... what we experience in the dream cannot be real. So, what we are directly acquainted with cannot be the real thing, but our perception of the real thing. — Ashriel

P1 if we were directly acquainted with external objects, then hallucinatory and veridical experiences would be subjectively distinct — Ashriel

feedback — Ashriel

P1 if we were directly acquainted with external objects, then hallucinatory and veridical experiences would be subjectively distinct
P2 hallucinatory and veridical experiences are not subjectively distinct(i.e., subjectively identical)
P3 therefore, we are not directly acquainted with external objects — Ashriel

P1 if there is a long causal process between the object that we perceive and our perception of the object, then we do not know the object directly
P2 there is a long causal process between the object that we perceive and our perception of the object
P3 therefore, we do not know the object directly — Ashriel

However, on Direct Realism, it is far more surprising that skepticism is a possibility. If what we directly know is the external world, then how could it be that it is possible that what we know and the external world do not correspond, if they are indeed identical?

Concepts - The notion of a "concept" is notoriously muddy. It not obvious that my conceptual understanding of a concept like "Hegelian dialectical," or "Marxism," is the same sort of thing as the way in which my visual cortex organizes sensory input into the experience of "seeing a flower." The first exists (only?) in recursive self-awareness and can be articulated to other people via words. The second seems impossible to even get into recursive self-awareness, let alone communicate. Neuroscience cannot proceed by my describing how it is I use these unconscious processes to turn visual input into the image of a flower, nor can I communicate how I achieve it. I am unaware of these "concepts." Further, the second sort of concept seems "necessary," for the cognitive acts that give rise to the first. I cannot come up with an articulation of what flowers are if my sensory system cannot distinguish them. Lower animals certainly have the second type of concept, but it seems doubtful they have the first.

Indeed, I am only really aware that I am using the second type of concepts when I begin to suffer from agnosia or have a stroke, etc. And even then, the experiences that people who suffer from these ailments describe is one of absence, they are not able to diagnose themselves. Whereas if I forget what "Hegelian dialectical," is, I am aware of this inability to recall or the fuzzyness of the concept. Nor does it seem like I have a "concept" of every particular shade of green, yellow, and brown I see when I look at my lawn in the same way that I have a concept of "the United States." So, to the extent that some forms of indirect realism make their claims about anthropology and perception by conflating these two notions of the word "concept," they seem to be open to attack. And note that the brain areas that appear to be involved in both notions of the term "concept," appear to be quite different as well.

Phenomenological Inseparability - This leads into another problem, that of the defining feature of indirect realism, the claim that "we experience mental representations." The problem here is well summarized in the Routledge Contemporary Introduction to Phenomenology, which comes up with a comical list of excerpts of philosophers and scientists trying to describe phenomenal awareness without reference to the things being experienced. These invariably degenerate into just describing the things being experienced, "the taste of coffee," or "the red of a balloon floating in my room," or else become unintelligible nonsense like "I am perceiving hotly," and "I am smelling bitterly."

The point intentionalists (and some direct realists) make here is that there seems to be absolutely no daylight between the perception and the objects perceived. We seem perfectly able to communicate our experiences to one another in some ways, but it becomes impossible to do so if we focus on the perception side of "perceiving representations," by themselves. It leads to incoherence. And, so they argue, this shows that there is no distinct ontological entity that might be called a "mental representation," that is experienced by a "perceiver who perceives them." Nor is there really good empirical reasons to divorce the two. Where does neuroscience say representation occurs versus the perception of representation? It doesn't say anything about this. It has yet to articulate how this works, but tends to conclude there is no Cartesian theater and that perception and representation are at least not distinct at the level of neuroanatomy (fine grained analysis is indeterminate on this issue).

(This seems like a good argument in favor of intentionalists)

Superveniance Relations - Finally, we can consider direct realists' objection, which I think might be the best one. This relies on notions in superveniance. Superveniance cannot just be defined as "no difference in A (mental phenomena) without a difference in B (physical phenomena)." This turns out to be a wholly inadequate way to frame superveniance.

Such a definition allows, in global superveniance, that a world where Mars has one more molecule of dust can have completely different mental properties from the world without the extra molecule of dust. There is a physical difference between the worlds, so there can be as much mental difference as we like. The same is true for local superveniance. If Sally 2 has one more magnesium atom in her body than Sally 1, she can now have totally different mental properties (we can place the atom in the brain and the same problem remains)

People have tried to fix this with the idea of P-regions and B-minimal properties. P-regions are just those regions of space time that are absolutely essential to the mental phenomena being considered. B-minimal properties are just those physical properties needed to ensure the mental phenomena in question.


If might be thought that these concepts wouldn't cause problems for indirect realism. After all, for any freeze frame microsecond of perception, we can assume that the relevant P Region is entirely in the brain. Does this not support the assertion that perception must just be "of" things in the brain, representations?

The problem comes when you want to analyze any perception that actually takes a meaningful amount of time. All of the sudden, things outside the body become part of the P Region. If we would not have seen the apple but for the apple being on the table, then the apple, or at least part of it or something with similar B-minimal properties, is required to explain the mental state.

So now the direct realist (along with all the externalists) will say: "hey, the superveniance relationship for perception has to involve the object, it is a necessary physical constituent of perception." Which, while not proving their point, still seems to make it more plausible. If the B-minimal properties of the object perceived cannot be changed one iota without changing the mental experience, then it seems like there is a very "direct" connection between the object and the perception. There is, in this case, no change in the mental representation without a change in the B-minimal properties of the object, and it seems that the "directness" of this relationship is exactly the sort of thing the direct realist is talking about.

Recall, Aristotle (and Aquinas) don't have us perceiving the entire form of an object. Nor do they have us perceiving the form "as it is in itself." This would require our heads turning into apples or something when we see an apple. Rather, a part of the substantial form is directly communicated to sensation. And here, the B-minimal properties of the object that precisely specify the part of subjective experience corresponding to that object, seems like a very good candidate for the parts of the object's "form/intelligibility" that are directly communicated. This relation is direct in that there can be no change in A without a change in B, and because B is B-minimal, no change in B without a change in A. This is a one to one relationship between part of sensation and an external object — what Aristotle wants to communicate even though he is certainly no naive realist.

An indirect realist would have to explain how this 1:1 correspondence between external objects and experience fails to be "direct."

This argument is interminable because folk fail to think about how they are using direct and indirect.

Non-veridical experiences like hallucinations are not subjectively distinct from veridical experiences, that seem to represent what they actually represent. A dream is as subjectively real as your current experiences. These two are exactly the same to us. — Ashriel

A dream is as subjectively real as your current experiences. These two are exactly the same to us. — Ashriel

Non-veridical experiences like hallucinations are not subjectively distinct from veridical experiences — Ashriel

P1 if we were directly acquainted with external objects, then hallucinatory and veridical experiences would be subjectively distinct — Ashriel

P2 hallucinatory and veridical experiences are not subjectively distinct(i.e., subjectively identical) — Ashriel

P3 therefore, we are not directly acquainted with external objects — Ashriel

P4 if we are not directly acquainted with external objects, then we are directly acquainted with our perceptions of external objects — Ashriel

representing is perceiving — Banno

P5 therefore, we are directly acquainted with out perceptions of external objects
P6 therefore, Indirect Realism is true — Ashriel

P1 if there is a long causal process between the object that we perceive and our perception of the object, then we do not know the object directly — Ashriel

P1 if the things we perceive do not exist, then we do not know the things we perceive directly — Ashriel

P2 if the causal process that allows us to perceive things takes time, then the things that we perceive do not exist — Ashriel

Skepticism comes from the realisation that it is logically possible for your experiences and reality not to properly correspond. For example, during hallucinations, your experiences(the hallucination) and reality do not correspond. — Ashriel

Ok, with this aside, let us define Direct Realism, the thesis that do indeed have direct access to the external world.

Now let me propose a few arguments for Indirect Realism that I run. Note that all the names I'm giving these are non-standard. — Ashriel

hallucinatory and veridical experiences would be subjectively distinct — Ashriel

I see my hand directly when I look down, indirectly when I see its reflection in a mirror. Here I have a clear enough understanding of what it means to see my hand directly and indirectly. — Banno

What makes them distinct is that in the hallucinatory experience nothing is experienced. — jkop

“Directly acquainted with perceptions” seems a roundabout way of saying we perceive perceptions, which is to assume the initial point. We cannot perceive perceptions any more than we can see sight or observe observations. — NOS4A2

Well that is certainly true. That and we often fail to consider how other people are using the terms "direct" and "indirect." — Count Timothy von Icarus

Wording aside, the general idea is that when I put my hand in the fire the pain I feel isn't a property of some external world object but a mental phenomenon caused brain activity (and in turn caused by the nerves in my hand). The same principle holds with tastes and smells and sounds and visual imagery.

Many read far too much into the particulars of English grammar. The fact that we say "I feel pain" and the fact that pain is a feeling and the fact that a simple substitution gives us the non-standard "I feel a feeling" has no philosophical relevance at all. The same for tasting and smelling and hearing and seeing.

The ordinary way of speaking and the (meta)physics/epistemology of perception are two very different things.

But what it is one is seeing... — NOS4A2

I agree with a lot of what you said there about the over-concern with the language. But what it is one is seeing, and what object in the world that noun ought to refer too, is important and relevant; and if the indirect realist is unable to state what that is, then the ideas are immediately lacking.

A term like “pain” is a sort of folk biology. Maybe one feels a pinched nerve or some other malady that would reveal itself upon closer examination. If true, the latter ought to supersede the former as a more accurate accounting of reality. — NOS4A2

I think the question isn't clear. What does it mean to say that I smell some X?

When I see Joe Biden on TV I am seeing Joe Biden on TV, and the term "Joe Biden" refers to the man who is the President of the United States.

I don't see how this addresses the (meta)physics or epistemology of perception.

We might disagree over whether or not pain is a physical or non-physical thing, but whatever it is it is real and we feel it, so I don't see how this amounts to folk psychology.

Perhaps physicalism is correct and that pain is reducible to the firing of C-fibres. It still entails that pain isn't a property of the external world object (e.g. fire) that is causally responsible for the firing of those C-fibres. The indirect realist will say the same about tastes and smells and sounds and colours. They're reducible to some bodily function (whether it be in the brain or in the eyes), not to some property of external world objects.

A subject (you) smells some direct object (smoke, for instance). — NOS4A2

The word refers to an external object. If you were to point at that object you would never point internally. The direction towards which your eyes face, in combination with measurable distance between you and that object, never reveal that any of it is internal, and in fact prove the opposite. — NOS4A2

Pain is neither a thing nor a property. It is a noun, sure, but it is without a referent. — NOS4A2

This thread is just a dream. Do not trouble to respond, folks. — unenlightened

If nothing is experienced then what is the distinction between having an hallucinatory experience and not having an hallucinatory experience? — Michael

Under any normal use of language, things are experienced when we hallucinate (and when we dream); it's just that the experience isn't a consequence of external stimulation of the relevant kind. — Michael

...you see photons — Quk

Folk might well see using or because of photons. But photons are not visible. — Banno

When it isn't a real duck but a hallucination, it may still be a real hallucination-as opposed, for instance, to a passing quirk of a vivid imagination. That is, we must have an answer to the question 'A real what?', if the question 'Real or not?' is to have a definite sense, to get any foothold. — Austin

Doesn't this still place a middle man in your 'direct' position? — AmadeusD