How is it not real? Its a real experience.
My point is, is that any discrete experience is real.
But I don't know 'space' as a discrete experience apart from experience
Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?
…
You need to be extremely clear. If I judge space as catching a ball, what part is apriori, what is aposteriori? If babies cannot grasp spatial relations prior to six months, what do they know about space apriori?
My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space.
No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences
No. This is just wrong. It is a fact that the concepts of space and time are developed over time. It is on you to show proof that space and time are concepts apart from experience. I'm siding with science on this one.
Correct. Then everything is apriori.
Incorrect. Space is a concept we learn by bodily extension. Discrete experience comes first, the concept of 'space' comes after
No, I did not agree to this. Please link to a scientific reference to senses beyond the five.
I'll agree that proprioception and echolocation are definitely senses, but introspection? — Philosophim
Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them
“One more step, and it becomes clear why there are only two pure intuitions, given the dualistic nature of the human intellect.
-Mww
Could you elaborate on this? I didn’t follow this part. — Bob Ross
The Kantian way of thinking about it, philosophically, is essentially:
1. An object “impacts” your senses.
2. Your sensations produce sensations. — Bob Ross
We do not have to have ever thought of the concepts time or space, and we would still function because we are beings of time and space. The argument that our ability to function is innate knowledge, means that even a single cell amoeba has an innate knowledge of time and space. That's absurd. — Philosophim
If you want to use ‘real’ in your more generic sense, then that is fine: it does not avoid the issue that the a priori preconditions for that experience are not a part of reality—they are, rather, the epistemic ‘tools’ which human cognition has for cognizing reality. Do you see this difference I am noting (irregardless of the semantics)? — Bob Ross
My point is, is that any discrete experience is real.
It is not a part of reality, though. Do you agree with that? — Bob Ross
“discrete” is a word which references an idea engrained, fundamentally, in space. You may say that ‘space’ is not conceptually known, self-reflectively, by merely discretely experiencing, but do you agree that, at least, space is the ingrained form of that experience in virtue of which it is discrete? — Bob Ross
I need clarification: are you asking for an example of a prior vs. a posteriori aspects of experience OR a priori vs. a posteriori knowledge? — Bob Ross
My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space.
There is no a posteriori space—it is pure intuition. What I think you are confusing is self-reflective knowledge with transcendental knowledge (and innate capacities, as you would put it). — Bob Ross
1. Babies experience (outer objects) in space.
2. Babies do not have any self-reflective conceptual capacities (through reason) that they experience (outer objects) in space nor what ‘space’ is as ‘extension’.
3. A child can, at some stage of development, understand notionally what space is without being about to apply language to explain it.
4. Adults have a self-reflective understanding of what space is, and can apply language to explain it. — Bob Ross
No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences
Hmmm, maybe I am misremembering your theory: I thought you agreed with me that our experience is inherently, innately, discrete; which implies that space and time are the forms, even if you don’t think they are pure a priori, of that experience. — Bob Ross
Here’s one of the roots of our confusion: you are failing to recognize that cognition has a dual meaning on english—it can refer to our self-reflective cognition (e.g., thinking about our experience) or our transcendental cognition (e.g., our brains thinking about how to construct experience). I would like you to address this distinction, because you keep equivocating them throughout your posts. — Bob Ross
Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them
Do you deny that your brain is organizing your thoughts in time to construct your experience of them (of which you can introspect)? — Bob Ross
Kant begins with the presupposition that our experience is representational and proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. — Bob Ross
So it is that perception is conditioned by both space and time, but thought is conditioned by time alone without regard to space.
That got the Andy Rooney-esque single raised eyebrow from me. Like…wha???
I wonder if this post, although not addressed to you, might have been relevant to your enquiries?
Isn't Thing-in-itself a postulated existence, rather than perceived existence?
Hence you need faith to perceive it, rather than knowledge?
Empirical experiences are experiences that are assumed to be sensations that represent things outside of myself. Non-empirical sensations are those which are generated inside of myself.
I feel the above terms are clear and largely unambiguous, which is important for any model and discussion of knowledge. My issues is, "What is apriori"? Its not clear, and its not unambiguous.
In the above two paragraphs, what would you consider apriori? What clarity and accuracy would the term add?
No, I can't agree that the term 'discrete' references space in some way. I feel like you're confusing 'living in space' with 'knowing space'. Because we live in space, we will act and sense things from space.
All things act as if they live in space, because they are beings that live in space.
But no living thing has knowledge prior to interacting with space
An electron circles around a hydrogen atom. Does it do this because it knows space and time apriori?
These discrete experiences become memories, and beliefs can form about them.
What do you see as 'apriori'?
Does it need to have another term tied to it like experience or knowledge? If so, give both.
Apriori and aposteriori are often seen as divisions between 'knowledge apart from experience (I generously say "apart from the empirical"' to fix this, and "Knowledge from experience (or the empirical).
So there should be an aposteriori conception of space
If I measure the table as being 1 meter long, isn't that an aposteriori conception of space?
Further, what is a clear term of 'transcendental knowledge' vs 'self-reflective knowledge'?
If there's something about it that you would like to discuss with me specifically, then please feel free to let me know and I would be happy to discuss — Bob Ross
Hmmm, you don’t perceive a thing-in-itself: it is, logically, the thing which your senses produced sensations of; and your understanding cognizes those sensations—not the thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross
Your senses don't produce sensations
but sensations are caused by the external objects, which are phenomenon.
Thing-in-itself is not sensible entity, but cognisible entity via reasoning
. It is the entity from the reasoning point of view, which must exist, but is unavailable to your senses, hence unknowable via normal perception
It is a different type of perception you need to perceive Thing-in-itself.
….our internal thinking in-itself occurs only with one occurring at a time….. — Bob Ross
I don’t see how one could prove, transcendentally, that I cannot have two thoughts at a time; other than to say that my brain would fail to properly render that into my self-consciousness — Bob Ross
Mww? — Bob Ross
If thing-in-itself is unknowable and unperceivable, how could you talk about sensations of thing-in-themselves? When you have sensation of something, does it not mean that you can perceive and know them?Phenomenon, in the Kantian tradition, are sensations of things-in-themselves; which are thusly not the thing-in-itself but, rather, conditioned sensations of them. — Bob Ross
Numena and Thing-in-Itself are described as the same thing in CPR.That would be a noumena, in the strict sense that Kant talks about it sometimes. A noumena is an object of thought which cannot be sensed. — Bob Ross
That sounds like a tautology. How does it get sensed? Why isn't it migrated over into the sensations?A thing-in-itself is sensed insofar as it is what excited the sensibility in the first place but necessarily is not migrated over into the sensations. — Bob Ross
When thinking-as-conceived is reduced to a series of thoughts, experience confirms we cannot think a plurality of thoughts simultaneously, which is to say we cannot think more than one thing at a time, which is the same as saying we have only one thought at a time.
the transcendental analysis of experience demonstrates there is only ever one thought at a time, which does not prove more than one is impossible.
That understanding can think noumena….which is their true origin after all….. is not contradictory, but the cognition of them with the system we are theorized to possess, is impossible, for the exact reason that forming a representation through our form of sensuous intuition, of an object merely thought by understanding alone, is impossible.
Numena and Thing-in-Itself are described as the same thing in CPR.
–– (CPR, p. 109)If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion—and this is a noumenon in the positive sense
If thing-in-itself is unknowable and unperceivable, how could you talk about sensations of thing-in-themselves?
(PS: I kept in the bracketed portion as another demonstration of Kant’s double meaning to noumena, although it is not relevant to my point now). –– (CPR, p. 108)At the same time, when we designate certain objects as phenomena or sensuous existences, thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in themselves, it is evident that by this very distinction we as it were place the latter, considered in this their own nature, although we do not so intuit them, in opposition to the former, [ or, on the other hand, we do so place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses, but are cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them intelligible existences (noumena) ]
How does it get sensed?
Why isn't it migrated over into the sensations?
But, in terms of what we actually are, as opposed to what we appear to ourselves, we cannot say any of this is true…right? — Bob Ross
How can transcendental analysis demonstrate that there can only ever be one thought we have…. — Bob Ross
How would such a noumena, though, be a representation of something which is real? — Bob Ross
The understanding can create an object of pure intellect, but that would always just be a product of imagination—wouldn’t it? — Bob Ross
No they are not at all. The word “noumena” is used in a double-sense in the CPR, and Kant is very explicit about that. E.g.,: — Bob Ross
Thing-in-itself is not available to your senses, ergo there is no sensation of it. If you have sensation of Thing-in-itself, then you would perceive it like you would see chairs, tables and cups. But you cannot have sensation of Thing-in-Itself.That’s the whole point of a thing-in-itself: it is whatever was sensed—and that is the limit of what we can talk about it. Viz.,: — Bob Ross
There are things that is unavailable to your senses, so there is no excitation from the things. But your reason can infer the things which exists outside of the boundary of your senses such as God, spirits and souls.Because some thing excited your senses; otherwise, you are hallucinating, which is absurd. That thing which excited your senses, was a thing, whatever it may be, as it were in-itself. — Bob Ross
Some of the concepts are A priori. Senses are not A priori.Because the way your senses sense is a priori. — Bob Ross
Which version of CPR are you reading?
There are several passages where Kant uses noumena and Thing-in-itself synonymously.
Thing-in-itself is not available to your senses, ergo there is no sensation of it. If you have sensation of Thing-in-itself, then you would perceive it like you would see chairs, tables and cups. But you cannot have sensation of Thing-in-Itself.
There are things that is unavailable to your senses, so there is no excitation from the things. But your reason can infer the things which exists outside of the boundary of your senses such as God, spirits and souls.
Some of the concepts are A priori. Senses are not A priori.
You should make note which version of CPR you are quoting i.e. 1st or 2nd. They have many different contents on what they are saying.It has all the editions in it, as far as I understand, and it is translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn. — Bob Ross
It depends on what context he was talking about. As I said, you must make notes which version of CPR you are quoting and for your points.The former is a thing-in-itself, which is just to say they are synonyms in this sense, but the latter is not a thing-in-itself at all. — Bob Ross
Kant is never clear in CPR, because he says totally opposite things in the other parts of CPR, and 1st and 2nd edition of CPR sounds totally different. You should read some of the academic commentaries on CPR too. Not just CPR, because anyone just reading and quoting CPR only would be usually in total confusion and contradictions on what he talks about.Kant is painfully clear in the CPR that a thing-in-itself is the thing which excited your senses as it were independently of how it excited those senses and what got sensed—viz., something excited my senses such that, as an end result, I perceived a cup: whatever that is, is the thing as it were in-itself. — Bob Ross
If all the daily objects you perceive in the external world had their Thing-in-itself, then the world would be much more complicated place unnecessarily and incorrectly. For instance, when you had a cup of coffee in a cafe, the cafe maid will demand payment for 2 cups of coffee. Why do you charge me 2 cups of coffees when I had only 1 cup? You may complain, and she will retort you, "well you had 1 cup of coffee alright, but remember every cup of coffee comes with a cup of coffee in Thing-in-itself, which must also be paid for. Therefore you must pay for 2 cups of coffee although you may think you had only 1 cup." You wouldn't be pleased with that, neither would had Kant been at the barmy situationNo, you are demarcating an invalidly stricter set of real things as things-in-themselves; which are really just supersensible things—which would be noumena in the positive sense (at best).
Whatever excited your senses such that you see here a cup, is a thing in reality which exists in-itself in some way—that’s a thing-in-itself. A thing-in-itself could also, in principle, if you want, include noumena in the positive sense; if by this you carefully note, in your schema, that a thing-in-itself is just a real thing as it were in-itself and a noumena a thing-in-itself which cannot be sensed—but, then, most notably, you are still incorrect to say that things-in-themselves are not that which excite our senses but, instead, right to say that some things-in-themselves cannot excite our senses. — Bob Ross
You should make note which version of CPR you are quoting i.e. 1st or 2nd. They have many different contents on what they are saying.
If all the daily objects you perceive in the external world had their Thing-in-itself, then the world would be much more complicated place unnecessarily and incorrectly. For instance, when you had a cup of coffee in a cafe, the cafe maid will demand payment for 2 cups of coffee. Why do you charge me 2 cups of coffees when I had only 1 cup? You may complain, and she will retort you, "well you had 1 cup of coffee alright, but remember every cup of coffee comes with a cup of coffee in Thing-in-itself, which must also be paid for. Therefore you must pay for 2 cups of coffee although you may think you had only 1 cup." You wouldn't be pleased with that, neither would had Kant been at the barmy situation
had their Thing-in-itself
well you had 1 cup of coffee alright, but remember every cup of coffee comes with a cup of coffee in Thing-in-itself, which must also be paid for. Therefore you must pay for 2 cups of coffee although you may think you had only 1 cup.
Not only was this ungrammatical, but it makes no sense. Kant never argued this at all—not even remotely. — Bob Ross
The coffee which you perceive is the cognized version of the sensations of a thing-in-itself; whatever it may have been in-itself. There isn’t a coffee out there, and a coffee-in-itself which corresponds to it. The coffee which you perceive isn’t out there in the real world: it is a perception you have of something. — Bob Ross
The problem I, and it seems plenty of other very intelligent people, have with this conception of both Kant's intention, and the (relatively) plain reading of the concepts is that there is no foundation for expecting a disconnect of this kind between experience and that which causes the experience. We simply have no reason to reduce our description to "something".
The experience couldn't be without that which 'triggered' it within us, within the bounds of our a priori concepts. We can easily still use the term "coffee" and just accept we can't know it's properties beyond it's tendency to elicit the experience of itself within the bounds of our a priori conceptual schema
Otherwise, we're saying things cause us to experience other things in some pretty direct fashion.
That’s literally the whole project of the CPR: you just denied the whole book here (: . — Bob Ross
Ok, now you are affirming the CPR (: — Bob Ross
I wasn’t claiming that. Are you implying that’s what I was saying in the quote you had of my explanation of the coffee cup? — Bob Ross
The coffee which you perceive is the cognized version of the sensations of a thing-in-itself; whatever it may have been in-itself — Bob Ross
There isn’t a coffee out there, and a coffee-in-itself which corresponds to it. The coffee which you perceive isn’t out there in the real world: it is a perception you have of something. — Bob Ross
I'm not sure that's the case.
There is nothing in the CRP that gives me any reason to think Kant saw anything more than a logical (i.e non-empirical, which is how your take has been framed) gap between the thing-in-itself and the experience of same (akin to the induction issue)
Reading that quote (of mine, that you used) in conjunction with the above, I can't see how the two are opposed.
You have expressed said the coffee isn't out there. Meaning, something else is causing you to have a cup of coffee (in terms of causation, not like it forces you to drink coffee lol).
That 'something' is coffee on both ways to read my take.
The thing-in-itself, in terms of what it represents, is not a figment of reason’s imagination—it’s a real thing out there. — Bob Ross
In the first, you were denying that there is a medium by which we experience — Bob Ross
For Kant, of course there is: it is the way we sense and cognize that provides that disconnect. — Bob Ross
for two different external objects per external object — Bob Ross
If you agree that the something which excited your senses cannot be known from the perception intuited and cognized from the sensations of it — Bob Ross
then it plainly follows that what you are calling ‘coffee’ only holds intelligibility insofar as it is phenomena and not noumena — Bob Ross
a priori modes of cognizing reality — Bob Ross
When you work backwards from your experience of the coffee to whatever excited your senses to have that experience of it, you end up with a perfectly unknowable ‘thing-in-itself’. That’s how it should be. — Bob Ross
Then, you must demonstrate how any phenomenal property of the coffee is a property of the coffee-in-itself — Bob Ross
the very concept of a ‘coffee’ is only distinguishable from the generic ‘thing’ insofar as it is already conditioned by the a priori means of cognizing it — Bob Ross
That’s why Kant never says “coffee-in-itself” or anything similar, but always ‘thing-in-itself’: it has to be that generic. — Bob Ross
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