Philosophy is a meta-cognitive art form more than a science which aims to clarify that "big picture" of the whole of reality. — Agustino
Now you're changing your tune though. Previously you only claimed that philosophy doesn't produce any knowledge (or almost no knowledge).philosophy doesn't help with that. — The Great Whatever
This presupposes once again that philosophy ought to teach us some new knowledge, and we both agreed that there is no such knowledge to be gained out of philosophy right? So to say we don't stop thinking (but we do stop philosophising) in order to go study whatever it is we want to know about is problematic. It underlines that we were thinking that we're studying philosophy in order to know something, which isn't the case.no, you don't stop thinking, you go study whatever it is you want to know about. — The Great Whatever
Of course! So what?philosophy has nothing to contribute to the special sciences. — The Great Whatever
yep. so what's the matter? do you dissent to anything i've said? notice that i introduced truth with no reference to verification. so if what i say is trivial, you can't be right. you must haver made a mistake somewhere. — The Great Whatever
That it's raining if it's raining isn't inconsistent with the claim that "it's raining" must have recognisable truth conditions for it to be mean something. — Michael
what are the truth conditions for "it's raining?" surely this is true iff it's raining. but as we just agreed, it's raining iff water is falling from the sky, and as we just showed, this has nothing to do with verification. — The Great Whatever
Oh, that is indeed one thing we have in common ;)i demonstrate by example — The Great Whatever
Given that there's some use to it inside the simulation, it doesn't matter what's happening (or isn't happening) outside the simulation. The external world "drops out of consideration as irrelevant", as the author of the article in the OP says. — Michael
What has been set out here just strikes me as basic indirect realism. There is the object out there. By the time it finds its way into your consciousness, it has been transformed by all sorts of things from light, gravity, air, the composition of your eye, and the interpretive ability of your brain. — Hanover
This isn't about perception, which is why it isn't indirect realism. It's about meaning. The same argument can apply even if direct realism is the case. The point of the simulation analogy is that the external world has no bearing on what the people in the simulation mean by "it is raining", even if the simulation is an exact representation of the external world. — Michael
Whether or not it is also raining in the external world isn't relevant. — Michael
I get all this, but that doesn't address my point. My point is that the simulator was caused by the external world. It had to be because it was caused by something. The external world is therefore relevant as the cause of the simulator, but irrelevant to the pragmatic question of what you're currently perceiving. — Hanover
Your simulator discussion was in fact a metaphysical discussion, and it correlated meaning to reality, to the extent you defined reality as the products of the simulator. — Hanover
You say "simulation," I say "transformation," but they are the same. By the time the thing gets to your consciousness, there's no reason to think (or care) if it bears any meaningful relationship to the original thing out there. All we can say is that we have received a simulation in our heads and it was caused by something in the external world, but what that something is, we have no idea of. That thing in itself is beyond the limits of what we can know. All of this is just a basic definition of noumena. — Hanover
Why isn't this a topic about pragmatism and the latter Wittgenstein? — Posty McPostface
Dummett's argument concludes that the principle of bivalence be rejected because we cannot always recognize whether or not a statement is true/false. — creativesoul
The principal connection with metaphysics is via the notion of bivalence—the semantic principle that every statement is determinately true or false. If the truth of our statements depended on the obtaining of a worldy state of affairs (as the realist maintains), then our statements would have to be determinately true or false, according to whether or not that state of affairs obtained. However, given that we cannot guarantee that every statement is recognisable as true or recognisable as false, we are only entitled to this principle if our notion of truth is recognition-transcendent. By the above argument, it is not, and hence bivalence must be rejected and metaphysical anti-realism follows (Dummett 1963).
However, given that we cannot guarantee that every statement is recognisable as true or recognisable as false, we are only entitled to this principle if our notion of truth is recognition-transcendent. By the above argument, it is not, and hence bivalence must be rejected and metaphysical anti-realism follows (Dummett 1963)
So what? If it's something we can't know, who cares? — Srap Tasmaner
Godel's target was inductive logic, right? — creativesoul
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