How is it not real? Its a real experience.
My point is, is that any discrete experience is real.
But I don't know 'space' as a discrete experience apart from experience
Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?
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You need to be extremely clear. If I judge space as catching a ball, what part is apriori, what is aposteriori? If babies cannot grasp spatial relations prior to six months, what do they know about space apriori?
My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space.
No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences
No. This is just wrong. It is a fact that the concepts of space and time are developed over time. It is on you to show proof that space and time are concepts apart from experience. I'm siding with science on this one.
Correct. Then everything is apriori.
Incorrect. Space is a concept we learn by bodily extension. Discrete experience comes first, the concept of 'space' comes after
No, I did not agree to this. Please link to a scientific reference to senses beyond the five.
I'll agree that proprioception and echolocation are definitely senses, but introspection? — Philosophim
Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them
“One more step, and it becomes clear why there are only two pure intuitions, given the dualistic nature of the human intellect.
-Mww
Could you elaborate on this? I didn’t follow this part. — Bob Ross
The Kantian way of thinking about it, philosophically, is essentially:
1. An object “impacts” your senses.
2. Your sensations produce sensations. — Bob Ross
We do not have to have ever thought of the concepts time or space, and we would still function because we are beings of time and space. The argument that our ability to function is innate knowledge, means that even a single cell amoeba has an innate knowledge of time and space. That's absurd. — Philosophim
If you want to use ‘real’ in your more generic sense, then that is fine: it does not avoid the issue that the a priori preconditions for that experience are not a part of reality—they are, rather, the epistemic ‘tools’ which human cognition has for cognizing reality. Do you see this difference I am noting (irregardless of the semantics)? — Bob Ross
My point is, is that any discrete experience is real.
It is not a part of reality, though. Do you agree with that? — Bob Ross
“discrete” is a word which references an idea engrained, fundamentally, in space. You may say that ‘space’ is not conceptually known, self-reflectively, by merely discretely experiencing, but do you agree that, at least, space is the ingrained form of that experience in virtue of which it is discrete? — Bob Ross
I need clarification: are you asking for an example of a prior vs. a posteriori aspects of experience OR a priori vs. a posteriori knowledge? — Bob Ross
My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space.
There is no a posteriori space—it is pure intuition. What I think you are confusing is self-reflective knowledge with transcendental knowledge (and innate capacities, as you would put it). — Bob Ross
1. Babies experience (outer objects) in space.
2. Babies do not have any self-reflective conceptual capacities (through reason) that they experience (outer objects) in space nor what ‘space’ is as ‘extension’.
3. A child can, at some stage of development, understand notionally what space is without being about to apply language to explain it.
4. Adults have a self-reflective understanding of what space is, and can apply language to explain it. — Bob Ross
No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences
Hmmm, maybe I am misremembering your theory: I thought you agreed with me that our experience is inherently, innately, discrete; which implies that space and time are the forms, even if you don’t think they are pure a priori, of that experience. — Bob Ross
Here’s one of the roots of our confusion: you are failing to recognize that cognition has a dual meaning on english—it can refer to our self-reflective cognition (e.g., thinking about our experience) or our transcendental cognition (e.g., our brains thinking about how to construct experience). I would like you to address this distinction, because you keep equivocating them throughout your posts. — Bob Ross
Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them
Do you deny that your brain is organizing your thoughts in time to construct your experience of them (of which you can introspect)? — Bob Ross
Kant begins with the presupposition that our experience is representational and proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. — Bob Ross
So it is that perception is conditioned by both space and time, but thought is conditioned by time alone without regard to space.
That got the Andy Rooney-esque single raised eyebrow from me. Like…wha???
I wonder if this post, although not addressed to you, might have been relevant to your enquiries?
Isn't Thing-in-itself a postulated existence, rather than perceived existence?
Hence you need faith to perceive it, rather than knowledge?
Empirical experiences are experiences that are assumed to be sensations that represent things outside of myself. Non-empirical sensations are those which are generated inside of myself.
I feel the above terms are clear and largely unambiguous, which is important for any model and discussion of knowledge. My issues is, "What is apriori"? Its not clear, and its not unambiguous.
In the above two paragraphs, what would you consider apriori? What clarity and accuracy would the term add?
No, I can't agree that the term 'discrete' references space in some way. I feel like you're confusing 'living in space' with 'knowing space'. Because we live in space, we will act and sense things from space.
All things act as if they live in space, because they are beings that live in space.
But no living thing has knowledge prior to interacting with space
An electron circles around a hydrogen atom. Does it do this because it knows space and time apriori?
These discrete experiences become memories, and beliefs can form about them.
What do you see as 'apriori'?
Does it need to have another term tied to it like experience or knowledge? If so, give both.
Apriori and aposteriori are often seen as divisions between 'knowledge apart from experience (I generously say "apart from the empirical"' to fix this, and "Knowledge from experience (or the empirical).
So there should be an aposteriori conception of space
If I measure the table as being 1 meter long, isn't that an aposteriori conception of space?
Further, what is a clear term of 'transcendental knowledge' vs 'self-reflective knowledge'?
If there's something about it that you would like to discuss with me specifically, then please feel free to let me know and I would be happy to discuss — Bob Ross
Hmmm, you don’t perceive a thing-in-itself: it is, logically, the thing which your senses produced sensations of; and your understanding cognizes those sensations—not the thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross
Your senses don't produce sensations
but sensations are caused by the external objects, which are phenomenon.
Thing-in-itself is not sensible entity, but cognisible entity via reasoning
. It is the entity from the reasoning point of view, which must exist, but is unavailable to your senses, hence unknowable via normal perception
It is a different type of perception you need to perceive Thing-in-itself.
….our internal thinking in-itself occurs only with one occurring at a time….. — Bob Ross
I don’t see how one could prove, transcendentally, that I cannot have two thoughts at a time; other than to say that my brain would fail to properly render that into my self-consciousness — Bob Ross
Mww? — Bob Ross
If thing-in-itself is unknowable and unperceivable, how could you talk about sensations of thing-in-themselves? When you have sensation of something, does it not mean that you can perceive and know them?Phenomenon, in the Kantian tradition, are sensations of things-in-themselves; which are thusly not the thing-in-itself but, rather, conditioned sensations of them. — Bob Ross
Numena and Thing-in-Itself are described as the same thing in CPR.That would be a noumena, in the strict sense that Kant talks about it sometimes. A noumena is an object of thought which cannot be sensed. — Bob Ross
That sounds like a tautology. How does it get sensed? Why isn't it migrated over into the sensations?A thing-in-itself is sensed insofar as it is what excited the sensibility in the first place but necessarily is not migrated over into the sensations. — Bob Ross
When thinking-as-conceived is reduced to a series of thoughts, experience confirms we cannot think a plurality of thoughts simultaneously, which is to say we cannot think more than one thing at a time, which is the same as saying we have only one thought at a time.
the transcendental analysis of experience demonstrates there is only ever one thought at a time, which does not prove more than one is impossible.
That understanding can think noumena….which is their true origin after all….. is not contradictory, but the cognition of them with the system we are theorized to possess, is impossible, for the exact reason that forming a representation through our form of sensuous intuition, of an object merely thought by understanding alone, is impossible.
Numena and Thing-in-Itself are described as the same thing in CPR.
–– (CPR, p. 109)If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion—and this is a noumenon in the positive sense
If thing-in-itself is unknowable and unperceivable, how could you talk about sensations of thing-in-themselves?
(PS: I kept in the bracketed portion as another demonstration of Kant’s double meaning to noumena, although it is not relevant to my point now). –– (CPR, p. 108)At the same time, when we designate certain objects as phenomena or sensuous existences, thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in themselves, it is evident that by this very distinction we as it were place the latter, considered in this their own nature, although we do not so intuit them, in opposition to the former, [ or, on the other hand, we do so place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses, but are cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them intelligible existences (noumena) ]
How does it get sensed?
Why isn't it migrated over into the sensations?
But, in terms of what we actually are, as opposed to what we appear to ourselves, we cannot say any of this is true…right? — Bob Ross
How can transcendental analysis demonstrate that there can only ever be one thought we have…. — Bob Ross
How would such a noumena, though, be a representation of something which is real? — Bob Ross
The understanding can create an object of pure intellect, but that would always just be a product of imagination—wouldn’t it? — Bob Ross
No they are not at all. The word “noumena” is used in a double-sense in the CPR, and Kant is very explicit about that. E.g.,: — Bob Ross
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