After all, we receive a torrent of representative perceptual experience all the time, and most of it is unreflected upon. Only a small fraction receives attention, and anything like linguistic content. — hypericin

If most of the data is never brought to consciousness it does not seem apt to refer to it as "representation"; who is it being represented to?

Representation without language and knowledge is still perceptual experience. But language and knowledge without representation is just language and knowledge. — hypericin

Since language and knowledge are inherently representative, I can't see how we could have language and knowledge without representation.

If most of the data is never brought to consciousness it does not seem apt to refer to it as "representation"; who is it being represented to? — Janus

Perceptual experience represents the world to conscious awareness. We are aware of a gestalt of perceptual experience, and can choose to attend to a tiny slice of it.

Since language and knowledge are inherently representative, I can't see how we could have language and knowledge without representation. — Janus

I was referring to perceptual experience as representation. I changed "representation" in the quote to perceptual experience for clarity.

Perceptual experience represents the world, to conscious awareness. We are aware of a gestalt of perceptual experience, and can choose to attend to a tiny slice of it. — hypericin

Right, so those parts of sense which are not attended to, not conscious, are not representations, but are presumably unconscious physical, neural effects.

I was referring to perceptual experience as representation. I changed "representation" in the quote to perceptual experience for clarity. — hypericin

Right, but it depends on what you mean my "perceptual experience". Presumably the body/ brain is affected by the environment constantly via the senses, with only a small part of these effects becoming "perceptual experience" if we do not count anything as being perceived which is not attended to, however minimally.

To me, because it seems most plausible, because we seem to have no cogent reason to doubt, that thoughts are neural events, then I count them as real and causal. — Janus

You’re not alone, I’m sure. But the fact I keep harping on, is that we do not think in terms of that which makes neural events real. Or, if this shoe fits better, what the brain does in its manufacture of our thoughts, in no way relates to what is consciously done with them.

I’m sticking with the notion that my senses will never be given my neural events, from which follows I can never represent a real-time, first order neural event as a phenomenon. As for every single possible real object ever given to my senses, every single one of them will be represented as a phenomenon. Thoughts are represented, but as conceptions, not as phenomena, and this is sufficient to mark the validity of the distinction between the real of things, re: neural events, and the not-real of abstract conceptions, re: thoughts.

But, as you say, that’s just me I guess.

Right, so those parts of sense which are not attended to, not conscious, are not representations, but are presumably unconscious physical, neural effects. — Janus

No, you are missing the distinction between "not attended to" and "not conscious". Think of looking at a painting. You are aware of the visual gestalt of the whole painting, but you can only attend to an aspect of it, maybe the main theme of the painting. Then you can choose to focus on other details.

Why must one know what it is they are perceiving in order to be perceiving it?

That makes no sense.

...my senses will never be given my neural events... — Mww

Senses include neural events.

If however perception for you entails the kind of representational perception we use, where the brain generates a virtual world for the centralized decision maker to evaluate and respond to, then perception is inherently indirect. — hypericin

Here is an example of disqualifying us from directly perceiving by using our biological machinery and how they work as reason.

Makes no sense to me.

Touching the fire, on your view, is not directly perceiving the fire. Nonsense.

Here is an example of disqualifying us from directly perceiving by using our biological machinery and how they work as reason.

Makes no sense to me.

Touching the fire, on your view, is not directly perceiving the fire. Nonsense. — creativesoul

Yup. That's the way it is, your common sense opinions notwithstanding.

No, you are missing the distinction between "not attended to" and "not conscious". Think of looking at a painting. You are aware of the visual gestalt of the whole painting, but you can only attend to an aspect of it, maybe the main theme of the painting. Then you can choose to focus on other details. — hypericin

How do you know you are aware of the "visual gestalt of the whole painting" simultaneously? I mean you can probably fix your gaze on the edges that contain the painting and thus say you are aware of the whole painting, but you will not be aware of all the detail contained within those edges or perhaps much or even any of it while you are attending to the containing edges. I'm not convinced I can even attend to all four edges at once.

Sure, you can scan it and become aware of the various details, but for me 'attending to' just is 'being conscious of'.

I’m sticking with the notion that my senses will never be given my neural events, from which follows I can never represent a real-time, first order neural event as a phenomenon. As for every single possible real object ever given to my senses, every single one of them will be represented as a phenomenon. Thoughts are represented, but as conceptions, not as phenomena, and this is sufficient to mark the validity of the distinction between the real of things, re: neural events, and the not-real of abstract conceptions, re: thoughts. — Mww

Right, we are "brain blind" in the sense that we cannot see neurons at work. But we cannot see cells, molecules, atoms or electrons at work and yet we count those as being real and causal. For that matter we cannot see causation itself at work either.

For me, thoughts inasmuch as they can be objects of awareness are phenomena. We call them mental phenomena. It seems odd to me to say that thoughts are causal and yet not real. You say

what the brain does in its manufacture of our thoughts, in no way relates to what is consciously done with them. — Mww

But I would say our thoughts are products of real causal brain activity just as what is consciously done with them is. Otherwise, the grim specter of dualism looms with all its problems and aporias.

So, by definition then... how convenient. Reminiscent of the 'hard' problem.

This is not necessarily weaker, just different. It seems more accurate to say that perceptual experience is a representation, and that language and knowledge might be stimulated by the perceptual experience, or might not, depending on whether we attend to it . — hypericin

Sure, and perceptual experience might also include, and/or be affected by, expectation, environmental conditions, and other stuff too.

Perceptual experience without language and knowledge is still perceptual experience. But language and knowledge without perceptual experience is just language and knowledge. — hypericin

This is not nitpicking, these distinctions are crucial to the discussion. If knowledge of an object is part of the perceptual experience itself, it may be considered as immediate as the representation. But if it only follows/stimulated from the representation, then this seems implausible — hypericin

I'm no expert, but I believe that studies have shown that our perceptual experience can be shaped by expectations, and also (possibly?) by language, among other things.

Moreover, if a perceptual experience is a representation (or is a representation plus language), then we do not have a perceptual experience of this representation.
— Luke

Agreed — hypericin

Have I convinced you of direct realism, then?

If you agree that our perceptual experience is not of a representation (i.e. is not of itself), then what do we have a perceptual experience of? Odour molecules?

I'm confused about what would it take to qualify as direct perception to those who argue for indirect.

Anyone here have an answer?
— creativesoul

I have an answer no one has given yet that I think is the correct one: lower organisms that do not use representational perception perceive directly.

Think of an amoeba, light hits a photo receptor, and by some logic the amoeba moves one way or the other.

If you regard this as "perception", then this is direct perception. — hypericin

Hmm...

Like the motion sensor outside my shop.

There's an evolutionary gulf between single celled organisms and us.

I'm confused about what would it take to qualify as direct perception to those who argue for indirect.

Anyone here have an answer? — creativesoul

Niave realism. The qualia of our experience is not something manufactured in our head, but is just reality-as-it-is.

Why must one know what it is they are perceiving in order to be perceiving it? That makes no sense. — creativesoul

It does make no sense. I for one reject the very idea.
————-

Senses include neural events. — creativesoul

Of course, but neural events are not that which is given to the senses to be represented. Neural events in the senses just are the representations the senses afford.
————-

…..the grim specter of dualism looms with all its problems and aporias. — Janus

HA!!! Brain blind. I like it. But ya know…..if brain blind is true, then dualism must be true, problems and all. I’d even go as far as to say, because brain blind is true, dualism is necessarily true, insofar as it is impossible dualism is not true. There is that which we live in as things, and that which we create merely because of the things we are.

Sure, and perceptual experience might also include, and/or be affected by, expectation, environmental conditions, and other stuff too. — Luke

Everything is affected by other things. If X is affected by Y, we don't generally say that X is X and Y

If you agree that our perceptual experience is not of a representation (i.e. is not of itself), then what do we have a perceptual experience of? Odour molecules? — Luke

Yes, The experience is of odor molecules. The whole point is we have no direct awareness of what experience is of. This is very obvious in the case of smell; until recently we didn't know odor molecules existed at all. All we are directly aware of is the smell, by way of which we are indirectly aware of odor molecules.
.

No straight answers or arguments or anything interesting, so nothing to respond to... — Janus

Underlined: Patently false:

colours are obviously visual sensations. 'seeing a colour' is that sensation — AmadeusD

Colours are a sensation (well, a class of sensations, anyway). Read into that what you will, using your own grammar — AmadeusD

Bolded: that explains a fair bit. If you aren't interested in the clarity needed for this issue, that you appear to not really want - I cannot help there :) And this is not derogatory. If that is not what you're looking for, I've been barking up the wrong tree.

Italicised: haha, ok buddy.

The experience is of odor molecules. The whole point is we have no direct awareness of what experience is of. This is very obvious in the case of smell; until recently we didn't know odor molecules existed at all. All we are directly aware of is the smell, by way of which we are indirectly aware of odor molecules. — hypericin

Your position seems to be that a perceptual experience is a representation, and that the perceptual experience or representation is directly of worldly objects. Furthermore, that it is our awareness of these perceptual experiences or representations which makes it an indirect perception.

Whereas I would call the perceptual experience the perception, you want to include an additional step and call your awareness of the perceptual experience the perception.

If our body’s perceptual machinery represents odour molecules to us as a smell, then how can there be any smell if you are unaware of it? You wouldn’t smell or perceive anything in that case. So I don’t see why the additional step of our awareness of the smell is necessary. If you are aware of the smell, you have a perception and if you aren’t aware of the smell, you have no perception. But that’s no different to having the perceptual experience or not. The extra step of awareness is unnecessary.

So, there's only two choices? Indirect realism/perception and naive realism?

Nah.

Of course, but neural events are not that which is given to the senses to be represented. Neural events in the senses just are the representations the senses afford. — Mww

Our overall worldviews/positions are very close to one another.

I think perhaps the differences can be teased out in our respective notions of mind. However, we do both seem to hold that all meaningful experience consists of correlations drawn between different things(here is where perception first happens). Our differences may be a matter of taxonomy. Maybe not if you're a mind/body dualist or physical/mental dualist. We're very close to one another though. At least, I think we are.

Touching the fire, on your view, is not directly perceiving the fire. Nonsense.
— creativesoul

Yup. That's the way it is, your common sense opinions notwithstanding. — hypericin

Of course that's 'the way it is', because I merely stated a consequence of what you're arguing for. If you believe that touching fire is not directly perceiving fire, then there's not much more I can say.

the perceptual experience or representation is directly of worldly objects — Luke

For a "perception to be directly of worldly objects " makes sense to me by contrast with the case when the perception is mediated by other objects, i.e. a photo of an apple vs an apple.

Whereas I would call the perceptual experience the perception, you want to include an additional step and call your awareness of the perceptual experience the perception. — Luke

I think it is clear that the perceptual experience is not the perception. A perception happens when an object in the world directly (touch, taste) or indirectly (smell, sight, hearing) stimulates nerve endings, which transmit information to the brain, which (somehow) produces the perceptual experience. the only part of this process the subject is directly aware of is the perceptual experience itself. All the rest of it, the brain's interpretive processes, the nerves, the way the object stimulated the nerves, and above all the object itself, are parts of the perception that must be inferred, as the subject is not directly aware of them.

That is the question I think we are answering: "does perception afford the subject/self direct awareness of the world?", not "is perception considered as an abstract entity in some sense directly of the world?"

Of course that's 'the way it is', because I merely stated a consequence of what you're arguing for. If you believe that touching fire is not directly perceiving fire, then there's not much more I can say. — creativesoul

You are not making arguments, but merely appealing to common sense. There are venues where appeals to common sense carry some weight, this is not one of them.

Of course that's 'the way it is', because I merely stated a consequence of what you're arguing for. If you believe that touching fire is not directly perceiving fire, then there's not much more I can say.
— creativesoul

You are not making arguments, but merely appealing to common sense. There are venues where appeals to common sense carry some weight, this is not one of them. — hypericin

You could not be more wrong. Perhaps I'll be able to show you soon. The gross neglect has not happened unnoticed.

Like our herring well done, eh?

the only part of this process the subject is directly aware of is the perceptual experience.

How does someone become aware of a perceptual experience if his senses point outward, and he is not seeing, tasting, smelling, or hearing inside his brain?

For instance, Meningioma can grow in the brain undetected for many years. But somehow one can be aware of a perception in the brain almost immediately.

....a perception in the brain... — NOS4A2

Needs substance.

If you refer to a dualism of aspects as opposed to a dualism of substances then I agree.
You seem to count as real only that which the senses apprehend. My point earler was that on that criterion causation is not real.

What you say seems to imply that you think that seeing a particular colour and that particular colour are the same thing.

I have asked you several times if this is so and you haven't given a straight answer. If that is what you think I don't count it as clarity but as murk.

you haven't given a straight answer. — Janus

I have to assume you're not reading? That is exactly what the quote shows I have said - and that I directly addressed, in that quote. I requote - again, for the slow among us:

Colours are a sensation — AmadeusD

Your own grammatical reading into that is for you, not me, to clarify. If it reads as something odd, clarify it for yourself. It is a direct answer to your question, whether you accept it as adequate or not. I can't work with a charge such as 'murk' in the face of a direct answer.

All meaningful experience consists of correlations being drawn between different things. Correlations can only be drawn between different things if the creature under consideration somehow perceives the content of their own correlations. Language less beasts do not draw correlations between language use and other things. Some can see green cups. Some can peek into their opening. Some can draw correlations between green cups and feeding. They do not know that the cups are green. They cannot.

A creature incapable of detecting certain ranges of the visible spectrum cannot draw correlations between the colors that that range helps enable us to pick out and anything else.

A creature that cannot know the names of colors but can see them nonetheless cannot possibly draw correlations between color names and other things. Nevertheless, some language less creatures can see green cups in very much the same way we do, given similar enough biological machinery. However, that same creature cannot know that they're seeing a green cup. Some creatures perceive green cups without knowing that they are. We can know that they are though.

If the green cup is meaningful to the creature, it cannot be as a result of language being meaningful to the same creature. They cannot know that the green cup has become especially meaningful/significant to them. But green cups can and do become quite meaningful to language less creatures, despite all that, if for no other reason than by virtue of pure repetition alone.

Given enough time, the color of the cup can become background noise. The creature will no longer pause and take note of the color. Rather, it can become immediately taken note of. The creature can know to run towards the green cup instead of the polka dotted ones and we can watch them do so, immediately upon being released - without any hesitation. They have no idea that those cups are polka dotted or solid. They directly perceive differences. The latter are clearly meaningful. They associate those cups with eating. The polka dotted ones are meaningful as well. They are not the ones that contain food.

Janus is correct. You've drawn an equivalence. He asked about it. You've squirmed.