It's a great example of what happens when you have no structure to your philosophy and end up putting philosophy of language prior to metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. Also the tendency of philosophers (particularly in the Anglo-American tradition) to start by analyzing human language as a sort of sui generis phenomena, rather than a special case of communication/signification and act.

It just says that one cannot be certain as to which name refers to which thing. Not so much about multiple words for the same thing so much as one word potentially referring to various things - so gavagai might refer to a rabbit, a rabbit's tail, a rabbit leg or a potential hot meal. For Quine, there is no fact of the mater. Others differ. Putnam seems to have suggested that since we couldn't refer with certainty, there was nothing to refer to. Odd.

There's a bit more to it, especially to do with interpreting formal systems using notions of satisfaction, and few sources that are written clearly.

:up:

So my understanding, I guess, is that because we have different words that we use for the same thing that there is no one referent for a specific thing and that therefor translation in speech wouldn’t be possible? — Darkneos

You read the reference from the wiki yet?

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/quine/#IndeTran

Yeah, the Wiki page is pretty dreadful, too obtuse. I re-read the SEP article and browsed a couple of Davidson's papers before posting: Indeterminism and Antirealism, and The Inscrutability of Reference. Davidson bypasses downplays indeterminism using charity – despite not being certain, we can be pretty damn confident.

I came across this little bit of brilliance, which you might enjoy

If we were not in communication with others, there would be nothing on which to base the idea of being wrong, or, therefore, of being right, either in what we say or in what we think. — Davidson, Indeterminism and Antirealism

For Quine, there is no fact of the mater. Others differ. — Banno

That was sorta my other take on him, but I still don't really think he's right in his conclusions. I'm pretty sure I say a paper proving his theory wrong and himself mistaken.

If we were not in communication with others, there would be nothing on which to base the idea of being wrong, or, therefore, of being right, either in what we say or in what we think. — Davidson, Indeterminism and Antirealism

I dunno about that one.

You read the reference from the wiki yet? — Moliere

Still reads like he's mistaken IMO. I don't think a sentence can be translated in more than one way, but context does change that.

One phrase would be like "netflix and chill" which most take to me code for sex, unless you are on the spectrum or out of the culture and literally see it as just watching movies (I'll admit I've done this).

Ok, so by way of explaining what he was getting at, have you read the gavagai example?

See, for example, https://medium.com/@ranjanrgia/thought-experiment-1-gavagai-70ae1bfc792a

What do you make of it?

I dunno about that one. — Darkneos

Yes, it is clearly wrong. It's remarkable that there are people who find such nonsense "brilliant."
Eating a poison mushroom instead of a healthy mushroom will be wrong whether or not one is in communication with others. Pain and death do not ask permission of human language before visiting. Something I referenced earlier today:

One of the differences is the very fact that the philosophy of language does not represent the first philosophy of Aristotle. In fact, it doesn’t even come close. Language is, first and foremost, a tool for understanding. Our philosophy of language is always going to be secondary to the metaphysical, logical, and epistemological perspectives that underlie it. The philosophy of language will presuppose the purpose of language itself. Rather than constituting the raw material of thought, language is both separable from thought and separable from corresponding entities. The proper use of language consists of using it to get things right about the world as it exists independently of us and our attempts to describe it. — What did Aristotle say about Meaning and Language?

It just says that one cannot be certain as to which name refers to which thing. — Banno

Yes, it's not a very exciting result when applied to things like rabbits, because, as has been said, we can be pretty damn confident.

I think it gets interesting when we move to names for more ambiguous or abstract items. There is a strong tendency among some philosophers to attach a name to a thing or a concept with metaphysical Superglue, such that, if there is a question about translation or clarification, we’re told we can't suggest a name change without also changing the thing named. In the case of the rabbit, that seems wrong. If for some reason we decided we needed a new (better?) name for Leporidae, that could be effected with minimum difficulty, since we could always point to the creature itself if anyone had doubt, and say, “No, the object remains the same. This is only a recommendation for a terminological change.”

This is much harder with abstracta. If A says, "Let's change the name of Goodness to 'Rational Self-Interest'," it's unclear what B, who objects, can point to in protest. B can say, "That is not how Goodness has traditionally been used” or perhaps even “That is not what Goodness means” but if A’s reason for wanting to make the change is because A believes the previous usage was mistaken, what are we to say? I think the best response is a straightforward, “No, it’s you who are mistaken,” and allow the argument to be a legitimate one that can sensibly continue. But the type of philosopher I referred to above (call them C) wants to disallow the argument, on the grounds that it isn’t coherent to change the name of Goodness to something else. If you do that, C urges, you’re no longer talking about Goodness. Name and concept are metaphysically wedded together.

I suggest that it’s this sort of intransigent approach that can benefit from considering Quine’s point about gavagai. There is no certainty (or necessity) about the connection of name and thing-named. Often enough – perhaps usually – we’re pretty damn sure. But not always, especially in philosophy. I don’t know how general the inscrutability of reference is; whether it goes “all the way down,” so to speak. What if Quine had used “truth” instead of “rabbit,” e.g., as the thing being referenced as “gavagai”? The linguist visiting the tribe could be supposed to follow a simple if-then argument between speakers, using words she already knows, and then a native listener smiles, nods, and says “Gavagai!” Our linguist wants to ask “Do you mean ‛That’s true’?” but since that’s impossible to ask, what should she do next?

The IEP has an article on The Indeterminacy of Translation and Radical Interpretation., with much more background, but which is perhaps a bit too sympathetic to Dennett. It has an explanation of Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument, from Lewis' stance.

What do you make of it? — Banno

Sounds like overthinking it to me, no wonder people accused him of being a relativist or a scientific skeptic. The dude is more or less arguing against communication just because language isn't perfect and neither is translation.

Like...what exactly is the point of bringing that up and to what end? Like...I'm finding it hard to take him seriously because it just sounds dramatic. Yeah there is a chance we might not mean the same thing, but people do this all the time, they just ask what they mean when it's not clear. Apart from that we just trust, especially if we speak the same language. Otherwise what's the point of making and sharing a language if you're just gonna constantly doubt if they mean the same thing?

In all honesty I can see why people call his argument wrong.

Yes, it's not a very exciting result when applied to things like rabbits, because, as has been said, we can be pretty damn confident. — J

This is a consequence of taking the philosophy of language as first philosophy, as pointed out. If philosophy of language is first philosophy, then the fact that different people use words in different ways is inscrutable. So it's a good thing that philosophy of language is not first philosophy! But given that so much of contemporary philosophy is built on this foundation of sand, what is needed is rebuilding from the ground up, and that would be painful.

The dude is more or less arguing against communication just because language isn't perfect and neither is translation. — Darkneos

Quine? No, he isn't arguing against communication. More that he's pointing out that communication takes place despite such issues.

Quine? No, he isn't arguing against communication. More that he's pointing out that communication takes place despite such issues. — Banno

He is arguing against it though. Especially in that thought experiment, I mean...he might as well quite writing philosophy at that point if that's his argument.

Ok. I'll leave you to it.

Ok. I'll leave you to it. — Banno

You're saying he's not when that's what the argument is pointing to, even why that's a common criticism of him. You're not really making a good case for the alternative.

I don’t know how general the inscrutability of reference is; whether it goes “all the way down,” so to speak. What if Quine had used “truth” instead of “rabbit,” e.g., as the thing being referenced as “gavagai”? The linguist visiting the tribe could be supposed to follow a simple if-then argument between speakers, using words she already knows, and then a native listener smiles, nods, and says “Gavagai!” Our linguist wants to ask “Do you mean ‛That’s true’?” but since that’s impossible to ask, what should she do next? — J

I think Quine is just massively overthinking it. This is something most people engage in on a daily basis, if we're wrong in our assumptions we can just ask and work it out. If we can't speak the same language all there really is to do is figure it out.

But if his grand insight is that we'll never be able to truly understand someone else's perspective or worldview, that's got nothing to do with language. The reality is we aren't the other person. Even if the language is the same we cannot truly be them without some mind-link device. But that doesn't mean we can't try, I mean it's worked out pretty well so far.

Like I said above, the dude is unknowingly arguing against communication, the thought experiment doesn't help that case.

Though I will say this:

Holism: This is the notion that the meaning of an individual word is tied to its place in the whole language. Thus, to truly understand “Gavagai,” one might need to understand the entire language and culture it comes from.

Isn't true. Maybe for a some words and maybe some languages (though not very many) but on a whole the words aren't really tied to their place in the language. You don't need to know the whole language to understand some words in say Spanish, and definitely not the culture. The only real thing is the vosotros which is in Spain.

I can see why people argued his theory is false.

I think Quine is just massively overthinking it. — Darkneos

Probably.

But perhaps overthinking it leads to insights.

"Overthinking it", in philosophy, is far from a bad thing ;)

It's a great example of what happens when you have no structure to your philosophy and end up putting philosophy of language prior to metaphysics and the philosophy of nature. Also the tendency of philosophers (particularly in the Anglo-American tradition) to start by analyzing human language as a sort of sui generis phenomena, rather than a special case of communication/signification and act. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I like the cut of your jib here. Good observation.

This is much harder with abstracta.

It seems to me that it will be harder to find agreement on things like truth and goodness because those are extremely general principles, on many accounts, the most general.

I suggest that it’s this sort of intransigent approach that can benefit from considering Quine’s point about gavagai.

Maybe, if we use the example very loosely. IIRC Quine proceeds by essentially assuming something like behaviorism, and this is crucial to how he makes the argument. This is already a very particular view of signs/language and what sort of "evidence" one has to support translation. He also assumes physicalism, which IIRC for him is rather corpuscular and reductionist. Everything comes down to particle ensembles.

With such presuppositions in play, what would be shocking is if it was possible to give the sorts of "translations" he is disproving. Meaning, in the sense that is "disproved" seems to have already been eliminated from the outset, or at the very least rendered completely epistemically inaccessible. However, I think many thinkers would simply say that to take Quine as a starting point would be essentially to beg the question on the sorts of topic you're talking about.