How is it not real? Its a real experience.

I am not sure there is much more I can say on this point other than reiterate: what you mean by ‘real’ here is just a vague notion of existence—i.e., that you are having an experience—whereas what I am indicating is that the a priori aspects of our experience, e.g., of a tree is purely epistemic and not ontological. If you want to use ‘real’ in your more generic sense, then that is fine: it does not avoid the issue that the a priori preconditions for that experience are not a part of reality—they are, rather, the epistemic ‘tools’ which human cognition has for cognizing reality. Do you see this difference I am noting (irregardless of the semantics)?

My point is, is that any discrete experience is real.

It is not a part of reality, though. Do you agree with that?

But I don't know 'space' as a discrete experience apart from experience

“discrete” is a word which references an idea engrained, fundamentally, in space. You may say that ‘space’ is not conceptually known, self-reflectively, by merely discretely experiencing, but do you agree that, at least, space is the ingrained form of that experience in virtue of which it is discrete? Can we agree on that, and then work our way up (so to speak)?

Perhaps what would help is to clearly show a non-empirical aposteriori example and an empirical apriori example?
…
You need to be extremely clear. If I judge space as catching a ball, what part is apriori, what is aposteriori? If babies cannot grasp spatial relations prior to six months, what do they know about space apriori?

I need clarification: are you asking for an example of a prior vs. a posteriori aspects of experience OR a priori vs. a posteriori knowledge?

Your original question (above) was about the former, and now I think, based off of your response (above) that you are actually thinking about knowledge—not those innate aspects of experience.

My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space.

There is no a posteriori space—it is pure intuition. What I think you are confusing is self-reflective knowledge with transcendental knowledge (and innate capacities, as you would put it). So let’s start with the basics. Do you agree that:

1. Babies experience (outer objects) in space.
2. Babies do not have any self-reflective conceptual capacities (through reason) that they experience (outer objects) in space nor what ‘space’ is as ‘extension’.
3. A child can, at some stage of development, understand notionally what space is without being about to apply language to explain it.
4. Adults have a self-reflective understanding of what space is, and can apply language to explain it.

Let’s start there.

No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences

Hmmm, maybe I am misremembering your theory: I thought you agreed with me that our experience is inherently, innately, discrete; which implies that space and time are the forms, even if you don’t think they are pure a priori, of that experience.

No. This is just wrong. It is a fact that the concepts of space and time are developed over time. It is on you to show proof that space and time are concepts apart from experience. I'm siding with science on this one.

Again, you are confusing self-reflective knowledge with transcendental knowledge. No one is denying that we develop the concepts, in the sense of self-reflectively, of space and time over time; but this doesn’t negate the fact that space and time are the pure forms of our experience independently of our self-reflective, conceptual understanding of them.

Correct. Then everything is apriori.

???

The experience which you have, as I noted before, is as in part a posteriori; otherwise, you are doing the equivalent of hallucinating—since there is no empirical content.

Incorrect. Space is a concept we learn by bodily extension. Discrete experience comes first, the concept of 'space' comes after

Bodily extension presupposed space: your experience presupposes space as one of its forms. Space is more fundamental than what you are calling your ‘concept of space’; because by concept, you are referring to a concept derived self-reflectively.

Here’s one of the roots of our confusion: you are failing to recognize that cognition has a dual meaning on english—it can refer to our self-reflective cognition (e.g., thinking about our experience) or our transcendental cognition (e.g., our brains thinking about how to construct experience). I would like you to address this distinction, because you keep equivocating them throughout your posts.

No, I did not agree to this. Please link to a scientific reference to senses beyond the five.

You agreed here:

I'll agree that proprioception and echolocation are definitely senses, but introspection? — Philosophim

Here’s a basic article from a neuroscientist: https://www.sciencefocus.com/the-human-body/how-many-senses-do-we-have . Exteroceptive vs. interoceptive senses are just the scientific way of saying ‘outer’ vs. ‘inner’ senses.

Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them

Do you deny that your brain is organizing your thoughts in time to construct your experience of them (of which you can introspect)?

“One more step, and it becomes clear why there are only two pure intuitions, given the dualistic nature of the human intellect.
-Mww

Could you elaborate on this? I didn’t follow this part. — Bob Ross

In its simplest form, that which doesn’t require any explanation and without regard to any exceptions, we perceive things, and we think things. If the primary conditions for both of those very dissimilar activities had equal functional necessity, we couldn’t distinguish one from the other. But it is in our nature that we can, and we are perfectly aware we can, and that without any self-contradiction whatsoever, the content of either being whatever they may.

It follows that for the thought of things and the perception of things, even of the very same thing, there is necessarily a primary, fundamental difference in whatever it is that enables us to do both, such is the dualistic nature of the human intellect.

Again, on its simplest form, if we can do both, and each is different than the other, it follows that perception of things is conditioned differently than thought of things. Most obviously the difference in perception and thought, is one is conditioned necessarily on real things external to us and the other is not so necessarily conditioned.

So all we need is that which makes “external” necessary, which is nothing more than a relation between the object and the subject affected by it, and we ended up calling that relation “space”, such that the subject and the object are related to each other by the necessary differences in their spaces. It turns out mighty convenient that we can also determine the relation of objects to each other by their spaces.

All well and good, but turns out not all we need, in that space doesn’t give us something else just as necessary, that being, the immediate recognition that a multiplicity of objects is perfectly warranted, but absolutely not any of them in the same space. Or, and just as important, we can immediately recognize the existence of an object and the immediate non-existence of the very same object, which…..DUH!!!….has absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the space of it. From all that, we conceive coexistence, duration and succession, and call that recognition, time. And this is why we have two and only two pure intuitions. I mean, we just don't need more than two, and any less negates the functionality of our kind of strictly empirical intuition.

Now, since time and space have to do with our perception of objects, yet have nothing to do with each other, we can now proceed to what is missing from the thought of objects, such that the difference in these perception/thought activities is valid, without the negation of either because of the intrinsic relation they may have to each other. Right? I mean, the object we merely think is not external to us, so there isn’t a representation of it as a phenomenon at the time of its thought, which absolutely requires a space, but is only represented as a conception, which doesn’t.
(Here’s where someone telling you he put your car in the garage prevents your knowledge of it being there, insofar as all you know is what he tells you but not of anything regarding the object he tells you about. All you’re allowed, is to think the car is where he said he put it, contingent on his honesty, but you have no ground whatsoever to claim to know either the moral inclination of his honesty, or the empirical location of the car.)

Ehhhh……enough already. In perception, it is a fact more than one sensory device can be affected by the same object, but in thought, it is impossible to think more than one object at a time. So it is that perception is conditioned by both space and time, but thought is conditioned by time alone without regard to space. But those objects we think, if they have already been antecedent cognitions, re: from memory for the psychologists in the audience, or consciousness for the philosophers, have already been condition by time as a pure intuition in phenomenal representation, and if not already cognized must be nonetheless a possible phenomenal representation, insofar as to think an impossible object is itself impossible, and thereby in conjunction with the categories which are themselves, not conditioned by time, but conditions of it. And we end up with time as the fundamental condition of thought, even if not as a pure intuition as needed for perception.
————-

Your #2:

The Kantian way of thinking about it, philosophically, is essentially:

1. An object “impacts” your senses.
2. Your sensations produce sensations. — Bob Ross

That got the Andy Rooney-esque single raised eyebrow from me. Like…wha???

Anyway, 5 days ago, so long passed.

Sorry if I talked too long about stuff too obscure. It’s what sometimes happens to the elderly retired hence otherwise idle. (Grin)

We do not have to have ever thought of the concepts time or space, and we would still function because we are beings of time and space. The argument that our ability to function is innate knowledge, means that even a single cell amoeba has an innate knowledge of time and space. That's absurd. — Philosophim

I hadn't thought of that, but it's true! The amoeba must at very least have an innate sense of itself as being separate from its environment, otherwise it would perish. Of course an amoeba has no consciousness of its own existence, but in some fundamental sense time means something to it, that it does not mean to a rock.

I wonder if this post, although not addressed to you, might have been relevant to your enquiries?

If you want to use ‘real’ in your more generic sense, then that is fine: it does not avoid the issue that the a priori preconditions for that experience are not a part of reality—they are, rather, the epistemic ‘tools’ which human cognition has for cognizing reality. Do you see this difference I am noting (irregardless of the semantics)? — Bob Ross

I think so, but this is usually handled with the terms empirical and non-empirical. Both experiences of the empirical and non-empirical are real. The only question is when we state that our conclusions of the experience are not contradicted by reality. I may experience a tree, but if I then claim, "That tree exists as an entity, not only in my experience, then we are making claims about reality that extend beyond our experience. To claim it exists as a tree is to claim that it exists independently of me.

So for example, if I experience a tree in a forest, that's real. But if I say, "I know that tree exists as a real entity apart from me," then we are applying our discrete experiences in ways beyond the experience itself. This is where the terms belief and knowledge come into play. Deductively I can know its a tree by going over a careful process. Inductively I can believe the tree will still be there when I shut my eyes. Empirical experiences are experiences that are assumed to be sensations that represent things outside of myself. Non-empirical sensations are those which are generated inside of myself. But they're all sensations, and they're all real.

The term real simply means, 'what exists'. I feel the above terms are clear and largely unambiguous, which is important for any model and discussion of knowledge. My issues is, "What is apriori"? Its not clear, and its not unambiguous. And if we can't make it clear and unambiguous, then maybe its not a great term to use. In the above two paragraphs, what would you consider apriori? What clarity and accuracy would the term add?

My point is, is that any discrete experience is real.

It is not a part of reality, though. Do you agree with that? — Bob Ross

No, your discrete experiences exist. They are real. It is our interpretation of those existences when we start to claim, "Because I experience X, I know that X exists apart from myself," that we get into beliefs and knowledge.

“discrete” is a word which references an idea engrained, fundamentally, in space. You may say that ‘space’ is not conceptually known, self-reflectively, by merely discretely experiencing, but do you agree that, at least, space is the ingrained form of that experience in virtue of which it is discrete? — Bob Ross

No, I can't agree that the term 'discrete' references space in some way. I feel like you're confusing 'living in space' with 'knowing space'. Because we live in space, we will act and sense things from space. Again, my reference to an amoeba. All things act as if they live in space, because they are beings that live in space. There is a basic instinct and capability to come to terms with this, and to learn how to ambulate, eat, and live in space. But no living thing has knowledge prior to interacting with space. Go one further. An electron circles around a hydrogen atom. Does it do this because it knows space and time apriori? When it is flooded with energy and separates, does it do this because it innately knows how? This is just the way its being reacts to stimulus. So too with living beings.

The way a being lives, even a conscious one, is to have experiences. These discrete experiences become memories, and beliefs can form about them. Only a process of deductive justification can result in knowledge of whether those beliefs are true or not. As such, no knowledge is innate, because all knowledge is born of experience.

I need clarification: are you asking for an example of a prior vs. a posteriori aspects of experience OR a priori vs. a posteriori knowledge? — Bob Ross

I don't know myself. What do you see as 'apriori'? What does the word mean without ambiguity? Does it need to have another term tied to it like experience or knowledge? If so, give both.

My point is that I am unable to see your division between aprior space and aposteriori space.

There is no a posteriori space—it is pure intuition. What I think you are confusing is self-reflective knowledge with transcendental knowledge (and innate capacities, as you would put it). — Bob Ross

Apriori and aposteriori are often seen as divisions between 'knowledge apart from experience (I generously say "apart from the empirical"' to fix this, and "Knowledge from experience (or the empirical). So there should be an aposteriori conception of space. If I measure the table as being 1 meter long, isn't that an aposteriori conception of space? If that's not, what is it? Further, what is a clear term of 'transcendental knowledge' vs 'self-reflective knowledge'? How are these different from beliefs?

1. Babies experience (outer objects) in space.
2. Babies do not have any self-reflective conceptual capacities (through reason) that they experience (outer objects) in space nor what ‘space’ is as ‘extension’.
3. A child can, at some stage of development, understand notionally what space is without being about to apply language to explain it.
4. Adults have a self-reflective understanding of what space is, and can apply language to explain it. — Bob Ross

Translated:
1. Babies have discrete experiences. Some of these are empirical, or through the senses.
2. Babies do not express apparent knowledge beyond instinct that there is a thing that exists outside of themselves that we identify as 'space'.
3. A child eventually comes to realize that there is an outside reality apart from itself.
4. Adults can create an identity for the idea that there is something outside of one's own consciousness called 'space'.

No, we are continually experiencing. Then, we create discrete experiences

Hmmm, maybe I am misremembering your theory: I thought you agreed with me that our experience is inherently, innately, discrete; which implies that space and time are the forms, even if you don’t think they are pure a priori, of that experience. — Bob Ross

No, my point is that we experience, then we focus on parts of that experience. Over time we refine this. Thus a child has the experience of living, but the discrete identity of 'space' is not formed yet. It is like looking out into the vast ocean for the first time, then realizing there's waves, and that patch over there is a different color. We can also go reverse. Experience the parts, then then expand to a whole. But as a new being, there can only be the flood of sensations that we slowly part and parcel over time. I have a theory that shrooms diminish or shut off this discrete experience aspect for a time based on testimony of people saying they stopped seeing divisions and saw everything as one. (Just a fun aside)

Here’s one of the roots of our confusion: you are failing to recognize that cognition has a dual meaning on english—it can refer to our self-reflective cognition (e.g., thinking about our experience) or our transcendental cognition (e.g., our brains thinking about how to construct experience). I would like you to address this distinction, because you keep equivocating them throughout your posts. — Bob Ross

I see no difference between these two definitions. Empirical and non-empirical are clear and distinct. I don't see how these definitions are clear or add anything to the discussion. What is the difference between thinking about the experience and how to construct it?

If I see red and think, "That's red" how is that different from I see red and "That' red, and I want to imagine red"? In both cases, we observe red, so that seems self-reflective. But what thought that we are conscious of is not self-reflective? Experiences are by nature, conscious. How is that conscious thought any different from saying, 'that red, and..."?

For the senses:

"But your body also has receptors for events occurring inside you, such as your beating heart, expanding lungs, gurgling stomach and many other movements that you’re completely unaware of. They’re traditionally grouped together as another sense, called ‘interoception’."

All of this can simply be summed up as, "empirical sensations". Non-empirical thoughts are things like imagination. They aren't instantly deemed to represent something outside of our internal consciousness in reality. We can invent a thing like a unicorn and say, "Maybe that exists." But that's not the same as getting the image of a horse with a horn from our sight. Analyzing our thoughts is not a sense, because senses are empirical. This makes a nice and clear division which allows logical discussion. The less muddy the terms, the better.

Your thoughts are not represented to you. You experience them

Do you deny that your brain is organizing your thoughts in time to construct your experience of them (of which you can introspect)? — Bob Ross

No, your brain organizes information and gives it to you, the conscious part. And that conscious part of you is the brain as well. Its been long known that certain portions of the brain process different sensory areas and allow us certain functions. Damage the sight part of your brain for example, and you can no longer see or visualize. "You" are the conscious entity that is able to discretely experience. To focus on certain aspects, refine, and make judgement calls that the rest of the brain must follow. But I don't see how this processing has anything to do with apriori or aposteriori.

Ok, good discussion again Bob! I think I've addressed everything and made my position more clear. Can you make a clear and unambiguous distinctions between apriori and apoteriori for both being and knowledge? I look forward to your thoughts.

Kant begins with the presupposition that our experience is representational and proceeds to correctly conclude that knowledge of the things-in-themselves is thusly impossible. — Bob Ross

Isn't Thing-in-itself a postulated existence, rather than perceived existence? Hence you need faith to perceive it, rather than knowledge?

So it is that perception is conditioned by both space and time, but thought is conditioned by time alone without regard to space.

Your recognition that space is required for outer sense because it must have the possibility of representing a multiplicity of external objects, whereas our inner sense is in time alone because we cannot exercise our inner functions other than sequentially, is an astute and fascinating observation; however, I think it oversteps the bounds of reason and presumes highly questionable teleology. For what you are positing, with respect to the former, is that our internal thinking in-itself occurs only with one occurring at a time; which already presupposes knowledge of how we think as it were itself as opposed to how it appears to itself, and it supposes that that thinking occurs in a time which is not a pure form of sensibility. With my argument to Philosophim, I was merely noting, transcendentally, that my brain must be cognizing my thoughts (that I am aware of) because they are organized in time; but I cannot claim to know that my thinking, which could be occurring at deeper levels of my subconscious and of which I am not aware of, is fundamentally conditioned itself by time and, moreover, determined in-itself to be a series of one thought per time unit. With respect to the latter, it seems like if you are right then objects external to us are themselves in space and our thoughts are in time (alone); which then, beyond overstepping the bounds of reason, incites the question of “how could the brain be so pre-constructed to happen to mirror the forms of reality-in-itself?!?”.

I don’t see how one could prove, transcendentally, that I cannot have two thoughts at a time; other than to say that my brain would fail to properly render that into my self-consciousness. Likewise, I should, rather, say that I cannot see how one could prove anything about how thoughts exist in-themselves, which my previous statement presupposed many things about them as they are in-themselves (e.g., ‘two’, ‘at a time’, etc.).

That got the Andy Rooney-esque single raised eyebrow from me. Like…wha???

Oh I see: number 2 was supposed to say that “your senses produce sensations”.

I wonder if this post, although not addressed to you, might have been relevant to your enquiries?

I thought it was a good exposition of some of Kant’s ideas :up:

If there's something about it that you would like to discuss with me specifically, then please feel free to let me know and I would be happy to discuss. An in depth response, given how densely packed the information was, would probably to futile without us honing in on a specific aspect of the conversation.

Isn't Thing-in-itself a postulated existence, rather than perceived existence?

A thing-in-itself is whatever external thing in reality impacted your senses in the first place, and of which excited your faculties of representation into producing the perception which you ended up having.

If by “postulated existence”, you mean that reason herself must posit the thing-in-itself, given that one’s conscious experience is representational, then yes: we do not perceive things-in-themselves—that’s the whole point!

Hence you need faith to perceive it, rather than knowledge?

Hmmm, you don’t perceive a thing-in-itself: it is, logically, the thing which your senses produced sensations of; and your understanding cognizes those sensations—not the thing-in-itself. No perception of a thing-in-itself is ever possible for any being which has a representational experience; which arguably is any being with experience at all.

Empirical experiences are experiences that are assumed to be sensations that represent things outside of myself. Non-empirical sensations are those which are generated inside of myself.

Two things needing to be mentioned here:

1. This “empirical” vs. “non-empirical” distinction you are making is NOT the same as my distinction between what I sense vs. I use to cognize those sensations. You, here, are making a distinction between what is sensed about external objects vs. sensed about oneself.

2. The word “empirical” does not, nor ever has, referred to only sensations of external objects (assuming, and we must assume for your distinction to work, we are excluding ourselves as an external object); because anything which is sensed about reality is empirical (traditionally); and so anything of which my brain senses about my body or its own internal processes (e.g., thinking) is empirical data—for those are sensations of something which is in reality. The only time it would make sense to say that some set of sensations are non-empirical, is if we admit, which is highly questionable, that when we are hallucinating (or something similar) our senses are generating fake data. FYI, I would say that it is much more plausible, in that case, that our brain is simply capable of using the faculty of imagination as a source of fabricated sensations rather than our senses themselves being capable of, on cue, generating fake data.

I feel the above terms are clear and largely unambiguous, which is important for any model and discussion of knowledge. My issues is, "What is apriori"? Its not clear, and its not unambiguous.

Of course, as any philosophical discussion naturally goes, each participant believes they have all the unambiguous points (:

I don’t think your terms are clear at all but, rather, are muddied.

E.g., to use your tree example, you are saying that, if I understood correctly, the experience of the tree is empirical but that your thoughts about that tree are non-empirical; and this is because the tree is a representation of sensations of something in reality whereas your thoughts are not. However, your thoughts as presented to you in your conscious experience, are representations of something in reality just as much as the tree is—so both are empirical; and this distinction sidesteps the whole discussion about a priori aspects of experience, for you completely skipped over the fact that there are pre-structured aspects to the way that you experience that tree!

In the above two paragraphs, what would you consider apriori? What clarity and accuracy would the term add?

Let’s use the tree example: you are experiencing a tree. Ok. The tree, assuming you are not hallucinating, must be the product of your senses, ultimately, being excited by something in reality and of which your brain is intuiting and cognizing; and so the sensations, insofar as they are raw data of that thing which excited your senses, must be empirical (because they are about reality). The tree, however, is represented to you in space and time which are pure forms that your brain uses to intuit those (empirical) sensations and thusly are not properties of the thing, whatever it was, which excited your senses in the first place. So the space and time are synthetic. Likewise, the tree is presented to you not just in space and time, but also with strict mathematical relations; and this is something which is necessarily something which your brain synthetically adds to the mix in order to represent the ‘thing’ which is constructing from the sensations of whatever thing impacted your senses (in the first place) (viz., it is impossible for you to come up with a way to represent, e.g., a square on a plotting graph without producing inherent mathematical relations between each line and what not when graphing it). Likewise, the tree is not just represented to you synthetically in space, time, and with mathematical relations; but also with strict logical relations. Viz., when your brain is constructing the objects to present to you from those sensations, it does it in an inherently logical way: it will not, e.g., determine that it should represent that leaf and that other leaf in the same exact place in space and time because a proposition, for your brain, cannot be both true and false in accordance with those forms of intuition—these are, viz., rules a priori which your brain has which do not apply to whatever thing excited your senses in the first place. Likewise, your brain must have, in order to cognize those sensations, certain a priori, and primitive, concepts; such as causality (viz., your brain must already be equipped with the understanding that it must seek out cause-effect relations in those sensations in order to represent them inherently causally for you in the first place—e.g., in order for your brain to represent the sensations of whatever the tree is in-itself which excited your senses, it must already have the concept of causality at its disposal and the rule that it must connect things in those sensations in a cause-effect manner). Likewise, in order to do math (which is synthetic), your brain must, as another example, have the concepts of quantity (i.e., unity, plurality, and totality).

Just try plotting a line on a graph without having the implicit understanding that, e.g., a dot is identical to itself, the line unites the dots, there are multiple dots which are required to make the line, you must add the dots together in succession, etc. It’s impossible. Your brain is plotting objects on essentially a graph, namely space and time, to represent objects to you as an experience.

No, I can't agree that the term 'discrete' references space in some way. I feel like you're confusing 'living in space' with 'knowing space'. Because we live in space, we will act and sense things from space.

‘Discrete’ is obviously referencing space, otherwise you would have to posit that a discrete experience does not contain a multiplicity of objects.

We do not live in space, our brains represent things in space. Do you see what I mean? I think you think that there’s a space and time beyond the space and time which are the forms of your experience and, of which, you live in. We only ‘live in’ space and time insofar as we have conditional knowledge about ourselves and our environment which is inherently in space and time; because that’s how our brain represents them.

All things act as if they live in space, because they are beings that live in space.

That you understand things to be in space, like amoeba, does not entail that they are in space themselves. You understand an amoeba to react in space because space is a fundamental form which your brain uses to represent amoeba; or you use, with your reason, assuming you cannot see them with your own eyes nor with a microscope, to understand, conditionally, how they behave.

But no living thing has knowledge prior to interacting with space

Your brain does NOT interact with space: it uses it to represent whatever is going on in reality. You are using your knowledge of reality, which is conditioned by those spatiotemporal forms which your brain uses to represent things, to project that onto the things which excited your senses. You cannot validly do that. All you are doing is anthropomorphizing reality with the a priori modes that your brain has for representing it.

An electron circles around a hydrogen atom. Does it do this because it knows space and time apriori?

Electrons and atoms, and one circling the other, is already conditioned by your a priori understanding of reality; because it is deeply and inextricably ingrained in the a priori spatiotemporal means which your brain uses to cognize things. You are projecting that onto electrons and atoms with respect to whatever they are in-themselves, which we cannot know.

I can give you an even easier example: my car in my garage. When I say “my car is in my garage”, I am not saying that there’s a car which exists in a garage in the sense of what they may exist in-themselves; but, rather, explaining it in terms of the only way I can: as conditioned by the a priori means which my brain cognizes reality. I cannot think away space and time from my understanding of a car, a garage, and a car in a garage not because they are actually in space and time but, rather, because all I have ever experienced, and will ever experience, of a car, garage, and a car in a garage is going to be placed in space and time (synthetically by my brain in order to represent the sensations which were excited by whatever they are in-themselves).

These discrete experiences become memories, and beliefs can form about them.

All of which assumes that your experience is fundamentally spatial; and not that reality in which you exist is spatial.

What do you see as 'apriori'?

a priori has always referenced, traditionally, that which is prior to empirical data. Prior to Kant, it was primarily used to denote the forms of reality as opposed to its content (i.e., the rationalists arguing that reality is inherently rational because it has spatial, temporal, mathematical, logical, etc. forms); and for Kant, it was used primarily to denote that those inherently rational aspects, or forms, of Nature (e.g., the inherently logical and mathematical aspects to a leaf, or the laws of which is seems to obey) are actually the forms of our modes of experience. There’s nothing ambiguous about this. When someone says something is a priori, they are saying that thing pertains to the prior forms to something as opposed to the empirical aspects to it (e.g., the inherent mathematical aspect to a wooden block as opposed to how it reacts when being lit on fire).

Does it need to have another term tied to it like experience or knowledge? If so, give both.

a priori can be a noun or an adjective; so one can denote a certain thing as being the aspect of it which is a priori by saying “a priori <thing in question>”—e.g., a priori knowledge.

Simply put, a priori experience refers to the aspects of one’s conscious experience which are prior to the empirical data being represented and which are used to cognize the sensations of those things which excite our senses; and, of which, I gave a detailed account with the tree—so I don’t feel the need to add another example of this.

a priori knowledge refers to any knowledge which is grounded in those a priori aspects of experience. Such as “1+1=2”, “!(a && !a)”, etc.

Apriori and aposteriori are often seen as divisions between 'knowledge apart from experience (I generously say "apart from the empirical"' to fix this, and "Knowledge from experience (or the empirical).

This is true, because by experience they mean the empirical aspects of experience. E.g., you don’t need to technically sense anything in reality to know that 1+1=2; but you do need an experience, even if it be merely hallucinogenic, in order to do math. Viz., a knocked out mathematician cannot do math, but a conscious one can derive mathematical proofs without any empirical experiments.

So there should be an aposteriori conception of space

Ehhh….space is pure a priori. Not everything has both aspects to it. The a priori concept of quantity does not have a a posteriori aspect to it—that wouldn’t make any sense.

If I measure the table as being 1 meter long, isn't that an aposteriori conception of space?

Space is the extension in which the table is represented; and not the exact mathematical quantity that you measured. Math, not in terms of its axioms and propositions itself but in terms of how your brain represents things with math, does have an a posteriori aspect—the idea of representing it with extension does not.

Your brain learns, arguably, how to deploy the a priori axioms and propositions and concepts of math (e.g., geometry, quantity, addition, subtraction, etc.) in manners to better represent those sensations in space and time in relation to each object it determines is a part of those sensations; and, to your real point (I would say), the exact mathematical relations it attributes to something in order to represent it are conditioned by what it cognizes and intuits it is (based off of the intuitions).

In other words, math itself, which your brain is using, is a priori; but that your brain decides to represent that table as 1 meter long (although it is uncertain what unit of measure it uses, but that’s despite the point here) is conditioned by the empirical data which it is represented with that a priori math.

Think of it this way, as an analogy, if we are playing a game where I have a plotting graph (like in math class) which only allows me to draw in straight lines and tell me to represent a shape that is almost a square (but is a little squiggly); then I will use the mathematical principles which I do not learn from the fact that you told me to represent this squiggly square nor from the idea of a squiggly square to draw the straight-lined representation of the squiggly square. You telling me to represent a squiggly square, along with the nuanced squiggly square, in this analogy, is the empirical sensations and the math which I use to draw a representation of it is the a priori, non-empirical means of me representing it. You are, by analogy, with the tree, conflating these two and saying that the straight-lined representation of the squiggly line on the plotted graph is itself purely empirical—no, no, no...some of that is a priori.

Further, what is a clear term of 'transcendental knowledge' vs 'self-reflective knowledge'?

In simpler terms, it is the differencing between cognizing and thinking—it is the difference between your brain’s cognition for representing objects and your ability to reason about that constructed experience.

This is getting really long (: , so I will end it here.

If there's something about it that you would like to discuss with me specifically, then please feel free to let me know and I would be happy to discuss — Bob Ross

I felt the major point was Kant's relationship with modern cognitive science. You could say that in some respects some of his major ideas have been vindicated, the point being that unlike what some might say, he hasn't been left behind by subsequent science.

Very true. Very true. The only difference is that, I would say, cognitive science can't really get at the fundamental questions that Kant was trying to answer; being that it is purely philosophical. Most people nowadays won't grant transcendental philosophy as legitimate because they think science is the only valid means of inquiry into reality---which is false.

Hmmm, you don’t perceive a thing-in-itself: it is, logically, the thing which your senses produced sensations of; and your understanding cognizes those sensations—not the thing-in-itself. — Bob Ross

You got it upside down here. Your senses don't produce sensations, but sensations are caused by the external objects, which are phenomenon. Thing-in-itself is not sensible entity, but cognisible entity via reasoning. It is the entity from the reasoning point of view, which must exist, but is unavailable to your senses, hence unknowable via normal perception. It is the entity that must be reasoned, and postulated. It is a different type of perception you need to perceive Thing-in-itself.

Your senses don't produce sensations

By senses, I just mean your faculties (or faculty) of sensibility; which is the power you have to be excited by things-in-themselves.

but sensations are caused by the external objects, which are phenomenon.

Phenomenon, in the Kantian tradition, are sensations of things-in-themselves; which are thusly not the thing-in-itself but, rather, conditioned sensations of them. The “external object” is not a phenomena—they are noumena (in a loose sense) or, if you wish to reserve such a term for merely an object of pure intellect (as it is unclear which one Kant meant), things-in-themselves.

Thing-in-itself is not sensible entity, but cognisible entity via reasoning

That would be a noumena, in the strict sense that Kant talks about it sometimes. A noumena is an object of thought which cannot be sensed. A thing-in-itself is sensed insofar as it is what excited the sensibility in the first place but necessarily is not migrated over into the sensations.

. It is the entity from the reasoning point of view, which must exist, but is unavailable to your senses, hence unknowable via normal perception

Right, it is, logically, the thing which, as it were in-itself, excited your senses; but cannot necessarily be sensed absolutely accurately because the sensibility can only sense relative to how it is pre-structured to,

It is a different type of perception you need to perceive Thing-in-itself.

things-in-themselves are never perceivable—not just for “normal” perception—unless by a thing-in-itself you are conflating it with a noumena (in that stricter sense of the word).

By my lights, a noumena, in this sense, is a contradiction in terms, because it posits an outer object of intellect; which posits that the understanding, or some form of a faculty of understanding, could possibly cognize an outer object without being given sensations of it. @Mww?

….our internal thinking in-itself occurs only with one occurring at a time….. — Bob Ross

Yes, with the understanding that what we call thinking is nothing but an initial condition of a theoretical metaphysic. In other words, it seems as though we have this mental activity we subsequently conceive as thinking as a function of that activity. When thinking-as-conceived is reduced to a series of thoughts, experience confirms we cannot think a plurality of thoughts simultaneously, which is to say we cannot think more than one thing at a time, which is the same as saying we have only one thought at a time. But this is only a general rule in accordance with the theory, insofar as there may be exceptions to such rule, re: savants, autistics, sheer geniuses, and the like.

People in general, however, all else being equal, do not have the capacity to think more than one thought at a time. In addition, for those promoting the notion all thought is in images, it is quite clear it is impossible to hold more than a single image as a focus of attention, at any one time. Even following upon each other apparently instantaneously is still one at a time.

Thinking-in-itself, that supplemental physical system functionality for which we have grossly insufficient empirical knowledge given from thinking-as-conceived, may indeed have a clandestine level not included in the empirical domain. But insofar as there is no experience, a predicate of a metaphysical system, at all possible from the functionality of a purely physical system, whatever thoughts-in-themselves which reside below the level of conscious awareness are by definition unintelligible, hence necessarily of no consequence.

Perhaps it is merely the natural workings of the physical system, rather than the conscious workings of the metaphysical system, that permits confinement of some thinking to subconscious levels, as a way to prevent mental overload. But then the question arises how does the physical system ascertain which thinking to hold subconscious and which to raise to conscious level, to which the metaphysical system answers…..instinct.
————-

I don’t see how one could prove, transcendentally, that I cannot have two thoughts at a time; other than to say that my brain would fail to properly render that into my self-consciousness — Bob Ross

It isn’t proved; the transcendental analysis of experience demonstrates there is only ever one thought at a time, which does not prove more than one is impossible. Maybe it’s a simple as the transcendental principle that knowledge of a thing is its certainty, and from that principle, if all certainty follows from the synthesis of certain conceptions in a single judgement relative to that which is thought about, then if there are multiple thoughts in the form of syntheses of conceptions, there would then be multiple judgements relative to that which is thought about, in which case certainty is merely contingency and the fundamental notion of knowledge itself, becomes self-contradictory.

The critique of pure reason is the textual admonishment not to go beyond what is possible to know, in the fruitless search of what there is no possibility of knowing.

Mww? — Bob Ross

That’s the way I understand it, yes. Perhaps, rather, an impossibility of intellectual capacity than a contradiction in terms.

That understanding can think noumena….which is their true origin after all….. is not contradictory, but the cognition of them with the system we are theorized to possess, is impossible, for the exact reason that forming a representation through our form of sensuous intuition, of an object merely thought by understanding alone, is impossible.

We know this is the case, insofar as we talk about noumena as this something-or-other ‘til Doomsday but never once figure out what one would be like if it was right there in front of our face. We can’t even imagine anything about a noumenal object, that sufficiently distinguishes it from a mere phenomenon.

Phenomenon, in the Kantian tradition, are sensations of things-in-themselves; which are thusly not the thing-in-itself but, rather, conditioned sensations of them. — Bob Ross

If thing-in-itself is unknowable and unperceivable, how could you talk about sensations of thing-in-themselves? When you have sensation of something, does it not mean that you can perceive and know them?

That would be a noumena, in the strict sense that Kant talks about it sometimes. A noumena is an object of thought which cannot be sensed. — Bob Ross

Numena and Thing-in-Itself are described as the same thing in CPR.

A thing-in-itself is sensed insofar as it is what excited the sensibility in the first place but necessarily is not migrated over into the sensations. — Bob Ross

That sounds like a tautology. How does it get sensed? Why isn't it migrated over into the sensations?

When thinking-as-conceived is reduced to a series of thoughts, experience confirms we cannot think a plurality of thoughts simultaneously, which is to say we cannot think more than one thing at a time, which is the same as saying we have only one thought at a time.

But, in terms of what we actually are, as opposed to what we appear to ourselves, we cannot say any of this is true…right?

the transcendental analysis of experience demonstrates there is only ever one thought at a time, which does not prove more than one is impossible.

How can transcendental analysis demonstrate that there can only ever be one thought we have, when those thoughts are not occurring in the time which is used to represent them?

That understanding can think noumena….which is their true origin after all….. is not contradictory, but the cognition of them with the system we are theorized to possess, is impossible, for the exact reason that forming a representation through our form of sensuous intuition, of an object merely thought by understanding alone, is impossible.

How would such a noumena, though, be a representation of something which is real? The understanding can create an object of pure intellect, but that would always just be a product of imagination—wouldn’t it?

Numena and Thing-in-Itself are described as the same thing in CPR.

No they are not at all. The word “noumena” is used in a double-sense in the CPR, and Kant is very explicit about that. E.g.,:

If, by the term noumenon, we understand a thing so far as it is not an object of our sensuous intuition, thus making abstraction of our mode of intuiting it, this is a noumenon in the negative sense of the word. But if we understand by it an object of a non-sensuous intuition, we in this case assume a peculiar mode of intuition, an intellectual intuition, to wit, which does not, however, belong to us, of the very possibility of which we have no notion—and this is a noumenon in the positive sense

–– (CPR, p. 109)

If thing-in-itself is unknowable and unperceivable, how could you talk about sensations of thing-in-themselves?

That’s the whole point of a thing-in-itself: it is whatever was sensed—and that is the limit of what we can talk about it. Viz.,:

At the same time, when we designate certain objects as phenomena or sensuous existences, thus distinguishing our mode of intuiting them from their own nature as things in themselves, it is evident that by this very distinction we as it were place the latter, considered in this their own nature, although we do not so intuit them, in opposition to the former, [ or, on the other hand, we do so place other possible things, which are not objects of our senses, but are cogitated by the understanding alone, and call them intelligible existences (noumena) ]

(PS: I kept in the bracketed portion as another demonstration of Kant’s double meaning to noumena, although it is not relevant to my point now). –– (CPR, p. 108)

How does it get sensed?

Because some thing excited your senses; otherwise, you are hallucinating, which is absurd. That thing which excited your senses, was a thing, whatever it may be, as it were in-itself.

Why isn't it migrated over into the sensations?

Because the way your senses sense is a priori.

But, in terms of what we actually are, as opposed to what we appear to ourselves, we cannot say any of this is true…right? — Bob Ross

That would seem to be the case, but where does that leave us? We continue to think even without apodeitic certainty of being right under any and all conditions. We are left, then, to think as well as we can, in which logic is chosen the sole arbiter.
———-

How can transcendental analysis demonstrate that there can only ever be one thought we have…. — Bob Ross

Because transcendental analysis is downstream from that which it analyses, and it is logically parsimonious by introspection, and is confirmed by experience, that thoughts do not coexist. How that analysis proceeds is unknown, but they don’t coexist, and apparently they don’t, there are a multiplicity of them, and obviously there are, then they must be successive. And if they are successive, they must be one at a time, the whole syllogism comprised of synthetic principles a priori forms a transcendental deduction of pure reason, by which the notion comes to the conscious forefront in the first place.

Funny, innit. We love our science but understand we’re limited in our knowledge from it. Why should it be surprising we’re limited in the thoroughness of our metaphysical speculations?
————-

How would such a noumena, though, be a representation of something which is real? — Bob Ross

Representation of something real is phenomenon. Noumenon, then, cannot be representation of something real.

The understanding can create an object of pure intellect, but that would always just be a product of imagination—wouldn’t it? — Bob Ross

Not quite. While it is a condition of transcendental metaphysics that the understanding can think whatever it wants, that which it does think must still be under the rules provided by cognitive overwatch, if you will. One aspect of that overwatch is, even though imagination would be the only means for representation of that which the understanding thinks, imagination cannot conjure an otherwise impossible object, or, that object that does not come under the jurisdiction of the same set of rules, in short, that object for which no possible cognition is forthcoming.

A-Hem…
Thought is the synthesis of different conceptions, by imagination; cognition is that by which the relation of different conceptions to each other produce an experience. When understanding thinks an intellectual object, there is no synthesis of different concepts, hence no relation of them to each other insofar as there is no other, hence no cognition and obviously, no experience, is at all possible for conceptions of intellectual objects alone.

Dems da rules, donchaknow, thus it turns out imagination cannot always produce that which the understanding conceives.

No they are not at all. The word “noumena” is used in a double-sense in the CPR, and Kant is very explicit about that. E.g.,: — Bob Ross

Which version of CPR are you reading? There are different accounts for the concept in different versions of CPR. Is it 1sr or 2nd edition? Who was the translator?

You should also bear in mind that Kant has written his summary on CPR and explanation on the concepts in Prolegomena to any future Metaphysics too. There are several passages where Kant uses noumena and Thing-in-itself synonymously.

That’s the whole point of a thing-in-itself: it is whatever was sensed—and that is the limit of what we can talk about it. Viz.,: — Bob Ross

Thing-in-itself is not available to your senses, ergo there is no sensation of it. If you have sensation of Thing-in-itself, then you would perceive it like you would see chairs, tables and cups. But you cannot have sensation of Thing-in-Itself.

Because some thing excited your senses; otherwise, you are hallucinating, which is absurd. That thing which excited your senses, was a thing, whatever it may be, as it were in-itself. — Bob Ross

There are things that is unavailable to your senses, so there is no excitation from the things. But your reason can infer the things which exists outside of the boundary of your senses such as God, spirits and souls.

Because the way your senses sense is a priori. — Bob Ross

Some of the concepts are A priori. Senses are not A priori.

Which version of CPR are you reading?

It has all the editions in it, as far as I understand, and it is translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn.

There are several passages where Kant uses noumena and Thing-in-itself synonymously.

I am not denying that. As I said, no one really knows what Kant exactly had in mind with those terms; and that’s why I separated them hypothetically based off of which semantic schema one might accept.

The interpretation I have from the CPR and Prolegomena is what I already quoted, essentially, to wit, that the term “noumena” in two senses: the first negative, the second positive. The former is a thing-in-itself, which is just to say they are synonyms in this sense, but the latter is not a thing-in-itself at all.

Thing-in-itself is not available to your senses, ergo there is no sensation of it. If you have sensation of Thing-in-itself, then you would perceive it like you would see chairs, tables and cups. But you cannot have sensation of Thing-in-Itself.

The confusion lies in the ambiguity in your thinking here. What was sensed turns out to be different than the sensations of it, because our sensibility senses according to the way it is pre-structured to, so you are partially right and wrong when you say “[the] thing-in-itself is not available to your senses”. Kant is painfully clear in the CPR that a thing-in-itself is the thing which excited your senses as it were independently of how it excited those senses and what got sensed—viz., something excited my senses such that, as an end result, I perceived a cup: whatever that is, is the thing as it were in-itself.

There are things that is unavailable to your senses, so there is no excitation from the things. But your reason can infer the things which exists outside of the boundary of your senses such as God, spirits and souls.

No, you are demarcating an invalidly stricter set of real things as things-in-themselves; which are really just supersensible things—which would be noumena in the positive sense (at best).

Whatever excited your senses such that you see here a cup, is a thing in reality which exists in-itself in some way—that’s a thing-in-itself. A thing-in-itself could also, in principle, if you want, include noumena in the positive sense; if by this you carefully note, in your schema, that a thing-in-itself is just a real thing as it were in-itself and a noumena a thing-in-itself which cannot be sensed—but, then, most notably, you are still incorrect to say that things-in-themselves are not that which excite our senses but, instead, right to say that some things-in-themselves cannot excite our senses.

Some of the concepts are A priori. Senses are not A priori.

Yes they are. There are pure intuitions of sensibility, like space and time, and who knows what else. In principle, your sensibility is pre-structured to sense a particular way; and it is not true that all faculties of sensibility are equally structured to sense the same way. Viz., there could be an extra-dimensional being which senses toto genere different than us, and has different pure forms of sensibility.

It has all the editions in it, as far as I understand, and it is translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn. — Bob Ross

You should make note which version of CPR you are quoting i.e. 1st or 2nd. They have many different contents on what they are saying.

The former is a thing-in-itself, which is just to say they are synonyms in this sense, but the latter is not a thing-in-itself at all. — Bob Ross

It depends on what context he was talking about. As I said, you must make notes which version of CPR you are quoting and for your points.

Kant is painfully clear in the CPR that a thing-in-itself is the thing which excited your senses as it were independently of how it excited those senses and what got sensed—viz., something excited my senses such that, as an end result, I perceived a cup: whatever that is, is the thing as it were in-itself. — Bob Ross

Kant is never clear in CPR, because he says totally opposite things in the other parts of CPR, and 1st and 2nd edition of CPR sounds totally different. You should read some of the academic commentaries on CPR too. Not just CPR, because anyone just reading and quoting CPR only would be usually in total confusion and contradictions on what he talks about.

No, you are demarcating an invalidly stricter set of real things as things-in-themselves; which are really just supersensible things—which would be noumena in the positive sense (at best).

Whatever excited your senses such that you see here a cup, is a thing in reality which exists in-itself in some way—that’s a thing-in-itself. A thing-in-itself could also, in principle, if you want, include noumena in the positive sense; if by this you carefully note, in your schema, that a thing-in-itself is just a real thing as it were in-itself and a noumena a thing-in-itself which cannot be sensed—but, then, most notably, you are still incorrect to say that things-in-themselves are not that which excite our senses but, instead, right to say that some things-in-themselves cannot excite our senses. — Bob Ross

If all the daily objects you perceive in the external world had their Thing-in-itself, then the world would be much more complicated place unnecessarily and incorrectly. For instance, when you had a cup of coffee in a cafe, the cafe maid will demand payment for 2 cups of coffee. Why do you charge me 2 cups of coffees when I had only 1 cup? You may complain, and she will retort you, "well you had 1 cup of coffee alright, but remember every cup of coffee comes with a cup of coffee in Thing-in-itself, which must also be paid for. Therefore you must pay for 2 cups of coffee although you may think you had only 1 cup." You wouldn't be pleased with that, neither would had Kant been at the barmy situation

No. You are misunderstanding. The objects which excite your senses in the external world has nothing to do with Thing-in-itself.

You should make note which version of CPR you are quoting i.e. 1st or 2nd. They have many different contents on what they are saying.

It doesn’t matter: I’ve read many different versions; and there is a consensus that Kant did use the term ‘noumena’ at least in a double-sense in some parts of his works. I already demonstrated this.

Now it is your turn to demonstrate how he reworded it in a different version with respect to those sections I quoted. You haven’t even attempted to demonstrate that yet.

If all the daily objects you perceive in the external world had their Thing-in-itself, then the world would be much more complicated place unnecessarily and incorrectly. For instance, when you had a cup of coffee in a cafe, the cafe maid will demand payment for 2 cups of coffee. Why do you charge me 2 cups of coffees when I had only 1 cup? You may complain, and she will retort you, "well you had 1 cup of coffee alright, but remember every cup of coffee comes with a cup of coffee in Thing-in-itself, which must also be paid for. Therefore you must pay for 2 cups of coffee although you may think you had only 1 cup." You wouldn't be pleased with that, neither would had Kant been at the barmy situation

This made absolutely no sense. Kant never argued any of this; and I am unsure where to even begin. I would suggest re-reading the CPR. I’ll just give you some nudges and pointers.

had their Thing-in-itself

This implies there are two objects for each object: there aren’t. Kant’s critique is epistemic, not ontological.

well you had 1 cup of coffee alright, but remember every cup of coffee comes with a cup of coffee in Thing-in-itself, which must also be paid for. Therefore you must pay for 2 cups of coffee although you may think you had only 1 cup.

Not only was this ungrammatical, but it makes no sense. Kant never argued this at all—not even remotely.

The coffee which you perceive is the cognized version of the sensations of a thing-in-itself; whatever it may have been in-itself. There isn’t a coffee out there, and a coffee-in-itself which corresponds to it. The coffee which you perceive isn’t out there in the real world: it is a perception you have of something.

Not only was this ungrammatical, but it makes no sense. Kant never argued this at all—not even remotely. — Bob Ross

I was just giving an inferencial scenario of a case from real life, if Kant were alive here today, so that you could come to better understanding of the concept of TII. Obviously you seem to have misunderstood it as if it were from a real life story from CPR.

The coffee which you perceive is the cognized version of the sensations of a thing-in-itself; whatever it may have been in-itself. There isn’t a coffee out there, and a coffee-in-itself which corresponds to it. The coffee which you perceive isn’t out there in the real world: it is a perception you have of something. — Bob Ross

The problem I, and it seems plenty of other very intelligent people, have with this conception of both Kant's intention, and the (relatively) plain reading of the concepts is that there is no foundation for expecting a disconnect of this kind between experience and that which causes the experience. We simply have no reason to reduce our description to "something". The experience couldn't be without that which 'triggered' it within us, within the bounds of our a priori concepts. We can easily still use the term "coffee" and just accept we can't know it's properties beyond it's tendency to elicit the experience of itself within the bounds of our a priori conceptual schema. Otherwise, we're saying things cause us to experience other things in some pretty direct fashion. That seems both wrong and possible illogical to me at least in the sense that it's pure speculation and unparsimonious. We have no other way to cite the causes of experience, so why are we being all esoteric and indie about it?

The problem I, and it seems plenty of other very intelligent people, have with this conception of both Kant's intention, and the (relatively) plain reading of the concepts is that there is no foundation for expecting a disconnect of this kind between experience and that which causes the experience. We simply have no reason to reduce our description to "something".

That’s literally the whole project of the CPR: you just denied the whole book here (: .

The experience couldn't be without that which 'triggered' it within us, within the bounds of our a priori concepts. We can easily still use the term "coffee" and just accept we can't know it's properties beyond it's tendency to elicit the experience of itself within the bounds of our a priori conceptual schema

Ok, now you are affirming the CPR (: .

Otherwise, we're saying things cause us to experience other things in some pretty direct fashion.

I wasn’t claiming that. Are you implying that’s what I was saying in the quote you had of my explanation of the coffee cup?

That’s literally the whole project of the CPR: you just denied the whole book here (: . — Bob Ross

I'm not sure that's the case. As best I can tell, on multiple readings and having traversed probably half a million words in analysis (I include lectures here) the point of the book was the distinction after Hume, as between a priori concepts and empirical objects with regard to reason to avoid error in reasoning as between the two incongruous sets of 'things' (though, i definitely transgress Kant here as he would never call an a priori concept a 'thing' other than the general concept of same). That's in the title, the introduction and the entire body of the text and as best i can tell, the conclusions in the Method (the Method, specifically, is where my take derives from). There is nothing in the CRP that gives me any reason to think Kant saw anything more than a logical (i.e non-empirical, which is how your take has been framed) gap between the thing-in-itself and the experience of same (akin to the induction issue). He, in parts (though, I'm not apt to quote them so grain of salt), notes that we can't have experience of anything, without the thing. And so, being unable to know the thing does not present a barrier to us understanding that the thing is out there in a form that (possibly) we wouldn't recognize. But it might be exactly hte same, on Kant's assertions too. We just dont know. At very best, this is neutral as to claiming that 'coffee' isn't out there (though, some uses of descriptive language would ensure that it isn't, because we have never known it and named it coffee).

Ok, now you are affirming the CPR (: — Bob Ross

Reading that quote (of mine, that you used) in conjunction with the above, I can't see how the two are opposed. They both reiterate the same contention, which, I content, is in line with the CRP as a whole.

I wasn’t claiming that. Are you implying that’s what I was saying in the quote you had of my explanation of the coffee cup? — Bob Ross

It certainly sounds like it. You have expressed said the coffee isn't out there. Meaning, something else is causing you to have a cup of coffee (in terms of causation, not like it forces you to drink coffee lol).

The coffee which you perceive is the cognized version of the sensations of a thing-in-itself; whatever it may have been in-itself — Bob Ross

It was coffee. BUt then you go on to say...

There isn’t a coffee out there, and a coffee-in-itself which corresponds to it. The coffee which you perceive isn’t out there in the real world: it is a perception you have of something. — Bob Ross

That 'something' is coffee on both ways to read my take. 1. The object is simply the one we perceive, despite never being able to describe how that's the case; or
2. A different object, which is transitively coffee, has a strict tendency to cause us to perceive what we, in sensation, call coffee.

I have just dropped coffee from my menu, however.

I'm not sure that's the case.

Sort of. Kant was offering a solution, through the critique, between the rationalists (e.g., Wolf) and the empiricists (e.g., Hume): he sublated their positions. More specifically, Kant was seeking to critique the limits of reason.

There is nothing in the CRP that gives me any reason to think Kant saw anything more than a logical (i.e non-empirical, which is how your take has been framed) gap between the thing-in-itself and the experience of same (akin to the induction issue)

The thing-in-itself is a concept which reason deploys to demarcate the limits of experience, and so is ‘logical’ in this manner, but it is about how we experience (and so is not purely ‘logical’). The thing-in-itself, in terms of what it represents, is not a figment of reason’s imagination—it’s a real thing out there.

A thing-in-itself is never empirical, insofar as we understand empiricism as the a posteriori aspects of our experience; but it is real—not purely logical.

Reading that quote (of mine, that you used) in conjunction with the above, I can't see how the two are opposed.

In the first, you were denying that there is a medium by which we experience: that there is a “disconnect...between experience and that which causes the experience”. For Kant, of course there is: it is the way we sense and cognize that provides that disconnect.

In the second, you were affirming that there is a “disconnect” but that this provides no grounds to argue for two different external objects per external object—which is absolutely correct.

You have expressed said the coffee isn't out there. Meaning, something else is causing you to have a cup of coffee (in terms of causation, not like it forces you to drink coffee lol).

Let’s break this down. If you agree that the something which excited your senses cannot be known from the perception intuited and cognized from the sensations of it; then it plainly follows that what you are calling ‘coffee’ only holds intelligibility insofar as it is phenomena and not noumena (or qua thing-in-itself). The very concept of a ‘coffee’ is inextricably connected to conditional human experience—in short, on those a priori modes of cognizing reality. When you work backwards from your experience of the coffee to whatever excited your senses to have that experience of it, you end up with a perfectly unknowable ‘thing-in-itself’. That’s how it should be.

That 'something' is coffee on both ways to read my take.

Then, you must demonstrate how any phenomenal property of the coffee is a property of the coffee-in-itself; and then you will realize, in failing to do so, that the very concept of a ‘coffee’ is only distinguishable from the generic ‘thing’ insofar as it is already conditioned by the a priori means of cognizing it. That’s why Kant never says “coffee-in-itself” or anything similar, but always ‘thing-in-itself’: it has to be that generic.

The thing-in-itself, in terms of what it represents, is not a figment of reason’s imagination—it’s a real thing out there. — Bob Ross

Yeah see, this is, on it's face, a totally contradictory set of claims. It represents nothing, unless there is a real thing to which you are referring. In which case, it represents that. It can't really cut both ways. This is one of my personal gripes with the CRP that makes it come apart in some of its most important aspects. This reply would go to a couple of your further paras too.

In the first, you were denying that there is a medium by which we experience — Bob Ross

False. If that's what you got, I cannot, on review, see how.

For Kant, of course there is: it is the way we sense and cognize that provides that disconnect. — Bob Ross

This would clearly provide a connection. And it certainly does for Kant.

for two different external objects per external object — Bob Ross

No. I did not say this, or imply it. I was very clearly speaking about hte 'object of perception' in contrast to whatever caused that perception. I am saying that seeing a true disconnect (i.e "it is not out there" as you put it) is unparsimonious speculation that I find pretty unfortunate.

If you agree that the something which excited your senses cannot be known from the perception intuited and cognized from the sensations of it — Bob Ross

I don't really. That's just the way the thing-in-itself has been spoken about over time. I don't think this was the intention, necessarily, though it is where Kant left it. I also think it's wrong. But that's not an argument about CRP or it's contents. Just that I think this.

then it plainly follows that what you are calling ‘coffee’ only holds intelligibility insofar as it is phenomena and not noumena — Bob Ross

No. And i gave the specific reason for this 'no'. Unless you accept a total disconnect between the thing-in-itself and hte perception (i.e you speculate that empirically, they are simply not the same thing - not that we can't know this, but that it is the case that they are not hte same thing) then there is simply no reason whatsoever to assume the object which causes perceptions would be significantly different to the perception. I see nothing to support that contention, other than saying "its beyond our knowledge, and so it (depending on which of your posts I take as your position) it doesn't exist" or ".. it is something other than that which you have perceived". Neither of these is tenable, to me.

a priori modes of cognizing reality — Bob Ross

Which may in fact simply be informations from objects "out there". See how weak this contention is?

When you work backwards from your experience of the coffee to whatever excited your senses to have that experience of it, you end up with a perfectly unknowable ‘thing-in-itself’. That’s how it should be. — Bob Ross

I think you're perhaps not quite understanding what's being said here. No one is working backwards. One is stepping back. There is no directionality. That's kind of the basis for what I'm saying. There is no hierarchy of the primacy of either our perception of the object, or hte object and this is all Kant can really give us. And I accept that. We can't possibly put one before the other without either dismissing our experience, or pretending it is caused by literally nothing. I know you're not saying those things, which is why I posit you're not quite groking me - which is probably my fault. But I note you've made a moral call here. There is no 'should'. There is discussion. LOL.

Then, you must demonstrate how any phenomenal property of the coffee is a property of the coffee-in-itself — Bob Ross

No. No I don't.

the very concept of a ‘coffee’ is only distinguishable from the generic ‘thing’ insofar as it is already conditioned by the a priori means of cognizing it — Bob Ross

I thikn you're nearly getting it, now. Weirdly, you seem to be claiming the opposite of hte clear inference from this assertion. Namely, that the two objects must be inextricably linked. Given the mode of perception, there is literally no reason to think the object would be significantly different to the perception. Pretend you couldn't possibly know, all you want. That creates no reason to assume, in ignorance, that there's any major disconnect.

That’s why Kant never says “coffee-in-itself” or anything similar, but always ‘thing-in-itself’: it has to be that generic. — Bob Ross

I did cover this, in noting he would never use the term 'thing' other than to describe to generic concept of "a thing". Generic. This does nothing for either side of the conflict, in my view. That's just something Kant did to avoid going beyond hte bounds of knowledge. Unfortunately, to my mind, he absolutely failed in guarding against over-extension by making claims about the thing in itself (some, you've reiterated well here).