Which beliefs are matters of faith and which are not, cannot be rendered in black and white terms. — Janus

To his great credit, @Bob Ross attempted exactly that, and he is right that a substantial rebuttal of his explanation is lacking. In fact I don't know that I have seen anyone else on TPF attempt to give a precise definition of what they mean by "faith." Usually it goes <more like this>.

I've always taken faith to mean belief in things without evidence. Apparently, this is wrong.

I think I arrived at this view through Bertrand Russell, who said: "Where there is evidence, no one speaks of 'faith'. We do not speak of faith that two and two are four or that the earth is round. We only speak of faith when we wish to substitute emotion for evidence."

I guess faith is one of those words that can be used in different ways and means different things to different people.

What do you understand faith to be?

Faith is a subclass of beliefs, of cognitive dispositions about propositions, that have at least in part an element of trust in an authority mixed up therein. E.g., my belief that '1 + 1 = 2' is true does not have any element of trust in an authority to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is non-faith based belief; whereas my belief that 'smoking causes cancer' is true does have an element of trust in an authority (namely scientific and medical institutions) to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is a faith-based belief. — Bob Ross

@Banno sorry mate - what do you think of this definition? If I am wrong about faith is it
because I am wrong about the nature of belief? "An element of trust in authority" would count many of our beliefs as faith based. Is faith simply a trust in something we can't fully verify ourselves?

Now that I've seen @Count Timothy von Icarus's reply, I can say a little more. (I hope to hear more from him as well, though he hasn't yet replied to my latest.) What he writes suggests to me that the equation of "valued as an end in itself" with "ought to be done" has two characteristics: It is definitional, and it is universalizable.

To the first, every philosopher is entitled to their own bedrock definitions, if they're not absurd, and this is not. All we can say in response is, That is not how I define the term. There could then be a discussion about each person's reasons for selecting their preferred definition.

To the second, I'm not sure what Count T thinks about this. You think what is of personal value cannot be universalized or objectified further. I'm more of the opinion that values can only be known subjectively, but that reasons for action may be presented rationally. And to say that "values can only be known subjectively" is not the same thing as saying "they cannot be misperceived or misunderstood, because they are strictly personal."

No, not as an absolute, non-hypothetical obligation. I don't think that can be done. When I say to you (anyone), "I think you ought to do X," what I mean is, "If you accept the values A, B, C, which you tell me you do, then you ought to do X." A lot of the unclarity around this discussion comes from denying the difference, epistemologically, between knowing what is of value, and knowing what one ought to do

Doesn't it seem problematic that your conception of "ought" makes it impossible to develop a single example of it?

It's a strange definition of "ought" that can be divorced from value. Suppose you brought me two Toyota Siennas from the same year, with the same trim, and said you needed a family commuter vehicle. I look them both over and say one is rusted, leaking transmission fluid, and might have a bad head gasket and the other looks great. "Vehicle #2 is the better one."

And you turn around and say: "ok, but you haven't told me which one I ought to pick."

"What? I just told you #2 is better in every way. It's the same exact van, just well-maintained and not broken."

"Yes, I understand that. But where is the connection between 'best' and 'ought?' How do you move between them?"

If x is best, then from the perspective of ethical decision-making x is most choice-worthy, which means x ought to be picked. Whether this is simply definitional, or whether it requires some sort of first principle of syteresis to the effect of "we ought choose the better over the worse," has never really interested me that much. They both seem hard to object to. Provided anything can be "truly better" then it does not make sense to choose what is "truly worse," unless one is making a decision based on some other end that the worse option ranks better on.

But then you say you believe in "objective values," yet your entire argument seems to rest on such values actually being epistemically inaccessible.

You believe they involve the same process -- rationality, broadly -- and I do not. I think that recognizing moral (and aesthetic) values is non-rational -- people can't be shown them rationally -- and involves techniques that are at base experiential. However, once there is agreement on such values, the question of what one ought to do, given those values, becomes tractable...

No, there's a third alternative, as I tried to outline above. There's nothing sui generis about the moral ought. It's a good old hypothetical imperative.* Where all the confusion comes in, is when we also try to claim that values are transparent to the rational mind in this way. This inevitably leads to the idea that values themselves could be "derived" in some way, from first premises. As I understand the question, they can't -- but that doesn't mean that everyone's perception/intuition/experience of values is equally correct. It's quite possible to perceive incorrectly. This is not a brief for ethical relativism.

If "rational" is reduced to "nothing but discursive (linguistic/formal) ratio," as it so often is in modern thought, then virtually nothing can be known rationally. When I say that Goodness can be sought and known as such, I do not mean "entirely in the context of discursive (linguistic) reasoning." Definitions of knowledge that focus exclusively on discursive justification are extremely impoverished. They are particularly deficient for ethics, where "knowing by becoming" (e.g. Boethius' Consolation) is very important.

See below:

Second, in both the “Neo-Platonic” and rediscovered Aristotelian traditions Dante was exposed to, there are elements of the conception of truth that hew closer modern “identity theories” of truth. The human mind is capable of “becoming all things.”1 When man comes to know something (when the potential to know is actualized) the form of the thing know is, at least in part, present in his mind. This is not a representation of form. The intellect dematerializes the thing known, resulting in the mind becoming identical with the object of knowledge.

Of course, this does not imply that when we know an apple our minds “become apples,” for the two exist in distinct modes.2 However, it does mean that many of the epistemic issues that dominate modern thought and tend to impose a sense of unbridgeable distance between knower and known are absent from Dante’s conception. For instance, in the medieval understanding of signs, the Doctrina Signorum, the symbol that joins the knower and the known is not an impermeable barrier between the two, but the very means by which they are bound together in a nuptial union. The sign relation involves distinct elements, but it is not reducible to these; rather, the elements are what they are only in virtue of their participation in an irreducible triadic whole.

The importance of this sort of “union in knowing,” which is both a “being penetrated” by what is known and an ecstasis, a “going out beyond the self to the known,” for Dante cannot be overstated. The most erotic passage of the entire Commedia occurs at the end of Canto X of the Paradiso, in the Heaven of the Sun, where Dante meets the souls of the wise theologians who progressed furthest in knowledge of the divine:

Then, as the tower-clock calls us to come
at the hour when God's Bride is roused from bed
to woo with matin song her Bridegroom's love,

with one part pulling thrusting in the other,
chiming, ting-ting, music so sweet the soul,
ready for love, swells with anticipation

Paradiso, Canto X, lines 139-142

Indeed, the antiquated term “carnal knowledge,” with all its erotic connotations, gets far closer to the older view than the sterile formulation of “justified true belief.” The goal of Dante’s pilgrimage, and of all mankind, is ultimately to know God, which is also to love and be in union with God. Modern conceptions that make both love and knowledge an entirely internal affair cannot capture this erotic element of knowing the other as other. As Byung-Chul Han notes in The Agony of Eros, the modern “crisis of love… derives from… the erosion of the Other... Eros concerns the Other in the strong sense, namely, what cannot be encompassed by the regime of the ego.”3 The beatific vision at the climax of the Commedia is fundamentally an encounter with the other, not the conquest of the other by the self. It is not the “grasping” and “possession” of the other that Han finds in the modern ethos, but rather a union, an offering of the self to the other as a gift.i,ii

Yet this knowing does involve an internal dimension, a penetration of the self by the other. To know God requires “knowing by becoming.”iii As Dante rises higher into the Heavens in the Paradiso, and comes closer to God, he is increasingly able to bear the overwhelming brightness of Beatrice’s (revealed truth’s) smile, due to a continuous internal transformation (as opposed to cumulative acquisition). In this conception, the world is not held at arm’s length while we inspect our own mental representations of it. Rather, there is a sense in which we become what is known. Thus, to know God is “to attain the very best,” to become “like onto God” as much as we are able—the theosis or deification that is man’s ultimate telos in the Christian tradition...


...For Dante, as for most pre-moderns, man has a natural desire to know Truth.“Man's mind cannot be satisfied unless it be illumined by that Truth beyond which there exists no other truth.”1 This is another desire that unifies, just as it also purifies. As noted above, contemplation of this truth involves both a union and a becoming. Just as Plato thought that the “whole person” must be turned towards the Good before a person could properly know it, the Christian tradition sees asceticism, good works, the sacraments, and other aspects of the spiritual life as necessarily preceding such a contemplative vision.2

Dante’s use of the imagery of man’s“wings” is apt here. Man cannot ascend on damaged wings. Healing and repentance, a self-aware turning away from evil as evil and towards Goodness as good, must come prior to successful flight. The mastery (and eventually, regeneration) of the passions and the harmonious orientation of man’s conditioned “rational love” with his “natural love” for the Good must come prior to beatitude. Hence, it is precisely in pursuing his highest joy that a man will also be led to be a better father, neighbor, and citizen. First, because he is no longer ruled over by his appetites and passions, nor dependent on finite goods that diminish when shared. Second, because greater knowledge of the Good is transformative, such that the knower comes to love creatures as signs and manifestations of the Divine.3

It's a strange accident of philosophical history that the empiricist tradition has largely convinced itself that it cannot know much of anything (including the validity of its own epistemic standards), but has stalwartly refused to turn around and challenge its dogmatic epistemic presuppositions, or its deflation of human rationality into just the lower faculty of just the intellect. Post-moderns, for their part, seem happy to lend the empiricists the rope they use to hang themselves with.

If you want an interesting experiment, try explaining Wittgenstein's rule following argument to people who don't really care about philosophy. Kripke's example with "quaddition" and "quus," is an easy way to present it. I have found that most people think it is, frankly, pretty stupid. They tend to think you are trolling them. As Mill once said: "one would need to have made some significant advances in philosophy to believe such a thing."

Because, when you ask people: "how are you sure that you are doing addition and not quaddition?" they rightly say that: "well, I would know." And if you press them on "third person verification," they're likely to say "something being one way and verifying that it is one way are not the same thing. When I tell a lie, it doesn't cease to be a lie just because no one can tell if I am lying or not."

You know, because people understand addition. Just like they understand ethics, or what a cat is. Discursive justification is a sign of truth, a means of communicating truth, etc.Ratio is how the intellect progresses from truth to truth. Completely eliminating understanding from the equation (and the whole of phenomenal experience) as "unobservable" doesn't just make ethics "non-rational," it makes everything "non-rational." Without intellectus all you have is rule following (rule following that cannot ever constitute understanding of its own rules).

↪J (just to cut in, as I think that's a great question) The only instance in which I think such a brute reading of "ought" could be used is where one is "living" and wishes to continue "living". There are no other options, but death, which is no option at all unless we take a 'further fact' type view of ourselves.

Excellent. Living is a natural end of organisms. Organisms are constantly at work trying to maintain their form against entropy—trying to survive. However, is it the only natural end? Does human happiness and flourishing consist solely in staying alive?

Survival isn't the number one priority of even the brutes. For instance, the bee will sacrifice itself (quite gruesomely) for the good of the hive in pursuit of its ends. In terms of the "metaphysics of goodness," it is ends that make things more fully "one." Ends makes any thing anything at all, instead of an arbitrary heap. Chemicals are unified by their role in organelles, organelles are part of an organic whole in cells, cells are unified in tissue, which in turn plays a role in the whole body of an organism. The goal-directedness of life is precisely why Aristotle has living things as most properly beings (plural). By contrast, a rock is largely a heap of external causes, and when we break a rock in half we have two rocks (whereas if we break a cat in half we have a corpse).

Maybe I understand you here. But doesn't MacIntyre say that Classical terms like "goodness" have lost their original meanings, in the modern context? And that therefore we shouldn't use them, unless we use them as the Greeks did? But that presupposes that conceptual development is precluded by a fixed vocabulary. Let's say I deny that "the will seeks goodness as an appetite (as truly desirable)." Wouldn't MacIntyre say that I am simply wrong about the will and about goodness, based on the only coherent meanings the words can have, i.e., their Classical roots? I don't find that thesis plausible, no, but I agree with him, and with you, that a thorough understanding of the conceptual development of key philosophical terms is important.

MacIntyre's thesis isn't that the old usages are arbitrarily to be preferred. They are to be preferred because the modern usages are incoherent and collapse into emotivism.

To the first, every philosopher is entitled to their own bedrock definitions, if they're not absurd, and this is not. All we can say in response is, That is not how I define the term. There could then be a discussion about each person's reasons for selecting their preferred definition.

Is a definition of "ethics" and "good" that makes it impossible to demonstrate a single example of such an "ethical good" or to even explain under what conditions something could be said to be "ethically good" or a "moral ought" not absurd?

Pace your claims to be a moral realist, you seem to think that in ethical matters "any definition is as good as any other." Perhaps this stems from the ethics of liberalism where everyone is entitled to "their own truth" and the bourgeois metaphysics where "things are allowed to be true so long as they prevent nothing else from being so" (such an ethics is, IMO self-refuting however). The same would apply for an anti-realism vis-a-vis universals. If someone wants to define a tiger as "an aquatic reptile," there would be an impasse so long as the person can defend "tigers are an aquatic reptile" with a straight face and some standard of "rationality."

If such a definition seems absurd to some, the words of the Big Lebowski hold: "well, that's just like, your opinion man."

But that isn't realism. Realism implies that not all definitions are equal. It does not entail a single canonical usage of "good" (indeed, we might distinguish between many types of good by looking at the same concept from different directions). It does, however, imply some isomorphism between definitions, else we are dealing with equivocal terms. There would be situations where "good" could be predicated of the same thing, in the same context, and the statement would be both true and false owing to this eqivocity (as opposed to this sort of issue being soluble through distinctions, as in cases of analogical predication).

Part of the problem here is that, if one adopts a throughgoing nominalism, it might indeed be impossible to be a consistent "moral realist." I think there is a strong argument to be made that MacIntyre's thesis might apply more broadly to metaphysics, and that the collapse into emotivism has metaphysical roots. Certainly, we have gone from a context where there was a strong metaphysical grounding and exploration of Goodness, to one where ethics is attempted largely is isolation from metaphysics (much the way logic has become detached from metaphysics, making some debates in logic, e.g. logical nihilism, essentially insoluble and difficult to even define).

Doesn't it seem problematic that your conception of "ought" makes it impossible to develop a single example of it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

Someone like @J or Michael will distinguish the moral ought from the non-moral ought, and when you press them on what is meant by "the moral ought" they will be reduced to the exact same problems that plagued them in the first place.

This goes back to your ethical/deliberative definition of good as "choice-worthy," or the definition of good as that which all things seek (i.e. a kind of desirability). "Ought" is no less conceptually complex and multivalent, and if we do not recognize the analogical nature of such terms we fall into univocal fallacies. For example, the univocal move where one distinguishes the moral ought from the non-moral ought and yet has no idea what they claim to mean by "the moral ought."

This all goes back to my reference to Simpson's paper.

I was disagrreing with who seemed to be saying that any belief about which we cannot be certain (because it is not self-evident or we have not seen for ourselves) is therefore purely a matter of faith. I suggested to him that framing it that way seems to me too black and white.

Much of what we call our knowledge consists in beliefs which are culturally accepted as facts so there is an element of faith of course. The assumption is that if had the time we could check the sources of such facts ourselves, that we have good reason to accept the findings and observations of experts, of scientists and scholars, and thus have good reason to believe in their truth. So there is also reasoning to the most plausible conclusion in play and such knowledge is not merely faith-based.

In matters where there is no possibility of seeing for oneself the beliefs are entirely faith-based. Especially when there seems no reason to belie e that the pronouncements of authorities, for example religious authorities, are themselves faith-based. So the degree of faith at play in our beliefs is on a spectrum from no faith to pure faith.

I think I arrived at this view through Bertrand Russell, who said: "...We only speak of faith when we wish to substitute emotion for evidence." — Tom Storm

That's a pretty standard pejorative (and unserious) usage. You won't find anything about emotion over evidence in dictionaries.

.

Is a definition of "ethics" and "good" that makes it impossible to demonstrate a single example of such an "ethical good" or to even explain under what conditions something could be said to be "ethically good" or a "moral ought" not absurd? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You've alluded to something like this before, but I really don't follow. I believe I've said quite a bit about the ethical good and the moral ought, focusing on the important (to me) epistemological distinction between value and obligation. But I may well be missing what you mean. If you have the patience, could you say more about the absurdity?

you seem to think that in ethical matters "any definition is as good as any other." — Count Timothy von Icarus

But I said just the opposite! "This is not a brief for ethical relativism."

If someone wants to define a tiger as "an aquatic reptile," there would be an impasse so long as the person can defend "tigers are an aquatic reptile" with a straight face and some standard of "rationality." — Count Timothy von Icarus

I think I was careful to rule out absurd definitions. There is no standard of rationality that either one of us would acknowledge which could make this straw definition non-absurd.

Realism implies that not all definitions are equal. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Of course they aren't. That's why I said, "There could then be a discussion about each person's reasons for selecting their preferred definition." It might well turn out that one set of reasons is the more convincing.

This last comment suggests some possibly useful paths to explore. I've often had the sense that your (and other neo-Aristotelians') conception of how to arrive at truth is what we might call "armchair" -- an apodictic, or at least deductive, process that one person, using premises believed to be reliable, could carry out completely on their own. There isn't a lively sense that other thinkers and traditions could be useful, could offer reasons and perspectives that would perhaps alter even those bedrock premises fruitfully. The truth is seen as already out there, waiting to be deduced. So perhaps the better phrase is "philosophy as a mathematical process."

Let me try to put this in terms that may be congenial to you. You may be familiar with the Lonergan scholar Michael H. McCarthy. And I'm guessing you admire Lonergan himself very much -- he and MacIntyre are often mentioned in the same contexts. This solo approach to dialectic, according to McCarthy, is what Lonergan called "dogmatic." He deplored "the search for an algorithmic method to eliminate philosophical disagreement." As McCarthy writes (and I'm not sure how much of this paraphrases Lonergan):

Only after a reflective appropriation of the subject is it possible to evaluate philosophical differences in a manner that is neither dogmatic nor skeptical. The goal of dialectical criticism is not the elimination of philosophical conflict, but the achievement of a critical center from which to judge the merits and limitations of the opposing philosophical traditions. — McCarthy, The Crisis of Philosophy, 294

This seems beautifully put, to me. It's essentially the same process I find Peirce and Habermas recommending. We simply cannot arrive at truth without taking the other's views into consideration. And "to take into consideration" does not mean to argue against them, on the assumption they are probably wrong. That is the dogmatism Lonergan rejected. That does not create "a critical center." As for Habermas, he would probably say something like, "Yes, let's sit down and see if we can understand each other before trying to form a judgment on the issue." With all respect, Timothy, that doesn't involve thinking your interlocutors are on the level of The Big Lebowski. I certainly hope you don't feel that I see you that way.

But, sigh, this is a Philosophy Forum, so I guess that proposing less argument will never be popular.
:smile:

I think I was careful to rule out absurd definitions. — J

But you are doubtless unable to answer the question, "What is an absurd definition?" You keep making claims that you are unable to explain, and using words that you are unable to define.

Of course they aren't. That's why I said, "There could then be a discussion about each person's reasons for selecting their preferred definition." It might well turn out that one set of reasons is the more convincing. — J

That one person has stronger metaphysical superglue? :wink:

I said no nor never implied such things: my definition was clear. A faith-based belief can have any degree of certitude (just like non-faith-based ones); for faith is a matter of the origin of the verification of a proposition's truth or falsity.

E.g.,:

1. If I believe that "1 + 1 = 2" because I was told this is the case from my math teacher and I trust that they know what they are doing but I myself have not verified through my own application of math that it is true, then this belief is mixed up with trust in an external authority and thusly is faith-based; and this proposition I am not absolutely certain is true (for there is always a level of uncertainty in trust as a source of verification).

2. If I believe that "1 + 1 = 2" because I understand the math behind it, independently of anyone or institution, then this is a non-faith-based belief because there is no external authority required to believe it; and this proposition I am absolutely certain is true (for one can deduce its truth from the basic axioms of math and logic).

3. If I do a scientific experiment myself about the causation between smoking and cancer and I believe "smoking can cause cancer" solely because of it, then this is a non-faith-based belief; and this proposition I am not absolutely certain of (for science never affords absolute certitude).

4. If I believe "smoking can cause cancer" because I trust the many medical and scientific institutions which purport it as true (given the articles and what not that are published), then this is a faith-based belief; and this proposition I am not absolutely certain of (ditto).

what do you think of this definition? — Tom Storm

I haven't been following this discussion. I've pretty much said what I thought already. So my answer here may well be out of context.

Faith is a subclass of beliefs, of cognitive dispositions about propositions, that have at least in part an element of trust in an authority mixed up therein. E.g., my belief that '1 + 1 = 2' is true does not have any element of trust in an authority to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is non-faith based belief; whereas my belief that 'smoking causes cancer' is true does have an element of trust in an authority (namely scientific and medical institutions) to render, even as purported, it as true or false and so it is a faith-based belief. — Bob Ross

We might agree that faith is a type of belief. Adjusting Moore, it would be odd to claim that one has faith in something that one does not believe.

I'd prefer to call it a propositional attitude rather than a disposition. A belief is a belief that..., and thereafter hangs something with a truth value. The disposition to occasionally scratch your arse does not much seem to count as a belief. The truth value is salient here.

We use the same word - "faith" - on the one hand for a conviction that such-and-such is true, and on the other for a trust or confidence in something or someone. The prototypical examples of faith in this second sense in contrast to mere belief are those in which fidelity, loyalty, or trust come to the fore. Too have faith, as Kierkegaard pointed out, is to take a leap.

While that might involve some authority, there is no reason to suppose that it must. And indeed, faith in a friend or faith in love look to be counter instances, were authority is not involved.

Bob differentiates between faith-based and non-faith-based beliefs. It's not clear that this is helpful. Taking his own example, I would not characterise a belief that smoking causes cancer as being faith-based. Sure, we are putting some trust in the experts who study such things, but we can go and look at their results for ourselves if we have doubts. The evidence is there. Contrast this with the priest who insists that the bread is Jesus's flesh. The evidence does not support the priest's contention and indeed is contrary to it. This is a much stronger example of faith at work than the scientists' contention that smoking causes cancer.

Hence my earlier suggestion that faith is seen most clearly when one believe despite the evidence.

There is a rhetorical ploy at play here, where faith is used to account for belief both in something evident - that smoking causes cancer - and also for something contrary to the evidence - the bread is flesh; and these as if they were of a kind. As if the faith in transubstantiation were no more than a variation on the scientific method. There simply a fair amount of such bull in this thread.

The appeal to authority doesn't cut it for me.

I would just clarify that faith is about trust in the strict sense of "in an authority". I could trust in the chair in that "this chair will hold me if I sit on it" because I believe it is made of strong materials and bolts by my inspection; but this kind of 'trust' is not the same as if I were to trust the chair craftsman that made it and this is why I believe it will hold me. Of course, both of these kinds of trust are in play with most of our beliefs; but it is worth separating them out for this discussion. I would say the only legitimate, strict sense of 'trust' is this kind that is in an authority.

:up:

I'd prefer to call it a propositional attitude rather than a disposition.

Fair enough: that is what I meant by ‘disposition’, but I get your point.

While that might involve some authority, there is no reason to suppose that it must. And indeed, faith in a friend or faith in love look to be counter instances, were authority is not involved.

By authority, I don’t mean only entities which have power or rights to judge another; but, rather, entities, namely agents and institutions, that are considered properly equipped to do or divulge something.

E.g., in friendship, I might have faith in my friend that they will show up to pick me up at 5:00 PM; and this demonstrates that I trust them to pick me up and this is because I consider them as properly equipped to pick me up. Likewise, I might not believe they are properly equipped to pick me up but that they will try to anyways (viz., I have faith they will try to pick me up); and this is just to say I find them properly equipped to put in the effort to try despite lacking the resources to do it.

I would guess that for you this is too broad of a definition of ‘authority’; as I would imagine you are envisioning authorities in the sense of some governing entity. I am not opposed to using a different term for what I am describing if a better one were to find its way into my ears.

Taking his own example, I would not characterise a belief that smoking causes cancer as being faith-based. Sure, we are putting some trust in the experts who study such things, but we can go and look at their results for ourselves if we have doubts.

1. This, in principle, is true; however the source of the verification of the belief is what determines if that belief is faith-based and not if in principle the proposition could be verified in a non-faith-based manner. E.g., if I believe “1 + 1 = 2” because my math teacher told me so, without verifying it myself, then this is purely faith-based even though in principle I could verify it if I knew basic math.

2. If you concede there is trust in the experts involved in your belief that “smoking causes cancer” and you grant my definition of faith, then your belief that “smoking causes cancer” is at least in part a matter of faith. This doesn’t mean it is invalid or on par with every other belief that is faith-based.

3. With science, we cannot, oftentimes, “go look for ourselves” in such a manner as to verify the entire study or purported facts as true independently of trusting the institution or experts involved in the studies or determining those purported facts.

The evidence is there. Contrast this with the priest who insists that the bread is Jesus's flesh.

Whether or not a belief has an element of faith in it is separate from whether or not the evidence for believing is credible or sufficient to warrant that belief.

Much of what we call our knowledge consists in beliefs which are culturally accepted as facts so there is an element of faith of course. The assumption is that if had the time we could check the sources of such facts ourselves, that we have good reason to accept the findings and observations of experts, of scientists and scholars, and thus have good reason to believe in their truth. So there is also reasoning to the most plausible conclusion in play and such knowledge is not merely faith-based. — Janus

Good point.

Hence my earlier suggestion that faith is seen most clearly when one believe despite the evidence.

There is a rhetorical ploy at play here, where faith is used to account for belief both in something evident - that smoking causes cancer - and also for something contrary to the evidence - the bread is flesh; and these as if they were of a kind. As if the faith in transubstantiation were no more than a variation on the scientific method. There simply a fair amount of such bull in this thread.

The appeal to authority doesn't cut it for me. — Banno

That's clear. Thanks.

By authority, I don’t mean only entities which have power or rights to judge another; but, rather, entities, namely agents and institutions, that are considered properly equipped to do or divulge something. — Bob Ross

I'm not seeing that this is useful, nor how it makes a difference, nor indeed how it might count against what I wrote.

2. If you concede there is trust in the experts involved in your belief that “smoking causes cancer” and you grant my definition of faith, then your belief that “smoking causes cancer” is at least in part a matter of faith. This doesn’t mean it is invalid or on par with every other belief that is faith-based. — Bob Ross

But I do not grant your definition of faith. While the belief that smoking causes cancer need not be faith-based, the belief that a piece of bread is flesh must be faith based. Again, the marker for faith is belief despite the evidence, not because of it. Hence,

Whether or not a belief has an element of faith in it is separate from whether or not the evidence for believing is credible or sufficient to warrant that belief. — Bob Ross

is mistaken.

That's clear. Thanks. — Tom Storm

That's all? For all my efforts? At least let me know if you agree, and if not, perhaps where and why.

Or was your aim just to drag me back into this mud wrestle, for your amusement?

:wink:

Ok, so you are defining "faith" as "belief despite the evidence" and not "belief which has an element of trust in an authority mixed up"; so I think we are just talking past each other. I don't think faith historically has ever referred to "belief despite the evidence" and that kind of usage is almost exclusively done by "new atheism" as a straw man.

It is also worth mentioning that your definition, contrary to what you wrote before, has nothing to do per se with trust in anything at all: I can have a believe despite the evidence without trusting anyone that it is true (e.g., believing I can fly because it makes me feel good).

so you are defining "faith" as "belief despite the evidence" — Bob Ross

No. I said the marker of faith is holding on to a belief - that your friend will pick you up or that the bread is flesh - despite the evidence.

We are not talking past each other. I am directly challenging your account. You would strain to a similarity between the physician's claim that cancer causes mortality and the priest's, that the bread is flesh. The first can be help true on the evidence, the second is contrary to it. The second is an epitome of faith, and shows your account remiss.

- Yep. :up:

So I have always held that faith is the excuse people give for believing something when they don't have a good reason.

The Russell quote seems to provide a polemical definition of faith.

My original issue with faith is that Christians often tell me that choosing to fly in a plane is an act of faith equivalent to belief in God. To me, this seems wrong on a couple of counts. First, we can demonstrate that planes exist. Second, they almost always fly safely. God, on the other hand, is a confused idea. Even within a single religion, people can't seem to agree on what God is or what God wants. And then there's the problem of proof, which in this context exists solely in making inferences of a certain kind.

But the reason I asked you about this is because how language is used seems to be a critical point in discussions of faith. I've been told that my understanding of faith is mistaken. The claim is that we all have faith of some kind, and that when we say faith is belief without evidence, we are oversimplifying or misrepresenting how the word is used. Sounds to me like there are multiple uses of the word faith going on, and they’re not all equivalent.

I don't think faith historically has ever referred to "belief despite the evidence" and that kind of usage is almost exclusively done by "new atheism" as a straw man. — Bob Ross

Forget the New Atheists - that was a publishing gimmick. I think this definition of faith has been used by freethinkers for many decades. It was certainly the one Russell used, long before Hitchens and company were being polemicists. I was using it back in the 1980's.

Your definition is clear. I'm trying to rethink mine based on feedback from theists.

So I have always held that faith is the excuse people give for believing something when they don't have a good reason. — Tom Storm

Yep.

The slippery slope. You need faith to fly a plane, so why not have faith in the Trinity - as if these were on par.

There are multiple uses of the word "faith", and no single definition will account for all. This is so for all complex terms. However we see faith most clearly where the faithful are most provoked, by martyrdom or by doubt. And that shows most clearly the distinction between faith and mere belief.

So I have always held that faith is the excuse people give for believing something when they don't have a good reason. — Tom Storm

Do you see that this is also pejorative?

I think this definition of faith has been used by freethinkers for many decades. It was certainly the one Russell used, long before Hitchens and company were being polemicists. I was using it back in the 1980's. — Tom Storm

Russell strikes me as an anti-Christian polemicist, not in the sense that that was his sole gig, but in the sense that he regularly engaged in anti-Christian polemicism.

I'm trying to rethink mine based on feedback from theists. — Tom Storm

Have you looked at Pieper's essay? If you want to know what a group means by faith, you have to look at sources from that group. In this case the way that group (Christians) use the word is entirely consonant with historical and lexical usage.

The closest thing you will find in an actual dictionary to, "Belief without evidence," is, "Belief without proof," but it should go without saying that proof and evidence are rather different beasts. The first question you need to ask yourself is, "How do I figure out what a word means?"

Do you see that this is also pejorative? — Leontiskos

Sure, I can see that it's inflammatory. But polemicists aren't always wrong. Being polemical can be a kind of poetry.

As a theist, you would of course see it as pejorative. But you and other theists also use polemics and pejorative language when talking about atheists, so as far as that goes, it seems to be open season. Both camps often convinced that the other is obtuse, irrational and wrongheaded.

Have you looked at Pieper's essay? If you want to know what a group means by faith, you have to look at sources from that group. In this case the way that group (Christians) use the word is entirely consonant with historical and lexical usage. — Leontiskos

I started it but struggled with it. It's prolix, and I would need some hours to step out the argument with notes, which I don’t have time for. But I appreciate the piece being included and may get around to it. We've ended up in a debate about whose usage is correct, and, unsurprisingly, we've landed where the theist thinks their usage is correct, and the freethinker thinks theirs is.

As a theist, you would of course see it as pejorative. — Tom Storm

It is, factually, a pejorative. It is the usage of the word in a negative or disapproving way.

But you and other theists also use polemics and pejorative language when talking about atheists, so as far as that goes, it seems to be open season. Both camps often convinced that the other is obtuse, irrational and wrongheaded. — Tom Storm

Pejoratives are useful in echo chambers, but to use them in arguments against the opposition is the logical fallacy of begging the question.

I started it but struggled with it. It's prolix, and I would need some hours to step out the argument with notes, which I don’t have time for. But I appreciate the piece being included and may get around to it. — Tom Storm

Fair enough. Thanks for giving it a shot.

We've ended up in a debate about whose usage is correct, and, unsurprisingly, we've landed where the theist thinks their usage is correct, and the freethinker thinks theirs is. — Tom Storm

No, not really. I've pointed to dictionaries, philosophy of religion, historical usage, etc. You've appealed to members of your echo chamber. That's a rather big difference.

No, not really. I've pointed to dictionaries, philosophy of religion, historical usage, etc. You've appealed to members of your echo chamber. That's a rather big difference. — Leontiskos

You might be right - although I don't recall appealing to an echo chamber.

Note that the pejorative argument looks like this:

1. Religious faith is irrational
2. Faith in airplanes is not irrational
3. Therefore, faith in airplanes is not religious faith – there is an equivocation occurring

That’s all these atheists are doing in their head to draw the conclusion about an equivocation, and this argument is the foundation of any argument that is built atop it.

-

We can actually parallel the two propositions quite easily:

Lack of faith, lack of assent
1a. “I do not have faith that the airplane will fly, and I do not assent to the proposition that the airplane will fly.”
1b. “I do not have faith that God exists, and I do not assent to the proposition that God exists.”
Lack of faith, presence of assent
2a. “I do not have faith that the airplane will fly, but I assent to the proposition that the airplane will fly.”
2b. “I do not have faith that God exists, but I assent to the proposition that God exists.”
Presence of faith, presence of assent (where assent flows solely from faith)
3a. “I have faith that the airplane will fly, and I assent to the proposition that the airplane will fly (and my assent is based solely on my faith).”
3b. “I have faith that God exists, and I assent to the proposition that God exists (and my assent is based solely on my faith).”
Presence of faith which is not necessary for assent (overdetermination)
4a. “I have faith that the airplane will fly, but I would assent even if I did not have faith.”
4b. “I have faith that God exists, but I would assent even if I did not have faith.” — Leontiskos

I find this interesting. Now bear with me, I'm not a philosopher, so this is just how it looks to me.

What seems missing from your summary of this discussion is exploration of evidence. Doesn't that leave out the key element?

From the atheist perspective - let’s start with the top example:

Religious faith is considered irrational because god can't be demonstrated and there is no good reason to believe in a god.

Faith in airplanes is not irrational because we can demonstrate that they exist and that people fly safely every second of the day.
Therefore, faith in airplanes is not unwarranted.

Now, I grant you that the question of whether one believes in God or not generally comes down to whether one is convinced by certain arguments. If someone doesn't share particular presuppositions and beliefs, then the argument is going to land very differently.

If you have the patience, could you say more about the absurdity?

I am referring to AmadeusD's contention that the "good" and "ought" of most ethics is not a true "moral good" or "moral ought" (which you seemed to be agreeing with?), while nonetheless being unable to describe or give examples of what such a "moral good" or "moral ought" would even entail.

Just framing ethics in terms of human flourishing, as Harris does, already gets you to the possibility of a science of human welfare at the individual and social level, but the older definition also has a quite robust metaphysical underpinning. By contrast, the other definition being offered up is a je ne sais quoi that is even being presented by its advocate as "unintelligible." That's not a contest between two definitions, one of these is a non-definition, a shrug.


It's strange to me that someone would accept facts about values, and facts about human flourishing, but not ethics on the grounds that the aforementioned are not properly "moral." Yet this is even stranger if what constitutes "moral" cannot be stated.

But I said just the opposite! "This is not a brief for ethical relativism."

How is an ethics where it is impossible to derive any oughts not a brief for relativism though? What's the idea: "There are facts about what is good and evil, but this tells us nothing about what one ought to do?" If such facts tell us nothing about what to do, then the result is relativism—all acts are equally correct responses to "facts of values."

But as I pointed out, this seems bizarre to me. "This car is better in every way, and cheaper," doesn't provoke the response "ok, so this one is clearly better, but I don't know which I ought to pick, the better or the worse?"

I think I was careful to rule out absurd definitions. There is no standard of rationality that either one of us would acknowledge which could make this straw definition non-absurd.

Yeah, fair enough. I knew I should take the time to think up an at least plausible definition, but I think it still makes the point. What's the criteria for "absurdity" here? "You just know it when you see it?" Good philosophy doesn't just remove absurdities and keep whatever else remains as a matter of opinion, so there has to be a strong criteria either way.

But the example jumps to mind because this is actually the sort of thing nominalists on this board have defended. Nothing is really anything, everything is just a soup of "patterns" and "constraints" given names, etc. My point would be this: any thoroughgoing nominalism like this is probably going to entail moral anti-realism. It's essentially an anti-realism that is metaphysically prior to ethics.

Anyhow, this insight might be helpful: that you think "ought" must imply "obligation" is perhaps indictive of the problem I mentioned about an ethical tradition that ultimately grows out of voluntarism. When someone gives relationship advice and says "you should ask her out," they do not mean "you have an obligation to ask her out." Nor does "this place's pizza is the best, you ought to try it," mean "you have an obligation to eat this pizza because it is good." Obligation and duty are one reason why it might be good to do something. That you can find no connection between "x is best" and "you should choose x," would seem to lie in this idea you have that any "ought" must be in the context of some sort of command, a "thou shalt."

As for the rest of the post accusing me of being dogmatic, I just don't see it. I consider disparate systems of ethical thought all the time. In this thread, I tried to explain my position. The repeated objection has been "that isn't a moral/ethical good/ought" or that "x is best" cannot generate the "moral ought" for "choose x." When I ask what this "moral/ethical good/ought" is, the answer is that it's impossible to give an example and the very idea is probably unintelligible (Amadeus) or that it is unknowable and inaccessible to reason, but might perhaps be experienced (you). These are not definitions though.

One of us has a definition. The Good is "that at at which all things aim." I am not dogmatically rejecting any other definitions (indeed, I asked for them), I am pointing out that the objections in this thread are based on no definitions at all.

Tigers being "aquatic reptiles" might be "absurd," but there is certainly a dialogue to be had about why it is wrong, and why "tigers are large stripped cats" is better. This conservation seems more to me like "tigers aren't large stripped cats because real tigers are x." And then to the question: "what is this x that real tiger possess?" the answer is: "I don't know, it probably doesn't exist" or "x exists but it is inaccessible to reason."




:up:

It's perhaps indictive of the voluntarism underpinning the ethics (and metaphysics) of command (law) and obedience (duty). I think this is why anti-realists so often claim that divine command theory is a good theory of ethics, and what any "real ethics" would look like, if only God existed.

Duty and natural law aren't situated in anything broader here, they ultimately spring from the inscrutable Will, and so there is no role for desire. You don't have eros leading up and agape descending (two movements in a unity). There is rather a unidirectional impetus, be it coming from God, from the irrational sensible appetites and sentiments (Hume), or from a sort of bare human will (early Sarte, some readings of Nietzsche).

I'm not huge on deconstruction and post-structuralism, but I think Byung-Chul Han is spot on here in partly locating the "deflation of everything" and disappearance of Eros in the ever growing inflation of the self. I find it interesting that this same critique comes from different directions, because it's one made by C.S. Lewis, D.C. Schindler, etc. too.

You might be right - although I don't recall appealing to an echo chamber. — Tom Storm

I think of Bertrand Russell as an anti-Christian polemicist who would not be considered an objective source in these discussions.

What seems missing from your summary of this discussion is exploration of evidence. Doesn't that leave out the key element? — Tom Storm

Only the key element of your definition of faith. See:

All of the work I did in <this post> is based on Pieper's definition, which is empirically derived via actual usage. Pejorative definitions preclude true philosophical work like that. — Leontiskos

If we have no common point of departure, then we will just talk past each other by using different definitions of 'faith'. That's why I proposed Pieper as a common point of departure which is rigorous and academic (and perhaps too academic for your palette).

So we could try to oversimplify a complex word with appeal to a dictionary. The definition that Bob Ross gave can be related to an entry in the Cambridge Dictionary, "a high degree of trust or confidence in something or someone."

Religious faith is considered irrational because god can't be demonstrated and there is no good reason to believe in a god. — Tom Storm

But this is little more than prejudice. I have read Aquinas on faith, Avery Dulles' historical survey of faith, Pieper's essay on faith, Martin Laird's dissertation-derived book on faith, Ratzinger's treatment, and various academic encyclopedias on the topic. It's a very well-developed topic. Bertrand Russell strikes the informed like a drunk 3rd grader stumbling into a post-graduate seminar. It's a remarkable combination of ignorance, arrogance, and irrationality.

Why irrationality? Because suppose you ask the question, "There are 2.4 billion people in the world who are Christians. Why are they Christians?" The answer, "Because they are emotional and irrational," is just plain stupid. It's not an intellectually serious answer. Psychologists, sociologists, and anthropologists would get a good laugh out of that sort of intellectual unseriousness. It is evidence of ignorance of human psychology, basic sociological dynamics, and even the principle of sufficient reason as applied to beliefs. People who think 2.4 billion humans basically form beliefs in the absence of evidence or contrary to evidence simply don't understand the first thing about human psychology. They are so biased against religion that they adopt psychologically absurd theories. They are conspiracy theorists.

There are a few different ways to approach the topic of faith. Here are some:

1. Try to objectively understand what the word means
2. Try to understand what people are actually doing when they engage in acts of faith
3. Assume that faith is irrational and proceed to subtly or not-so-subtly call religious people stupid, arguments be damned

If your starting point for comparing religious faith to airplane faith is to blandly assert that "there is no good reason to believe in god," then it's pretty clear that your protestations against being grouped with the New Atheists are entirely without merit, and you're engaged in nothing more than (3). If that is your starting point then you're not taking the topic seriously. What you need to do is recognize that religious people are human beings, that human beings are not merely irrational, and then you need to generate a sincere interest in understanding why they believe the things they do. Until that happens dialogue is a non-starter.