If there is a foreseen effect to one's actions, then it is intentional. If it isn't foreseen, then I agree that it is accidental but that doesn't entail that it is intentional. So I am not following what you are contending with here.

From what you said, it follows that accidents are never intentional; even if accidents can arise from intentional acts.

A direct intention is anything which is a part of the directional flow of what is aimed at (as the end); whereas indirect intention is anything which is still aimed at (for the sake of the end) but not a part of that directional flow towards the end.

I would suggest reading through this thread and specifically the exchange between @Leontiskos and I.

A good diagram for explaining this is Leontisko's V vs. 7; and a good example is how the one dying, by way of pulling the lever, in the trolley dilemma (to save the five) is a side effect which is not a part of the directional flow of the aim towards the end, which can be evidently seen by removing the one sacrificed person from the hypothetical and still seeing that that direct flow towards the end (of saving the five) is untainted. The killing of the one is still intended because it is foreseen and aimed at (insofar as it is a foreseen effect of using the means of saving the five), but is not intended in the same manner as using the lever (i.e., means) to save the five (nor is it intended in the same manner as kidnapping and harvesting the organs of a healthy person to save five sick people).

I will leave it up to you when you want to stop the conversation. I guess I am more of a Hegelian than you are...

:up:

That's not a definition of the concept of good: he just mentioned that it has been rightly (according to him) said that what is good is what everything aims at. That's an entirely different claim than what good itself is.

EDIT: To elaborate more, to say that everything aims at what is good does not elaborate at all on what good itself is nor what is supremely good. Firstly, what can be supremely noted as good could be anything at all, and it could still be true that everything aims at it (depending on what it is); and Aristotle's statement leaves it an open-question entirely. Secondly, even if he would have elaborated on what is supremely good then it would still be an open-question what the concept of good refers to (e.g., if everything aims towards what is intrinsically valuable, then it is still an open-question--without further elaboration--what the concept of 'good' refers to even if it is good to aim at what is intrinsically valuable)

Aristotle makes zero attempt to define what the concept of good refers to; but he alludes to what is supremely good being that which is aimed at (which is an allusion to intrinsic value).

@Count Timothy von Icarus

CC: @Herg

I see a mention was made in this discussion board (OP) by Herg, but when I visit the link it says "not found": https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/915150 . Did a moderator remove it?

Aristotle never defines good in his ethics: he just uses it and the reader has to tease out what he means by it based off of what he says.

That's fair: I meant to depict the foreseeable effects, and not all of them.

I am not a deontologist either; so I can appreciate that. By the principle of PDE, I am referring to a generally applicable moral principle. There might be a situation where I would oppose using it, even as I depicted it; but it seems to work well in most controversial situations, and I certainly am not about to become a straight up particularlist about morals (;

Accidents are never intentional; but evolution doesn't operate on accidents.

Saying it is "intentional", "purposeful", etc. is tricky with non-agency; and I understand why people oppose it. It is usually associated with an agent of some sort; but, in that case, I just call it "function".

Upon thinking about it more, I updated the OP: now it resembles the traditional PDE.

Couple updates to note:

1. My PDE no longer mandates anything as obligatory, as I was thinking of when there is no action or inaction one could take which didn’t have a bad side effect—and that is a separate question from whether or not it is permissible to do good sometimes when there will be a bad effect;

2. My PDE accounts for the comparison of the good effect and the bad effect (of the currently selected means of achieving the former): this is an essential aspect that my PDE was completely missing; and

3. My PDE still finds comparing the alternative means (towards the end) necessary (because if there is a means that has no bad side effect to bring about the same good, then that is the best option even if the good effect significantly outweighs the bad effect of the currently selected means) but it does not obligate anyone either way; and

4. The good effect must significantly, as opposed to merely, outweigh the bad effect—otherwise, it resembles too closely (although it is not) directly intentionally doing something bad as a means towards a good end (e.g., if there are two sick people and there is a means which could cure the one but kill the other, then it seems immoral to use that means).

Number 4 gets me into dicey waters, because I am uncertain if I can still hold my expounded position on the hysterectomy: is saving the mother of cancer significantly outweigh the death of an unborn child? I am not sure.

What you just described is the idea of over-taxation and its mitigation/eradication being manifested into society through action; which is impossible under your view, since ideas come after what happens.

What you are forgetting or misunderstanding is that action is the manifestation of ideas; and I think you may be thinking of an "idea" as something sans action.

I believe, if I am understanding you correctly, Aristotle would say it is always learned; because virtuous activity is never on accident. Aristotle thought that we are morally responsible for our rationally deliberate actions; and those are never innate.

Not a strong recommendation in my opinion.

Why not? What are your thoughts, Banno?

That is impressive in itself - intellectual honesty on display. Cudos to you, brother Bob.

You too, brother. It is always a joy conversing with you (:

It’s a real tightrope with real pitfalls.

Very true, indeed; and this is why I had to be more specific with my PDE in the OP than the classical definition.

Just ridiculous, and if that situation actually arose I would never blame any of the falling people for any outcome. Too surreal to inform a question of morality.

To a certain extent I agree; but I would say that one, as I am understanding it, should pull the lever because:

1. They have two options: let the five die to directly intentionally respect the life of the one or kill the one to directly intentionally save the five;

2. Either option is an action or inaction which is a result of directly intending something good but is accompanied by a bad side effect;

3. The option with the least bad side effect, in the instance that they all have bad side effects, should be taken; and

4. The killing of the one is less severe of a bad side effect than the deaths of the five (all else being equal).

So pulling the lever is obligatory; because I make no distinction between the inaction and action in #2. Now, perhaps it is relevant and I am missing something.

You aren’t morally responsible for choosing to let 5 people die or choosing to kill 1 person, you are morally responsible for choosing not to take on a duty to make any decision given those facts, and the bad effect of 5 people dying is not intended by you.

I only see omissions as a morally permissible when one can only directly intend something bad by performing an action; and so any other case one is equally morally responsible for the results of their inactions.

:up:

Again, I think the idea comes second, after the fact.

This is impossible: society is based off of social constructs, which are ideas people have had—ideas through action (at a minimum). Human beings develop their living structures on ideas, even if they are not entirely able to explicate it to people through language what those ideas are, and so the idea which is embodied in the society must come first.

According to your logic, rights came before the idea of rights; which makes no sense. People started formulating an idea of a ‘right’ and started implementing it into society (largely because they were fed up with being mistreated).

:up:

In the other thread I ended up in the end saying that it is not permissible to pull the lever, but I think it is uncontroversial the PDE does not make it obligatory to pull the lever.
…
The key here is that the PDE does not apply to omissions, and this is because omissions (non-acts) do not have proper effects. So I would say that you have two principles operating: the PDE which renders the act permissible, and another principle regarding omissions which renders the act obligatory.

Within my formulation, I think it would be obligatory; because, as you noted, my version compares the bad side effects of each foreseeable means (towards the end) and not just the good effect (of that end) and the bad side effect being considered (of an action).

I agree that there is a morally relevant difference between omissions and commissions; but, for me, it is when considering doing something directly intentional bad vs. directly intentionally letting something bad happen. In the cases I expounded in the OP, it is about doing something directly intentionally good with a bad side effect vs. directly intentionally lettings something bad happen.

E.g., the driver that swerves to save the two at the expense of the other two, instead of killing all four, is choosing to directly intentionally save the two with a bad side effect of killing the other two; whereas if they chose to do nothing and kill all four they are directly intentionally respecting the two with a bad side effect of killing all four. In both cases, they are intending something good but both have bad side effects; so the less severe one should be chosen. On the contrary, a person that refuses to kidnap and harvest the organs of one person to save five ill patients which results in the five patients dying, is letting the five die because they cannot directly intend something bad (like using the one as a means to save them).

In the other thread you were quite adamant to distinguish commissions from omissions, and you got a lot of pushback. I never actually opposed that distinction, but I put it off as a separate topic. What I would say is that there is a morally relevant difference between a commission and an omission, but this does not mean that we are never responsible for omissions, or that omissions are always permissible.

Agreed; but I think, now that I have refined my understanding of an intention, my distinction only applies to direct intentions.

The proportionalist condition classically compares the good effect(s) to the bad effect(s) of the single action, not the effects of different actions.

Yes, I agree. I just see that as a weakness in the classical formulation: it is completely silent on if one should pick the means with the least severe bad effects, and instead only comments on whether the bad effect does not outweight the good effect. Both are arguably important.

I don't see any connection between these two worldviews and Aristotle's.

Design and purpose are inextricably linked, and can be used to two ways: the intentionality of an agent and the expression thereof in something, or the function something. I mean it in the latter sense when it comes to humans.

That my eye was not designed by an agent, does not entail it does not have the function, developed through evolution, of seeing. In that sense, it is designed for seeing. If you wish to use "design" in the former sense strictly, then I would just say that one should size up to their nature, and their nature dictates their functions.

More or less, yes. We are designed a particular way, and we can choose to go against it; but we will only be damaging ourselves.

I have created my own purpose of being good (to your point); and thereby commit myself to the purpose, which I have independently of my created purpose, of being a eudaimon (because that is what I was designed for).

The first is merely a decision I made, and the latter stems from what is good.

I don't think this is true, but I don't think I have the ammunition to shoot it down.

I am not a historian either, so perhaps I don’t either; but it seems pretty clear that society is like a wave, and the flow is marked out by someone (or a group of people) gaining sufficient influence on the masses...this starts with an idea.

If by common knowledge you mean something known by most people, I disagree. I think if you started a thread to discuss the meaning of any of these three terms you would get quite a few differing opinions, and that's just among us amateur philosophers. The answers would be even more diverse in the general public.

If, on the other hand, you mean it is common knowledge among those familiar with Aristotle's works, I don't have a response, since I don't know enough to have a meaningful opinion.

I mean the second.

I think that human values are a reflection of human nature, whatever that means. I would have thought that means the answer to your question is "yes," but now I'm not so sure.

This doesn’t necessitate a “yes” or “no”: it is indeterminate with the information you have given so far.

Moral realism is usually a three-pronged thesis (at a minimum):

1. Moral judgments are truth-apt.
2. Moral judgments express something objective.
3. There is at least one true moral judgment.

Prong 2 is the most important one: moral objectivism. I can’t tell if you hold there are moral facts or not.

Now I have the freedom to follow where my intrinsic virtuosities lead me, although that's something easier said than done. I find many of the things I do are playful, participating in the forum is one of those.

Engaging in fun is arguably an essential aspect of becoming happy, but it is not an element of being virtuous. I am not acting, in any meaningful sense, virtuous by intending to merely do something I enjoy doing.

Happiness, virtue, and good as objective standards without making a circular argument by using each word to define the others. Actually, I think that will take us down a long and winding path, so we can leave it for now.

The concept of good is identical to the concept of value; and the property of goodness is identical to the property of valuableness. Actual, or intrinsic, goodness is actual, or intrinsic, valuableness; and thusly the highest (intrinsic) good is what is the most (intrinsically) valuable.

Happiness is the most intrinsically valuable; because it is the most intrinsically motivating (and I leave this intentionally vague for now); which makes it the chief good. It is a persistent state of supreme fulfillment and well living. It is essentially well-being.

Virtue is a habit of usually character which is excellent (relative to what is the subject of discussion). “Excellence” here is NOT a morally loaded term, and is kind of confusing for the modern man. This can be readily seen by how confusing it can be to the modern man to encounter Aristotle splitting virtues into moral and intellectual virtues; which seems odd since most people think of a virtue as inextricably tied to morality. Virtues are excellent habits of character; and this is not limited to the moral domain—e.g., the particular traits required to be a good runner are virtuous running traits because they are excellent for running.

This feels like an escape clause. Yes, follow your heart, but let me decide if your heart is up to the task.

It has to be that way: a conscience is not necessarily naturally morally sensitive and well-grounded. Wouldn’t you agree? A child conditioned by Nazi propaganda that follows their heart in their adulthood are going to make really morally egregious decisions.

This is an interesting discussion. Thanks for that.

You too!

It is something they have. "Receive" and "create" presuppose that purpose only comes from an agent.

Nietzsche did not like the idea of happiness because he viewed it as anti-thetical to working on a noble project; but in a deeper sense "happiness" fits well into his theory, because working on a long-term project, which one imposes upon themselves out of passion, is a way, according to Nietzsche, to find a deep and persistent sense of fulfillment...he just doesn't call it happiness.

I am not sure what you mean here? Nietzsche talked about acquiring happiness through fulfilling desires?

Nietzsche's moral philosophy is that there is no morality (in the traditional sense) but, rather, we create our own values and subject ourselves to our own created moral law. Our own created law is based off of our values, and our values, according to Nietzsche, on our own subjective tastes which do not reside as cognitive (but rather conative) dispositions.

I would suggest reading, if you haven't already, Thus Spoke Zarathustra: it outlines very well his "solution" to morality by way of radical invidualism.

Nietzsche also, throughout all his works, praises Epicureanism as a way to live life properly (and usually contrasted to the rigidness of Stoicism). Nietzsche's view is essentially a rationalized form (Apollonian) of Dionysian thought.

I am getting a bit lost: I never suggested people should create their own purposes, so I am confused why you asking me about that. Am I missing something?

Philosophy follows society, not the other way around

Philosophical idealogies are the guiding forces behind societial norms; so I don’t know how you could think the roles are reversed.

As for that, I don't see that you've provided any evidence or argument that Aristotle's moral formulations are in any way objective.

This thread was not meant to provide an argument for why Aristotelian ethics is a form of moral realism: that’s common knowledge.

As I see it, impossible to implement, unlikely to solve the problem you've identified, unnecessary, and damaging to societies and individuals.

You will have to elaborate more on this for me to respond adequately.

Maybe this is the my biggest disagreement with you and Aristotle in this regard. The meanings of "good," "virtue" and "happiness" are in no way objective facts.

Ah, so you are a moral anti-realist?

Happiness without play? That is not my experience or, I think, that of most people.

Aristotle is noting that the happy life consists in hard work, in being virtuous, and not chasing desires or passions; he is clarifying for those who conflate happiness in the richest sense with the superficial kind that kids have.

Again, you haven't really defined the key words in this statement. Does Aristotle?

Aristotle kind of does—it depends. What words do you need me to define for you?

By "intrinsic virtuosity" Chuang Tzu means our true nature, to oversimplify - our hearts, conscience. My first take is that this is exactly what you meant when you said "moral anti-realism," but as I thought about it, it struck me that's not true at all. They really are very similar, at least as you've described Aristotle's ideas.

I saw your OP, I just haven’t had time to comment in there yet; but I will.

Following one’s moral intuitions is not necessarily incompatible with moral realism, and, as a virtue ethicist, Aristotle is going to agree that a moral compass is more important than moral principles; but he will warn against blindly following one’s heart: one has to cultivate a virtueous character or otherwise they have no reason to believe they are morally sensitive and wise enough to intuit properly in nuanced situations. A psychopathic narcissist probably isn’t going make the right decision following their heart, without first reshaping it.

Please outline where and why. I don't follow, and I don't want to go on a derailed spiel on Nietzschien ethics: I'd rather contend with whatever complaints you have to offer.

Telos was cast aside by Democritus about 50 years before Aristotle. 'Things do not come into existence for a purpose, but having come into existence, they find a purpose.' Both outlooks are parts of our heritage, and they're both still with us. I expect that if humanity exists 2400 years from now, that will still be the case. Don't you agree?

I think telos is still important today, and Aristotle was right to view everything through its lens. It is essential for living a wise life, because a wise person fulfills their nature exactly because they are self-conscious of their nature and the nature of things around them.

It is misleading for many people to think of themselves as having no design and instead having to create their own purpose: that leads to radical individualism.

Do you see how society is shifting towards viewing what is good as people just being autonomous...to the point of extremity?

For example, there are movies being produced now, which depict putting "furies" (viz., people who think they are a different animal than a human being and mimic that animal's behaviors) in mental illness rehabilitation programs as if it is a form of persecution; because they don't want to be changed: they don't need a cure (according to them).

Another example, transgenderism is no longer a mental illness (called gender dysphoria) and is viewed, instead, as normal; because they are rationally achieving their own desire of imitating the other gender.

Another example, women by-at-large, in the younger generations, think it is self-empowering to have an only fans and find it wrong when people call them out as online prostitutes.

Etc.

Nietzschien thought did not take rise during or immediately after Nietzsche published his works; and I already conceded that now is arguably the best time to be alive when comparing to the past.

The recognition of The Good as legitimate and well-being as good for humanity, and this only being achieved through fulfilling one's nature, is an aspect of past societies that is superior to our own; but this in no way implies that, as a whole, there has been a better society than the ones today. I was suggesting that we are in a state of moral decay, not that we should revert completely back to a past society.

What makes you think I haven't read Nietzsche?!? That's a bold assumption....and I have actually.

CC: @Count Timothy von Icarus, @Lionino

By “moral decay” I mean that we are in a period of time where morality is being by-at-large supplanted with hyper-individualism; and this leads, as is being seen as it is currently developing in the modern world, to an unstable and bad society.

I can agree with some of the points many of you have been saying (such as that now is arguably the best time to be alive than any point in the past); but I disagree nevertheless that we are still morally progressing. Don’t get me wrong, we have progressed morally throughout history, but now we are starting to go too far and this hyper-extension of individualism and tolerance is causing our societies to rot.

My crude and basic outline of history is as follows:

The first stage is the recognition that there is actual goodness. This is the older time periods mainly marked by the development of religions and older philosophical works (like Aristotle’s and Plato’s).

The second stage is the violent, inhumane, and brutal contest of competing theories of actual goodness. This is the time period of marked by complete intolerance and disregard for human well-being; and lots of torturing, prosecution, and wars (in the name of The Good).

The third stage is humanity learning that this bloody contest is by-at-large not good, and needs to stop. This is when people start looking down upon those who rage wars for the soul purpose of spreading “the word”; torturing people for being of a different religious sect; etc. They start realizing that what humanity has been missing, is that caring about the well-being of other humans is more important than whatever conception of ‘The Good’ one has.

The fourth stage is to disband from this contest and look towards well-being of individuals as most concerning (instead of what is actually good). This is the stage where people start saying things like “even if it is immoral, why do you care? It is not like they are hurting anyone doing it”. This stage starts to lose its sense of why progressing towards ‘The Good’ matters, and starts substituting it for the well-being of living beings.

The fifth stage is the denial of actual goodness altogether, and leads to hyper-individualism and hyper-tolerance. This is the stage where people start transitioning into caring solely about individuals achieving their own desires, so long as it doesn’t impede on other people’s pursuit of theirs, instead of the well-being of people: this is the stage where its it common for people to say “hey, whatever floats your boat: you do you, man”. This is where mental illnesses start being largely unrecognized, because a “normal person” is now viewed as simply “a person that abides by their own desires”; and this is where people start condemning people who try to help other people against their will (for the well-being of that person) as “intolerant”. Likewise, people start losing their sense of “rights” in this stage; and start to see certain obvious violations of rights (such as abortion) as a “grey area”.

The sixth stage is significant losses in happiness, and various unhealthy tendencies are developed in an attempt to counter-act it. We are starting to transition in the modern world to this stage, and its mark is that of active shooters, chronic depression, people butchering their own bodies, substance abuse, sexual self-indulgence, etc. This is stage is the consequence of hyper-individualism leading by-at-large to hedonism which, in turn, leads to a giant void that a person feels like they can never fill as they grow old.

Obviously, history is much more complex than my synopsis here; but I think it suffices.

EDIT:

If we continue down this historical path, then stage seven will more than likely be complete Nietzschien thought: the individual will grow weary and tired of being so superficially happy, will begin losing their sense of respect for other people, and start pursuing their own passions at all expense. This is when the "Ubermensch" would most likely start emerging.

More simply, the objection asks why one ought to want to be happy. For Aristotle this is sophistry. Humans do want to be happy, just as fish do want to be in the water. It's just the way we are. "We don't necessarily want to be happy," is nothing more than a debater's argument.

I think it is a valid question, but Aristotle is on to something. The reason humans want to be happy is because it is the most intrinsically (positively) valuable "thing"...Aristotle just never quite mentions this and starts instead with his idea that what is good is a thing fulfilling its nature. I would say it should be reversed.

The problem is that your question fundamentally makes no sense when taken as a whole: if it is just a question on "purely pragmatic" grounds, then there is no right answer—as pragmatism offers no actual answers to anything (viz., it is purely hypothetical). Your question, while claiming to ask a pragmatic question, is asking for real answers to what is considered proper, frivolous, etc. reason(s) for committing suicide; which goes beyond what pragmatism is capable of answering (and segues into moral discourse).

On pragmatism sans goodness, see this thread by @Count Timothy von Icarus: it has a good outline of the mistake you are making.

In terms of a legal question, all legalities stem back to morality (and specifically justice); unless you are asking just for what particular legal systems (that currently exist) consider a legally permissible form of suicide (and not what people think should be legally permissible).

How can anyone answer this if you are precluding ethics from the discussion? Isn't this fundamentally an ethical question?

are there sound, logical reasons to commit suicide?

This is vacuously true. That the cookie monster created the universe is a logically sound argument.

Are there frivolous and silly ones that nevertheless compel people to do it? If so, why do they?
Are there reasons that seem to make sense from one POV, but not from another?

I would say it is only silly or frivolous relative to what is actually good; which you precluded from the discussion.

Should other people intervene?

This is a moral question.

It might not contradict itself, but ultimately it reduces all action to the momentary or arbitrary victory of some impulse over others. It is inchoate, even if it is not inconsistent.

I just don't see how it is inchoate nor inconsistent nor (internally incoherent). The claim is simple: values are non-objective. Something matters only if one is concerned with it ("thinks or feels" it matters); so nothing actually matters but, rather, only what one holds matters.

It is dissatisfying, but not internally incoherent. I mean, what would you say is an example of an internal incoherence with it? Something like: "a person who thinks that nothing actually matters can't think what they think matters matters"---is that it?

:up: