We know, according to Wittgenstein, that propositions are pictures of possible states of affairs (facts). “A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts (T. 2.2).” It has logico-pictorial form in common with the facts it depicts. And, as we’ve said over and over the picture (the proposition) by itself only represents the possibility that it mirrors or reflects reality or the facts (T. 2.201, 2.202, 2.203). “A picture agrees with reality or fails to agree [with reality]; it is correct or incorrect, true or false (T. 2.21).” How does it do this? The picture does this by displaying its pictorial form, and what the picture represents is its sense (T. 2.22, 2.221). The sense of a proposition is separate from whether it agrees with the facts. If this wasn’t the case, we wouldn’t understand the sense of false propositions. We cannot know from the picture alone whether it is true or false, it must be compared with reality (T. 2.223, 2.224). In other words, “There are no pictures that are true a priori (T. 2.225).” — Sam26
Perhaps this is how one should think about these objects. The analysis of language demands that there are elementary propositions. These elementary propositions are about possible atomic facts, consisting in combinations of names. These names name elementary objects
Of course this is muddled, hence the PI. — Banno
so a step back. — Sam26
... arranged to form any possible fact (state of affairs). — Sam26
Objects by themselves are mere potentiality ... — Sam26
Objects by themselves are mere potentiality ...
— Sam26
What do you mean "by themselves"? If they are mere potentiality what actualizes them? — Fooloso4
Are you saying that somehow the fact plays some role in whether or not x and y do combine? Or that if and when they combine the result is a fact? — Fooloso4
when Wittgenstein states that "the variable name 'x' is the proper sign for the pseudo-concept object (T. 4.1272)." - he is simply saying something about the essence of symbolic representation in formal logic. — Sam26
The concept of an object, as Wittgenstein envisions it, is not real in the sense that it lacks empirical content or logical significance within his analysis. — Sam26
Strangely, he refers to objects as pseudo-concepts, and at the same time, they form the building blocks of atomic facts. Maybe it's a pseudo-concept because no concept can capture their essence. I'm not sure. — Sam26
I must point out that you don't have to understand all of this to understand Wittgenstein's basic ideas in the Tractatus. — Sam26
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