You’ll find a thread that I’ve created about him here. — Wayfarer
there is a 'paradise lost' aspect to your versions of the history of ideas that I do not subscribe to. — Paine
In school we learned that something/someone can act and that someone/something can be acted on. — tim wood
That can only mean that for you, it is meaningless to say that anything is (ever) acted upon. — tim wood
For me, no object which does not yet have material existence is ever acted on. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think the matter belongs to a discussion of what Aristotle intended. Folding his efforts into an omlette of other ideas is what I am challenging. — Paine
Can you point to some place in the text where this is claimed? Where do beings move from the not-material to the material? — Paine
I take your point that generation is the counter example of the productive arts. — Paine
But you were making a claim about when beings actually existed 'materially'. — Paine
And as pointed out quite a while ago, the consequence of all of this is that a house cannot be built. A nice piece of nonsense. Do you think Aristotle would agree?A house is not being acted on at this stage, because the matter does not have the form of a house. And when the matter does have the form of a house, the house is no longer being built, it is already built. — Metaphysician Undercover
And as pointed out quite a while ago, the consequence of all of this is that a house cannot be built. — tim wood
So what is true? The absurd conclusions of tortured language? Or language that accurately describes/represents the world? (This not to say that description/representation is always problem-free, but instead to say that absurdities are not solutions - and at best signal that the thinking that has led to them has to be re-thought.) — tim wood
^sigh* No. It was you who completely misread my post. It was - is - your argument that the house not existing before it is built, cannot be being built, and once built, is no longer being built, hence - on your argument - the house cannot be (being) built.You are the one who used language to come to the absurd conclusion, that houses cannot be built. — Metaphysician Undercover
You thought this a stupid question - maybe you still think so. But observe how tortured your understanding is. A - or the or my - house can be built, but it cannot be being built. What you apparently don't get is that with that kind of reasoning nothing can be built. You spoke of acting on raw materials as realizing the goal of the house. But "acting on raw materials" does not in, of, or by itself produce a house. First the ground is prepared - built, a foundation built, a frame built, all the parts of the house that are not the house itself are built - the roof beams and trusses, the staircases, and so on, all are built. But cannot be being built. And you say the house is built as a goal -- from a plan no doubt. But how, exactly, does that work? My answer is nothing gets built unless it is being built.Let's set aside translation. Question to you: is it possible to build a house? Yes? No? — tim wood
And this is plain language. And plain language is what I find in Aristotle, Doesn't mean he leaves it unquestioned, but I am not aware of any instance where he overthrows plain language. — tim wood
Good posts. I agree with what you say about Aristotle in them. I would have to go back to see what you've said about Plotinus. — Leontiskos
Aristotle says that the first existence is separated from sense objects and is an intelligible existence. But when he says that "it thinks itself," he takes the first rank away from it. He also asserts the existence of a plurality of other intelligible entities in a number equal to the celestial spheres, so that each of them might have its principle of motion. About the intelligible entities, therefore, Aristotle advances a doctrine different from that of Plato, and as he has no good reason for this change, he brings in necessity.
Even if he had good reason, one might well object that it seems more reasonable to suppose that the spheres as they are coordinated in a single system are directed towards the one end, the supreme existence. The question also might be raised whether for Aristotle the intelligible entities from one originating principle or whether there are several originating principles for the intelligible entities. If the intelligible entities proceed form on principle, their condition will be analogous to that of the sense spheres where each contains and dominates all the others. In this case, the first existence will contain all the intelligible entities and be the intelligible world. Just as the spheres in the world of senses are not empty, - for the first is full of stars and each of the others has its stars,- so their movers in the intelligible world will contain many entities, being that are more real than sense things. On the other hand, if each of the movers is an independent principle, their interrelation will be subject to chance. How then will they unite their actions and agree in producing that single effect which is the harmony of the heaven? What also is the reason for the assertion that the sense objects that are in heaven equal in number their intelligible movers? Further, why is there a plurality of movers since they are incorporeal, and no matter separates them from on another?
Thus those among the ancient philosophers who faithfully followed the doctrines of Pythagoras, of disciples, and of Pherecydes, have maintained the existence of the intelligible world. — Plotinus, Ennead V, i, 9, translated by Katz
[9] There is another absurdity, however, that follows both from this account and from most of the ones concerning the soul, since in fact they attach the soul to a body, and place it in a body, without |407b15| further determining the cause due to which this attachment comes about or the condition of the body required for it. Yet this would seem to be necessary. For it is because of their association that the one acts, whereas the other is acted upon, and the one is moved, whereas the other moves it. None of these relations, though, holds between things taken at random. These people, however, merely undertake to say what sort of thing the soul is, but about the |407b20| sort of body that is receptive of it they determine nothing further, as if it were possible, as in the Pythagorean stories, for any random soul to be inserted into any random body, whereas it seems that in fact each body has its own special form and shape.96 But what they say is somewhat like saying that the craft of {13} carpentry could be inserted into flutes, whereas in fact the |407b25| craft must use its instruments, and the soul its body. — De Anima, 407b10, translated by C.D.C Reeve
The issue of the receptivity of matter raises the question of how there can be "natural" beings in a world where necessary events occur in conjunction with accidental ones. The view leads to an argument about the nature of actuality and potentiality (as I refer to upthread). What I have seen in Gerson overlooks the importance of the 'material' in Aristotle's pursuit of the natural. — Paine
Do you accept that a claim of ancient wisdom is largely dependent upon a description of what those old people were saying? — Paine
Do you accept that a claim of ancient wisdom is largely dependent upon a description of what those old people were saying? — Paine
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