I'm curious if it can handle the whole thing (at least, opus?). — hypericin

All three models can handle 200k tokens context windows. However, each new question/response cycle implies feeding the whole context anew to the model, and the respective costs for all three models, when I had only given them the first ten pages of this thread (approx. 48k tokens), were $0.01 for Haiku, $0.17 for Sonnet and $0.85 for Opus. So, to have Opus generate a summary of the last 27 pages would cost me $2.30. I could have Sonnet do the job, only slightly less effectively, and it would cost five times less. But it's a time consuming process to prepare all of this data and I don't want Claude to get too much embroiled into the dispute and feel like I have to defend its takes rather than defending my own.

Claude 3 doesn't really have a take on its own anyway. It is highly sensitive to the intellectual commitments of whoever it perceives it is responding to and never wishes to ruffle feathers. This is why, when placed in a position to arbitrate a dispute between two or more people, unless one party is clearly unethical, it will almost always come across as very conciliatory and uncommitted. It is very good however for showing each party the other viewpoints in the most intelligible and articulate light. I had discussed with GPT-4 the potential llms have for helping human beings escape closed epistemic bubbles in this post.

AmadeusD and Janus debate the coherence and implications of claiming that objects "present themselves" to us in perception. They discuss whether this implies a form of animism or agency on the part of objects. — Pierre-Normand

I think it comes down to different ways of speaking about it. Taking vision as paradigmatic, we can say that objects are presented, made present, to us via reflected light and no sense of agency need be invoked.

I made the point early on that the 'indirect' parlance is one way of looking at it and the 'direct' is another, and that there is no fact of the matter. It is a false dichotomy. It is remarkable how many pages of argument can be generated by people imagining that there is an actual fact of the matter regarding whether perception is direct or indirect,

Your discussion of objects "presenting themselves" in perception is intriguing. I think Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, which was a major influence on Merleau-Ponty, could be relevant here. Husserl argued that perception involves a direct intuition of essences or "eidetic seeing." This view seems to support a form of direct realism, albeit one that is very different from naive realism. — Pierre-Normand

To Janus: Husserl's notion of eidetic intuition is intriguing, but we might worry that it reintroduces a form of Platonism or essentialism that many find problematic. A more deflationary account of essences as abstractions from experience could be preferable. — Pierre-Normand

This might be an interesting avenue to explore, but I didn't have anything to do with Husserl or essences in mind.

This might be an interesting avenue to explore, but I didn't have anything to do with Husserl or essences in mind. — Janus

You are aware Claude 3, not me, made those suggestions, right?

By the way, the idea of objects presenting themselves to the subject in perception rather than perceptions constituting representations of them also is being promoted by John Searle.

Yes, I was aware of that Pierre. Thanks for the Searle reference; I wasn't aware of his take on perception.

Yes, I was aware of that Pierre. Thanks for the Searle reference; I wasn't aware of his take on perception. — Janus

@jkop had drawn my attention to Searle's book Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception, OUP (2015) when we were discussing disjunctivism early on in my Claude 3 thread.

But “a perceptual experience is a representation” does mean that “a perceptual experience” equals “a representation”. Therefore, if a representation is of real objects then (via substitution) a perceptual experience is of real objects. — Luke

"A representation is of real objects" is a nonsensical claim. A representation may be of anything. Rather, "the representation is of real objects". "The" means we are talking about the representation in "Phenomenal experience is a representation". You cannot then substitute in "phenomenal experience" for "representation" in "the representation is of real objects", because that sentence is modifying the representation in "phenomenal experience is a representation"..

The two sentences are equivalent to "phenomenal experience is a representation of real objects". That sentence s definitely not equivalent to "phenomenal experience is of real objects".

Your perceptual experience of the smoky smell is just the smell itself, which you may or may not be experiencing or consciously aware of? — Luke

Yes. The perceptual experience may necessarily entail the awareness, as we discussed earlier. But all that is required for my argument is that we are aware of it.

"A representation is of real objects" is a nonsensical claim. — hypericin

You are taking this out of context. The context of our exchanges followed from what you said earlier in the discussion, namely:

If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation and if the representation is of real objects, then:

The “direct perceptual experience” is a representation of real objects

Which I agree with. — hypericin

You referred to "a representation", and I followed your usage. If this is a nonsensical claim, then it's one that you also made.

A representation may be of anything. Rather, "the representation is of real objects". "The" means we are talking about the representation in "Phenomenal experience is a representation". — hypericin

I wasn't referring to any other sort of representation. I was referring to the perceptual experience as being the representation. That is, I was referring to the representation in "Perceptual experience is a representation".

You cannot then substitute in "phenomenal experience" for "representation" in "the representation is of real objects", because that sentence is modifying the representation in "phenomenal experience is a representation".. — hypericin

I can substitute it in because the perceptual experience is the representation. That sentence is modifying the representation, but because the perceptual experience is the representation, then it is also modifying the perceptual experience.

Look at your earlier argument again:

P1. If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation; and
P2. If the representation is of real objects; then
C. The “direct perceptual experience” is a representation of real objects

The two sentences are equivalent to "phenomenal experience is a representation of real objects". That sentence s definitely not equivalent to "phenomenal experience is of real objects". — hypericin

According to P1 of your argument, the perceptual experience is a representation. According to P2 of your argument, this (the) representation (mentioned at P1) is of real objects. As you note: ""The" means we are talking about the representation in "Phenomenal [perceptual] experience is a representation" (i.e. at P1). P1 allows the substitution of "the perceptual experience" for "the representation" into P2. Therefore, via substitution into P2, the perceptual experience is of real objects.

Your perceptual experience of the smoky smell is just the smell itself, which you may or may not be experiencing or consciously aware of?
— Luke

Yes. The perceptual experience may necessarily entail the awareness, as we discussed earlier. But all that is required for my argument is that we are aware of it. — hypericin

You don't see any issue with your perceptual experience being the smell itself, which you might not experience? How can your perceptual experience be something that you don't experience?

If the perceptual experience entails the awareness, then it is not possible to have a perceptual experience that you might not experience or be aware of.

Therefore, the perceptual experience cannot be "the smell itself", acting as an independently objective smell that you may or may not be aware of.

But I think a stronger argument against your view is that it is meaningless to refer to your awareness of your perceptual experience as "direct", because it is just as meaningless to refer to your awareness of your perceptual experience as "indirect", If it is impossible for your awareness of your perceptual experience to be indirect, then it is also impossible for it to be direct. The "direct" qualifier doesn't add anything; it's meaningless. It would make no difference for you to refer to your awareness without the qualifier. And if you can't qualify your awareness of your perceptual experience as direct, then you can't use this as a basis to qualify your awareness of real objects as indirect.

P1: We are aware of perceptual experiences. — hypericin

Therefore, via substitution into P2, the perceptual experience is of real objects. — Luke

This doesn't work. What if I had rephrased P2 with the equivalent:

P2. If the representation represents real objects...

Then your substitution yields "Direct phenomenal experience represents real objects". If this is logically valid, how can inconsequential differences in how the premises are phrased yield totally different results?

Therefore, the perceptual experience cannot be "the smell itself", acting as an independently objective smell that you may or may not be aware of. — Luke

Whether or not it is an independently objective smell that you may or may not be aware of (I don't think it is), all that is necessary to my argument is that we are aware of it.

But I think a stronger argument against your view... — Luke

Talking about awareness, awareness of perceptual experience is direct, awareness of real world objects is indirect. A clear contrast, I don't see the problem.

This doesn't work. What if I had rephrased P2 with the equivalent:

P2. If the representation represents real objects...

Then your substitution yields "Direct phenomenal experience represents real objects". — hypericin

I asked ChatGPT whether the argument is valid:

User
Is this argument valid:
P1. If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation; and
P2. If the representation mentioned at P1 is of real objects; then
C. The “direct perceptual experience” is of real objects

ChatGPT
The argument you've presented is valid.

This argument follows a valid form of deductive reasoning known as hypothetical syllogism. The conclusion logically follows from the premises. If the "direct perceptual experience" is indeed a representation, and if that representation is of real objects, then it logically follows that the direct perceptual experience itself is of real objects. Therefore, the argument is valid.

If this is logically valid, how can inconsequential differences in how the premises are phrased yield totally different results? — hypericin

User
Can P2 be re-phrased as "P2. If the representation represents real objects"?

ChatGPT
Yes, you can rephrase P2 as "If the representation represents real objects" without changing the meaning of the argument. Both "If the representation mentioned at P1 is of real objects" and "If the representation represents real objects" convey the idea that the representation within the direct perceptual experience corresponds to real objects. Therefore, the rephrased version maintains the validity of the argument.

Whether or not it is an independently objective smell that you may or may not be aware of (I don't think it is), all that is necessary to my argument is that we are aware of it. — hypericin

You treat the perceptual experience not as part of your experience, but as an independently objective smell that you may or may not be aware of. This was your earliter attempt to separate your awareness of your perceptual experience from your perceptual experience:

The "perceptual experience of smelling smoke" refers to the qualitative, ineffable smoky smell. The "awareness of smelling smoke" or "awareness of the perceptual experience of smelling smoke" refers to the binary fact (or 0-1 spectrum) that you are consciously cognizant of that qualitative, ineffable smoky smell. — hypericin

I am saying that these are inseparable. You are also saying that these are inseparable when you say that the perceptual experience entails its own awareness. Therefore, the perceptual experience cannot simply be "the qualitative, ineffable smoky smell" that is somehow independent of your awareness; that you may or may not be aware of. Both your awareness and your perceptual experience are of this smoky smell. The perceptual experience is not an independent objective odour that you smell using your awareness. Your perceptual experience and your awareness of the perceptual experience are equally of the real world object.

Talking about awareness, awareness of perceptual experience is direct, awareness of real world objects is indirect. A clear contrast, I don't see the problem. — hypericin

Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have direct awareness of your perceptual experiences. The "direct" qualifier has no contrast, so it doesn't mean anything.

As ChatGPT states:

In philosophical discourse, the concept of "direct awareness" typically implies an immediate, unmediated apprehension of something. However, to establish the notion of direct awareness, there must be a contrasting concept, such as indirect awareness. If there is no possibility of indirect awareness, then the qualifier "direct" loses its meaning because there is no alternative mode of awareness to contrast it with. So, without the possibility of indirect awareness, the term "direct awareness" becomes vacuous.

As ChatGPT states: — Luke

Just curious. What did you ask of it, to get that statement?

Just curious. What did you ask of it, to get that statement? — Mww

User
true or false: Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have direct awareness of your perceptual experiences. The "direct" qualifier has no contrast, so it doesn't mean anything.

ChatGPT
The statement is true. In philosophical discourse, the concept of "direct awareness" typically implies an immediate, unmediated apprehension of something. However, to establish the notion of direct awareness, there must be a contrasting concept, such as indirect awareness. If there is no possibility of indirect awareness, then the qualifier "direct" loses its meaning because there is no alternative mode of awareness to contrast it with. So, without the possibility of indirect awareness, the term "direct awareness" becomes vacuous.

I also asked ChatGPT about the discussion topic and got this response:

User
is perceptual experience direct or indirect?

ChatGPT
Perceptual experience can be understood as both direct and indirect, depending on how one defines these terms.

In a strict sense, perceptual experience is often considered direct because it involves the immediate apprehension or sensing of objects and events in the external world through the senses, such as sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell. This directness implies that there is no need for conscious inference or interpretation for the experience to occur.

However, some philosophers argue that all perception involves a degree of interpretation or processing by the mind, even if it happens very quickly or subconsciously. From this perspective, perceptual experience could be seen as indirect because it is mediated by mental processes that shape or filter the raw sensory input before it reaches conscious awareness.

So, whether perceptual experience is considered direct or indirect depends on the philosophical framework and the specific definition of these terms used in the discussion.

(Another) User
"true or false: Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have direct awareness of your perceptual experiences. The "direct" qualifier has no contrast, so it doesn't mean anything."

(Another) ChatGPT
"The statement is true. In philosophical discourse, the concept of "direct awareness" typically implies an immediate, unmediated apprehension of something. However, to establish the notion of direct awareness, there must be a contrasting concept, such as indirect awareness. If there is no possibility of indirect awareness, then the qualifier "direct" loses its meaning because there is no alternative mode of awareness to contrast it with. So, without the possibility of indirect awareness, the term "direct awareness" becomes vacuous."

User
But, what if direct awareness of your perceptual experiences" is contrasted with "indirect awareness of the external world"? Is it then sensible to refer to awareness of your perceptual experiences as direct?

ChatGPT
Yes, in that case, it would be sensible to refer to awareness of your perceptual experiences as "direct."
The term "direct" in "direct awareness of your perceptual experiences" is used to denote an immediate, unmediated apprehension of your perceptual experiences. This is contrasted with "indirect awareness of the external world," where your awareness of the world is mediated by your perceptual experiences.
In this context, "direct" and "indirect" serve as contrasting qualifiers that give meaning to each other. Therefore, even if there is no indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, the term "direct awareness" still retains its meaning because it is contrasted with "indirect awareness of the external world."
So, the statement "Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have direct awareness of your perceptual experiences" would be false in this context.

Ok. Thanks.

“….depends on the philosophical framework and the specific definition of these terms used in the discussion….”

Can’t disagree with that, at least.

I asked ChatGPT whether the argument is valid — Luke

Apologies, I see my mistake. I was focusing on the argument when I should have focused on the conclusion. This is what initiated this thread:

I don't allow for direct perceptual experience of real objects. Perceptual experience is representational, we are aware of it, and the representation is of real objects. But this doesn't mean we have direct perceptual experience of real objects. — hypericin

It seems to follow that it is. If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation and if the representation is of real objects, then the “direct perceptual experience” is of real objects. — Luke

I deny that the premises entail:
direct perceptual experience of real objects

You counter by affirming that the premises entail:
"direct perceptual experience” is of real objects.

These look somewhat similar but are totally nonequivalent. The conclusion I deny says that the perceptual experience of real objects is direct. This is just direct realism. They conclusion you affirm says that direct perceptual experience, aka phenomenal experience, merely is of real object. But this is innocuous, and compatible with direct and indirect realism: the direct realist says it is directly of real object, and the indirect realist says it is indirectly of real objects.

ou treat the perceptual experience not as part of your experience, but as an independently objective smell that you may or may not be aware of. This was your earliter attempt to separate your awareness of your perceptual experience from your perceptual experience:... — Luke

This was not me making any ontological claims, I don't need to. I was only defining the terms I use. If it turns out that awareness and the experience are two aspects of the same thing, no problem.

those high-level processes can't be segmented — Pierre-Normand

Why?

the physiological basis of perception is indirect, in a sort of causal sense — Pierre-Normand

Indirect realism doesn't necessarily appeal to physiological processes. The fundamental distinction is between the qualitative first person experience of the world, and the world itself. The intuition is that if the components of this first person experience are all mind products, the relationship between perceiver and perceived is fundamentally indirect. I'm not sure why perception is too "molar" to make this distinction.

this indirectness is highlighted in abnormal cases where illusions, hallucinations or misperceptions may occur (and the fault line in the causal chain can be identified), but the perceptual acts themselves, when nothing goes wrong, are direct. But this directness-thesis is also clarified when the disjunctive conceptions of experience is brought to bear on the direct vs indirect perception debate. — Pierre-Normand

Disjunctivism feels like a weak, hand-wavy response to particularly the argument from hallucination. Here is my take on that argument:

Assume a hallucinatory experience of an object is identical to a veridical experience of the same object. So for every property x of that object,
Eh(x) = Ev(x)
If the object is a red ball, the experience of redness is the same:
Eh(red) = Ev(red)
For direct realism, in the veridical case te experience of an object's redness is that object's redness:
Ev(red) = Obj(red)
But in the halliucinatory case, the experience can not be of that object's redness
Eh(red) != Obj(red)
But we already stipulated that
Eh(red) = Ev(red)

Therefore direct realism is contradictory, and disjunctivism is an inadequate defense

Disjunctivism feels like a weak, hand-wavy response to particularly the argument from hallucination. Here is my take on that argument:

Assume a hallucinatory experience of an object is identical to a veridical experience of the same object. So for every property x of that object,
Eh(x) = Ev(x)
If the object is a red ball, the experience of redness is the same:
Eh(red) = Ev(red)
For direct realism, in the veridical case te experience of an object's redness is that object's redness:
Ev(red) = Obj(red)
But in the halliucinatory case, the experience can not be of that object's redness
Eh(red) != Obj(red)
But we already stipulated that
Eh(red) = Ev(red)

Therefore direct realism is contradictory, and disjunctivism is an inadequate defense — hypericin

A disjunctivist would not accept your first premise and, also, would state their thesis somewhat differently. It's actually a core claim of the disjunctivist conception of experience that a hallucinatory experience (or an illusion or misperception) and a veridical experience are two different things, and that they are not experiences of a common object (or representation). Rather, in the veridical case, what is perceived is the red color of the apple (or the fact that the apple is red, if you take the contents of experiences to have propositional form). And in the non-veridical case, or in a case of misperception, the subject falsely believes that they are seeing a red apple. What makes the cases indistinguishable isn't a common object that is being directly perceived in both cases. Rather, we might say that the subject simply is unaware of the circumstances that make their perceptual ability misfire, as it were. There may be a hidden mirror, for instance, or a misleading environmental cue, or the effect of a drug. Such possibilities don't undermine the directness of the experience in the good case.

A disjunctivist would not accept your first premise and, also, would state their thesis somewhat differently. It's actually a core claim of the disjunctivist conception of experience that a hallucinatory experience (or an illusion or misperception) and a veridical experience are two different things, — Pierre-Normand

It might be that in some ontological sense they are different. But what I meant by the first premise is that from the first person, phenomenological point of view, the experiences are subjectively identical. In that sense, there is no room to deny the first premise, it is a stipulation, and not implausible.

And in the non-veridical case, or in a case of misperception, the subject falsely believes that they are seeing a red apple. — Pierre-Normand

What makes the cases indistinguishable isn't a common object that is being directly perceived in both cases. — Pierre-Normand

If you take "object" literally, everyone agrees that there isn't a common directly perceived object. But there must be something that is in common between the two cases. And it can't just be a shared belief that there is an object being perceived.

Sue is recovering from Covid, and sometimes she falsely smells ammonia in the air. As far as she can tell, out of nowhere she experiences the same subjective sensation she does when she opens a jar of ammonia. If it were only the belief that there is ammonia in the air that is common in the two cases, then Sue is lying or fooling herself, she is not really experiencing anything, or she is experiencing something that is somehow different. But why believe that? Why can't she expereince ammonia when there is none? Moreover, how do you account for the case where Sue knows there is no ammonia, but still feels she is experiencing that identical smell?

Why can't she expereince ammonia when there is none? Moreover, how do you account for the case where Sue knows there is no ammonia, but still feels she is experiencing that identical smell? — hypericin

For a disjunctivist the seeming experience of ammonia caused by viral damage to the olfactory organ is not identical to the experience of ammonia.

I'm not a disjunctivist, but experiences can resemble each other without being identical. Wine, for instance, can have a taste that partly resembles pear with a splash of citrus without having pear and citrus as ingredients. It's the wine that tastes like pear and citrus.

For a disjunctivist the seeming experience of ammonia caused by viral damage to the olfactory organ is not identical to the experience of ammonia. — jkop

Not identical in what way?

It might be that in some ontological sense they are different. But what I meant by the first premise is that from the first person, phenomenological point of view, the experiences are subjectively identical. In that sense, there is no room to deny the first premise, it is a stipulation, and not implausible.

[...]

If you take "object" literally, everyone agrees that there isn't a common directly perceived object. But there must be something that is in common between the two cases. And it can't just be a shared belief that there is an object being perceived. — hypericin

It's not actually everyone who agrees that there isn't a common directly perceived object. Many empiricists who endorse a highest-common-factor conception of experience hold that in both the veridical and the misperception (or hallucination) case, it is an internal representation that is the object directly perceived (even though they may not use the word 'object' to describe it). I agree with you, however, that there is something common to both cases, and this common thing isn't merely the belief that P (when one sees, or it merely seems to one that one sees, that P). What is common to both cases, according to the disjunctivist, is that (in both cases) it seems to one that one sees that P (or that one sees an apple, say). Its seeming to one that one sees that P captures the subjective phenomenal character of the experience in a way that merely believing that P doesn't.

But from the fact that in both cases it seems to one that one sees that P, you can't logically infer that in both cases there is something — the same one thing — that one sees.

So, the disjunctivist is indeed entitled to disown your first premise. Your claim that "from the first person, phenomenological point of view, the experiences are subjectively identical" is indeed common ground. But what this means, according to the disjunctivist, is that the subject isn't able to identify a feature from their experience that would enable them to discriminate between both cases (veridical or non-veridical).

The tricky bit is that it doesn't follow from this sort of 'indistinguishability' that the subject can't know that they are seeing that P in the good case, or that they can't know this non-inferentially. The fact that they can sometimes be wrong, in different circumstances, only demonstrates that the capacity to perceive that P (and thereby to directly acquire the empirical knowledge that P) is a fallible capacity.

Not identical in what way? — hypericin

A disjunctivist might say that the smell she feels is not of the same type as that of ammonia. They're not type identical.

I disagree with disjunctivism, because non-veridical experiences employ parts or most of the same perceptual faculties as veridical experiences. It is possible, at least temporarily, to have a non-veridical experience that is indistinguishable from a veridical experience. In practice, however, it is often easy to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical experiences.

A disjunctivist might say that the smell she feels is not of the same type as that of ammonia. They're not type identical.

I disagree with disjunctivism, because non-veridical experiences employ parts or most of the same perceptual faculties as veridical experiences. It is possible, at least temporarily, to have a non-veridical experience that is indistinguishable from a veridical experience. In practice, however, it is often easy to distinguish between veridical and non-veridical experiences. — jkop

I think this rather misrepresents the disjunctivist thesis. Disjunctivists don't claim that people are able to distinguish veridical from non-veridical experiences or that, on the basis of knowing the discriminating features, are able to tell whether they are or aren't in the good case. Rather, they are claiming that such subjective distinguishability (which may or may not exist or be attended to) is not needed as a basis for the directness of perception (in the good case) or for the ability to gain non-inferential empirical knowledge of the world through perception to be successfully exercised (again in the good case).

The Wikipedia entry on disjunctivism is very short and could phrase a couple of things better, but it provides a decent enough overview. The SEP also has an entry on disjunctivism. It seems quite comprehensive but I haven't read it.

Thanks for the links!

My addition about indistinguishability is not an attempt to misrepresent disjunctivism. It follows from rejecting its thesis that veridical and non-veridical perceptions are fundamentally different. By rejecting disjunctivism and assuming that veridical and non-veridical perceptions are of the same type, I must give them the same analysis. Hence the stipulation that they can be phenomenally indistinguishable.

More specifically, they are of the same type constitutively, because they employ the brain's perceptual system unlike other types of conscious experiences, such as beliefs, desires, memories, imaginations.

Intentionalistically, however, they remain different and distinguishable, because in the non-veridical case nothing is perceived. Illusory objects are not perceived but constructed from habit, association, interpretation, or misinterpretation, imagination, memory and so on.

But what this means, according to the disjunctivist, is that the subject isn't able to identify a feature from their experience that would enable them to discriminate between both cases (veridical or non-veridical). — Pierre-Normand

So is the implication that there is a hidden feature in the subject's own phenomenological experience that the subject is unable to discern?

Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have direct awareness of your perceptual experiences. The "direct" qualifier has no contrast, so it doesn't mean anything. — Luke

This is clearly untrue, without much need to qualify that. We can understand 'direct' without a perfect conception of indirect and vice verse. Even a decent analogy makes this so, if you want to reject the brute fact. This smacks of a random limitation on concepts to service a particular view. The quote from ChatGPT makes it clear what each would consist in. We need not have experienced them to talk about htem with meaning. In any case, several possible 'more direct' types of perception have been put forward.

More specifically, they are of the same type constitutively, because they employ the brain's perceptual system unlike other types of conscious experiences, such as beliefs, desires, memories, imaginations. — jkop

Great point.

We agree that correlations can be drawn prior to(far in advance of) experience, but I suspect for very different reasons.
— creativesoul

Mine are: on the one hand all that which constitutes the representation of an object as it is perceived, which I call a phenomenon, correlated with representations for all that I think the phenomenon contains, which I call conceptions. The result is what my intelligence informs me about the object, which I call an understanding.

Yours are……? — Mww

Driven and delineated by evolutionary timeline.

….compatible with, an evolutionary timeline.
— creativesoul

This being aimed against the creationists? — Mww

Nah, more towards current knowledge.

The experience is meaningful to the dog, but not the sensor. The sensor detects and the dog perceives the very same thing.
— creativesoul

Ok, I get that. Because you already posit that experience is meaningful only to the creature, can half of each of your pairs be eliminated? Detection/perception eliminates detection because the creature perceives, and likewise, for sensitivity/sentience, sensitivity is eliminated. I wonder then, why you brought them up in the first place, just to dismiss them for their difference. — Mww

Who's being dismissive?

I brought them up to continue what I've been doing. I'm offering an outline I've been working with. That's part and parcel for methodological naturalist approaches. The strict rule against invoking supernatural entities as "a" or "thee" means for explanation is based upon knowing that logical possibility alone does not constitute sufficient reason to believe. I'm establishing my own terminological choices, and I'm adhering to a few basic principles while doing so.

That said...

Noting the difference between detection and perception is not dismissive. It is not dismissive of me to draw and maintain distinctions. I'm paving the way, as it were. Laying the groundwork. Letting you know what I mean by some of the key words, and trying to make consistent, coherent, non-contradictory, sense of it all.

Not all things capable of light detection are biological creatures. Photoreceptors need not be alive. Perceiving light is more than interacting with it. Light interacts with manmade photoelectric sensors as well as biological ones.

Who ever heard of ice cream that wasn’t creamy, just as who ever heard of an experience that wasn’t perceptual, or, perceptually instantiated. On the other hand, while the ice is of the cream, experience is not of the perception, but only of a determinable set of abstract intellectual predicates cognized as representing it. — Mww

It's the cream that mattered. Cream is an elemental constituent - a necessary ingredient - of ice cream. Cream exists in its entirety prior to becoming part of ice cream. Ice cream is existentially dependent upon cream, but not the other way around. The same is true of experience and perception respectively.

Again, I think we agree.

I’m saying no experience at all, includes language use. — Mww

If that is true, then language acquisition is not meaningful experience. Looks like a reductio ad absurdum.

My acquiring an experience is very different than me telling you about what it was, which manifests as me telling you all about what I know of the object with which the experience is concerned, or how I came into possession of it. — Mww

I see no issue with past experience being both, substantially different and elementally the same as the recollection thereof. It's different in its elemental constituency, and yet also like cream and ice cream there is an existential dependency in that the one is existentially dependent upon the other, but not the other way around.

A report of past experience presupposes past experience. If there is no past experience, there can be no report thereof. However, experience need not be reported upon. None of that is a problem.



I simply cannot agree with a (mis)conception and/or emaciated notion of experience that leads us to conclude that language acquisition is not meaningful experience.

People are very often mistaken about their own mental events.
— creativesoul

I can’t tell whether they have no use for understanding what such events are, they don't want to think it the case there are any mental events to be mistaken about, or, given mistakes, that mental events are necessary causality for them, which……for (a-hem) those of us in the know like you ‘n’ me……is a serious contradiction. — Mww

I was thinking more along the lines of knowing that and how we're influenced. I'm certainly not claiming to be 'in the know' as a means for evaluating/judging another as not being so well informed. I was merely stating something that is true of everyone. None of us knows everything. All of us hold some false belief or another.

They're not type identical. — jkop

Whatever type is, it is not phenomenal.

My addition about indistinguishability is not an attempt to misrepresent disjunctivism. It follows from rejecting its thesis that veridical and non-veridical perceptions are fundamentally different. By rejecting disjunctivism and assuming that veridical and non-veridical perceptions are of the same type, I must give them the same analysis. Hence the stipulation that they can be phenomenally indistinguishable.

More specifically, they are of the same type constitutively, because they employ the brain's perceptual system unlike other types of conscious experiences, such as beliefs, desires, memories, imaginations.

Intentionalistically, however, they remain different and distinguishable, because in the non-veridical case nothing is perceived. Illusory objects are not perceived but constructed from habit, association, interpretation, or misinterpretation, imagination, memory and so on. — jkop

My apologies. I should have employed a phrase like "fails to capture the true import of" rather than "misrepresents".

I understand that you are attempting to thread the needle between acknowledging the common factor that accounts for the illusory case to be indistinguishable from the good case, on the one hand, and acknowledging the distinction that externalists about perceptual content insist on, on the other hand. But successfully threading that needle precisely is what disjunctivism accomplishes, it seems to me.

The disjunctivist indeed insists on the distinction between veridical and non-veridical cases, as you acknowledge. They also recognize the existence of 'internal' common factors (such as similar retinal images or patterns of neural activation) that may help explain why the subject is unable to tell, in the bad case, that they aren't perceiving things as they are.

However, the disjunctivist argues that the difference in intentional content between the two cases is not merely extrinsic to the subject's phenomenology, but intrinsic to it. This claim may seem puzzling if we think of phenomenology as purely 'internal,' as if the subject were a passive recipient of sensory inputs akin to a disembodied mind or soul. But the disjunctivist urges us to reconceive perceptual experience as an active, embodied engagement with the world.

On this view, the phenomenal character of seeing that the apple is red is constituted by the successful exercise of the subject's perceptual capacities in an environment that cooperates. It is not a mere 'internal' state, but a way of being in the world, an enactive exploration of the subject's surroundings. In contrast, merely seeming to see that the apple is red is a case where this engaged, embodied perception has gone wrong, where the environment (or, sometimes, one own brain or sensory organs) has failed to cooperate.

So while the two cases may be subjectively indistinguishable, they are in fact fundamentally different in their phenomenal nature. Veridical perception is a kind of attunement or resonance between the embodied subject and the world, whereas non-veridical perception is a breakdown or disharmony in this relationship. The disjunctivist thus recasts the notion of phenomenal character in ecological, enactive terms.

On that view, seeing that the apple is red provides a distinctive kind of warrant or justification for believing that the apple is indeed red - a warrant that is absent in the case of merely seeming to see that the apple is red. The disjunctivist maintains that this difference in epistemic warrant is tied to the successful exercise of the subject's perceptual capacities in the good case.

Furthermore, the disjunctivist argues that the very nature of a perceptual experience — what makes it the kind of phenomenal state that it is — depends on the subject's ability to successfully exercise their perceptual capacities, at least in some cases. Without this link to veridical perception, it would be unclear how our phenomenal states could have any intentional or representational connection to the external world at all.

ChatGPT
Yes, in that case, it would be sensible to refer to awareness of your perceptual experiences as "direct."
The term "direct" in "direct awareness of your perceptual experiences" is used to denote an immediate, unmediated apprehension of your perceptual experiences. This is contrasted with "indirect awareness of the external world," where your awareness of the world is mediated by your perceptual experiences.
In this context, "direct" and "indirect" serve as contrasting qualifiers that give meaning to each other. Therefore, even if there is no indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, the term "direct awareness" still retains its meaning because it is contrasted with "indirect awareness of the external world."
So, the statement "Unless you can have indirect awareness of your perceptual experiences, then it makes no sense to say that you have direct awareness of your perceptual experiences" would be false in this context. — hypericin

Fair enough. I concede this point.

However, I still have doubts about your version of indirect realism, in which awareness of external objects is mediated by perceptual experience.

ChatGPT offers the following definition of indirect realism:

User
what is indirect realism

ChatGPT
Indirect realism, also known as representationalism or epistemological dualism, is a philosophical theory regarding perception and reality. It posits that our experiences of the world are mediated by mental representations or ideas, rather than directly perceiving external objects themselves.

According to indirect realism, when we perceive the world, what we are actually experiencing are mental representations or perceptions that are caused by external objects. These mental representations are often considered to be in the mind and are distinct from the external objects they represent.

In other words, indirect realism suggests that we do not directly perceive external objects such as tables, chairs, or trees. Instead, we perceive representations or perceptions of these objects that are constructed by our senses and mental processes. This theory acknowledges that there is a real external world but asserts that our understanding and experience of it are indirect and mediated by mental representations.

One of the key proponents of indirect realism was the philosopher John Locke, who argued that the mind receives sensory information from the external world and constructs perceptions based on this information. Other philosophers, such as George Berkeley and David Hume, also contributed to the development of indirect realism, albeit with variations in emphasis and interpretation.

The definition of indirect realism offered by ChatGPT states that our experiences (presumably our perceptual experiences) are mediated by mental representations or ideas. It contrasts this with "directly perceiving external objects themselves", i.e. direct realism.

Instead of the view that our perceptual experiences of external objects are mediated by mental representations or ideas, your version of indirect realism is that our awareness of external objects is mediated by our perceptual experiences. That is, you claim we have awareness of perceptual experiences of external objects.

If yours counts as a version of indirect realism, then I find the distinction between perceptual experience and awareness of perceptual experience to be problematic. You seem to agree with the direct realist that perceptual experience of external objects is direct (or you don't appear to argue for an intermediary between them). However, if your perceptual experience is, e.g., the taste of strawberries, then is your awareness of the taste of strawberries different to your perceptual experience of the taste of strawberries? How does the perceptual experience mediate the awareness? You said earlier that a perceptual experience entails awareness of that perceptual experience; that it entails its own awareness. In that case, what does awareness of the perceptual experience add to the perceptual experience that the perceptual experience itself lacks?

I don't allow for direct perceptual experience of real objects. Perceptual experience is representational, we are aware of it, and the representation is of real objects. But this doesn't mean we have direct perceptual experience of real objects.
— hypericin

It seems to follow that it is. If the “direct perceptual experience” is a representation and if the representation is of real objects, then the “direct perceptual experience” is of real objects.
— Luke

I deny that the premises entail:
direct perceptual experience of real objects

You counter by affirming that the premises entail:
"direct perceptual experience” is of real objects.

These look somewhat similar but are totally nonequivalent. The conclusion I deny says that the perceptual experience of real objects is direct. This is just direct realism. They conclusion you affirm says that direct perceptual experience, aka phenomenal experience, merely is of real object. But this is innocuous, and compatible with direct and indirect realism: the direct realist says it is directly of real object, and the indirect realist says it is indirectly of real objects. — hypericin

In the first quote above, you say that "Perceptual experience is representational" and that "the representation is of real objects". This strongly implies that perceptual experiences are representations and that these representations (i.e. these perceptual experiences) are of real objects. However, if perceptual experiences are merely "representational" without being "representations", then what are these representations of real objects? Where do representations fit in amongst awareness, perceptual experiences and real objects? Is there an intermediary between the representation and the real object, or is it a direct relationship?

This was not me making any ontological claims, I don't need to. I was only defining the terms I use. If it turns out that awareness and the experience are two aspects of the same thing, no problem. — hypericin

I think it is a problem if you cannot distinguish between a perceptual experience and a (direct?) representation of a real object.

If we are to know anything about external objects, then don’t we need to (somehow) have access to that object of knowledge? And to have access, don’t we need a means by which we access it? When we go on a journey by automobile, we need a road to access our destination. So too with knowledge; we need a “road” (or a way) to get it.

Take another example: We solve algebraic problems by adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing. This is the means by which we access – or gain knowledge about – the answer. Note that we do not identify the process of adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing with the answer to the problems – they are merely the means by which we access the answer. Without adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing, we can not have knowledge about (answers to) the problems. They are just the means to obtaining said knowledge.

Is it not similar with sensory perceptions and knowledge about the external world? Aren’t sensory perceptions the means by which we gain access to – and knowledge about – the external world? Surely we should not identify perception of external objects as a direct representation of the objects themselves; nor should we identify perceptions as indirect representations, for that matter. Either one would be akin to conflating process with result; confusing the road with the destination; and identifying addition, subtraction, multiplying and dividing with the solutions of algebraic problems.