Ok. Thank you. You have put me on track re Noumena.

Is there a "direct reality" for Kant? Does he even get into that? — ENOAH

I'm not sure if @Mww is trying to convey this but..
Noumena is a speculative notion that are the "objects-themselves" or the "things-in-themselves" - a reference to the "entity" non-cognized, but as it is "in itself". For Kant, I believe, this could be many objects, a plurality of various objects. However, it cannot be known, what, if any, "being" stands behind empirical understanding. It is "X" for lack of better term for Kant. For Kant as well, it is only a concept that is gotten to by negation. It is the "not-empirical thing".

For Schopenhauer, he thinks he can go "beyond Kant" by not just proposing that there are "things-in-themselves" behind the empirical, that we can never know (X), but rather, we CAN KNOW and very INTIMATELY what X actually IS.. and that is a monism, Will.. The very fact that we have an "inner being" (subjective experience) is for Schopenhauer proof that Will exists as this double-aspected thing that strives.

Now again, does Schopenhauer here mistakenly equate his "subject" for Will? I am not sure.. I think he might be saying just the fact that there is inner experience points to a "striving" of sorts- a greater Will at work. I don't think he is actually identifying the subject as Will.

For Kant, I believe, this could be many objects, a plurality of various objects. However, it cannot be known, what, if any, "being" stands behind empirical understanding. It is "X" for lack of better term for Kant. For Kant as well, it is only a concept that is gotten to by negation. It is the "not-empirical thing". — schopenhauer1

Yes that is clear to me now. Thank you.

For Schopenhauer, he thinks he can go "beyond Kant" by not just proposing that there are "things-in-themselves" behind the empirical, that we can never know (X), but rather, we CAN KNOW and very INTIMATELY what X actually IS.. and that is a monism, Will.. The very fact that we have an "inner being" (subjective experience) is for Schopenhauer proof that Will exists as this double-aspected thing that strives. — schopenhauer1

Yes, and this is also finally clear to me. S. goes beyond K at "disclosing" that "non empirical" with a "higher" status in the scheme of reality. Whereas K settles upon not accessible to knowing; S says it is the Will, the very "drive" of all being(s).

I don't think he is actually identifying the subject as Will. — schopenhauer1

I would be surprised if he was. I would think tge "Subject" belongs to representation, that "double" part of Wills "double aspect."

But finally, is therefore the most ultimate reality for S the Will? Or is there a Being of all Beings which is merely manifesting as the Will?

While it is true we think in images, as soon as we present to ourselves a representation of a triangle in general, it is a particular instance of a universal idea. In no other way than by means of principles, is it possible to think things in general, the backbone of pure transcendental cognitions. — Mww

Thanks for your elucidations, they're helpful.

is therefore the most ultimate reality for S the Will? Or is there a Being of all Beings which is merely manifesting as the Will? — ENOAH

See this blog post. It's not directly about Schopenhauer, but some of his near-contemporaries, grappling with the division between phenomena/noumena posed by Kant:

Hegel and Schleiermacher thought that Kant had missed something important—namely, that the self which experiences the world is also a part of the world it is experiencing. Rather than there being this sharp divide between the experiencing subject and things-in-themselves, with phenomena emerging at the point of interface, the experiencing subject is a thing-in-itself. It is noumenal—or, put another way, the self that experiences the world is part of the ultimate reality that lies behind experience.

So: the self that has experiences is a noumenal reality. Both Schleiermacher and Hegel believed that this fact could be made use of, so that somehow the self could serve as a wedge to pry open a doorway through the wall of mystery, into an understanding of reality as it is in itself. ...

... Schleiermacher dealt with this conundrum by privileging a distinct mode of self-consciousness, one in which all attempts to make the self into an object of consciousness—that is, all attempts to come to know the self—are set aside. When the self is made an object of study it becomes a phenomenon, and as such is divorced from the noumenal self. But it is possible to simply be—to become quiescent, if you will, and simply be what one is rather than attempt to know what one is.

And in this place of cognitive stillness, one discovers in a direct experiential way an ultimate reality that cannot be conceptualized or made into an object of study. This is the domain of mystical experience—and even though it is ineffable (that is, even if it cannot be made into an object of knowledge) it brings with it a kind of insight or enlightenment. One may not be able to adequately put this experience into propositional terms that can be affirmed as true, but that doesn’t mean one hasn’t in some sense encountered noumenal reality. One hasn’t encountered it as an object of experience (since that would turn it into a phenomenon). Rather, one encounters it in the way one experiences.

The challenge, then, is to attempt to articulate this encounter in a way that is meaningful to us--in other words, in a way that our cognitive minds can grasp and affirm. The encounter itself is what Schleiermacher calls “religion.”

Fascinating on a few levels. Thank you!

Is there a "direct reality" for Kant? Does he even get into that? — ENOAH

Not as such, no. There’s serious conceptual diversity between him and his successors, in that for Kant, the only realism is empirically conditioned, as opposed to that pseudo-realism which is technically only logical validity, while the only empirically direct, which he terms “immediately given”, is perception. So it is that the only directly real is that which is perceived, but that has nothing to do with direct reality, which, pursuant to reality’s inclusion in the table of categories, is neither directly real empirically nor perceived. “Direct reality”, then, reduces to a metaphysical non-starter.

On the other hand, reality, as such, is directly deduced transcendentally as a pure conception, pure meaning without a definitive conception subsumed under it, more commonly termed a universal, from which follows that this form of the real, first, belongs to reason rather than sensibility, and second, is real only insofar as without it all a priori cognitions become impossible. Which presents a kinda quasi-contradiction, in that if the real is only that which is empirically conditioned, then pure transcendental deductions cannot be real, but they are real insofar as they are and can only occur as objects of pure thought.
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What were the "opposing" "realities" in his dualism? — ENOAH

He states for the record his dualism resides in that which is experienced as opposed to that which is thought. Whether these are realities is questionable, considering how these conceptions are defined in accordance with the theory to which they are the ground.

And to nip the inevitable in the bud, no, noumena are not one of the opposing realities. While it is a valid conception, insofar it is not self-contradictory, it remains only that, a mere conception, hence is very far from an empirical reality for human intelligence.

Yea? Nay? Maybe, who knows?

I'm not sure if Mww is trying to convey this but..
Noumena is a speculative notion that are the "objects-themselves" or the "things-in-themselves" - a reference to the "entity" non-cognized, but as it is "in itself". — schopenhauer1

I’m not, in keeping with the definitions incorporated in the thesis. While it is true noumena are speculative notions, by definition a notion is “….a pure conception, in so far as it has its origin in the understanding alone, and is not the conception of a pure sensuous image….”.

The solution to what noumena entails, arises from why is there no sensuous image. And while it is the same reason for noumena as it is for things-in-themselves, re: neither are ever appearances to sensibility, that does not make the one the same as the other, but they remain nonetheless conceptually interchangeable with each other given their respective origins both reside in understanding alone.

The difference is the starting point. For us, we start with the thing’s appearance to our senses, then understand that which appears does not have to appear, and if it doesn’t, we understand that thing still remains as it is in itself. Noumena, on the other hand, originate, not in its affect on sensibility but in understanding, and from its conception we immediately comprehend why it cannot ever be an appearance.

(“….intuition cannot think, and understanding cannot intuit…”///“…. Thoughts without content are void; intuitions without conceptions, blind….”)

For what that’s worth…..

the only realism is empirically conditioned, as opposed to that pseudo-realism which is technically only logical validity, — Mww

Direct reality”, then, reduces to a metaphysical non-starter. — Mww

a universal, from which follows that this form of the real, first, belongs to reason rather than sensibility, and second, is real only insofar as without it all a priori cognitions become impossible. — Mww

Ok. Makes sense for Kant. But seems either extremely honest or extremely convenient. I tend to think the former. I.e., noumena is unknowable enough; he won't even touch that which really is unknowable.

we understand that thing still remains as it is in itself. — Mww

Noumena is a speculative notion that are the "objects-themselves" or the "things-in-themselves" - a reference to the "entity" non-cognized, but as it is "in itself". — schopenhauer1

Does anyone know the historical first instance of this "need" for an "in itself?" Assume it is not intuitive. Was it Plato's forms and/or this anamnesis? Was it pre-socratic? If so, what form did it first take.

It seems to me that this "in itself" is a hinge by which opposing views cannot reconcile which way it closes.


ADDENDUM: I.E., why can't "concept" which have no objective appearance be habituated constructions shared and reconstructed such that initiation into Culture/ Language means input with that data.

….either extremely honest or extremely convenient. — ENOAH

Maybe, but with respect to a theory predicated on sound logic, honesty and convenience don’t have much sway. At its simplest explanation, noumena cannot be known because they are what are called intellectual objects meaning they have no possibility of being represented in intuition. Only that which is intuited can be phenomenon from which arises experience, which is the same as being known as a certain something.
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….that which really is unknowable…. — ENOAH

How do we distinguish between the unknowable and the really unknowable?

How do we distinguish between the unknowable and the really unknowable? — Mww

Fair question. Deliberately, yet recklessly, I created the category "really" unknowable.

My thinking emerges from these very categories I have been grappling with, in some "points" intersecting across philosophers, in other places, divergent only superficially, in still others, clearly divergent.

Currently (admittedly, possibly plain only to me), I see "across the board" the phenomenal/representational as mediated reality; the noumenal as still mediated reality; though posited as unknowable because its constructed source is ambiguous; that which remained unspoken of by Kant, and referred to as The Will by Schopenhauer, as really real (though neither philosopher made compelling arguments for how they described/why they "ignored" it.)

My thinking emerges from these very categories I have been grappling with, in some "points" intersecting across philosophers, in other places, divergent only superficially, in still others, clearly divergent. — ENOAH

I could be wrong but, I don’t think Schop makes the distinction between Thing in Itself and noumenal. For schop Will is Thing itself is Noumena…however I suppose the notion of Will, it’s feeling to us as representation is Thing itself, and perhaps the ascetics Denial, is akin to Noumena or some such playing with the concepts

Me, I think the argument can be made that he was 'the last great philosopher' (although I'll leave it to someone else to actually write it ;-) )

The guy who does the Great Courses' modern phil survey course makes this point. He is talking about Hegel, but the two were contemporaries and even taught across the hall from one another for a period. He says Hegel was the last great philosopher in terms of creating an all encompassing system (aesthetics, ethics, politics, metaphysics, epistemology, etc.) Others since have had careers that touch on all these eras (although even that is rare these days) but they don't build them off one another and make them hang together as a whole. I think it's fair to say this sort of thing could be said of Schopenhauer's thought too.

For a more recent candidate, there is Ferdinand Ulrich, who is still alive. I haven't made it very far with him but since a number of people who know their philosophy extremely well have described him with all sorts of superlatives I will try to get there. I take it he is systematic in this way, although not nearly as prolific as Hegel. Despite some famous people singing his praises, he hasn't really broken out in popularity, which does seem somewhat essential to being "great." The type of philosophy he does hasn't been in vouge for a while, but that might change.

I could be wrong but, I don’t think Schop makes the distinction between Thing in Itself and noumenal. For schop Will is Thing itself is Noumena… — schopenhauer1

I agree. That was me extrapolating.

….the noumenal as still mediated reality; though posited as unknowable because its constructed source is ambiguous; that which remained unspoken of by Kant — ENOAH

If noumena are mediated reality, why do we have phenomena? We know….theoretically…..what phenomena are mediated by, re: sensation, but what mediates noumena when we don’t even know what a noumenon would be? And whatever it may be, it certainly isn’t a sensation for us.

It isn’t posited as unknowable because of its source, for it is possible for a priori knowledge to arise from understanding alone, re: mathematics, or, the logical laws of rational thought.

It’s unknowable not because of what it is or what its source is, but because of what it isn’t and what its source is not; it isn’t that which appears to human sensibility and therefore its source is not intuition.

that which remained unspoken of by Kant (…) as really real…. — ENOAH

Really real in Kant is the affect of things on our senses.

….though neither philosopher made compelling arguments for how they described/why they "ignored" it.) — ENOAH

I suppose you could say he failed to describe affects on our senses. He made a brief reference to the ontology of things, but in a treatise on epistemology, things just need to be given, where they come from and what they are be what they may. Where they come from doesn’t matter, and we’re going to say for ourselves what they are anyway, as befits our kind of intelligence, so……

Cool thing about speculative metaphysics: you can see across the board any way that makes sense to you.

If noumena are mediated reality, why do we have phenomena? — Mww

First, this is currently where I'm settled. And it goes without saying, I speak without authority.

We shouldn't have noumena. Noumena, only seemed to Kant et. al. to be unknowable. But their "thing in itself" is as unknowable as that of an apple. Both are known already mediated, and there is no inherent difference in what they are in our experience. Yes, noumena are not apparent to our five (conventional to western) senses, but they are no less representations to our 6th/7th senses, image-ing/inner feeling. Though I will be corrected, loosely, I note, Vedanta based philosophies recognize these.

And regardless, any concept, including logic and reason itself, I think are part of the world mediated/represented (I like constructed/projected). "We" as in the particular form human Mind took, constructed logic no more or less than it constructed apple. And what these two are independent of our constructions are equally not knowable.

This should not reflect the hypothesis, but the best and quickest way to illustrate here is, if it arises in thought or our form of "conscious experience", it is a representation even if there is no corresponding object. So God, Souls, and Meno's triangle, are not unmediated realities that exist independently of our representations. They are "learned" constructions.

Another way to illustrate would be to turn to what is not projected, the "really real," so called because real is already a projection (as is really real, but...). It is necessarily unspeakable. I think whether you're an apple, a soul, or a human, what you really are is meaningless to ask because meaning too is projection. What you are remains in being it; not knowing it. We ask because it enhances the experience of constructing knowledge; not because it brings us anywhere close to uncovering real being.

Really real in Kant is the affect of things on our senses. — Mww

Is that a settlement he necessarily reaches given his empirical approach? That is, is he saying, What things are, I cannot know, so I can only express positions on them as appearances, and for those representations based upon other than appearance, I will infer only from observing their effects?

Or, is he saying reality is its effects? I.e., even if I could access Truth as knowledge unmediated, I'd say reality was the affecting. If it is this, it sounds more like Schopenhauer's Will being that which drives all activity of being. And perhaps Kant just stayed clear of that (at least in his critique of pure reason).

The guy who does the Great Courses' modern phil survey course makes this point. He is talking about Hegel, but the two were contemporaries and even taught across the hall from one another for a period. He says Hegel was the last great philosopher in terms of creating an all encompassing system (aesthetics, ethics, politics, metaphysics, epistemology, etc.) — Count Timothy von Icarus

It's well-known that Schopenhauer despised Hegel (and didn't hold too many of the other German philosophers of his day in high regard either.) I agree with Schopenhauer that Hegel was extremely verbose. I feel that German idealism collapsed under the weight of its own verbosity and obscurity but that Schopenhauer's reputation has endured, because of the relative brevity and style of his writing. (I know that Schelling and Hegel each have a following but they're really confined to the ivory tower, don't you think?)

If noumena are mediated reality, why do we have phenomena? We know….theoretically…..what phenomena are mediated by, re: sensation, but what mediates noumena when we don’t even know what a noumenon would be? And whatever it may be, it certainly isn’t a sensation for us. — Mww

In traditional (pre-modern) philosophy, wasn't it the case that 'intelligible objects' were known immediately, i.e. knowledge of them was unmediated by sense? That when you know an arithmetical principle or proof, you 'see' it in a way that you can't see a sense-object? They are "higher" in the sense of being immediately grasped, rather than intermediated by the senses. Isn't that the gist of the 'eye of reason' in the Platonic tradition? (I'm writing here from a more pre-Kantian perspective.)

I think key to the 'noumena' issue is Kant's criticism of the rationalists including Liebniz and Descartes, both of whom believed the existence of God could be proven by rational principles. A major part of his critique is in criticizing the legitimacy of those kinds of ideas (on the one side, but also of the empirical philosophers on the other, who claimed knowledge comes from sense-experience alone.)

Kant argued that as a matter of principle we can't know what is beyond the bounds of sense and reason, which God by definition is (although elsewhere he also 'made room for faith' as he saw a necessity for God as the ground of practical reason and ethics). But much of his discussion of 'noumena' and 'ding-an-sich' (which are not the same but often confused with each other) is set against that background.

I think interminable confusion results from trying to figure out what 'noumenal' or 'ding-an-sich' really means, or is. It's like trying to peek behind the curtain, so to speak. Whereas, according to this primer on Kant,

Kant's introduced the concept of the “thing in itself” to refer to reality as it is independent of our experience of it and unstructured by our cognitive constitution. The concept was harshly criticized in his own time and has been lambasted by generations of critics since. A standard objection to the notion is that Kant has no business positing it, given his insistence that we can only know what lies within the limits of possible experience. But a more sympathetic reading is to see the concept of the “thing in itself” as a sort of placeholder in Kant's system; it both marks the limits of what we can know and expresses a sense of mystery that cannot be dissolved, the sense of mystery that underlies our unanswerable questions. Through both of these functions it serves to keep us humble.

Viewed in that light, and resisting the urge to 'peek behind', I think it's quite a reasonable idea.

key to the 'noumena' issue is Kant's criticism of the rationalists including Liebniz and Descartes, both of whom believed the existence of God could be proven by rational principles. — Wayfarer

Ok. Good to know that context. Makes even more sense.

Viewed in that light, and resisting the urge to 'peek behind', I think it's quite a reasonable idea. — Wayfarer

Yes, I see and agree it is reasonable.

Thank you

But their "thing in itself" is as unknowable as that of an apple. — ENOAH

That object which was initially unknown became “apple”, hence to say that object is unknowable, is a contradiction. The thing-in-itself, on the other hand, never becomes anything at all, so can be said to be, and remain, unknowable.

Both are known already mediated, and there is no inherent difference in what they are in our experience. — ENOAH

The thing-in-itself is not mediated, hence the difference in what they are relative to our experience, in that only the mediated object, in this case called “apple”, is one.
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We" as in the particular form human Mind took, constructed logic no more or less than it constructed apple. — ENOAH

Somewhat more or less, but I get your point. The constructed apple is the synthesis of empirical conceptions grounded by the categories. Logic is the a priori transcendental deduction of relations in the form of principles, for which the categories have no application.

And what these two are independent of our constructions are equally not knowable. — ENOAH

And what I just said relates to this, because logic cannot be independent of our constructions, insofar as the human intellect just is logical, whereas all that is naturally real, can.
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Really real in Kant is the affect of things on our senses.
— Mww

Is that a settlement he necessarily reaches given his empirical approach? — ENOAH

The point of the treatise, given from its title, is to describe what the system does when it is left to its own internal machinations, which can only arise in juxtaposition to what it does when it is affected by external influences. So it isn’t so much a settlement he reaches, as the simplest, easiest place to begin.

That is, is he saying, What things are, I cannot know…. — ENOAH

He’s obviously not saying that; we do know what things are. We tell them what they are by the properties we think as belonging to them.

…..so I can only express positions on them as appearances — ENOAH

This seems to mistreat appearance as “what it looks like” when it should be “when it makes its presence felt”.

Or, is he saying reality is its effects? (…) reality was the affecting. — ENOAH

Yes, by definition, that is in principle what he’s saying:
“…. reality is concerned only with sensation, as the matter of experience…”
“… reality is the conjunction of the thing with perception.…”

it sounds more like Schopenhauer's Will being that which drives all activity of being. And perhaps Kant just stayed clear of that — ENOAH

Oh HELL yeah he stayed clear!! Kant wouldn’t let will be the equivalent of, or synonymous with, reality, no way, no how. In Kant, reality is a pure conception of the understanding, a category, but will is a pure transcendental faculty from which arise moral volitions. Reality is a necessary condition for knowledge a posteriori; will is a necessary functional component for aesthetic judgements a priori. One can never sub for the other.
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It's well-known that Schopenhauer despised Hegel…. — Wayfarer

And was severely critical of the “Young Hegelians” who followed him blindly. Not one to pull his punches, ol’ Arthur.

'noumena' and 'ding-an-sich' (which are not the same but often confused with each other) — Wayfarer

Whew!! Finally. Music to my ears. The text says treated the same as, cognized the same as, which the inattentive consider as being the same as.
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In traditional (pre-modern) philosophy, wasn't it the case that 'intelligible objects' were known immediately, i.e. knowledge of them was unmediated by sense? That when you know an arithmetical principle or proof, you 'see' it in a way that you can't see a sense-object? — Wayfarer

You’d be more familiar with that than I, but I’d say, in Kant, the immediacy of knowledge a priori is relative to the principles upon which it rests, in particular, the LNC, which he calls analytical or explicative judgement and we call tautological truths.

That object which was initially unknown became “apple”, hence to say that object is unknowable, is a contradiction. The thing-in-itself, on the other hand, never becomes anything at all, so can be said to be, and remain, unknowable. — Mww

Yes, and I meant "unknowable" as to the "in itself". Though, as you said, Apple "becomes" knowable. It is only in its construction/projection.

The thing-in-itself is not mediated, — Mww

Yes. I'm mixing terminology. It is not mediated. Hence "in itself." What I mean to say is even the noumenal, though they seem to have an existence before or independently of our constructions, are constructions.

because logic cannot be independent of our constructions, — Mww

Yes

This seems to mistreat appearance as “what it looks like” when it should be “when it makes its presence felt”. — Mww

Yes, understood.

In the OP, ↪Shawn found Schop's "denial of the will to live" unacceptable. — Gnomon
Yes, I would like to elaborate on why I find it unacceptable. How is one to deny the will to live? Doesn't this imbue a persons life or deny their adaptability to the environment they are in?
Compare and contrast the Darwinian notion of the survival of the fittest with Schopenhauer's notion of the denial of the will to live? — Shawn

I'm not a Schopenhauer scholar, so I'm just shooting in the dark here. His description of WILL --- "a blind, unconscious, aimless striving {random erratic motion?} devoid of knowledge {unintentional ; indeterminate?}, outside of space and time {supernatural?}, and free of all multiplicity {singular ; monistic?} " --- sounds like a natural mechanical energetic force, except for the "outside" and "monistic" modifiers, which sound more like a deity. Yet it's not an individual object or person, but more like an impersonal energy field or Causal Essence.

For example, Aristotle's Prime Mover kicks-off the world in a certain direction, then innate mass/velocity Momentum keeps it going. Ironically, Schop's term "Striving" makes it sound like a goal-directed, self-directing (cybernetic) mechanism/organism. Or perhaps like Plato's intentional First Cause/Logos.

In any case Schop's mechanical "Will" may be only distantly related to the animal "will to live". In Darwinian terms, the latter is merely an instinct to avoid death, in terms of pleasure vs pain motivations. Hence, animals are goal-directed organisms. But Schop could be interpreted to generalize that selective avoidance-of-pain into a cosmic drive-to-survive that propels the animate & inanimate world to evolve from a fetal state into a more mature system. He seems to think humans are merely sentient animals with only short-term emotional goals.

Could Schop really imagine that the evolutionary world system was internally motivated by an ultimate goal of perfection to "strive" (expend Energy) against Entropy? If so, I would think he'd be more sanguine about the world's prospects for a better future. And wouldn't be associated with "toxic" Antinatalism. :cool:


Will to live :
The will to live (German: Wille zum Leben) is a concept developed by the German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, representing an irrational "blind incessant impulse without knowledge" that drives instinctive behaviors, causing an endless insatiable striving in human existence.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Will_to_live

I'm not a Schopenhauer scholar... — Gnomon

All his works are freely available online. Granted, a fair amount of reading, but the World as Will and Representation Vol 1 is a good start. In respect of the nature of the will, and why everything should be seen as its manifestation, read the paragraphs beginning here. Not easy reading, but then which of the German idealist were?

read the paragraphs beginning here. — Wayfarer

Why does it sound to me like K is saying, like the Body is an idea uniquely arising to the Subject, so to is the will; both ultimately, "explanations" a Subject must necessarily construct to make "sense of itself".

It’s the double-aspect point of one’s own body - that on the one hand it’s an object to us but on the other it’s the only thing we’re subjectively aware of. Still getting my head around that.

Also that’s S not K

yes, K. and you wouldn't say my read, though worded idiosyncratically, is inaccurate?

As far as I can tell. It’s a lynchpin of Schopenhauer’s philosophy. (I also wonder if it was an inspiration for Freud’s libido theory?)

I ran that query by ChatGPT, see https://chatgpt.com/share/97df2f69-9f7b-44d4-8451-30735412e03b

All his works are freely available online. Granted, a fair amount of reading, but the World as Will and Representation Vol 1 is a good start. In respect of the nature of the will, and why everything should be seen as its manifestation, read the paragraphs beginning here. Not easy reading, but then which of the German idealist were? — Wayfarer

Thanks. But it's a bit late in life for me to begin a scholastic study of "German idealists". I have a pretty good foundation in the pioneering Greeks. But I've never read any of Kant or Hegel or Schop --- other than popular quotes, Wiki articles and Wayfarer posts. So, all those famous philosophers are, for me, mainly symbols of specific concepts (Hegelian Dialectic) or general worldviews (Transcendental Idealism) that I may, or may not, want to use in what's left of my own real life. :smile:

Know what you mean.