awareness of the close bond that links the knowing of truth to the condition of purity.” That is, in order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort. The full transformation of character that we need will, in fact, finally require the virtues of faith, hope, and love. And this transformation will not necessarily—perhaps not often—be experienced by us as easy or painless. Hence the transformation of self that we must—by God’s grace—undergo “perhaps resembles passing through something akin to dying.”
I appreciate your elaborate, substantive, and thought-provoking response! Hopefully, I can adequately respond.
I think the heart of our disagreement (and correct me if I am wrong) is twofold:
1. A lack of a positive account of pronge-2 P2 of the moral subjectivist thesis; and
2. The implications of true moral judgments expressing something subjective (e.g., is that even possible?). — Bob Ross
...then the only option left is that they express something objective. Sure, this is a negative argument, in a sense,... — Bob Ross
My only point here is that if you believe that we have good reasons to reject C, then you can’t agree with me that !A and !B... — Bob Ross
Under moral subjectivism, when taken literally, ‘one ought not torture babies for fun’ is not true, not cognitive, and not a (valid) moral judgment but, rather, must be rewritten as ‘I believe one ought not torture babies for fun’. The latter is cognitive (being a fact about one’s psychology), is true in my case, is a valid moral judgment. — Bob Ross
For you it is sentences which at least validly purport facts which do not pertain to our psychology... — Bob Ross
Admittedly, I need to spruce up my terminology on this point in the essay, because I see how I made this part a bit confusing. By non-factual moral judgment, I just meant that the disapproval, the preference, which underlies the psychological fact that “I believe one ought not torture babies”, is non-factual (which is exactly why I call it a preference). Technically, saying they are non-factual moral judgments is contradictory to what I outlined above as a moral judgment (which is the belief, not the underlying non-factual preference). So, yes, I agree that preferences are not moral judgments, but I would say that moral judgments are the upshot of those preferences. I will add this to the essay in a little while (when I have time). — Bob Ross
That’s true. I should have made this more clear in the OP: the truth is the indexical belief which is universal insofar as either one does indeed have the belief or they don’t, thusly making truth absolute and expressing something objective (even though it is just a fact about one’s psychology, which is an upshot of non-factual dispositions a person has).
‘I believe one ought ...’ is universal insofar as either it is true that the person being referenced by the indexical statement does believe one ought … or they don’t. However, the belief itself, being just an upshot of one’s psychology, is not expressing something objective: it is not latching onto a moral fact out there. — Bob Ross
I don’t think there is such a thing as ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’ truth: truth is absolute, and it is the relationship between subjectivity and objectivity such that thought corresponds with reality. I take it to be two different claims to say “truth is objective/subjective” vs. “this proposition expresses something objective/subjective”. — Bob Ross
This describes the subjective in the former sense. But what if those truths - like life-lessons or existential facts - that can only be understood 'in the first person'? Those that are not objective in the sense of corroborated by third-person measurement but real nonetheless? — Wayfarer
'In order to know the truth we must become persons of a certain sort'. — Wayfarer
Yes, but this is a rather rarefied point. — Leontiskos
I think it's a fundamental point, but one that has been lost sight of. — Wayfarer
Here I would like to add a point about making distinction between 'subjectivity' and 'subjecthood'. It's an awkward distinction to make, but it attempts to distinguish between 'subjective' as in 'pertaining only to an individual' and 'subjective' as in 'pertaining to the state of being a subject', and to facts which can only be truly understood in the first person.
"If a truth is not universally knowable, then it cannot be universally binding; and if the ground of a truth is accessible to only a single subject, then it is not universally knowable." — Leontiskos — Wayfarer
I see the distinction you are trying to make, but I am not convinced that your second category does not collapse back into your first category. Presumably your second category is something along the lines of qualia. But the difficulty is that qualia can be understood through language. I can speak about the perception of red, and you will know what I am talking about given your experiences. — Leontiskos
Were morality to have anything to do with suffering and its absence, for example, and were this to itself be included in the objective category of subjectood as just mentioned, then the truth of morality could be appraised as grounded in subjectood - and this such that it could be universally knowable in principle. — javra
A1. Ceteris paribus, I should not cause suffering for myself
A2. Others are like me
A3. Therefore, ceteris paribus, I should not cause suffering for others — Leontiskos
Yes, but more precisely than (2), "P2: There are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective." It is precisely the non-objectivity that I am concerned with.
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It is entirely negative. It is a disjunctive syllogism, as noted above.
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My point is that rejecting A and B is insufficient when C is also implausible. C must be supported positively.
In your OP, in the section, "A Case for Moral Cognitivism [Prong-1]," you state something quite different. You give a moral proposition about driving drunk and claim it is truth-apt. If we are to argue about this moral proposition then it must be objectively truth-apt.
This is not a moral proposition, but it is truth-apt and objectively true or false. Yet the subject of cognitivism (and binding morality) is moral propositions, not belief propositions.
According to your own OP, mere statements about someone's beliefs are not part of moral language.
No. As noted in your previous thread, I reject your exclusive distinction between what is moral and what is psychological. Beliefs are always psychological, as is the mathematical belief I set out in my last post. No one believes we have non-psychological beliefs.
The truth of a moral statement regards the truth of a moral judgment, and statements about belief are not moral statements. The statement, "Jane believes one should not torture babies," is not a moral statement, it is only a statement about what Jane believes. Jane's statement, "One should not torture babies," is a moral statement, because it pertains to what is "permissible, omissible, or obligatory."
Note that if you claim that Jane's belief is "psychological" in the sense that it is grounded by one of her values, then the exact same question applies to that value. We must then ask if the value is truth-apt, and if so, if it is true or false. Only if the value is true can the moral statement be true (and therefore binding).
Okay, good. Again, the key here is that preferences are not judgments and judgments are not preferences.
The corollary is that truth-apt judgments cannot flow from non truth-apt preferences, unless the judgment is merely about the preference/belief (as explained above)
Yet if it is merely about the preference/belief, then it cannot be moral in the sense you set out (pertaining to what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory).
Statements about belief cannot be binding at all because they are not moral statements
And do you go on to say that the moral subjectivist believes that moral propositions express something subjective?
The ontological reality of suffering differs in certain ways from the ontological reality of mathematics, but I think both propositions are objectively true. — Leontiskos
Hmmm…isn’t “Jane believes one should not torture babies” refer to what is ‘permissible, omissible, or obligatory’? Seems to be to me, even if it is just an expression of what jane subjectively believes. — Bob Ross
If I say either A, B, or C are true and A is false and B is false, then C must be true. If you turn around and say ‘I also think C is false’, then you are wrong about one of them being false. If you think C is false, then which of the other two do you think is true? — Bob Ross
That’s fair. I actually edited this with my addition of an elaboration on how moral judgments express something that is subjective. — Bob Ross
That’s the whole point of contention: moral subjectivism allows moral judgments to be beliefs. — Bob Ross
‘I believe one ought not ...’ is the moral judgment under moral subjectivism and not ‘one ought not...’. It still meets my definition of ‘moral’ signification because it is still a subject-referencing normative statement which expresses ‘what one ought to find permissible, omissible, or obligatory’. — Bob Ross
Correct. Judgments are beliefs. — Bob Ross
I would say that it is the latter in my case, if I am understanding correctly. This is what I mean by the moral judgment (the belief) being an upshot of one’s pyschology and not a moral fact out there. — Bob Ross
Why? “I believe one ought not ...” is expressing something pertaining to what one ought to hold as permissible, omissible, or obligatory, no? — Bob Ross
Statements about belief cannot be binding at all because they are not moral statements. — Leontiskos
Moral judgments (which are beliefs about what one ought to be permissible, omissible, or obligatory under my view) are binding to the subject at hand. I can’t say “I believe one ought not torture babies” and then in the next breath say “but I don’t believe that it is impermissible to torture babies”: which one is it? — Bob Ross
Yes. I am not sure what the contention was here: perhaps I am misunderstanding you. So prong-2 of my thesis is that they express something subjective: a sentence expressing something non-objective is to express something subjective—they mean the same thing to me. Are you saying something could be non-objective and not subjective? — Bob Ross
Perhaps I could revise it to expound more on how moral judgments expressing something non-objective entails it is expressing something subjective. To me, it seems like it is impossible for a statement to express something that is non-objective and non-subjective: truth, on the other hand, is an emergent property, so to speak, of statements’ relationship to reality and is beyond those bounds. — Bob Ross
There is a crucially significant difference. From, "Jane believes X," one cannot infer anything about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory; just as from, "Jane believes 28^28=33.13*10^39," one cannot infer anything about mathematics
Fair enough. I am limiting my involvement, arguing that C is false.
That’s fair. I actually edited this with my addition of an elaboration on how moral judgments express something that is subjective. — Bob Ross
Hmm, okay...
This is equivocal. "I believe X" usually means, "I believe that X is true." You want it to mean, "I happen to hold belief X." You want it to be parallel to, "She believes X." But in the third-person case the ambiguity disappears, because there is no implication that the speaker (the "I") also believes/judges regarding X.
This goes back to that equivocation and I vs. She (and, in the first-person case, belief qua belief vs. belief qua judgment).
A moral judgment is not a statement about belief, it is a statement about what is permissible, omissible, or obligatory. It makes no difference that a belief ends up being about what is moral.
I can say, "She believes X," without myself believing X,
The other thing to note is that to judge that (no)one ought torture babies, is to judge that everyone is bound to not-torture babies (and not merely myself).
And so what is the subjective thing that a moral proposition expresses?
P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.
C: Therefore, moral facts cannot exist. — Bob Ross
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism]. — Bob Ross
‘truth’ is the ‘correspondence/agreement of thought with reality’ — Bob Ross
Within moral subjectivism, the moral judgment is a belief which is the upshot of one’s psychology and it is proposition which is indexical—e.g., ‘I believe one ought not torture babies for fun’ is a moral judgment, and the belief about the belief attempts to determine the truth of the claim: either I believe one ought not to torture babies for fun or I don’t. — Bob Ross
For there to be true moral judgments, is just to say that we have good reasons to believe that some of the truth-apt (cognitive) moral judgments we have are true and thusly binding. — Bob Ross
P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to ‘lie down and starve to death’. — Bob Ross
P1: If there are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective, then they must be an expression of something subjective. — Bob Ross
Hello Bob, I'm happy to explore morality with you on multiple fronts here, as its a very deep topic and requires a lot of consideration from all possible sides.
In very simple terms, this doesn't work because you forgot the possibility of different states of reality.
"Something is subjective if it is dependent on a mind (biases, perception, emotions, opinions, imagination, or conscious experience).
Something is objective if it can be confirmed independent of a mind."
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjectivity_and_objectivity_(philosophy)
I think these are fairly uncontroversial and straight forward definitions, so lets start here.
Now, is truth subjective, or objective?
If there is a true moral judgement, then it must be an objective moral judgement.
"If a claim is true exclusively when considering the claim from the viewpoint of a sentient being, it is subjectively true. For example, one person may consider the weather to be pleasantly warm, and another person may consider the same weather to be too hot; both views are subjective. The word subjectivity comes from subject in a philosophical sense, meaning an individual who possesses unique conscious experiences, such as perspectives, feelings, beliefs, and desires, or who (consciously) acts upon or wields power over some other entity (an object).
If a claim is true even when considering it outside the viewpoint of a sentient being (how ?), then it is labelled objectively true. Scientific objectivity is practicing science while intentionally reducing partiality, biases, or external influences. Moral objectivity is the concept of moral or ethical codes being compared to one another through a set of universal facts or a universal perspective and not through differing conflicting perspectives. Journalistic objectivity is the reporting of facts and news with minimal personal bias or in an impartial or politically neutral manner."
Lets examine the idea of 'subjective truth'. Person A states, "Its hot" while person B states, "Its cool". From their perspectives, this is true. But how is it true? How is it 'in correspondence with reality" if we've claimed truth is objective?
Its because we've left out the implicit information within their statements.
Person A: From my subjective experience, I feel its hot.
Person B: From my subjective experience, I feel its cold.
Bob Ross: From my subjective viewpoint, I believe moral judgements are based on psychology, therefore all moral judgements are based on psychology.
As we can see, this is a subjective claim, and not objective.
Your own definition of truth counters this statement. Your definition of truth indicated no necessity that a person have knowledge or justification of something being true. A true moral judgement simply needs to be in correspondence with reality. The only thing you can state with your definition of truth is:
"For there to be true moral judgments, is just to say that our moral judgement corresponds to reality."
P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to ‘lie down and starve to death’. — Bob Ross
This statement is a contradiction. If there are no moral judgements, then there is nothing one has to do. Therefore one would not have to 'lie down and starve to death'.
P1: If there are true moral judgments and they are not an expression of something objective, then they must be an expression of something subjective. — Bob Ross
Except that if something is true, it is in correspondence with reality objectively. The subjective knowledge or lack of knowledge is irrelevant. Therefore if there are true moral judgements, then they are objective.
After reading I think this all comes down to the terms subjective and objective. Now that I've seen your definition, its necessary they be included in your 'pre-requisites' section
‘Objectivity’ is ‘that which exists mind(stance)-independently’ and ‘subjectivity’ is the negation of objectivity.
If you do not define them specifically, then people are going to assume they are the traditional definitions of subjective and objective. The argument won't go anywhere because they'll think you mean the normative terms, not your revisions.
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As is, your statements about subjective and objective veer wildly from their original intent.
Can you clarify what the (stance) means as well?
Even further, this begs the question that your definition of subjective and objective are true. Why do we need to redefine these terms?
This would be a widely misinterpreted argument to give to others if you've deviated strongly from the terms' original meaning without very carefully clarifying what you mean.
An object can make no objective or subjective judgements. Only a subject can. The reason we have the terms objective and subjective are to give meaning to the judgements a subject makes.
The reason we have the terms objective and subjective are to give meaning to the judgements a subject makes
When you state the term objective means "that which is mind independent", what is 'that'? Is it existence?
After reading I think this all comes down to the terms subjective and objective. Now that I've seen your definition, its necessary they be included in your 'pre-requisites' section
This is already in the OP under ‘Brief Exposition of a Correspondence Theory of Truth’, which, I would say, is where it should be: — Bob Ross
You are saying the same thing I am saying, but less refined. I say there is no such thing as an objective statement because all statements are subjective, you are merely predicating that subjective statement with ‘objective’ if it is true in virtue of corresponding to some mind-independently existing state-of-affairs. — Bob Ross
‘trueness’ is the property ascribed to statements of which what they allege of (refer to about) reality correspond/agree with reality with respect to that specific regard — Bob Ross
(Me) In very simple terms, this doesn't work because you forgot the possibility of different states of reality.
(You) I don’t think comparing potential states of affairs (of reality) helps get around P1. P1 is the claim that it doesn’t matter what is the case about reality at all when it comes to what ought to be: what ought to be is despite what is. — Bob Ross
I would just say that objectivity is that which exists mind(stance)-independently and we come to know it subjectively because we are subjects—what tool can we use that isn’t ultimately contingent on us observing it? — Bob Ross
P1: The way reality is does not entail how it ought to be.
P2: Moral facts are statements about how reality is such that it informs us how it ought to be.
C: Therefore, moral facts cannot exist. — Bob Ross
Likewise, a ‘fact’ is a ‘statement which is true’ or, more precisely, ‘a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality’. — Bob Ross
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism]. — Bob Ross
Moral cognitivism is the metaethical position that moral judgments are truth-apt
P1: If moral non-cognitivism is true, then ‘If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi’ is not a logically valid and intelligible conditional statement.
P2: ‘If I [believe I] ought not drive drunk, then when I am drunk I should call a taxi’ is a logically valid and intelligible conditional statement.
C: Therefore, moral non-cognitivism is false. — Bob Ross
P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to ‘lie down and starve to death’.
P2: People do not ‘lie down and starve to death’.
C: Therefore, some moral judgments must be true. — Bob Ross
P1: If there are no true moral judgments, then one would have to ‘lie down and starve to death’. — Bob Ross
(Me)This statement is a contradiction. If there are no moral judgements, then there is nothing one has to do. Therefore one would not have to 'lie down and starve to death'.
(You) Not quite. I was claiming that doing something entails at a minimum the concession that it is morally permissible; so if one can’t even agree that it is permissible to do X, then they can’t do X because they don’t affirm that it is permissible. I think you would have to contend with the collapse of morals into actions to say that one can do something even if they don’t find it morally permissible. — Bob Ross
I think you would have to contend with the collapse of morals into actions to say that one can do something even if they don’t find it morally permissible.
— Bob Ross
But if there are no true moral judgements, then we don't have to consider that there is anything morally permissible. There is nothing to permit or deny. Meaning my objection still holds. — Philosophim
My apologies! I reskimmed and missed it. Your argument is dense, so I did not retain it after I had finished reading your OP the first time. That's on me. :)
If all statements are subjective, why not just say "statement"? "Subjective statement" is redundant at that point as there is no contrast. The term subjective is only uniquely useful in contrast with an "objective statement".
If you eliminate the vocabulary of objective statement, then you may as well eliminate the term "subjective statement" as well.
There is still the question of making a statement in regards to utilizing only your personal viewpoint, or making a statement that can be logically agreed upon by all potential viewpoints.
Not at all. The statement is subjective, and it’s correspondence is what it true; and that truth is not dependent on the statement.‘trueness’ is the property ascribed to statements of which what they allege of (refer to about) reality correspond/agree with reality with respect to that specific regard — Bob Ross
What you've done here is make trueness subjective.
But to say that it is neither objective nor subjective is false. To be mind independent is to be free of any mind. To be mind dependent is to have at least an iota of mind in there. :) It is still mind dependent, as without a mind, you cannot make a true statement.
This is again the problem of 'everything is now subjective' and it devalues any meaning to the term.
If the intention is, "What ought to be is despite what is", I agree. This assumes that what is could be something different, which is a core consideration of a moral statement.
You cannot come to know something objective according to your terminology. Objectivity is mind independent. Meaning that its existence is what is without any mind ever attempting to correspond to it.
Once any attempt at correspondence is made, it is now subjective, or mind dependent
"An object exists independently and we can come to know that object truthfully".
Likewise, a ‘fact’ is a ‘statement which is true’ or, more precisely, ‘a statement which is truth-apt (i.e., a proposition) which corresponds appropriately with reality’. — Bob Ross
Therefore, we can refine P2 to mean:
Moral facts are judgements that a particular state of reality is preferable over another possible state of reality, and that these judgements are true.
As is, P2 is merely a definition without an assertion of its truth or falsity.
If I had to guess what you were originally going for, I think you were neglecting potential states as part of the moral consideration and simply noting that reality at any time/state could not indicate what it should be in the next state
But perhaps the above is irrelevant if we look at your next argument.
1. Moral judgments are propositional [moral cognitivism]; and
2. Moral judgments express something subjective [moral non-objectivism]; and
3. There is at least one true moral judgment [moral non-nihilism]. — Bob Ross
Lets translate this into simpler terms:
1. Moral judgements are made by subjects (minds)
2. Moral judgements are expressions of subjects.
3. At least one moral judgement corresponds with reality.
The problem is this isn't anything meaningful. I can replace "moral judgements" with the word statements, and statements meaning "Any thought, word, belief, or expression".
Of course, we haven't actually proved number 3 with our setup.
As we can see, all this argument notes is that we can think say or do things, and maybe they correspond with reality. This indicates nothing that should be done.
It does not indicate any criteria as to what defines morality
Is what "should" be done central to the individual, or is there something universal we can all agree on with logic?
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Is there a logic that we must all rationally agree upon which leads to a morality everyone can logically ascertain?
1. Moral cognitivism is the idea that there are true moral judgments.
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But, you then attempt to prove that there is at least one moral judgement that is true. And if that is the case we can replace point 3 with that true statement and the argument will work.
1. Moral cognitivism is the idea that there are true moral judgments
2. Assume moral cognitivism is false, that there are no moral judgements which are true.
3. I have the moral statement: "When I am drunk, I shouldn't drive and instead call a taxi."
4. Holding to point 2, this moral judgement is not true.
5. But point 3 is true.
C: Therefore moral cognitivism is true.
The problem is point 5 has not been proven to be true
But if there are no true moral judgements, then we don't have to consider that there is anything morally permissible. There is nothing to permit or deny. Meaning my objection still holds.
Alright, a rather long one from me! I'm still off for the holidays so I have time on my hands. I'm enjoying the exploration Bob, keep at it!
If X in “Jane believes X” was “vanilla ice cream tastes good”, then I don’t think you have a hard time seeing why your analogy to math fails. — Bob Ross
The belief is what makes the judgment true in moral subjectivism. — Bob Ross
For example, let’s go back to the “Jane believes ice cream tastes good”: does this belief not in virtue of its own judgment make it true? I think so. — Bob Ross
I find nothing incoherent with “Jane believes everyone should not torture babies” even though it is only true relative to herself—I would imagine you beg to differ on that one (; — Bob Ross
Cognitive approval/disapproval, — Bob Ross
“Because I believe it is.” — Leontiskos
Is the only coherent justification for moral truth other than divine command presented, though. — AmadeusD
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