The problem is that for each of your examples, the second sentence is wrong, not the "I see" part. — Lionino
Then how is it merely grammatical? — Luke
Well, here's the puzzle: did you recognise it, or just think you recognised it? Dejà vu?
You have no way to tell.
Hence, following a rule has to be public. — Banno
How is the dispute between naive realists and indirect realists any different? One group just prefers to use the noun "visual experience" to include distal objects among its constituents when talking about having a visual experience and the other group just prefers to use the noun "visual experience" to exclude distal objects among its constituents when talking about having a visual experience. — Luke
No. Experience exists within the brain (either reducible to its activity or as some supervenient phenomenon), whereas proximal stimuli exist outside the brain. So neither proximal stimuli nor distal objects are constituents of experience. — Michael
I think I understand. So for you, this process goes like:
distal object -> proximal stimulus -> interpretation -> mental phenomenon
and/or
distal object -> proximal stimulus -> interpretation -> experience — fdrake
and for you, "interpretation" and "mental phenomenon" are what perception is? — fdrake
Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism, which concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are constituents of experience. — Michael
I'm not seeing a good reason not to consider the distal object to be a constituent of the causal process that results in my seeing the cow. Why would the cow be any less a constituent of the causal process which results in me seeing a cow, than are the photons that enter my pupil? — wonderer1
The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65).
...
... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.
Naive realists claim that distal objects and their properties are constituents of our experience and indirect realists claim that they're not. — Michael
... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.
recognising it as a cow consists in not running for the gate because it's a bull, keeping a eye out for pats on the surrounding ground, counting how many cows there are as opposed to kangaroos, and so on. That is it consist in interacting with the cow and with other things. You know it is a cow by those interactions - indeed, knowing it is a cow is those interactions.So you're looking at a cow. Do you recognize it as a cow? Or just think you recognize it? Knowing that it's called a "cow" doesn't make any difference. There is no fact about which rule you've been following all this time. Other people can't help you with that. — frank
It's not obvious that this follows from your previous paragraph. Yes, dealing with cows requires there to be cows, if that is what you are claiming. But you seem to want some Kantian transcendence here? I have a vantage point.Therefore perception has to start with innate confidence in a world circumscribed by space and time, where you, the real you, reside in an unchanging spot as it all swirls around you, or you fly through it as it rests on arbitrary x-y-z axes. — frank
I'll offer you the same answer as given to Frank, above. Blind, illiterate mutes can herd cows. You account seems a bit ableist...Consider that we are all deaf, illiterate mutes. Naive realists claim that distal objects and their properties are constituents of our experience and indirect realists claim that they're not. — Michael
One group just prefers to use the verb "to see" only when talking about seeing distal objects and the other group just prefers to use the verb "to see" only when talking about seeing mental phenomena. — Michael
Blind, illiterate mutes can herd cows. You account seems a bit ableist... — Banno
Can you not see that these are both wrong? We use the word "see" in both ways. — Banno
I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. — Michael
Yes, we experience distal objects like cows. — Michael
A [veridical experience] depends on a [distal object] but the [distal object] is not a constituent of the [veridical experience]. The constituents of the [veridical experience] are just [mental phenomena]. — Michael
Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism, which concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are constituents of experience. Naive realists claim they are, indirect realists claim they're not. — Michael
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