When I think about it deeply, I am skeptical about such coherent ontology of the individual where the causo-historico thing has any signicance beyond a kind of bookkeeping role of keeping track of things. — Apustimelogist
Simply because if one is skeptical about a coherent ontology for identity then there is nothing for it to be potent about. All it would then be about is labelling things and keeping track of those labels. — Apustimelogist
All chains are selections from the many interconnections of the web. When we articulate a specific causal chain, we make decisions about where it starts and where it finishes, to suit the needs of the moment. But if we attend to the context and recognize the web, we can see that those are decisions, not facts. I can understand why some people would like to think that the causal chain that you select is important. But other choices are equally valid. There's no magic about the fertilization of egg by sperm. Many people would high-light birth as the magic moment and this makes perfect sense when you remember that we do not know about your magic moment, except by inference. I'm deeply suspicious of these ideas, as you can guess by what I call them. The growth and development of a person is a complicated and lengthy process, not an instantaneous creation.So sure, all that causally does have to be in place, and I am not denying that this causal chain has to be in place. However, the terminus for which this has to take place, where otherwise you would not even be there in the first place to reflect back is the conception. Anything after that, could still be a version of you, perhaps. Anything before would not even be a version of you, but a version of someone else. It would be someone else's range of possibilities (including the actualized one there is now looking back). — schopenhauer1
I would agree that the intention of the speaker is important in recognizing what is being referred to. In some cases, where I have misunderstood what the term refers to (I think that "mule" also refers to "donkey"), I need to be corrected. But this is an awkward case. Kripke, if I have him right, says that when I refer to Hesperus, I am referring to Venus, whether or not I know that Hesperus is Venus. This is all very well, so long as the context of use is shared between both parties. But if I don't know that Hesperus is Venus, my use of the term will be incomprehensible to you.Meant I should reconsider some things because I think people are actually referring to what they say they are referring to. The difference between "water" and "H2O", in a technical sense, seems to depend on this. If what people really mean by "water" is "H2O" then I have no case at all. — Moliere
Perhaps it would be better to think of what is going on as simplification. We have to decide (and agree) what features of the world are important in a particular context and need to be attended to and which are not.It seems to be idealizations everywhere though. Even if you want to go past the idealization of water=H2O, then the less idealized descriptions will include idealizations as per the nature of chemistry where various models still involve idealization. — Apustimelogist
Can you define, "What counts"? — schopenhauer1
Yes, individuation is a social activity. Language is not private. And yes, there are differing, and even inconsistent ways of individuating the things around us.That's ok so far as it goes. — Ludwig V
The advantage of possible world semantics is that it provides a way of talking about counterfactuals that we know to be consistent. It is important to note that possible world semantics is extensional. There will be intensional word uses not captured by an extensional system.My thought here is that in common usage we don't distinguish between the elements that are within a glass of water. — Moliere
Yep, we may well choose to do that. I\'m just pointing out that doing so is making a choice, not just making an observation. Moliere, ice is also water, but not wet....biological organisms can generally be identified by their DNA — Janus
Here again is the common distinction between sense and reference, between extension and intension. Possible World Semantics is extensional.I don't think people necessarily really mean h2O when they say water. — Apustimelogist
Perhaps it would be better to think of what is going on as simplification. We have to decide (and agree) what features of the world are important in a particular context and need to be attended to and which are not. — Ludwig V
The advantage of possible world semantics is that it provides a way of talking about counterfactuals that we know to be consistent. It is important to note that possible world semantics is extensional. There will be intensional word uses not captured by an extensional system.
Superman is Clark Kent, and extensionally Superman sometimes wears glasses - when he is dressed as Clark Kent.
A glass of pure H₂O just is a glass of pure water, and an impure glass of water just is an impure glass of H₂O. The lone water molecule floating through space is not wet. Moliere, you are drawing out intensional differences, and so far as they go that is fine, but extensionally these differences are simply dropped. ↪Janus already made this point. B ut I can see no reason to supose that there are not free individual water molecules. — Banno
Moliere, ice is also water, but not wet. — Banno
...if it can be shown that "H₂O" and "water" have different extensions then you'd accept that they are different individuals? — Moliere
Well, the contention is that if water = H₂O then ☐water =H₂O. — Banno
I wouldn't characterise what you said as a misuse. There is a difference in sense between "water" and "H₂O". John can believe that liquid water is wet but not that liquid H₂O is wet... Or protest against those evil moguls who put dihydrogen monoxide in his drinking water. — Banno
I see the clear odorless liquid coming out of the faucet and presume it's H₂O — Moliere
It is very unlikely to be pure H2O. — Janus
You could make an argument that because water commonly contains all sorts of solutes and is yet still referred to as "water" that 'water' is therefore not equivalent to H2O. The truth or falsity of such an argument would depend on perspective, though, so perhaps there is no unequivocal fact of the matter there. — Janus
But now we find that water is H₂O, and we decide to only call things "water" if they have the atomic structure H₂O. So we decide that "water = H₂O" is true, and add that ☐water = H₂O. In doing this we remove access to those possible worlds in which water is not H₂O, effectively pruning the tree of possible worlds.
But only if.
So I don't see a problem with your syllogism as such; it's just that if we take water = H₂O, the second premise is false, and if not, it isn't. — Banno
All good questions. I think we are getting into accessibility relations. So in our natural language we would like to say that it's possible that water is not H₂O, and hence in some possible worlds water is not H₂O, and this does not seem outlandish. We can picture these possible worlds as related to the actual world. — Banno
Ok. So we have an end to this part of the discussion? — Banno
Relating this back to the topic, If someone is identical to their genetics, then (arguably) they are neceisarrily identical to their genetics.
If.
The same answer the Spartans gave Athens — Banno
I'm wondering if the premises from causation could act as a kind of support for the implication. — Moliere
I am denying objective identity and so I am denying that the developmental trajectory of an organism is deeply intwined with some objective identity. The organism is a collection of components, always changing, always in flux, taking things in from the environment, spitting things back out. There is no essential self there. — Apustimelogist
John Searle gives the most complete explanation. I think I;ve already pointed you to the thread on Institutional Facts. — Banno
I asked whether you thought causality didn't exist somehow if there are no labels for it. — schopenhauer1
Nothing I've said should be understood as suggesting otherwise.For example, clearly "individuals" don't need to be picked out with words, or so it would seem to me. There are individual animals, etc all prior to humans designating this or that thing "an individual". — schopenhauer1
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