I'm curious if it can handle the whole thing (at least, opus?). — hypericin
AmadeusD and Janus debate the coherence and implications of claiming that objects "present themselves" to us in perception. They discuss whether this implies a form of animism or agency on the part of objects. — Pierre-Normand
Your discussion of objects "presenting themselves" in perception is intriguing. I think Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, which was a major influence on Merleau-Ponty, could be relevant here. Husserl argued that perception involves a direct intuition of essences or "eidetic seeing." This view seems to support a form of direct realism, albeit one that is very different from naive realism. — Pierre-Normand
To Janus: Husserl's notion of eidetic intuition is intriguing, but we might worry that it reintroduces a form of Platonism or essentialism that many find problematic. A more deflationary account of essences as abstractions from experience could be preferable. — Pierre-Normand
This might be an interesting avenue to explore, but I didn't have anything to do with Husserl or essences in mind. — Janus
But “a perceptual experience is a representation” does mean that “a perceptual experience” equals “a representation”. Therefore, if a representation is of real objects then (via substitution) a perceptual experience is of real objects. — Luke
Your perceptual experience of the smoky smell is just the smell itself, which you may or may not be experiencing or consciously aware of? — Luke
"A representation is of real objects" is a nonsensical claim. — hypericin
If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation and if the representation is of real objects, then:
The “direct perceptual experience” is a representation of real objects
Which I agree with. — hypericin
A representation may be of anything. Rather, "the representation is of real objects". "The" means we are talking about the representation in "Phenomenal experience is a representation". — hypericin
You cannot then substitute in "phenomenal experience" for "representation" in "the representation is of real objects", because that sentence is modifying the representation in "phenomenal experience is a representation".. — hypericin
The two sentences are equivalent to "phenomenal experience is a representation of real objects". That sentence s definitely not equivalent to "phenomenal experience is of real objects". — hypericin
Your perceptual experience of the smoky smell is just the smell itself, which you may or may not be experiencing or consciously aware of?
— Luke
Yes. The perceptual experience may necessarily entail the awareness, as we discussed earlier. But all that is required for my argument is that we are aware of it. — hypericin
P1: We are aware of perceptual experiences. — hypericin
Therefore, via substitution into P2, the perceptual experience is of real objects. — Luke
Therefore, the perceptual experience cannot be "the smell itself", acting as an independently objective smell that you may or may not be aware of. — Luke
But I think a stronger argument against your view... — Luke
This doesn't work. What if I had rephrased P2 with the equivalent:
P2. If the representation represents real objects...
Then your substitution yields "Direct phenomenal experience represents real objects". — hypericin
If this is logically valid, how can inconsequential differences in how the premises are phrased yield totally different results? — hypericin
Whether or not it is an independently objective smell that you may or may not be aware of (I don't think it is), all that is necessary to my argument is that we are aware of it. — hypericin
The "perceptual experience of smelling smoke" refers to the qualitative, ineffable smoky smell. The "awareness of smelling smoke" or "awareness of the perceptual experience of smelling smoke" refers to the binary fact (or 0-1 spectrum) that you are consciously cognizant of that qualitative, ineffable smoky smell. — hypericin
Talking about awareness, awareness of perceptual experience is direct, awareness of real world objects is indirect. A clear contrast, I don't see the problem. — hypericin
Just curious. What did you ask of it, to get that statement? — Mww
User
true or false: Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have direct awareness of your perceptual experiences. The "direct" qualifier has no contrast, so it doesn't mean anything.
ChatGPT
The statement is true. In philosophical discourse, the concept of "direct awareness" typically implies an immediate, unmediated apprehension of something. However, to establish the notion of direct awareness, there must be a contrasting concept, such as indirect awareness. If there is no possibility of indirect awareness, then the qualifier "direct" loses its meaning because there is no alternative mode of awareness to contrast it with. So, without the possibility of indirect awareness, the term "direct awareness" becomes vacuous.
User
is perceptual experience direct or indirect?
ChatGPT
Perceptual experience can be understood as both direct and indirect, depending on how one defines these terms.
In a strict sense, perceptual experience is often considered direct because it involves the immediate apprehension or sensing of objects and events in the external world through the senses, such as sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. This directness implies that there is no need for conscious inference or interpretation for the experience to occur.
However, some philosophers argue that all perception involves a degree of interpretation or processing by the mind, even if it happens very quickly or subconsciously. From this perspective, perceptual experience could be seen as indirect because it is mediated by mental processes that shape or filter the raw sensory input before it reaches conscious awareness.
So, whether perceptual experience is considered direct or indirect depends on the philosophical framework and the specific definition of these terms used in the discussion.
I asked ChatGPT whether the argument is valid — Luke
I don't allow for direct perceptual experience of real objects. Perceptual experience is representational, we are aware of it, and the representation is of real objects. But this doesn't mean we have direct perceptual experience of real objects. — hypericin
It seems to follow that it is. If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation and if the representation is of real objects, then the “direct perceptual experience” is of real objects. — Luke
ou treat the perceptual experience not as part of your experience, but as an independently objective smell that you may or may not be aware of. This was your earliter attempt to separate your awareness of your perceptual experience from your perceptual experience:... — Luke
Why?those high-level processes can't be segmented — Pierre-Normand
the physiological basis of perception is indirect, in a sort of causal sense — Pierre-Normand
this indirectness is highlighted in abnormal cases where illusions, hallucinations or misperceptions may occur (and the fault line in the causal chain can be identified), but the perceptual acts themselves, when nothing goes wrong, are direct. But this directness-thesis is also clarified when the disjunctive conceptions of experience is brought to bear on the direct vs indirect perception debate. — Pierre-Normand
Disjunctivism feels like a weak, hand-wavy response to particularly the argument from hallucination. Here is my take on that argument:
Assume a hallucinatory experience of an object is identical to a veridical experience of the same object. So for every property x of that object,
Eh(x) = Ev(x)
If the object is a red ball, the experience of redness is the same:
Eh(red) = Ev(red)
For direct realism, in the veridical case te experience of an object's redness is that object's redness:
Ev(red) = Obj(red)
But in the halliucinatory case, the experience can not be of that object's redness
Eh(red) != Obj(red)
But we already stipulated that
Eh(red) = Ev(red)
Therefore direct realism is contradictory, and disjunctivism is an inadequate defense — hypericin
A disjunctivist would not accept your first premise and, also, would state their thesis somewhat differently. It's actually a core claim of the disjunctivist conception of experience that a hallucinatory experience (or an illusion or misperception) and a veridical experience are two different things, — Pierre-Normand
And in the non-veridical case, or in a case of misperception, the subject falsely believes that they are seeing a red apple. — Pierre-Normand
What makes the cases indistinguishable isn't a common object that is being directly perceived in both cases. — Pierre-Normand
Why can't she expereince ammonia when there is none? Moreover, how do you account for the case where Sue knows there is no ammonia, but still feels she is experiencing that identical smell? — hypericin
It might be that in some ontological sense they are different. But what I meant by the first premise is that from the first person, phenomenological point of view, the experiences are subjectively identical. In that sense, there is no room to deny the first premise, it is a stipulation, and not implausible.
[...]
If you take "object" literally, everyone agrees that there isn't a common directly perceived object. But there must be something that is in common between the two cases. And it can't just be a shared belief that there is an object being perceived. — hypericin
Not identical in what way? — hypericin
A disjunctivist might say that the smell she feels is not of the same type as that of ammonia. They're not type identical.
I disagree with disjunctivism, because non-veridical experiences employ parts or most of the same perceptual faculties as veridical experiences. It is possible, at least temporarily, to have a non-veridical experience that is indistinguishable from a veridical experience. In practice, however, it is often easy to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical experiences. — jkop
But what this means, according to the disjunctivist, is that the subject isn't able to identify a feature from their experience that would enable them to discriminate between both cases (veridical or non-veridical). — Pierre-Normand
Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have direct awareness of your perceptual experiences. The "direct" qualifier has no contrast, so it doesn't mean anything. — Luke
More specifically, they are of the same type constitutively, because they employ the brain's perceptual system unlike other types of conscious experiences, such as beliefs, desires, memories, imaginations. — jkop
We agree that correlations can be drawn prior to(far in advance of) experience, but I suspect for very different reasons.
— creativesoul
Mine are: on the one hand all that which constitutes the representation of an object as it is perceived, which I call a phenomenon, correlated with representations for all that I think the phenomenon contains, which I call conceptions. The result is what my intelligence informs me about the object, which I call an understanding.
Yours are……? — Mww
….compatible with, an evolutionary timeline.
— creativesoul
This being aimed against the creationists? — Mww
The experience is meaningful to the dog, but not the sensor. The sensor detects and the dog perceives the very same thing.
— creativesoul
Ok, I get that. Because you already posit that experience is meaningful only to the creature, can half of each of your pairs be eliminated? Detection/perception eliminates detection because the creature perceives, and likewise, for sensitivity/sentience, sensitivity is eliminated. I wonder then, why you brought them up in the first place, just to dismiss them for their difference. — Mww
Who ever heard of ice cream that wasn’t creamy, just as who ever heard of an experience that wasn’t perceptual, or, perceptually instantiated. On the other hand, while the ice is of the cream, experience is not of the perception, but only of a determinable set of abstract intellectual predicates cognized as representing it. — Mww
I’m saying no experience at all, includes language use. — Mww
My acquiring an experience is very different than me telling you about what it was, which manifests as me telling you all about what I know of the object with which the experience is concerned, or how I came into possession of it. — Mww
People are very often mistaken about their own mental events.
— creativesoul
I can’t tell whether they have no use for understanding what such events are, they don't want to think it the case there are any mental events to be mistaken about, or, given mistakes, that mental events are necessary causality for them, which……for (a-hem) those of us in the know like you ‘n’ me……is a serious contradiction. — Mww
My addition about indistinguishability is not an attempt to misrepresent disjunctivism. It follows from rejecting its thesis that veridical and non-veridical perceptions are fundamentally different. By rejecting disjunctivism and assuming that veridical and non-veridical perceptions are of the same type, I must give them the same analysis. Hence the stipulation that they can be phenomenally indistinguishable.
More specifically, they are of the same type constitutively, because they employ the brain's perceptual system unlike other types of conscious experiences, such as beliefs, desires, memories, imaginations.
Intentionalistically, however, they remain different and distinguishable, because in the non-veridical case nothing is perceived. Illusory objects are not perceived but constructed from habit, association, interpretation, or misinterpretation, imagination, memory and so on. — jkop
ChatGPT
Yes, in that case, it would be sensible to refer to awareness of your perceptual experiences as "direct."
The term "direct" in "direct awareness of your perceptual experiences" is used to denote an immediate, unmediated apprehension of your perceptual experiences. This is contrasted with "indirect awareness of the external world," where your awareness of the world is mediated by your perceptual experiences.
In this context, "direct" and "indirect" serve as contrasting qualifiers that give meaning to each other. Therefore, even if there is no indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, the term "direct awareness" still retains its meaning because it is contrasted with "indirect awareness of the external world."
So, the statement "Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have direct awareness of your perceptual experiences" would be false in this context. — hypericin
User
what is indirect realism
ChatGPT
Indirect realism, also known as representationalism or epistemological dualism, is a philosophical theory regarding perception and reality. It posits that our experiences of the world are mediated by mental representations or ideas, rather than directly perceiving external objects themselves.
According to indirect realism, when we perceive the world, what we are actually experiencing are mental representations or perceptions that are caused by external objects. These mental representations are often considered to be in the mind and are distinct from the external objects they represent.
In other words, indirect realism suggests that we do not directly perceive external objects such as tables, chairs, or trees. Instead, we perceive representations or perceptions of these objects that are constructed by our senses and mental processes. This theory acknowledges that there is a real external world but asserts that our understanding and experience of it are indirect and mediated by mental representations.
One of the key proponents of indirect realism was the philosopher John Locke, who argued that the mind receives sensory information from the external world and constructs perceptions based on this information. Other philosophers, such as George Berkeley and David Hume, also contributed to the development of indirect realism, albeit with variations in emphasis and interpretation.
I don't allow for direct perceptual experience of real objects. Perceptual experience is representational, we are aware of it, and the representation is of real objects. But this doesn't mean we have direct perceptual experience of real objects.
— hypericin
It seems to follow that it is. If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation and if the representation is of real objects, then the “direct perceptual experience” is of real objects.
— Luke
I deny that the premises entail:
direct perceptual experience of real objects
You counter by affirming that the premises entail:
"direct perceptual experience” is of real objects.
These look somewhat similar but are totally nonequivalent. The conclusion I deny says that the perceptual experience of real objects is direct. This is just direct realism. They conclusion you affirm says that direct perceptual experience, aka phenomenal experience, merely is of real object. But this is innocuous, and compatible with direct and indirect realism: the direct realist says it is directly of real object, and the indirect realist says it is indirectly of real objects. — hypericin
This was not me making any ontological claims, I don't need to. I was only defining the terms I use. If it turns out that awareness and the experience are two aspects of the same thing, no problem. — hypericin
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